The role of the bidding process in the corporate governance of bidding firms: the case of abandoned acquisitions by McCann, M
  
The Role of the Bidding Process in 
the Corporate Governance of Bidding 
Firms: The Case of Abandoned 
Acquisitions 
 
 
Michael McCann 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent 
University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
March 2013 
  
2 
 
 
Copyright Statement 
 
This work is the intellectual property of Michael McCann. You may copy up to 5% of 
this work for private study, or for personal, non-commercial research. Any re-use of 
the information contained in this document, should be fully referenced, quoting the 
author, title, university, degree level and pagination. Queries or requests for any 
other use, or if a more substantial copy is required, should be directed to the 
owners of the intellectual property right. 
 
  
3 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank Professor Robert Ackrill and Professor Alan Lovell especially. 
Their sustained support and encouragement throughout the extended period of this 
thesis was crucial to its completion. Further thanks to Professor Susanne Tietze, for 
her help with the methodological protocol and Professor David Smith, for his expert, 
independent perspective during the drafting of the final thesis document. The 
comments of independent assessors, conference delegates and anonymous referees 
were helpful in guiding the research. Finally, I must thank Angela, for her unceasing 
optimism. 
  
4 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is structured around an empirical investigation of the experience of 
bidding firms in abandoned acquisitions. Existing research suggests that, in certain 
circumstances, abandoned acquisitions may play a governance role, disciplining 
bidder managers for proposing acquisitions which reduce shareholder wealth. 
However, there has been little work analysing how, and in what circumstances, 
abandoned acquisitions perform this governance role. This research addresses this 
gap, by investigating the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions and their 
aftermath. 
The thesis develops an innovative, multi-dimensional conceptual framework, 
blending existing theories of acquisitions and corporate governance. This framework 
guides the empirical investigation, which uses the causal process tracing (CPT) 
method, not previously adopted in this field. The work builds cumulatively, to 
analyse the causal mechanisms, in cases of abandoned acquisitions, involving UK 
bidding firms.  
To enhance the identification of the nature of the impact of abandonment on 
bidding firms; disciplinary or otherwise, a different conceptualisation of the post-
abandonment experience of bidding firms is adopted. The research builds on this, 
by selecting distinctive cases; firms with disciplinary experiences and firms with 
non-disciplinary experiences. CPT is employed to analyse primary and secondary 
data, revealing the causal mechanisms present in these distinctive cases.  
As a result, meta-causal mechanisms are proposed. These are particular contingent 
generalisations, which apply to particular groups of cases. These fine-tune existing 
theoretical explanations, identifying how, and in what circumstances, variables 
interact. Disciplinary processes after abandoned acquisitions can be traced to causal 
mechanisms characterised by strategic uncertainty, raised by information revealed 
during the bidding process. Conversely, non-disciplinary processes after abandoned 
acquisitions cannot be traced to the causal mechanisms of abandonment. In these 
cases, the causal pathology of abandonment is localised. The bidder‟s offer price is 
too low and acquisitions are abandoned to avoid over-paying.  
The research implies that more effort should be made to enhance the flow of 
information in the bidding process. In addition, active monitoring is more nuanced 
than anticipated. This active monitoring should have a positive effect on acquisition 
decisions, producing enhanced shareholder wealth. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1. Background and Rationale for the Research 
 
Merger and Acquisition (M & A) activity represents an important aspect of business 
activity. In all countries, in all industries, mergers and acquisitions represent an 
important means of industrial reorganisation, ideally producing an increase in 
economic efficiency, represented by an increase in shareholders wealth. In 2005, 
the peak of the last wave of activity, assets work $3.4 trillion were acquired around 
the world.1 In 2005, firms worth over £53 billion were acquired in the UK.2 In the 
UK, with developed stock markets, the exchange of corporate control has been, and 
remains, one of the most important means of channelling resources to their highest 
value use. However, whether acquisitions create or destroy value is contentious. 
Despite the professed gains, many mergers fail to achieve those gains and there 
are numerous popular examples of merger failures.3 This is important. Whether 
acquisition activity creates or destroys value has significant economic 
consequences, relating to the efficient use of resources.  However, despite the vast 
amount of research devoted to acquisitions, there are still a number of outstanding 
issues. 
One notable gap in the literature on acquisition activity relates to those which are 
abandoned. There is a scarce literature on abandoned acquisitions and many 
aspects are under-researched. The analysis of abandoned acquisitions can 
contribute to the literature on the role of acquisitions in enhancing economic 
efficiency, by offering a different perspective on the acquisition process and its 
aftermath. This thesis aims to contribute to this literature, by employing conceptual 
and empirical innovations to the analysis of abandoned acquisitions. These 
conceptual and empirical innovations should offer a different perspective on the role 
of acquisition activity. Therefore, this research will be of interest to academics, 
policy-makers and practitioners involved in mergers and acquisitions.4 
The role and impact of mergers and acquisitions involves two broad groups of 
theories. One group argues that acquisitions are a way of enhancing economic 
efficiency in the use of resources. Theoretically, this is done in a variety of ways. A 
merger may realise economies of scale or scope (Bradley et al, 1983), economise 
                                           
1 Data from Thomson Reuters. 
2 Calculated using data from the Office of National Statistics. 
3  A high-profile failure referred to is AOL / Time Warner where up to $60 bn was 
written off after the merger. 
4 Indeed, several of the participants in this research expressed a strong interest in 
the anticipated findings. 
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on transaction costs (Coase, 1937) or enhance market power for the firms 
concerned (Eckbo, 1983).  
In the UK specifically, a lot of discussion about mergers and acquisitions has taken 
place in the context of the dispersion of share ownership highlighted by Berle and 
Means (1932). With the separation of ownership and control inherent in dispersed 
corporate ownership, principal-agent problems may arise. Principals (shareholders) 
and managers (agents) may have conflicting objectives. Under conditions of 
asymmetric information, managers may pursue activities detrimental to 
shareholder‟s interests and hide this from shareholders. This means their actions 
will not be penalised (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). With an increased dispersion of 
shareholding and limited product market pressure, acquisitions are viewed as a 
crucial corporate governance mechanism for limiting managerial discretion and 
ensuring that resources are used in the most efficient way possible (Cosh and 
Hughes, 2008). Firms with inefficient or self-serving management will suffer 
reductions in stock market value, making them susceptible to „disciplinary‟ 
acquisitions. After the acquisition, the inefficient or self-serving management is 
replaced. This threat will provide such managers with an incentive to act in 
shareholders‟ interests (Manne, 1965). 
“This optimistic belief in takeover efficiency has led supporters of takeover 
activity to advocate for an active market for corporate control.” 
(Wong and O‟Sullivan, 2001, p.146)    
In contrast, managerial theories propose that acquisitions, rather than providing a 
solution to the agency problems associated with the separation of ownership and 
control, are, actually, a manifestation of such problems. Acquisitions are one way in 
which managers can extend their control over resources. Williamson (1975) 
developed a model illustrating how managers may have an incentive to prioritise 
growth objectives over profitability and efficiency. Meanwhile, Jensen (1986) 
proposes that managers may use excessive acquisitions to expropriate wealth from 
shareholders. Conversely, managers may embark on an acquisition in the belief 
that there are acting in shareholders‟ interests, but through overconfidence, they 
overestimate the future benefits from this, and hence overpay (Roll, 1986). Hence, 
a distinction can be drawn between acquisitions which aim to increase efficiency in 
the use of resources, or acquisitions which further managerial preferences, perhaps 
destroying value, with the added dynamic of „managerial hubris‟ influencing 
acquisition decisions. 
A large volume of literature has analysed the role and impact of acquisitions as a 
way of distinguishing between these different theories of acquisitions. Chapter two 
of this thesis provides a review of this literature. However, given the size of the 
15 
 
literature base in this area, a comprehensive review is impossible. The chapter will 
seek to provide an overview of the main findings, the methodological debates and 
highlight important gaps in current knowledge. Abandoned corporate acquisitions 
represent a substantial part of acquisition activity. Using data from the Takeover 
Panel, figure 1.1 illustrates the percentage of acquisitions abandoned in the UK.1 
Figure 1.1: The Percentage of acquisitions abandoned in the UK between 1969 and 
2010 
 
 
Source: Takeover Panel 
 
The percentage of acquisitions abandoned does not follow the same neat wave 
pattern observed for completed acquisitions (Cosh and Hughes, 2008). Peaks in 
abandonments as a percentage of total acquisitions occurred in the early 1970s and 
again in the 1980s. In recent years, the rate of abandonment has declined 
significantly. Between 1969 and 1989, the average annual rate was 18.8%. 
Between 1990 and 2010, the average annual rate of abandonment was 10.5%. This 
decline may be due to bidding firms becoming wary of launching premature bids 
due to concerns about the costs of acquisitions (O‟Sullivan and Wong, 2005). 
Indeed, firms devote substantial resources to acquisitions which become 
deadweight costs in abandonment (Weston et al., 2004).  This is further evidenced 
by a decline in the incidence of hostile bids (bids which do not have the support of 
the management of the target). Data from the Takeover Panel shows that the 
                                           
1 This data represents abandonment after a bid has been made public and an 
informal offer has been made through an announcement to the stock exchange. 
Therefore, acquisitions abandoned before this stage are not included. Therefore, 
this data underestimates the true extent of abandoned acquisitions. 
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average percentage of hostile bids between 1991 and 2000 was 26%. From 2001-
2010 the average percentage was only 12%. More bidding firms try to reach 
agreement with target managers before launching a bid to minimise bidding costs.  
Despite its continued significance, the literature on abandoned acquisitions does not 
match the richness of the literature on completed acquisitions. The breadth and 
depth of the study of abandoned acquisitions is limited and infrequent. This scarcity 
is highlighted in a number of journal articles (see for instance, Wong and 
O‟Sullivan, 2001; and Muehlfeld et al., 2007). Acquisitions are abandoned for a 
variety of reasons including, inter alia, target management resistance, intervention 
by competition authorities, rejection of the bid by target shareholders, or voluntary 
withdrawal on the bidder‟s part (Wong and O‟Sullivan, 2001). However, while these 
are triggers for abandonment, there are likely to be deeper factors underlying these 
stated reasons. Indeed, abandoned acquisitions will be driven by similar factors to 
completed acquisitions. Therefore, the analysis of abandoned acquisitions can 
provide a distinctive perspective on the role and impact of acquisition activity.  
Most previous work on abandoned acquisitions has focused on the role and impact 
of abandoned acquisitions on target firms (the firm being acquired) as part of a 
disciplinary governance process (Wong and O‟Sullivan, 2001). However, managerial 
theories suggest that acquisitions may be motivated by the interests of self-serving 
managers in bidding firms. Indeed, studies show that managers of bidding firms 
who complete such acquisitions may be disciplined (see Lehn and Zhao, 2006). 
Abandoned acquisitions are part of this wider activity. Consequently, abandonment 
may prevent acquisitions reflecting managerial preferences from proceeding. 
Therefore, such abandoned acquisitions may be part of a disciplinary process in 
bidding firms. However, this is an aspect of abandoned acquisitions which has not 
received sufficient attention in the literature. This thesis aims to contribute to the 
literature on acquisition activity, by addressing this aspect. This aim is stated as 
follows: 
 
To investigate the role of the bid process in the corporate governance of 
bidders in abandoned acquisitions. 
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Within this aim, the research objectives are: 
I. To identify the impact that abandoned bids can have on bidding companies. 
II. To investigate the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. 
III. To ascertain, how, and in what circumstances abandoned acquisitions have a 
disciplinary effect. 
IV. To ascertain how, and in what circumstances abandoned acquisitions do not 
have a disciplinary effect. 
 
2. Regulatory Context in the UK 
 
The institutional and historical context is important to the analysis of acquisitions. 
The UK is chosen for analysis because it has a developed stock market, an active 
market for corporate control and all the firms would be governed by a common 
regulatory regime in both their general business activities and the acquisition 
process (Officer, 2003). In the UK, it is Public Limited Companies (Plcs) which are 
most likely to be joint stock companies with dispersed shareholding. Given the 
focus of this research is abandoned acquisitions in the UK market for corporate 
control, institutional arrangements surrounding the UK stock market and acquisition 
process need to be reviewed. These may have a bearing on the nature of any 
causal processes of abandoned acquisitions and their aftermath. This section of the 
chapter will provide the background of institutional arrangements relating to 
acquisitions in the UK.  
In 1968, the City Code on Takeovers was created to regulate the process of 
acquisitions for UK listed companies. The approach underpinning the Takeover Code 
is that the orderly workings of the market for corporate control are an essential 
part of the stock market and it should operate freely. The theoretical underpinning 
is that acquisitions are an important means of allocating resources in a more 
efficient manner. In this regard, the principal aim of the code is to protect target 
shareholder‟s interests: 
“The Code is designed principally to ensure that shareholders in an offeree 
[target] company are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to 
decide on the merits of a takeover and that shareholders in the offeree 
company of the same class are afforded equivalent treatment by an offeror 
[bidder].” 
(City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, p.A1)  
 
The above passage highlights concerns about asymmetric information in the 
acquisition process, which can happen due to the separation of ownership and 
control. Shareholders should be treated equally in relation to information and the 
timing of its release. Consequently, the Takeover Panel, the agency which 
18 
 
administers the code, must be informed of talks in progress. They then monitor the 
stock market for signs of the premature release of information and may compel 
firms to reveal information about potential bids to the stock market (termed rule 2 
announcements).  
Under the UK Code, target managers can resist a bid, but unlike the USA, the 
defensive actions which can be taken, are limited. Actions are limited to information 
announcements through the Regulatory News Service of the London Stock 
Exchange. This is consistent with the view that impediments to the smooth 
operation of the acquisition process should be limited and that the final decision 
regarding acquisitions should lie with the shareholders of target firms.   
In 2004, “Put-up or Shut-up” (PUSU) provisions were formalised in the Code. A 
PUSU announcement obliged bidders to make a bid within a stipulated period or 
withdraw from an acquisition process (typically twelve months). This stops targets 
being subject to distracting takeover speculation for a protracted period of time – 
the „siege‟ principle.     
In addition to regulations regarding the acquisition process, there has been a 
succession of corporate governance reforms for UK listed companies. These were 
consolidated into the first Combined Code on Corporate Governance in 2003 
(revised in 2006). There are several important provisions in the context of the 
separation of ownership and control and the motives for acquisition activity. There 
is an obligation on shareholders to take a more active role in monitoring the 
companies they own shares in. There is an onus on the Board of Directors to be 
more independent (at least 50% of the board should be composed of independent 
non-executive directors) and active in monitoring the decisions of managers. There 
should be procedures governing the evaluation of board effectiveness, the 
appointment of directors and setting executive remuneration. On this latter point, 
remuneration should be linked clearly to the performance of directors in promoting 
shareholders‟ wealth. 
The Combined Code and the Takeover Panel do not operate with legal backing, but 
they are required for stock market listing in London and accepted behaviour. 
Hence, they dominate the practice of and behaviour surrounding UK acquisitions. 
Therefore, the analysis of abandoned acquisitions must be conducted with reference 
to these regulatory arrangements. Throughout the thesis, reference will be made to 
relevant aspects of this regulatory environment.     
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3. Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis concentrates on the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions and 
their aftermath, aiming to extend the theoretical understanding of the corporate 
governance role of abandoned acquisitions in disciplining self-interested managers 
of bidding firms. In structuring the thesis, the cumulative nature of the research is 
demonstrated, showing how the innovative, multi-dimensional conceptual 
framework developed, and new empirical methods employed to the topic, address 
the aims and objectives of the research. This section of the chapter will describe the 
structure of the thesis, indicating the role of each part in achieving the aims and 
objectives of the research and their contribution to knowledge. 
In chapter two, it is shown that, while previous research has analysed the impact of 
abandonment on the subsequent stock market and accounting measures of 
performance of abandoned bidders, there has been little work on other aspects of 
the impact of abandonment on bidders, which may provide alternative evidence of 
post-abandonment discipline. This thesis attempts to make a contribution towards 
the literature in this area by measuring the impact of abandonment in a novel way. 
This involves analysing the differential experiences of bidders after abandoned 
acquisitions across a range of dimensions not previously investigated in a UK 
context. These dimensions include organisational restructuring, management 
turnover, asset and financial restructuring and whether bidders subsequently 
become acquisition targets themselves. These dimensions have been used as 
evidence of discipline in other contexts. But, these have not been analysed in the 
context of abandoned acquisitions. Furthermore, the research analyses the 
interactions involving these dimensions, drawing out sequences of changes after 
abandonment. An investigation of particular patterns of changes across these 
dimensions could provide evidence of the nature of post-abandonment discipline. 
The findings of such an analysis will enhance knowledge of the differential impact of 
abandonment on bidding firms in abandoned acquisitions. 
In addition to investigating the potential disciplinary impact of abandonment on 
bidding firms, the research is interested in how a bidding process produces 
abandonment and disciplinary changes subsequently. There is a substantial 
literature analysing the characteristics of bidders in completed acquisitions. Chapter 
two demonstrates the scarcity of literature regarding such characteristics in bidding 
firms in abandoned acquisitions. Theory and empirical evidence suggest such 
characteristics are important in providing the scope and incentives for managers to 
pursue bids reflecting their own preferences. Analysing the interaction of these firm 
characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding 
process can provide some guidance on the mechanisms of information revelation in 
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a bidding process. Differential mechanisms could help explain differences in the 
impact of abandonment on bidders. Causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions 
may / may not produce a disciplinary impact on bidders. By tracing the interaction 
of the variables from before the bid, through the bidding process to the aftermath 
of abandonment, the understanding of the causal mechanisms in abandoned 
acquisitions will be enhanced, particularly, how, and in what circumstances, 
abandoned acquisitions play a corporate governance role.   
To conduct the research effectively, a fresh approach to the conceptualisation of the 
acquisition process is proposed. As part of this research, a novel conceptual 
framework has been developed by blending existing fragmented theoretical 
concepts effectively. The interaction of the characteristics of bidders, transaction 
characteristics and contingent factors leading to changes in bidders after 
abandonment suggests a causal process. This framework encapsulates the causal 
process in terms of antecedent bidder characteristics, interceding causal 
mechanisms and outcomes (Steinberg, 2007). The development of this novel 
conceptual framework is discussed in chapter three. 
In order to investigate abandoned acquisitions using the conceptual framework 
required a methodological approach which could handle the, potentially complex, 
relations between variables. Causal process tracing (CPT) is useful in identifying 
interactions between variables in complex causal processes (George and Bennett, 
2005). The fieldwork stage of this research represents a novel application of CPT to 
analysing the causal mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions, in the context of 
bidding firms. This is the first application of such methods to abandoned 
acquisitions in a UK context. The innovative application of CPT to abandoned 
acquisitions is justified and explained in chapters three and four.  
The findings from the fieldwork will be presented and discussed in chapters five, six 
and seven. Chapter five will present and discuss the investigation of the experience 
of a sample of UK bidding firms after abandoned acquisitions. In itself, this analysis 
produces exciting findings regarding the differential experience of bidding firms 
after abandoned acquisitions. Chapters six and seven will present and discuss the 
investigation of cases of bidding firms using casual process tracing, revealing 
distinctive causal mechanisms present. Chapter eight is the conclusion, detailing 
proposed contributions to knowledge, limitations of the research and proposals for 
further work.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The growth, development and death of firms and industries inevitably involves 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Consequently, a substantial amount of research in 
business, management and economics has been devoted to analysing the field. 
Several questions dominate research on M&A activity. Firstly, why do acquisitions 
happen? Secondly, what role do they play in the restructuring of firms and 
industries? Thirdly, what impact do they have on all of those involved?  
This chapter reviews the rich literature on completed acquisitions. It also reviews 
the more limited literature on abandoned acquisitions highlighting gaps in current 
knowledge. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 will discuss the theoretical 
underpinning for merger and acquisition activity. Section 3 will discuss the empirical 
evidence surrounding the impact of completed acquisitions, in the context of the 
theoretical underpinning. Section 4 introduces the literature on abandoned 
acquisitions, discussing the impact of abandonment on bidding firms and target 
firms, and highlighting the proposed corporate governance role of abandonment for 
both bidding firms and target firms. Section 5 discusses the empirical evidence 
reviewing the use of control variables to explain the differential impact of both 
completed and abandoned acquisitions on both bidders and targets. By doing so, 
the literature aims to find evidence about the underlying motives of different 
acquisitions. In addition, analysing control variables in abandoned acquisitions may 
reveal evidence about the nature of the governance role of abandoned acquisitions. 
This chapter demonstrates that little is still known about the impact of 
abandonment on bidding firms, and hence, the nature of the governance role of 
abandoned acquisitions for such firms. Therefore, section 6 will summarise the gaps 
in the existing literature base and present the focus of research for this thesis, 
advancing its original contributions to knowledge. 
 
2. Reasons for Merger and Acquisitions  
 
Why do mergers and acquisitions occur? This question has underpinned the 
research in this field for the last half-century. The reasons for mergers and 
acquisitions is classified into two broad categories – „value-enhancing‟ reasons, 
represented by enhanced shareholder wealth and „value-destroying‟ reasons driven 
by managerial preferences, represented by diminished shareholder wealth (Weston 
et al., 2004). These explanations cover all acquisition behaviour, including 
abandoned acquisitions, so the analysis of abandoned acquisitions is framed in this 
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context. These different sets of motives predict very different outcomes for post-
acquisition outcomes. The analysis is typically framed in the context of shareholder 
wealth. „Value-enhancing‟ theories predict strong beneficial outcomes for the firms 
concerned, producing an increase in shareholder wealth. „Value-destroying‟ 
explanations predict acquisitions produce poor or indeed negative outcomes for the 
firms concerned, producing low, or negative returns to shareholders.  
„Value-enhancing‟ reasons for mergers and acquisitions propose improved economic 
efficiency through the reallocation of resources in the firms concerned. There are a 
variety of ways through which improved efficiency is achieved. Some research 
argues that mergers and acquisitions create synergistic benefits through, for 
instance economies of scale and scope, more effective management and improved 
production techniques (Bradley et al., 1983). These are more likely in horizontal or 
vertical mergers between firms. However, even conglomerate mergers may 
produce synergistic benefits, through for instance, economies in regulatory 
compliance. Another source of gains specifically derives from the enhanced market 
power achieved by the elimination of competition through horizontal mergers 
(Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983). Importantly: 
“The value increase predicted by the synergy theory requires an actual 
merger, as distinguished from an informational theory that merely relies on 
the revaluation of assets.” 
(Bradley et al., p.184) 
This means that the consummation of a merger is required for the synergies to be 
realised, whereas, informational theory argues information revealed during bidding 
processes may cause increases in value.  
Another source of efficiency in M&A derives from Coase (1937). The theory 
proposes that the organisation of a firm is a trade-off between the specific costs of 
conducting a transaction using the market and the costs of conducting a transaction 
within an internal firm hierarchy.  Transaction costs involve bounded rationality, 
incomplete contracting and asymmetric information. Mergers are transactions 
through which firms can minimise these transaction costs in the conduct of certain 
activities.  
An alternative explanation of why acquisitions can enhance efficiency is based on 
the reallocation of resources through the discipline of self-serving managers in 
companies with dispersed share ownership and a separation of ownership and 
control. Acquisitions are an essential element of the market for corporate control in 
countries where capital markets are highly liquid. Competing management teams 
bid to use the resources of firms in the most efficient way possible (Manne, 1965; 
Alchian and Demetz, 1972). A firm or management team can acquire a poorly-
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performing firm, replace its management, and reallocate resources to improve the 
performance of the acquired company. The way this occurs is through hostile 
„disciplinary‟ acquisitions, where acquirers bypass target management and make an 
offer directly to target shareholders to tend their shares (tender offers). In Manne‟s 
view:  
“Only the takeover scheme provides some assurances of competitive 
efficiency among corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection 
to the interest of vast numbers of small non-controlling shareholders.” 
(Manne, 1965, p.113) 
Alternatively, motives for mergers and acquisitions can be driven by managerial 
preferences. Originating in managerial theories of the firm (for instance, Marris, 
1964), these theories are, to some extent, related to the separation of ownership 
and control, but claim a contrasting motive for acquisitions to the disciplinary one 
described above. In these theories, acquisitions are not a solution to the agency 
problems which arise out of the separation of ownership and control, but a 
manifestation of them. Acquisitions are one way through which managers pursue 
their own preferences in corporate decisions at the expense of their company‟s 
shareholders and other groups. Examples of such expropriation include control over 
more assets and investment spending (Jensen, 1986); higher remuneration (Bliss 
and Rosen, 2001); shielding against personal risk (Amihun and Lev, 1981); or 
management entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Such expropriation by 
managers may use resources inefficiently, destroying value.   
Jensen (1986) proposes a specific model whereby the managers of companies that 
generate a large amount of free cash flow (cash in excess of that required to fund 
investments with positive net present values), keep control over these funds by 
investing in projects that generate negative net present values. One way of doing 
this is through corporate acquisitions using cash as the means of payment. Jensen 
identified the tobacco and oil industries as examples of mature industries, with 
companies generating substantial free cash, yet exhibiting low growth. According to 
finance theory, this free cash should be returned to shareholders for them to invest 
in alternative projects producing positive net present values. Instead it is used to 
further managerial preferences. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggest that 
managers will be hesitant in returning cash to shareholders. In their model, 
acquisitions are a form of „deadweight‟ investment through which managers 
entrench their position in firms. 
A final aspect of acquisition theories is managerial hubris (Roll, 1986). Although 
managers may embark on an acquisition in the belief they are acting in 
shareholders‟ interests, Roll (1986) argues that managers of acquiring firms tend to 
be excessively self-confident and overestimate the future benefits to be derived. 
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This outcome is more likely in cases with multiple bidders, where the firm which 
tends to win in competitive is likely to have the highest estimation of future 
benefits. Consequently, it overpays and suffer the „winner‟s curse‟ – according to 
auction theory, the winner of competitive bidding is cursed since the highest 
estimation will, in all likelihood, be an overestimation of expected benefits. 
Hence, a distinction can be drawn between acquisitions which increase efficiency in 
the use of resources, or acquisitions which further managerial preferences, with the 
added dynamic of managerial hubris influencing acquisition decisions. This 
distinction underpins the general evaluation of the impact of corporate acquisition 
activity. Based upon these theories, predictions can be made about post-acquisition 
outcomes. M&A enhancing value are expected to produce positive outcomes (gains) 
for both bidders and targets, whereas transactions driven by managerial 
preferences are anticipated to show, on average, negative outcomes (gains) to 
bidder firms, due to motives of bidder managers. The hubris theory predicts, on 
average, that the combined gains from an acquisition will be zero, since the 
anticipated gains from the transaction will be reflected in the price paid to target 
shareholders. Table 2.1 summarises the expected outcomes from the different sets 
of theories.  
 
Table 2.1: Theoretical Predictions of the Pattern of Gains in Acquisitions 
Theory Combined 
Gains 
Gains to 
Target 
Gains to 
Bidder 
 
Efficiency 
 
 
Positive 
 
Positive 
 
Positive 
 
Managerial 
Preferences 
 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Managerial Hubris 
 
 
Zero 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
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3. Impact of Completed Acquisitions   
 
The focus of the majority of studies is the effect of M&A activity on shareholder 
wealth. This is used as a measure of the value derived from acquisitions. It is 
anticipated that the impact on shareholder wealth provides an indication of the 
reasons for acquisition decisions. To do so, studies use either ex-ante performance 
measures based on either stock market data using event study methodology, or ex 
post accounting based-measures of operating performance, using pre-bid 
performance or non-acquiring firms as benchmarks. This section will review the 
major studies analysing completed acquisitions and the conclusions drawn about 
the motives for acquisitions. The limitations associated with such approaches are 
described as well. 
 
3.1 Event Studies  
 
The analysis of the impact of M&A on companies‟ share prices derives from Manne‟s 
(1965) assertion that changes in shareholders‟ wealth are the appropriate way of 
measuring the anticipated benefits from acquisitions. The studies typically use 
„event study‟ methodology to analyse the abnormal impact on share prices of M&A 
before and after announcements, to estimate the anticipated gains from 
acquisitions. The methodology is based on the assumption of semi-strong form 
informational efficiency, which states that the abnormal share price returns 
observed around the time of an acquisition (event window) are an indication of its 
expected impact on shareholders‟ wealth (Fama, 1970). Subject to controls for 
other factors, the extent of abnormal returns should reveal something about the 
anticipated impact on shareholder wealth.  
Results should be interpreted carefully. A variety of event windows are adopted by 
studies ranging from a few days around the announcement to many years 
afterwards. In addition, a variety of methods have been developed to estimate the 
„benchmark‟ returns necessary for calculating abnormal returns (see MacKinley, 
1997 for a discussion of these approaches). Furthermore, the research is subject to 
a number of methodological problems. Firstly, some criticism has been directed at 
the apparent inconsistency of the methodology in assuming semi-strong market 
efficiency while using historical data to estimate benchmark returns in some 
approaches (Cosh and Hughes, 1987; Eckbo, 1992). Secondly, in long-run studies, 
the interpretation of research findings is not straight-forward. Tuch and O‟Sullivan 
(2007) highlight that the tests are really joint tests; (i) whether abnormal returns 
are zero and (ii) whether the assumed model of estimated returns (eg. market 
model) is correct. Thirdly, ordinary t-tests require data that are normally 
distributed. Research has shown long-run share price returns are skewed, so 
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alternative tests have been developed (see Kothari & Warner, 2004). Thirdly, the 
reliability of long-run event studies may be undermined by thin trading – extended 
periods when a firm‟s shares are not traded - and the overlapping of event periods 
– where a range of company-specific events, including acquisitions may influence a 
firm‟s share price. Some studies get around these problems by removing firms 
suffering from thin trading and firms making multiple bids within the period under 
consideration. Finally, there is evidence that the time series estimators also tend to 
be more unstable for individual stocks, which is why many studies now use 
portfolios of companies (Gregory. 2005). Despite these limitations, event study 
methodology has been, and remains, the most popular way of studying the impact 
of M&A activity (Tuch and O‟Sullivan, 2007). 
Economic efficiency theories, managerial theories and managerial hubris theory 
make predictions about the abnormal impact of acquisition announcements. All of 
the economic theories of acquisitions would predict a strongly positive result from 
acquisitions. After the acquisition, this group of theories anticipates total gains 
should be positive. Meanwhile, managerial theories propose that, while bidder 
shareholders will suffer negative returns, target shareholders should enjoy positive 
abnormal returns. This pattern arises because bidding management share wealth 
expropriated from bidder shareholders with them, in the form of a higher bid 
premium. Managerial hubris theory predicts that because of the winner‟s curse, 
acquisitions represent zero net present value transactions for bidders. All of the 
anticipated benefits accrue to target shareholders because of the excessive price 
paid. 
Owing to the large number of empirical studies, as well as the variety of samples 
and methods adopted, the main findings of a sample of studies have been 
summarised in tables 2.2 and 2.3. The discussion focuses on using the studies to 
highlight the main findings and their contributed to the discussion surrounding the 
role and impact of acquisition activity. Table 2.2 summarises the main findings of 
short-run studies using daily returns around acquisition announcements. Table 2.3 
shows the main findings of long-run studies using monthly returns around 
acquisition announcements and for up to 5 years afterwards.           
Table 2.2 below summaries a sample of research which analysed daily share price 
returns around the announcement of a bid. Even where combined gains were 
positive, most of these gains accrue to target shareholders (for example Firth, 1980 
or Mulherin and Boone, 2000). Bidder shareholders, at best, break even (for 
example see Dodd, 1980; Schwert, 1996 and Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) and 
in many cases earn significantly negative abnormal returns (see for example; 
Walker, 2000; Gupta and Misra, 2004; Savor and Lu, 2009).  
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Table 2.2: Findings of a Sample of Event studies analysing Returns around 
Acquisition Announcements – Daily share price returns 
Panel A: Studies finding significant returns to Targets 
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Event Window Findings 
Firth (1980) 
UK 
642 acquisitions 
between 1969-
1975 
0 to +20  days +28.% for targets 
-6.3% for bidders 
Mulherin & 
Boone 
(2000) 
US 
281 acquisitions 
between 1990-
1999 
-1 to +1 days +21.2% abnormal returns to 
target firms 
-0.37% returns to bidders  
 
Panel B: Studies finding insignificant returns to Bidders 
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Event Window Findings 
Dodd 
(1980) 
US 
151 acquisitions 
between 1970-
1977 
-40 to +40 days -0.23% insignificant abnormal 
returns to bidders 
Schwert 
(1996) 
US 
1523 bidders in 
acquisitions 
between 1975-
1991 
0 to +126 days In cases with only one bidder, 
bidders have -0.4% insignificant 
abnormal returns 
 
Sudarsanam 
& Mahate 
(2003) 
UK 
519 acquisitions 
between 1983-
1995 
+2 to +40 days +0.14% insignificant abnormal 
returns to bidders 
 
Panel C: Studies finding significantly negative returns to bidders 
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Event 
Window 
Findings 
Walker 
(2000) 
US 
230 mergers 
48 tender offers 
between 1980-
1996 
-2 to +2 days -0.84% significant abnormal 
returns to bidders 
Gupta & 
Misra 
(2004) 
US 
5726 M&A 
between 1980-
1998 
-10 to +10 
days 
-1.57% significant abnormal 
returns to bidders in -1 to 0 day 
period. Returns for the rest of the 
event window are insignificant 
 
Savor & Lu 
(2009) 
US  
1773 acquisitions 
between 1978-
2003 
 
0 to 240 days -7.0% significant abnormal 
returns to bidders 
 
Alternatively, many studies analyse the long-term effects of acquisitions on 
shareholder returns. Much of this has been motivated by studies which indicate that 
acquisitions may have a negative effect on the long-run wealth of shareholders of 
bidding firms. The studies analyse monthly returns from around the acquisition 
announcement to between 12 and 60 months afterwards. In general, the studies 
reveal evidence of poor long run performance for acquirers, in both the UK and US, 
across a range of acquisition periods, using a variety of methods to calculate 
benchmark returns. Successful bidders earn insignificant or significantly negative 
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abnormal returns across the studies. Table 2.3 summarises the results according to 
the length of the event window for a sample of studies. 
Table 2.3 Long-term Event Studies 
Panel A: 0 to 24 months event window 
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Event Window Findings 
Malatesta 
(1983) 
US 
 
256 successful 
acquisitions between 
1969-1974 
 
+1 to +6 months -0.054% significant 
abnormal returns  
Franks & 
Harris (1989) 
UK  
 
1048 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1960-1985 
 
0 to +24 months -12.6% significant 
abnormal returns 
Limmack 
(1991) 
UK 
448 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1977-1986 
 
0 to +24 months -4.67% significant 
abnormal returns 
Gregory 
(1997) 
UK 
452 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1984-1992 
 
+1 to +24 months -11.82% significant 
abnormal returns 
Panel B: Up to +60 months  
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Event Window Findings 
Firth (1980) 
UK   
434 acquisitions 
between 1969-1975 
 
+3 to +36 months -4.5%  abnormal 
returns  
 
Sudarsanam & 
Mahate 
(2003) 
UK 
 
519 acquisitions 
between 1983-1995 
+2 to +36 months -14.76% significant 
abnormal returns 
Moeller, 
Schlingemann 
& Stultz 
(2004) 
US 
 
12023 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1980-2001 
0 to +36 months +0.018% insignificant 
abnormal returns 
Panel C: Up to +36 months 
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Event Window Findings 
Loughran & 
Vigh (1997) 
US 
 
434 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1970 – 1989  
 
0 to +60 months  -6.5% significant 
abnormal returns  
Gregory 
(2005) 
UK 
 
217 acquisitions 
between 1984 -1992 
 
0 to +60 months -19.9% significant 
abnormal returns for 
period 
 
Across all of the event windows, the studies report significantly negative returns to 
bidders in their samples (see for example, Limmack, 1991; Gregory, 1997; 
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003 and Gregory, 2005). The Moeller et al. (2004) study 
29 
 
is alone in finding insignificant returns to bidders in their sample during the three 
years after completion.  
There are several explanations for the pattern of findings in both short-term and 
long-term studies. Firstly, bids may be motivated by valid economic reasons, but, 
on average, bidders overpay, enabling most or all of the expected gains to accrue 
to target shareholders (the „winner‟s curse‟ suggested by Roll, 1986). This explains 
the pattern of returns around the announcement of acquisitions and the long-term 
impact on returns for acquirers. An alternative explanation is that bids are pursued 
to enhance managers‟ preferences, producing negative outcomes for shareholders 
because of the wealth expropriated from them. These studies investigate average 
returns. They are not able to distinguish between multiple motives present in their 
large samples. This requires the use of possible control variables to distinguish 
between motives (discussed in section 5 below).   
 
3.2 Accounting Studies  
 
Some researchers prefer analysing accounting measures of performance because of 
the methodological concerns regarding event studies and the view that the benefits 
arising from acquisitions will eventually appear in accounting reports. A number of 
studies use accounting measures of performance to assess whether post-acquisition 
performance is improved. Some studies use ex-post accounting measures of 
operating performance - Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE), and Return on Assets, (ROA) - to analyse the impact of acquisitions. Other 
studies use q-ratios (defined as the ratio of the market capitalisation of a company 
to the book value of its assets) to assess the impact of acquisitions. Typically, 
studies compare the measures of operating performance against a control group of 
companies (an industry group or group of non-bidding and target companies) to 
assess whether performance has changed significantly. Table 2.4 summarises the 
results according to the outcome measures; panel A summaries earnings-based 
studies, panel B cash-flow studies. 
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Table 2.4: Summary of a sample of Accounting Studies of Operating Performance 
Panel A: Earnings Based Studies 
Study Sample Characteristics Main Findings 
Meeks (1977) 
UK 
233 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1962-1972 
Significantly positive abnormal 
profits of 0.114% in year of merger. 
Significantly negative abnormal 
profits in years +1 to +5. 
 
Dickerson, Gibson 
and Tsakalotos 
(1997) 
UK 
2941 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1948-1977 
Non-acquiring firms have 
significantly higher return on assets 
compared to acquirers (2.4%). 
Carlinn, Linn and 
Yadav (2002) 
UK 
81 Mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1985-1994 
Acquirers had significantly better 
operating performance than industry 
benchmarks.  
 
Bild et al. (2006)  
UK 
303 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1985-1996 
 
Significantly positive return on 
equity of between 17.24% and 
21.5% for years 0 to +3. 
 
Panel B: Cash-Flow Studies 
Study Sample Characteristics Main Findings 
Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987) 
US 
62 acquisitions between 
1975-1977 
No significant difference between the 
ratio of cash flows/assets for 
acquirers and industry benchmark.  
 
Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback (1992) 
US 
50 large acquisitions 
between 1979-1984 
Significantly higher operating cash 
flow returns for combined firms 
compared to control group in 5 years 
after merger.  
 
Ghosh (2001) 
US 
315 mergers and 
acquisitions between 
1981-1995 
Significantly higher cash flow returns 
for combined firms compared to 
control group in 3 years after 
merger. 
 
Powell and Stark 
(2001) 
UK 
Mergers and acquisition 
between 1985-1993 
Significantly higher cash flow returns 
compared to control group in 3 years 
after merger.  
 
 
According to economic theories of M&A, acquisitions should produce superior post-
acquisition operating performance compared to the pre-acquisition period. Early 
studies by Singh (1971) and Utton (1974), analysing the merger wave of the 
1960s, found evidence of worse performance after acquisitions. Meeks (1977) 
found that profitability improved in the year of the acquisition, but decreased in 
each of the five subsequent years. Dickerson et al. (1997) found that bidders in 
completed acquisitions exhibited lower rates of return compared to their own 
performance prior to the acquisition. They also compared the companies to a 
control group of non-acquirers, finding that the acquirers performed significantly 
worse. This study also found that multiple bidders exhibited worsening performance 
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with each subsequent bid, suggesting they did not get better with experience. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) in their seminal study using US data found that, on 
average, the profitability of merging firms declined afterwards. However, Healy et 
al. (1992) investigated the largest 50 acquisitions in the USA between 1979 and 
1984, finding that, while the performance of these companies declined relative to 
the pre-bid period, it was still better than a control group of industry comparators. 
More recently, Andrade et al. (2001) examined the post-acquisition performance of 
approximately 2000 acquisitions in the USA between 1973 and 1998, finding that 
post-acquisition operating performance improves relative to industry benchmarks. 
The performance was also better than the performance prior to the acquisition. 
Finally, Bild et al. (2006) report significantly average abnormal returns of equity 
between 17.24% and 21.5% in the three years after the completion of an 
acquisition. This suggests acquisition activity enhances performance. 
The evidence here is mixed. Some studies find that acquisitions lead to the 
improved performance of the companies involved, but others find no improved 
performance. Martynova and Renneboog (2005) suggest that the findings are 
influenced by the choice of profitability measure. Studies which use earnings based 
measures tend to show declines in profitability while those based on cash flows 
tend to show gains in profitability. However, the evidence is not consistent.  
In addition, the analysis of accounting information has its own methodological 
issues. Accounting information is considered less reliable since it can be 
manipulated by management (Stanton, 1987). Also, a valid measure for the 
combined performance of the acquirer and target, as the latter is subsumed within 
the acquirer, is required. This is difficult to ascertain (Powell and Stark, 2005).  
Hence, a major issue is the methodological problems which hamper the 
measurement of underlying performance in acquisitions. Doubts over these 
empirical results regarding the impact of acquisitions may explain why M&A is still 
pursued. As Martin Lipton, a practitioner at the forefront of acquisitions for many 
years, stated in “The Davies Lecture” on 14th September 2006 at York University: 
 “…the academic studies are criticised and largely ignored on the grounds 
that they are mostly based on comparing the stock market value of the 
acquiring firm to that of its peers or the general index for periods 
subsequent to the acquisition. The obvious defect in this analysis is lack of 
information as to how the acquirer would have fared if the acquisition had 
not taken place.” 
 
The methodological problems would suggest that alternative research methods can 
be used to complement financial and accounting studies. In particular, qualitatively-
based case studies, by analysing the acquisition process and the impact of 
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acquisitions differently, could add to the findings of statistically-based studies, 
producing a fuller understanding of the acquisition process and its impact on the 
firms involved.    
 
4. Abandoned Acquisitions  
 
A significant number of acquisition bids are abandoned. However, since the basic 
motivation is not likely to change between the point at which a bid is proposed until 
it is abandoned, an analysis of abandoned acquisitions can provide a different 
perspective on the acquisition process, particularly helping analyse the role and 
impact of mergers and acquisitions to ascertain whether when they are driven by 
economic reasons or managerial preferences. Acquisitions are abandoned for a 
variety of reasons including, inter alia, target management resistance, intervention 
by competition authorities, rejection of the bid by target shareholders, or voluntary 
withdrawal on the bidder‟s part (Wong and O‟Sullivan, 2001). However, while these 
are triggers for abandonment, there are likely to be deeper forces producing 
abandonment. 
Research on abandoned acquisitions is limited. The research is rooted in the 
financial economics literature and focuses on two aspects of the process. One 
aspect of research analyses the impact of abandonment to ascertain whether the 
abandonment decision and its aftermath can determine whether managerial or 
economic-based motives dominated the original acquisition decision. In doing this, 
the focus of attention has been the role of abandoned acquisitions in the disciplining 
of target firms, to determine whether the failure of a bid represents a failure to 
discipline self-serving management (see Wong and O‟Sulllivan, 2001). A limited 
amount of empirical work has investigated the impact of abandonment on bidding 
firms. This requires further attention. Another aspect which has received a lot of 
attention is the characteristics which distinguish abandoned acquisitions from 
completed ones, providing indications on the causes of abandonment. Studies have 
investigated the characteristics of bidders and targets, transaction characteristics 
and events in the bidding process, to ascertain what distinguishes abandoned bids 
from completed ones.  
The acquisition process is complicated, so modelling it precisely is extremely 
difficult (Weston et al., 2004). Real world and conceptual modelling of the bidding 
process is complex. During the acquisition process: 
“…the two firms, the market and investors continue to receive new 
information regarding the deal and firm values as the negotiation process 
unfolds.”  
(Hotchkiss et al., 2005, p.1) 
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The release of new information in this period can significantly affect the risks and 
returns associated with a particular bid and therefore impact on the bid outcome. 
Two distinct positions regarding abandonment can be proposed. Either 
abandonment prevents acquisitions reflecting economic efficiency from proceeding, 
producing negative outcomes. Or, abandonment prevents acquisitions reflecting 
managerial preferences from proceeding, producing positive outcomes. In this latter 
case, abandoned acquisitions may form part of a disciplinary process within bidding 
firms.  
 
4.1 Impact of Abandonment 
 
In investigating abandoned acquisitions, research has analysed the impact of 
abandonment to ascertain whether the abandonment decision and its aftermath can 
determine whether managerial or economic-based motives governed the acquisition 
in the first place, and also, by implication, the abandonment decision. In doing this, 
the focus of attention has been on whether the failure of a bid is costly in terms of 
lost benefits to shareholders, either through lost synergies, or, the failure to 
discipline management (see Wong and O‟Sullivan, 2001). 
The existing literature evaluates the impact of abandoned acquisitions using the 
same two perspectives as studies of completed ones. In accounting studies, both 
the bidders‟ and targets‟ performance are compared with the pre-bid performance 
or the performance of a matched sample of either completed mergers, or non-
targets and non-bidders. In event studies, the impact of abandonment is assessed 
by analysing the post-abandonment share price performance of the companies. 
However, some studies have analysed wider quantitative and qualitative aspects 
which have contributed to determining whether abandonment has a governance 
role. Table 2.5 provides a summary of the main studies in this field. The table is 
grouped into (A) event studies, (B) accounting studies, and (C) studies of 
qualitative changes. The discussion will focus on the main findings surrounding the 
impact of abandoned acquisitions. 
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Table 2.5: Summary of Empirical Studies of the General Impact of Abandoned 
Acquisitions 
Panel A: Event Studies of Abandoned Acquisitions 
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Main Findings 
Firth (1980) 
UK 
434 completed and 
abandoned 
acquisitions between 
1969-1975  
No significant difference in the returns of 
targets in completed acquisitions compared 
to targets in abandoned acquisitions 
Abandoned targets respond through 
management and other changes  
Dodd (1980) 
US 
71 completed and 80 
abandoned 
acquisitions  between 
1970-1977 
When abandonment is initiated by the target, 
target shares retain their gains. 
When abandonment is instigated by the 
bidder, the value of the shares lapse to pre-
bid levels.  
Pound (1986) 
US 
56 targets of 
abandoned 
acquisitions between 
1974-1985 
Over a two year period, target shareholders 
30% worse off than if bid had been 
successful 
Davidson, 
Dutia & Cheng 
(1989) 
US 
163 abandoned 
acquisitions between 
1976-1985 
Abandoned target shareholders retain 
abnormal gains if firm receives another bid. 
Abandoned target shareholders lose 
abnormal gains if firm does not receive 
another bid.  
Limmack 
(1991) 
UK 
448 completed and 
81 abandoned 
acquisitions between 
1977-1986 
Abandoned target shareholders retain 
abnormal gains for at least two years 
afterwards. 
  
Chang & Suk 
(1998) 
US 
279 abandoned 
mergers between 
1982-1990 
Abnormal returns to bidders are positive 
when bidder initiates abandonment. 
Abnormal returns to bidders are insignificant 
when target initiates abandonment. 
Cole, Fatemi & 
Vu (2006) 
US 
22O abandoned 
mergers between 
1991-2000 
 
Abnormal returns earned at announcement 
are only partially reversed at abandonment. 
Savor & Lu 
(2009) 
US 
1773 acquisitions 
between 1978-2003 
Successful bidders earn significantly less 
negative returns than failed bidders.   
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Panel B: Accounting Studies 
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Main Findings 
Holl & 
Pickering 
(1988) 
UK 
50 abandoned 
mergers and 50 
successful mergers 
and 33 contested 
bids between 1965-
1975  
Failed bidders had higher profits and return on 
equity than successful bidders afterwards. 
Failed bidders had lower growth than 
successful bidders afterwards.  
Taffler & Holl 
(1991) 
UK 
55 abandoned 
targets, 
129 completed 
targets, 
76 bidders 
Abandoned targets do not improve their 
performance in three years following 
abandonment. 
Abandoned bidders do not improve their 
performance in three years following 
abandonment.  
Limmack 
(1994) 
UK 
98 abandoned 
targets between 
1977-1986  
Abandoned targets which retain abnormal 
gains after abandonment have improved 
operating performance. 
 
Panel C: Qualitative Changes 
Study Sample 
Characteristics 
Main Findings 
Denis (1990) 
US 
49 abandoned 
targets which make 
distributions to 
shareholders 
between 1980-1987 
Target shareholders earn abnormal returns 
form acquisitions irrespective of outcome. 
Abandoned targets conduct capital 
restructuring, strategic changes and changes 
to voting rights to improve managers‟ 
incentives to maximise value. 
Agrawal & 
Walkling 
(1994) 
US 
182 targets and 
169 matched non-
targets between 
1980 -1986 
CEOs are more likely to be replaced in 
successful targets than abandoned ones. 
CEOs retained in abandoned targets suffer 
changes in remuneration negatively correlated 
with pre-bid excess remuneration.   
Franks & 
Mayer (1996) 
UK 
58 targets of hostile 
bids and a match 
sample of non-
targets between 
1985-1986 
Managerial turnover is higher in both targets 
of completed acquisitions and abandoned 
targets than in matched sample. 
Management turnover is higher in abandoned 
targets. 
Denis & 
Serrano 
(1996) 
US 
98 targets of 
abandoned tender 
offers between 
1983-1989 
34% of targets experience the replacement of 
senior managers within two years.  
Ownership changes more likely to produce 
management changes and asset restructuring.  
Lehn & Zhao 
(2006) 
US 
714 completed and 
abandoned 
acquisitions 
between 1990-1998 
CEOs in bidders are more likely to be replaced 
if they pursue bids associated with negative 
abnormal returns around announcement 
compared to those who abandon bids. 
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4.2 Impact of Abandonment on Targets 
 
By just focusing on completed acquisitions, the analysis of the post-acquisition 
gains to targets cannot distinguish between competing economic efficiency theories 
of acquisitions. However, studies of abandoned acquisitions may be able to 
distinguish between the different explanations. Acquisitions driven by synergistic 
gains require a physical consolidation of the assets of the two companies. Hence, 
those prompted by synergistic gains should experience negative gains around the 
announcement of abandonment. On the other hand, the informational or 
disciplinary hypotheses do not require a physical consolidation in order to generate 
gains. Either new information may be revealed in a bidding process which leads to 
the revaluation of both companies, or the threatened management may be 
stimulated into action which improves operating performance. Both views suggest 
that any gains around the announcement of a bid should be sustained, even if a bid 
is abandoned (Wong and O‟Sullivan, 2001).  
Studies using event study methodology have found mixed results. Some research 
has found that targets in abandoned acquisitions that enjoyed positive abnormal 
returns after the announcement of a bid lost all of the gains once the bid was 
abandoned (Pound, 1986). Franks Mayer and Harris (1986) focused on merger 
proposals rejected by the Monopoly and Mergers Commission (MMC). There, all 
announcement period gains disappeared after the rejection. This is not surprising 
since acquisitions rejected on competition grounds are more likely to produce 
synergistic gains. Abandonment stops the gains being realised. Some studies, both 
in the UK and US, have found that the abnormal gains to targets around the 
announcement date did not completely disappear after abandonment (see Firth, 
1980; Dodd, 1990; Limmack, 1991; Holl and Kyriazis, 1997). This supports the 
idea that the abandoned bid led to a revaluation of the target in the light of new 
information. In order to distinguish further, Dodd (1980) separated his sample into 
those targets that were subsequently acquired by another bidder and those that 
remained independent. There was a significant difference in the experience of the 
two sub-groups. The group of firms subsequently acquired, enjoyed significantly 
higher abnormal returns after abandonment. This is consistent with the synergy 
explanation for M&A since the abnormal returns only persisted in cases where a 
subsequent bid was likely. Indeed, the authors reported that the bidding firms in 
abandoned bids suffered significant losses, on average, when the targets were 
subsequently acquired. Davidson et al. (1989) confirm these findings with results 
that demonstrated share price gains for target firms were sustained as long as they 
were engaged in subsequent acquisitions, regardless of whether the bidder or 
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target initiated the abandonment. This disputes informational theories and the 
likelihood that managers may be stimulated to better performance.      
Using accounting measures, both Holl and Pickering (1988) and Taffler and Holl 
(1991), found no improvement in the performance of targets of abandoned 
acquisitions in the three years afterwards. Meanwhile, Limmack (1994) compared 
the performance of targets which remained independent with those subsequently 
acquired, for a period of five years after abandonment. There was no significant 
difference in the post-abandonment performance of the two groups. In addition, the 
study reported that the sustained abnormal share price returns in targets were 
associated with improved operating performance after abandonment. This improved 
performance was achieved either through better effort by existing managers or 
through the replacement of under–performing managers. This supports a 
governance role for the acquisition process through disciplining underperforming 
managers in targets. Indeed, Jensen and Warner (1988) argue that if acquisitions 
signal information about the poor performance of managers, internal governance 
mechanisms should lead to a higher incidence of managerial turnover, even if an 
acquisition is abandoned. 
Studies of other aspects of the impact of abandonment provide some support for 
such a governance role. Pickering (1983) found that the post-abandonment 
performance of targets improved as a result of restructuring. Denis (1990) 
compared the targets of abandoned and completed acquisitions and found that the 
former group had a higher rate of management turnover than the latter group. In 
addition, he also found that the target companies in his sample of abandoned 
acquisitions had a higher propensity to make changes to capital structure, voting 
rights, strategy and managerial incentives than non-targets. Using UK data, Franks 
and Mayer (1996) also found targets in abandoned hostile bids, more likely to be 
disciplinary, had a higher rate of managerial turnover than non-targets. This echoes 
earlier findings by Firth (1980). In the later study, these managerial changes were 
associated with higher share price returns suggesting that the removal of managers 
after abandonment met with shareholders‟ approval. On the other hand, in the US, 
Agrawal and Walkling (1994) found the reverse – a CEO was more likely to be 
replaced in targets of completed compared to abandoned acquisitions. However, 
they did find that CEOs retained after an abandoned bid, were likely to suffer 
changes in remuneration negatively correlated to their pre-bid remuneration. This 
suggests a disciplinary link between the market for corporate control and internal 
governance mechanisms. In completed acquisitions, managers are disciplined 
through replacement. In abandoned acquisitions, the findings suggest that target 
managers are disciplined through ex-post reductions in remuneration.  
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Hirschleifer and Thakor (1994) and (1998) developed a model that demonstrates 
the interrelationships between acquisition bids, information revelation and internal 
corporate governance in targets, in response to bids. In their model, target 
shareholders delegate the task of monitoring to the board of directors. The market 
for corporate control provides additional disciplining of both the CEO and the board. 
The board and potential bidders have different information and this is important to 
assessing the performance of a CEO. The board aggregates information it possesses 
with that provided by the bid. A vigilant board may accept a bid based on its own 
information about the CEO, in conjunction with information provided by a bid. 
However, a board may reject a bid because it is concerned about being replaced 
and wants to avoid a change in control. In such circumstances, a bid may be 
rejected, but the aggregation of information may lead to post-abandonment 
discipline. 
“…a well-functioning internal control mechanism (the board) does not 
obviate the need for external control (takeovers).”  
(Hirschleifer and Thakor, 1998, p.489) 
Denis and Serrano (1996) provide some support for the model as a result of 
investigating the role of external ownership blocks in changes observed in targets 
after abandonment. They found that changes in target management following 
abandonment were associated with unaffiliated investment by external ownership 
blocks during and after the bidding process.  These ownership blocks are also 
associated with significant asset restructuring in the companies after abandonment. 
The evidence suggests these shareholding blocks may not want a change in control, 
but may have information or use information revealed in the bidding process to 
force disciplinary changes – such blocks have the incentive and ability to do so. This 
research suggests that, in some circumstances, abandoned „disciplinary‟ bids may 
still have a governance role primarily through its interaction with internal 
mechanisms, producing changes in target firms afterwards. This substantiates 
Jensen and Warner‟s (1988) observations regarding the governance role of the 
acquisition process. In this context, abandonment may not mean a failure to 
discipline incumbent management because the acquisition process signals 
information to target boards / shareholders of the need for remedial action. The 
sustained share price appreciation observed in some targets may be due to the 
remedial action taking effect. Those targets which do not take remedial action do 
not raise their performance subsequently, remaining targets susceptible to future 
disciplinary bids.  
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4.3 Impact of Abandonment on Bidders 
 
Many acquisitions may be driven by managerial preferences. If such bids were 
abandoned, then, the bidding process may have played a governance role, 
contributing to the discipline of managers. In such circumstances, it would be 
anticipated that abandonment may have a „disciplinary‟ impact on the bidding 
firms. Empirical work has investigated a variety of variables measuring the impact 
of abandonment on bidding firms.   
Event studies analyse the share price reactions to abandonment. If a bid was driven 
by managerial preferences, there should be a positive share price response around 
abandonment or, if a bid was driven by economic efficiency, there should be a 
negative response. Dodd (1980) found positive abnormal returns for bidding 
companies around abandonment announcements. Bradley et al. (1983) focus on 
tender offers, more likely to be disciplinary and found positive abnormal returns for 
bidding firms around the announcement of abandonment. This suggests 
shareholders viewed the proposed acquisition negatively and were relieved it was 
abandoned. In contrast, Bradley (1980) found a negative share price reaction to 
abandonment among bidding firms. These results indicate that abandonment may 
either, reveal that the anticipated benefits would not be achieved, or, signals 
perceived weakness in bidders to investors. Using a different benchmark, Asquith 
(1983) found no significant difference in the abnormal returns between successful 
and unsuccessful bidders in the post outcome period. This suggests that the market 
does not perceive any differential consequences for successful compared to failed 
bidders, implying bid failures were not viewed negatively. This supports the 
disciplinary theory where bidders are just agents of change in targets. Meanwhile, 
Chang and Suk (1998) examined 279 abandoned acquisitions and found support for 
this argument. When targets initiated abandonment, abnormal returns to bidders 
were not significantly different from zero. However, when bidders initiated 
abandonment, the abnormal returns were positive.  
A more recent paper by Cole, et al. (2006) investigates the circumstances which 
produce differential returns to bidders. They found that bids permanently reduce 
the value of bidders, whether it is abandoned or not. They interpret this as 
evidence that where shareholders view an acquisition being pursued for managerial 
preferences, the shareholders, “…punishes management by lowering its valuation of 
the firm” (p.16). Meanwhile, Savor and Lu (2009) found that, in general, successful 
bidders tended to exhibit higher abnormal returns around announcement dates 
compared to failed bidders. Furthermore, they found that the difference in 
performance was related to the use of equity as a means of payment (see section 
5.32 below for a discussion of the means of payment as a control variable).     
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Alternative studies focus on other aspects of the impact of abandonment on bidding 
firms, including accounting measures of performance. A seminal work in abandoned 
acquisitions in the UK is Pickering (1983). He found that bidders‟ managers‟ 
reaction to abandonment was one of relief - integration would have taken more 
time and effort and management resources would have been stretched. This is 
consistent with the research on the wealth effects of abandonment. However, while 
some bidders took no action in response to abandonment, others attempted 
positive action, engaging in internal changes such as changes in management, 
methods of production or reviews of products and markets. Interestingly, there 
were some that were subsequently acquired themselves. This result is consistent 
with Mitchell and Lehn (1990), who found that bidders who completed acquisitions, 
perceived to be value-destroying, were the targets of subsequent acquisitions, 
interpreted by the authors as „disciplinary‟. Pickering‟s findings suggest that this 
interpretation could be extended to the bidders, in his sample, who were 
subsequently acquired. This suggests that the bid process revealed the motives of a 
bid and this led to disciplinary changes in the companies subsequently. This impact 
is similar to the experience of some target firms after abandoned acquisitions. This 
supports the view that abandoned bids may have a governance role on bidders in 
circumstances where bids are revealed to be pursued to further managerial 
preferences and not shareholders‟ interests. Furthermore, Lehn and Zhao (2006) 
investigate CEO turnover after both completed and abandoned acquisitions. They 
found that CEOs who complete acquisitions associated with lower returns around 
announcement face a high probability of being replaced compared to CEOs who 
cancel acquisitions, anticipated to decrease shareholder wealth. This suggests a 
disciplinary response to the takeover process indicating that information is revealed 
by the bidding process leading to changes subsequently. CEOs who complete 
acquisitions anticipated to destroy value are replaced. Those who respond to the 
information signal during the bidding process, and abandon bids are more likely to 
keep their jobs. These findings echo those for target firms (Jensen and Warner, 
1988).    
Several quantitative studies have been carried out on abandoned acquisitions in the 
UK during the 1970s and 1980s. Using linear discriminant analysis, Holl and 
Pickering (1988) compared 50 failed mergers with a matched sample of 50 
successful mergers. They also analysed 33 cases of contested bids. The firms which 
did not merge performed better than those which did. In particular, the failed 
bidders had significantly higher profits and return on equity than successful bidders, 
suggesting that abandonment was a greater spur to efficiency than a completed 
acquisition. Indeed, the successful bidders had a higher growth rate, implying a 
focus on managerial preferences in those companies. Using a Performance Analysis 
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Score (PAS) that weighted profitability, working capital liquidity and financial risk in 
a sample of 55 cases of abandoned bidders in the UK, Taffler and Holl (1991) did 
not find any improvement in the performance of unsuccessful bidders after 
abandonment. They suggest this finding is evidence that little discipline is imposed 
through the acquisition process, which raises performance.   
 
4.4 Summary of Empirical Studies of Abandoned Acquisitions 
 
The findings of this research indicate that abandonment may have an impact on the 
firms involved. However, the results are conflicting, and so, the consequences of 
abandoned acquisitions remains a fertile topic for more research, particularly in the 
context of bidding firms. There is a scarcity of literature regarding the impact of 
abandonment on bidding firms which is surprising given that many studies indicate 
that acquisitions are driven by managerial aggrandisement. Research to date has 
focused attention on the impact of abandonment on the subsequent stock market 
and accounting measures of performance regarding abandoned bidders, but there 
has been little work on other aspects regarding the impact of abandonment on 
bidders. More research is needed. An analysis of the differential experiences of 
bidders after abandoned acquisitions would enhance our knowledge of the 
effectiveness of the acquisition market in disciplining self-serving managers 
following their own preferences. The differential experiences of abandoned bidders 
in relation to a number of qualitative variables which have been used in other 
contexts as evidence of discipline, may provide different evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of the acquisition process in disciplining self-serving managers of 
bidding companies. These variables include organisational changes (Pickering, 
1983), management turnover (Huson et al., 2001; Lehn and Zhao, 2006), asset 
restructuring, particularly divestments (Haynes et al., 2000; Perry and Shivdasani, 
2005) and financial restructuring, especially increased gearing (Stulz, 1990; Barclay 
and Smith, 1995) and whether bidders become acquisition targets themselves 
(Mitchell and Lehn, 1990).  
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5. The Influence of Control Variables on Acquisitions 
 
The relatively inconclusive evidence on the post-acquisition performance of 
acquisitions has led researchers to investigate other characteristics in an attempt to 
see whether they can differentiate between different impacts of acquisitions. The 
literature has focused on a range of control factors to explain the differential impact 
of completed acquisitions, and so, assess whether acquisitions are pursued for 
economic or managerial objectives. These control variables include the pre-bid 
performance of bidders and targets, corporate governance characteristics, 
transaction characteristics, as well as contingent factors in the bidding process. 
Such control variables have been used extensively in studies of completed 
acquisitions to relate post-acquisition performance to these characteristics.  
There has been more limited research conducted to analyse the impact of such 
control variables on abandoned acquisitions. The analysis of abandoned acquisitions 
in the context of these variables can help to identify the nature of the governance 
role of abandoned acquisitions.  The next section of this chapter will review the 
literature in these areas in the context of both completed and abandoned 
acquisitions. The characteristics can be separated into the pre-bid performance of 
the companies concerned, corporate governance characteristics of bidders and 
targets, transaction characteristics, as well as contingent factors in the bidding 
process. Table 2.6 summarises the main studies analysing the influence of control 
variables in abandoned acquisitions is at the end of this chapter.   
 
5.1 Firm Characteristics 
 
Research in M&A activity has attempted to discriminate between the performance 
characteristics of bidders and targets in completed and abandoned acquisitions in 
order to determine whether it has a significant impact on the outcome. This may 
reveal the underlying motives for the transaction. The studies use similar 
methodologies to analyse stock market or accounting data and are subject to the 
criticisms noted in section 2 and 3 above.  
 
5.11 Pre-Bid Performance of Targets  
 
A number of studies have analysed the pre-bid performance of target firms to test 
whether bids may be „disciplinary‟, motivated by the correction of managerial 
failure in targets. Only the disciplinary theory predicts that target companies should 
exhibit negative abnormal performance prior to the bid, indicating the poor 
performance, which requires the better management of resources, to improve 
performance. The disciplinary explanation makes no predictions about the pre-bid 
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performance of bidding companies, since these companies are viewed as the agents 
of change. Managerial theories propose nothing about the pre-bid performance of 
either bidders or targets.  
In studies of the pre-bid period, it is only early studies that find evidence of 
significant under-performance (see Firth, 1979, for the UK and Smiley, 1976, for 
the USA). However, the majority of subsequent studies have not found evidence of 
significant underperformance of targets prior to bids, disputing the argument that 
acquisitions discipline self-serving managers in targets. Notable here is the recent 
findings reported by Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) of positive abnormal returns in target 
firms for eight years leading up to a bid.  
To get a better understanding of the governance role of acquisitions, a number of 
studies have investigated a sub-set of acquisitions that are more likely to be driven 
by the correction of managerial failure. This subset includes bids that are defined as 
hostile, because there was a direct offer to shareholders to tender their shares to 
the bidder (tender offers). Of these studies, only the early study by Smiley (1976) 
reports significant negative performance by targets. Later work, for instance Franks 
and Mayer (1996), did not observe significantly negative returns in target 
companies in hostile bids compared to friendly ones during the pre-acquisition 
period. These results were echoed in the USA where studies by Martin and 
McConnell (1991), Kini et al. (1996) and Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) did not find any 
evidence of significantly negative abnormal returns in the pre-bid period. Kennedy 
and Limmack (1996) differ from the other studies by defining a disciplinary bid as 
one where the chief executive was replaced up to two years after an acquisition 
was completed. They found that the pre-bid performances of targets where the 
chief executives were replaced, were significantly worse than the performances of 
targets where the chief executive wasn‟t replaced. This supports a governance role 
for acquisitions through the removal of poorly performing managers. 
The pre-bid performance of targets has also been investigated using accounting 
measures of performance. Early studies by Kuehn (1975) and Cosh et al. (1980) 
suggest that targets may have lower pre-bid performance compared to non-targets. 
This is supported by recent evidence by Dickerson et al. (2002) in a sample of UK 
targets from the 1990s. However, other early studies found that acquisition targets 
actually exhibit a greater return on assets compared to non-targets (see Meeks, 
1977, for the UK and Herman and Lowenstein, 1988, for the USA), suggesting that 
acquisitions play a weak governance role. A recent comprehensive study by 
Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) compared the pre-bid performance of targets with a 
control group matched by industry, size and performance. In their overall sample, 
there is no evidence of significant underperformance by acquisition targets. In 
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acquisitions more likely to be disciplinary, both Franks and Mayer (1996) and 
O‟Sullivan and Wong (1999) compared the performance of targets in hostile bids 
with friendly ones and find no systematic evidence of underperformance. In their 
study, Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) investigated a number of definitions of discipline 
(tender offer, management resistance, multiple bidders), finding no evidence of 
systematic underperformance in any of these sub-categories, compared to their 
control group. The studies that examine Tobin‟s q provide mixed evidence of a 
disciplinary motive for acquisitions. Hasbrouck (1985) found that, on average, 
targets in corporate acquisitions have lower q-ratios than non-targets, suggesting 
underperformance in the former group. In contrast, Lang, et al. (1989) found that 
q-ratios in their sample were not significantly lower in hostile compared to friendly 
targets in the year prior to the bid, disputing the predictions of the disciplinary 
theory.  
There is a dearth of studies that investigate these sub-groups in the contact of 
abandoned acquisitions. This is surprising since there are studies that have done 
useful work on other aspects of acquisitions for such a sub-group and extending 
such analysis to post-abandonment accounting performance may reveal more 
information about the motives of acquisition activity.  
Using event study methodology, a number of studies have tested the disciplinary 
theory of acquisitions by analysing the pre-bid performance of abandoned targets. 
No consistent evidence can be drawn. Some studies found evidence of significant 
underperformance in target firms in the pre-bid period (Kummer & Hoffmeiser, 
1978; Limmack, 1991). However Asquith (1983), using US data, found worse 
performance in targets of completed acquisitions compared to abandoned ones, 
implying those bids were more likely to have been driven by disciplinary motives. A 
number of other investigations have analysed operating performance to assess the 
pre-bid performance of targets in abandoned acquisitions, producing similarly 
inconsistent results. Using linear discriminant analysis across a range of 
performance measures, Holl and Pickering (1988) found significantly superior 
performance in the pre-bid performance of targets of completed acquisitions 
compared to targets of abandoned ones. Using a Performance Analysis Score (PAS) 
that weighted profitability, liquidity and financial risk in the companies concerned, 
Taffler and Holl (1991) analysed an extended pre-bid period, finding no significant 
differences between targets of completed acquisitions compared to targets of 
abandoned ones. Focusing on hostile bids, which are more likely to be disciplinary, 
Franks and Mayer (1996), using q-ratios, found targets in completed acquisitions 
exhibited poorer pre-bid performance than targets in abandoned ones. However, 
Sudarsanam (1995), using a similar outcome measure, found no significant 
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differences between completed and abandoned targets. O‟Sullivan and Wong 
(1999), using return on capital employed, had similar results. These results suggest 
that abandoned acquisitions cannot be distinguished from completed acquisitions 
using target performance as a control variable.   
 
5.12 Pre-bid Performance of Bidders 
 
An interesting issue is whether bidders in abandoned acquisitions exhibit poorer 
pre-bid performance compared to their successful counterparts. This may reveal 
information about the motives for a bid. In his case study analysis Pickering (1983) 
found that the bidding companies were drawn from a broad spectrum, some fast 
growing with a high stock market rating, while others were in difficulty, exhibiting 
slow growth and fluctuating earnings. In their linear discriminant analysis of the 
same companies, Holl and Pickering (1988) found that, on average, the abandoned 
bidding companies were more profitable than companies which successfully 
completed acquisitions, but were smaller, less liquid, with lower levels of gearing 
and growth. This suggests that liquidity and not profitability may be the key factor 
in completing acquisitions, supporting theories of managerial preferences, 
particularly Jensen‟s free cash flow theory. The study concluded that the findings 
indicate that managers of both completed and abandoned bidders are motivated by 
growth rather than profitability. The extent of liquidity can influence the means of 
payment, which studies have shown to be an important factor in abandonment (see 
section 5.32 below for a detailed discussion of the role of the means of payment in 
the acquisition process). Meanwhile, Taffler and Holl (1991) support this 
observation by reporting that abandoned bidders had weaker pre-bid performance 
compared to not only successful bidders, but also their targets. Analysing stock 
market data, both Limmack (1991) for the UK, and Dodd and Ruback (1977) for 
the US, found no evidence to differentiate the pre-bid performance of successful 
and unsuccessful bidders. These results indicate that successful acquirers are those 
with higher levels of free cash flow, not higher profitability, implying that many bids 
may be motivated by managerial preferences and not an improved allocation of 
resources in firms. This is consistent with the findings of Holl and Pickering (1988). 
Comparing the pre-bid performance of bidder and target firms may reveal 
something about the motives behind bids. If the average performance of targets is 
superior to bidders, it may demonstrate the extent to which the bidding process 
prevents the completion of bids detrimental to shareholders‟ interests. Holl and 
Pickering (1988) found over a range of operating measures that abandoned bidders 
were weaker than their targets, and indeed successful bidders. This suggests the 
bidders needed the acquisition more than the targets. Taffler and Holl (1991) 
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support this observation by reporting that abandoned bidders in their sample were 
weaker than their targets. The unsuccessful bidders were less profitable, had lower 
levels of liquidity and greater financial risk compared to their targets. The study 
found no such differences in the bidders and targets of completed acquisitions. 
These results may indicate a governance role for the bidding process in preventing 
the completion of acquisitions by weak bidders. More research on the pre-bid 
performance of bidders in abandoned acquisitions is necessary. More could be 
learned about the role of abandoned acquisitions in disciplining underperforming 
managers, by differentiating the pre-bid performance of bidders which experience 
„disciplinary‟ outcomes after abandonment from those which don‟t. 
 
5.2 Ownership Characteristics, Corporate Governance and Acquisitions  
 
Corporate governance mechanisms are intended to overcome agency problems and 
ensure that managers act in the interests of shareholders. Internal governance 
mechanisms relate to board composition, ownership structure and incentives (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). As noted in chapter one, since the early 1990s there has been a 
great effort to improve the governance structures of UK and US companies which 
may suffer problems associated with the separation of ownership and control. 
Disciplinary theories propose that acquisitions are a substitute for weak internal 
mechanisms and hence the targets of acquisitions should exhibit weak internal 
governance mechanisms in the period before the bid announcement (Fama, 1980). 
Bidders, in contrast, should be well-governed.  
In contrast, since empirical studies reveal acquisitions may be a manifestation of 
managerial preferences in bidding companies, it would be interesting to analyse the 
corporate governance attributes of bidding companies. An examination of the 
corporate governance characteristics of the bidders in acquisitions may provide 
evidence of the opportunity and motivation of bidding managers to pursue 
managerial aggrandisement (O‟Sullivan and Wong, 1998). 
 
5.3 Targets 
 
5.31 Board Size and Composition 
 
The size of a company‟s board can have an impact on the discretion of managers in 
decision-making. The hypothesis proposes that smaller boards allow greater 
discretion because senior executives may be able to control decision-making better. 
Hence, acquisition targets should be more likely to have smaller boards than non-
targets. O‟Sullivan and Wong (1998) investigated whether the size of a company‟s 
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board was a significant issue in acquisitions and found no support for such a 
hypothesis.  
In addition to the size of a company‟s board, it is argued that its composition may 
provide indications about the extent of discretion senior managers have - the lower 
the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) on a board, the greater the 
discretion of its executive directors. Hence, if acquisitions play a governance role 
then there should be a lower proportion of NEDs on the board of targets of 
acquisition bids compared to non-targets.  
A number of studies have found that companies with a lower proportion of non-
executive directors on the board were more likely to be the subject of acquisition 
bids, suggesting that these bids were likely to be a disciplinary substitute for poor 
board monitoring (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Weir, 1997 and Kini et al., 2004). 
However O‟Sullivan and Wong (1998), who compared the corporate governance 
characteristics of a sample of targets with non-targets, found that the proportion of 
NEDs on a company‟s board was not a significant determinant of receiving an 
acquisition bid. Similarly, Weir et al. (2002) did not find any relationship between 
the composition of a board of directors and the pre-bid performance of a sample of 
targets, disputing the proposed disciplinary link. As a result, it is disputed that 
board structure is a critical indicator of governance determining whether a company 
will become a target for a disciplinary acquisition. 
The quality of the monitoring provided by NEDs is another aspect that has been 
considered by the literature. In the managerial labour market, higher quality 
executive directors will be valued more highly and offered more additional 
directorships on the boards of other firms. Hence, the number of additional 
directorships can be a proxy for the quality of NEDs. However, the more additional 
directorships that NEDs have, the lower the attention they can provide to each 
monitoring role (Core et al., 1999). Shivdasani (1993) found a negative relationship 
between the number of additional directorships and the probability of being 
acquired. The nature of the additional directorships held could be an important 
issue that quantitative studies ignore. If a NED is chief executive of another 
company, then, this may require a lot of attention. However, if the NED has 
numerous other non-executive positions, then these may distract them greatly. 
A number of studies have analysed the size and composition of the boards of target 
firms, to assess whether these characteristics had any effect on the outcome of bids 
– completed or abandoned. The findings are contradictory. O‟Sullivan and Wong 
(1998) found no evidence of such an influence, while Kini et al. (2004) did. In the 
context of target management reaction, O‟Sullivan and Wong (1998) report that 
hostile targets were more likely to have larger boards and a higher proportion of 
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NEDs, compared to boards of friendly targets. For the US, Cotter et al. (1997) 
found the same result. This can be interpreted as independent boards resisting bids 
in order to increase the price paid, but not to the extent that bids are abandoned.  
This could explain why event studies find that most of the gains in acquisitions 
accrue to target shareholders. However, more recent research by Bange and 
Mazzeo (2004) found that independent boards in targets are associated with lower 
premiums, but also reduce the likelihood of completion. This suggests independent 
directors may oppose bids because they feel they are not in target shareholders‟ 
interests. 
 
5.32 Ownership Characteristics 
 
For target firms, the disciplinary theory proposes that acquisitions are an efficient 
external corporate governance mechanism, because of the perceived dispersed 
ownership characteristics of joint stock companies in Anglo-American markets. 
Hence, the presence of external ownership blocks may enhance monitoring as such 
shareholders will have a better incentive to monitor managers and prevent actions 
in pursuit of managerial preferences (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987). Indeed, several 
UK studies found that the presence of large external block-holders had a positive 
impact on performance in their sample, negating the necessity for disciplinary 
acquisitions (see for example Weir et al., 1992). Kini et al. (2004) found that 
companies with low external ownership blocks were more likely to be the subject of 
disciplinary acquisitions. This supports the view of acquisitions as an external 
discipline, in circumstances where internal monitoring is poor. In contrast, 
Shivdasani (1993) found that independent external shareholders increased the 
probability of acquisition. Davis and Stout (1992) investigated institutional 
shareholders specifically, reporting that their presence in ownership structures did 
not affect the probability of being acquired. This is consistent with Weir (1997), 
who found no evidence that large external shareholders monitor effectively. 
The ownership structures of both bidders and targets should influence the outcome 
of a bid and may provide guidance on the nature of governance provided by the 
bidding process. If external blocks exert an influence in target companies, it would 
be more likely that bids founded on sound economic motives will succeed compared 
to bids driven by managerial preferences (Wong and O‟Sullivan, 2001). Indeed, the 
presence of significant external ownership blocks may be more likely to facilitate an 
acquisition, particularly if they are going to benefit significantly. However, 
O‟Sullivan and Wong (1998) found no significant difference in the level of external 
ownership blocks in targets of completed and abandoned bids, suggesting the 
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presence of external ownership blocks does not influence the outcome. The senior 
managers of firms with external ownership blocks are less likely to resist a bid.   
 
5.33 Managerial Shareholdings 
  
There has been a significant amount of discussion in the literature on the incentives 
provided to managers by the extent of shares they hold. The greater the proportion 
of shares held by managers, the more the interests of shareholders and managers 
should converge (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In contrast, the lower the proportion 
of shares held by managers, the greater the incentive for discretionary behaviour. 
Mikkelson and Partch (1989) found that target firms in their sample had 
significantly lower managerial shareholdings compared to non-targets. Numerous 
studies show this pattern in hostile bids, suggesting that acquisitions substitute for 
weaker internal incentives through managerial shareholdings (Walkling and Long, 
1984; Shivdasani, 1993; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; O‟Sullivan and Wong, 1999; 
Kini et al., 2004). 
In reacting to a bid, target managers have a trade-off to consider. They gain from 
the shares they hold, but lose remuneration, power and security through post-
acquisition replacement. In target firms, the proportion of share held by managers 
will influence their reaction to bids and hence the bid outcome. The more shares 
they hold, the more likely they are to favour a bid. The empirical evidence suggests 
that this is indeed the case (Raad and Ryan, 1995; Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; 
O‟Sullivan and Wong, 1998). This suggests that hostile acquisitions are associated 
with low managerial shareholding. Hence, this implies that there are cases where 
disciplinary bids should take place, but are deterred by the proportion of 
managerial shareholdings in the target. This could be an explanation for the decline 
in hostility in bidding observed in the UK (see chapter one) – bidder management 
want to reach agreement with targets before pursuing a bid.    
 
5.4 Bidders 
 
As an abandoned bid may play a governance role in bidders, preventing bids 
furthering managerial preferences being completed, an analysis of the governance 
characteristics of completed bidders may reveal information about the scope and 
incentives for managers to pursue self-aggrandisement. The analysis of these 
characteristics in abandoned bidders may enable the discrimination of cases where 
abandoned acquisitions play a governance role from situations where they don‟t.  
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5.41 Board Structure 
 
Independent boards are effective in preventing bad corporate decisions. This has 
been found in the context of a variety of corporate decisions – the replacement of 
CEOs following poor performance (Huson et al., 2001), and divestments following 
poor performance (Perry and Shivdasani, 2005). In the context of acquisitions, the 
analysis of the composition of the boards of bidding companies in acquisitions may 
reveal the extent of discretion management may have to follow their own 
preferences. Byrd and Hickman (1992) found that bidders in their sample with 
more independent boards produce greater returns around announcements 
compared to less independent boards. The interpretation of this evidence is that 
better monitoring by independent directors on boards leads to acquisitions which 
enhance shareholders‟ wealth. Indeed, in his case study analysis, Pickering (1983) 
reported that interviewees revealed that unexpected disagreements between board 
members represented reasons for abandonment. This indicates that board 
monitoring may prevent value-destroying acquisitions reflecting managerial 
preferences. Paul (2007) analysed the influence of board composition in 
abandonment decisions. She found that independent boards were more likely to 
respond to significantly negative share price by abandoning bids, suggesting the 
share price reaction to a bid may reveal information about the motives for a bid but 
also indicate the role of boards in imposing discipline during the bidding process by 
forcing abandonment. Interestingly, this study did not investigate whether there 
was any further discipline after abandonment and whether board independence was 
important in that. It would enhance our knowledge of the nature of the disciplinary 
governance role of abandoned acquisitions by investigating the disciplinary 
experience of bidders, if any, after abandonment. 
 
5.42 Ownership 
 
For bidders, the presence of external ownership blocks may enhance monitoring 
since these shareholders will have a better incentive to monitor managers and 
prevent value-damaging acquisitions (Shliefer and Vishny, 1986). Gaspar, et al. 
(2005) found that institutional investors with short term investment horizons were 
associated with lower abnormal returns around bids and worse post-acquisition 
performance. This suggests that companies with short-term institutional investors 
will have weaker bargaining, enabling greater discretion by managers. On the other 
hand, Chen at al. (2007) found that long-term ownership blocks (longer than one 
year) were positively associated with post-acquisition performance, suggesting 
active monitoring by these groups, promoting value-enhancing acquisitions.  
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While a substantial body of research has investigated the role of ownership blocks 
in targets of abandoned bids, there is a dearth of research investigating the role 
such ownership blocks play in abandonment and afterwards. Investigating 
differences in the extent of ownership across bidding firms in abandoned 
acquisitions would extend knowledge of the governance safeguards provided by 
blocks. In addition, looking at the relationship between ownership blocks and 
disciplinary changes in bidders after abandonment would enable more to be learned 
about the nature of discipline imposed by abandoned acquisitions.   
 
5.43 Managerial Shareholdings 
 
As managerial theories of acquisitions suggest that managers use acquisitions to 
further their own preferences, it would be interesting to assess the managerial 
shareholdings of bidding companies in acquisitions, to investigate whether this has 
an impact on their acquisition strategies. Companies with substantial managerial 
share ownership would be more likely to pursue acquisition strategies that produce 
economic gains and enhance shareholder wealth. Wright et al. (2002), suggest that 
increased share ownership is an effective way of ensuring that managers pursue 
value-enhancing acquisitions. Anderson et al. (2004) found a negative relationship 
between managerial share ownership and premiums paid in their sample of bank 
acquisitions, suggesting that bidding managers with substantial stakes are more 
likely to avoid hubris. In support of this, Cornett et al. (2003) report a significantly 
positive association between managerial share ownership in bidders and excess 
returns to bidder shareholders.  
While studies of completed acquisitions have found that the corporate governance 
characteristics of bidders may influence the bidding process, there is a scarcity of 
research in this area in relation to bidding companies in abandoned acquisitions. An 
exception is Chang and Suk (1998) who investigated the returns to bidding 
companies in abandoned acquisitions and considered the information that may be 
conveyed by the extent of managerial share ownership. This was found to have an 
insignificant impact on bidder returns, suggesting it doesn‟t influence the bidding 
process. The lack of research means that additional work is required analysing the 
role of managerial incentives in the abandonment decision.   
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5.5 Summary of Ownership and Governance Characteristics 
 
The literature in this area is imbalanced. There is a significant body of literature 
which studies the corporate governance characteristics of targets of abandoned 
acquisitions. However, there is little work investigating the role of the board 
composition, ownership structure and managerial shareholding in unsuccessful 
bidders. There is a need for this research, given the scope for managerial discretion 
in the pursuit of acquisitions. The corporate governance literature shows that these 
characteristics have an influence on major corporate decisions. Denis and Serrano 
(1996) have investigated aspects of this in targets of abandoned acquisitions. More 
research in this area in relation to bidding firms is necessary to further understand 
the role of corporate governance characteristics in abandonment decisions. Of 
particular interest is the differential influence these characteristics have across 
bidders during abandoned acquisitions. In addition, their influence on the 
differential experience of bidders after abandonment would extend knowledge of 
the nature of the disciplinary impact, if any, of abandonment on bidding 
management.   
 
5.6 Transaction Characteristics 
 
Transaction characteristics represent another set of control variables used by the 
literature to differentiate between different transactions in acquisition activity. In 
addition, some transaction characteristics are important in determining whether a 
bid is abandoned or not. Research in this area has concentrated on several 
characteristics: target management resistance, the means of payment, the 
industrial relatedness of the two firms and the extent of the bid premium offered. 
The following sections discuss the main findings for each of these characteristics. 
 
5.61 Managerial Resistance 
 
The reaction of target management can reveal important information that can affect 
the outcome of a bid. In recommended or friendly bids, negotiations are likely to 
have taken place before the formal announcement and resistance will not be an 
issue. Both groups will work to encourage the target shareholders to accept a bid. 
However, in the case of hostile bids, resistance will have a big impact on the 
acquisition process and the eventual outcome.  
The acquisitions literature interprets target resistance in two ways. Either managers 
act in shareholders‟ interest or act to entrench their own position at the expense of 
shareholders‟ interests. In the former scenario, Wong and O‟Sullivan (2001) state 
that target management resistance may set off an auctioning process by soliciting 
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bids from other companies, with the aim of extracting a higher price for their 
company. This may mean that a target may eventually recommend a bid it initially 
rejected. On the other hand, target managers may pursue strategies in 
shareholders‟ interests to defeat a bid pursued for the managerial preferences of 
bidder managers. This may involve soliciting „white knight‟ bids. In either case, 
such strategies lead to competitive bidding between rival interests. This may have a 
considerable impact on the bidding process (see section 5.41 below). If target 
management resist, to entrench their own position, this may stop a bid being 
completed, preventing gains in performance which would have benefitted 
shareholders.  
Holl and Kyriazis (1996) report that the probability of a hostile bid succeeding was 
0.609, compared to 0.958 for a friendly bid. O‟Sullivan and Wong (1998) report 
that 47% of hostile bids in their sample were unsuccessful, compared to only 6% of 
friendly bids. A recent study of the newspaper sector in the US, Muelhlfeld et al. 
(2007) found that managerial resistance had a significant impact on the outcome of 
bids in their sample of abandoned mergers. In a recent study, Branch et al. (2008) 
found that target resistance was a significant determinant of acquisition success.  
In resistance, a number of strategies can be adopted. In the US, the variety of 
defensive measures available is much greater than in the UK. These include „golden 
parachutes‟, „poison pills‟ and „greenmail‟. Golden parachutes are substantial 
payments to senior managers in the event they are replaced. Poison pills are assets 
deliberately purchased by target managers to reduce the value of the target firm. 
These defences increase the costs attached to a bid reducing the potential return 
for the bidder. Greenmail is a defence where target managers use the firm‟s cash is 
used to buy the firms‟ own shares from the bidder. This defence wastes target 
resources in a bid to entrench managers‟ positions. In the UK, The City Code on 
Acquisitions and Mergers places restrictions on the extent of defensive measures 
used by targets in the UK. Sudarsanam (1995) highlights the two most popular 
defensive tools as profit reports (59% of cases) and promises of increased 
dividends (45%). Such information revelation during the acquisition process can 
overcome any perceived information asymmetries regarding the value of the target. 
However, evidence suggests that such information has no influence on the outcome 
of a bid (Sudarsanam, 1995; Brennan, 1999). Cooke et al. (1998: P.136) 
summarise the position well:  
“…the characteristics of defence documents…do not materially affect the 
outcome of a hostile bid. This is consistent with a view that the defence is 
undertaken not to correct mis-pricing of the target‟s stock by providing 
additional information to shareholders to remain independent, but rather to 
drive up the purchase consideration and increase shareholders‟ wealth”.  
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This is consistent with the aims of the Takeover Panel. Target shareholders should 
receive a „fair‟ price for their firm. The evidence on the impact of resistance is 
mixed. Some studies suggest that managerial resistance has a negative impact on 
target shareholders wealth (Dodd, 1980; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988), while others 
indicate that resistance may have a positive impact on target shareholders‟ wealth 
(Franks & Mayer, 1996; Holl & Kyriazis, 1997). Indeed, Holl & Kyriazis (1997) found 
that the benefit of managerial resistance persevere for at least two years after the 
outcome (whether completed or abandoned). The results imply that managerial 
resistance enhances the performance of targets. However, resistance increases the 
cost to bidders and makes bids susceptible to the winner‟s curse. Indeed, avoiding 
overpaying may be one reason why acquisitions are abandoned by bidders.  
However, the evidence is mixed. Early studies show significant abnormal returns to 
bidders in completed acquisitions (Bradley et al., 1983). More recent evidence 
looking at short-term returns (Walker, 2000) or long-term returns (Loughran and 
Vigh, 1997; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2006) did not find that bidders in hostile 
acquisitions earn significantly higher abnormal returns than bidders in friendly 
acquisitions. If resistance is a deterrent then many acquisitions which are pursued 
for sound economic reasons may not be consummated. In response to this, many 
bidders try to avoid hostility and the evidence from the Takeover Panel, revealed in 
chapter one, indicate that the incidence of hostile bids in the most recent wave of 
acquisition activity was almost half the incidence in previous waves.    
 
5.62 Means of Payment 
 
The characteristics of a bid, particularly the means of payment – cash, shares, 
debt, or any combination - may provide evidence on whether bids are motivated by 
shareholder‟s interests or managerial preferences. However, the choice of the 
means of payment is a complicated one.  
The concept of the winner‟s curse suggested by Roll (1986) is, to some extent, the 
result of asymmetric information. In addition to overconfidence, bidders may 
overpay due to uncertainties about the value of the target (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Hanson, 1987). Therefore, if a bidder is uncertain about the returns from a bid, 
they may tend to offer equity as the means of payment. This internalises the 
asymmetric information associated with the value of targets, since target 
shareholders will burden some of the potential valuation uncertainty. Conversely, 
where there is greater certainty about the outcome from a bid, cash may be used. 
Rai and Forsyth (2002) find that hostile bidders were more likely to use equity, 
suggesting concern about the higher premium required to gain control of a target. 
These results have been interpreted as cash bids being motivated by economic 
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rationales and equity bids motivated by managerial preferences. Issues regarding 
misvaluations and acquisition activity are explained differently by Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003). They propose that overvalued firms use equity as a means of 
payment in order to acquire assets at a discount. In their market-timing model, the 
use of equity benefits bidders‟ shareholders at the expense of target shareholders.  
Stultz (1988) investigates the issue of the means of payment in the context of 
corporate control. His findings suggest bidders with more diffuse share ownership 
will use equity financing. One the other hand, if there are significant ownership 
blocks held in the target, cash financing may be used to avoid diminishing the 
bidder‟s shareholders control (Chang et al., 2009). This is particularly the case with 
growing firms which rely on debt financing to maintain managements‟ control. Cash 
transactions tend to require the use of debt financing and this can have a 
disciplining effect on managers (Stultz, 1990; Harris and Raviv, 1990). However, 
debt financing raises issues of financial distress and this can also influence the 
financing decision (Gadhaum et al., 2003). Alternatively, a cash bid may be 
evidence of significant free cash on the part of the bidder, and a sign that a bid is 
likely to be driven by managerial preferences rather than economic reasons 
(Jensen, 1986).  
Empirical studies using stock market data find that cash acquisitions produce lower 
negative abnormal returns around announcement for acquirers compared to equity 
acquisitions (Travlos, 1987; Andrade, et al., 2001). This disputes Jensen‟s free cash 
flow hypothesis, but supports the view that cash suggests greater certainty in the 
outcome for both bidder and target shareholders, or induces greater discipline on 
bidding managers,  through the use of debt. On the other hand, the announcement 
of an equity-financed bid may be interpreted as a signal of overvalued equity, 
leading to a downward correction. Using accounting measures of performance, 
Ghosh (2001) found a significant link between cash acquisitions and post-
acquisition improvements in cash flow while equity acquisitions are associated with 
reductions in cash flow afterwards. These ex-post findings reinforce the view that 
cash acquisitions produce more positive outcomes. 
The means of payment can play an important role in determining whether a bid will 
be successful or not. Empirical evidence suggests that cash bids are more likely to 
be successful (see for example Muehlfeld et al. 2007).  This may be because target 
shareholders prefer the certainty associated with cash. The use of equity produces 
ambiguity in determining the outcome for target shareholders. In addition, the 
means of payment can play a role in determining whether managers are resistant 
or not. Equity tends to elicit greater resistance. For instance, Sudarsanam (1995) 
found that equity reduces the likelihood that targets of hostile bids will be 
56 
 
successfully acquired. Target shareholders must trade-off the tax benefits of equity 
with the liquidity and risk-minimising benefits of cash (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). 
This means they may prefer cash to equity as the means of payment in 
transactions. However, this is an aspect of abandoned acquisitions which requires 
further investigation.  
The means of payment may reveal information about the motives of abandoned 
bidders, and hence signal the need for discipline. However, Chang and Suk (1998) 
found that it did not have a significant impact on bidders‟ returns in abandonment 
disputing the informational content. Meanwhile, Cole et al. (2006) found that cash 
bidders earned significant abnormal returns around the abandonment, while non-
cash bidders did not. This positive response to the abandonment of cash bids 
supports Jensen‟s view that such bids are more likely to be driven by managerial 
preferences. This suggests an information signal for the means of payment as part 
of corporate governance. More recently, Savor and Lu (2009) using event study 
methods, found that unsuccessful equity bidders endure significantly negative 
returns compared to unsuccessful cash bidders. Indeed,  
“…bid failure is not costly for shareholders of cash bidders” (p.1065).  
They suggest these findings support the view that overvalued firms use acquisitions 
to acquire assets at a discount. These conflicting explanations suggest this is an 
area which requires further investigation.  
Finally, Maloney, et al.(1990) and Barclay and Smith (1995) propose that debt has 
incentive effects that influence managerial decisions. Firms which are highly geared 
are more likely to make value-enhancing acquisitions. Therefore, there should be a 
negative relationship between bidder returns and gearing ratios at the time of 
abandonment. In their study this was found to be insignificant, suggesting no role 
for gearing in disciplining managers. However, there are few studies in this area, so 
there would be great benefit from additional investigation. 
 
5.63 Industrial Relatedness 
 
The issue of relatedness between bidders and targets derives from Rumelt (1982). 
Higher degrees of relatedness are largely associated with better post-acquisition 
performance (Peltier, 2004), supporting efficiency from economies of scale 
(horizontal mergers) and scope (vertical mergers), as important motives for such 
acquisitions. Related acquisitions may also produce benefits of corporate control 
since it is more difficult to assess the performance of managers in diversified 
ownership structures. Unrelated acquisitions will not produce the same level of 
synergistic benefits – at best related to finance, administration and governance. 
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Indeed, unrelated acquisitions may be part of excessive acquisitions by bidder 
managers pursuing higher growth at the expense of better performance (Jensen, 
1986). A number of studies identify industrial relatedness as a significant factor in 
post-acquisition performance. Related acquisitions tend to elicit higher abnormal 
returns than unrelated acquisitions (Gregory, 1997; Maquieira et al., 1998), 
anticipating positive gains for shareholders, based on the analysis above. However, 
the concept of a „diversification discount‟ has been the subject of much debate 
recently. For example, Campa and Kedia (2002) argue that firms tend to diversify 
because of poor performance in existing saturated markets, not that diversification 
causes poor performance. Burch et al. (2004) found that fewer growth 
opportunities and higher concentration in an industry provides incentives for the 
restructuring and reorientation of companies, sometimes involving diversification.   
In relation to abandoned bids, Muehlfeld et al. (2007) argue that the degree of 
relatedness may have an influence on the bid outcome. If the companies concerned 
are unrelated, and so, less familiar with one another, it may increase the potential 
costs associated with an acquisition. This may make abandonment more likely. On 
the other hand, such mergers are less likely to attract the attention of regulators, 
reducing the probability of abandonment for that reason. On the other hand, 
horizontal mergers involving firms from the same industry may be subjected to 
closer regulatory scrutiny, raising the probability of abandonment due to 
competition implications. In relation to the governance role of abandoned 
acquisitions, unrelated bids may be a sign of excessive acquisitiveness by bidder 
managers (Jensen, 1986). Hence, it may be argued that governance mechanisms, 
within bidders, may force the abandonment of such bids. However, Muehlfeld et al. 
(2007), in their study of newspaper M&A in the 1980s and 1990s, did not find this 
to be a significant determinant of bid outcome. The information contained in this 
characteristic is an area requiring further investigation. Of particular interest is the 
relationship between the degree of industrial relatedness and post-abandonment 
changes in bidders. This characteristic may reveal information about the motives of 
managers in making bids, which, through corporate governance in the bidding 
process leads to abandonment.      
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5.64 Bid Premium 
 
The higher the bid premium, the more likely target shareholders will accept a bid 
and the greater the likelihood of a bid being successful. Holl and Kyriazis (1996) 
find support for this hypothesis in their general sample of all acquisitions. However, 
in a sub-sample of hostile acquisitions more likely to be disciplinary, there is no 
such distinction. Franks and Mayer (1996) also explore the impact of the bid 
premium on the bid outcome. They distinguished two scenarios. Firstly, bids where 
there was management resistance, but the bids ultimately succeeded, and 
secondly, bids where there was management resistance, but the bids failed. They 
found significantly higher premiums paid in the former case. Therefore, once again 
there is a link between target management resistance and other factors. Hence, the 
evidence suggests that the reaction of target management has an important 
bearing on the outcome, through its interaction with other factors. The interaction 
of different factors may have an important bearing on the outcome of acquisitions, 
yet it is not clearly understood. Most studies shy away from modelling the dynamics 
of the bidding process, because of the complexities involved. However, such 
research is necessary in order to enhance our knowledge of the dynamics of the 
acquisition process. The next section discusses the limited research on the bidding 
process.  
 
5.7 Bidding Process 
 
Assuming underlying economic motives for acquisitions, both bidders and targets 
want to gain from transactions. A number of factors have an influence on the 
bidding process which influences the progress and outcome, creating the potential 
for great complexity.    
 
5.71 Valuation and Offer Price 
 
From a shareholder perspective, bidders want to complete positive NPV 
acquisitions, but may be concerned about the winner‟s curse. The temptation is to 
systematically undercut the anticipated value of the target. However, such actions 
may make failure more likely. In addition, another way of avoiding the winner‟s 
curse is to offer equity (see section 5.32 above). By doing so, the asymmetric 
information associated with the value of the target is internalised. However, studies 
show that equity bids are more likely to fail compared to cash ones (Muehlfeld et al. 
2007). Indeed, this possibility may deter the use of equity as a means of payment. 
The complex interaction between these variables during the bidding process needs 
to be analysed more.    
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5.72 Rival Bids 
 
Officer (2003) points out that a formal bid by a company can reveal information to 
the market about the availability of the target‟s assets which may elicit rival bids. 
Competitive bidding tends to increase the returns to target shareholders at the 
expense of bidders‟ shareholders (See Schwert, 1996, for example). Indeed, as 
discussed in section 5.31, target management may elicit rival bids to try and raise 
the offer price. This can lead to the abandonment of one of the bids if a higher price 
is offered by a rival bidder. This is particularly the case if the rival bid provides 
certainty by using cash as the means of payment. Again, this shows a complex 
interaction between variables. Chang and Suk (1998) investigated the impact of the 
number of bidders on abandoned bidder returns when they made their 
announcement and found it was not significant.  
Holl and Pickering (1988) found that, on average, unsuccessful bidders were more 
profitable than their successful counterparts, but less liquid and with lower levels of 
gearing. This supports the assertion repeated at several points in this chapter that 
cash bids, derived from superior liquidity, are more likely to be successful. This 
suggests the failed bidder‟s abandonment decision was taken with their 
shareholders‟ interests in mind. Indeed, Kummer and Steger (2008) propose that 
such abandonment can be explained as avoiding the winner‟s curse, especially 
when rivals are paying high premiums. Hence, the presence of rival bidders can 
play an important role in abandoned acquisitions. Its interaction with other 
contingent variables can have important implications for an acquisition process. 
However, the complexity of the interactions between actual and potential bidders 
and targets has deterred analysis. However, such analysis would be valuable in 
extending our knowledge of the bidding process. 
  
5.73 Competition Issues 
 
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) reviews the competition implications of a potential 
bid in the UK. The decision to refer or not refer a bid to the Competition 
Commission can reveal important information about whether a bid will succeed or 
be abandoned. If a formal inquiry is announced, then the transaction costs 
associated with a bid escalates (Arnold and Parker, 2007). In order to avoid these 
transaction costs, bidders may respond to the referral of their bid to the 
competition authorities by voluntarily abandoning it. Forbes (1994) found that this 
was particularly the case for those bidders which experienced share price declines 
at announcement. He concluded that such bids were most likely to produce the 
lowest returns, and so, managerially motivated. Therefore, it would be worth 
investigating whether referral, and subsequent abandonment, has a disciplinary 
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impact. Little work has been done analysing the impact of competition issues after 
abandonment. This requires further investigation to assess whether referrals to the 
competition authorities have an influence on the differential experiences of bidders 
after abandonment. 
 
5.74 Summary of the Bidding Process 
 
There are a number of factors which can influence the course of a bidding process. 
This section has reviewed several. It is demonstrated that these factors have a 
crucial bearing on decision-making in the bidding process. However, it has been 
shown that these factors may interact, in potentially complex ways, to influence the 
course of a bidding process and its aftermath. In addition, their influence is related, 
to some extent, to the transaction characteristics of particular bids. It is not clearly 
understood how, and in what circumstances, these characteristics and factors 
interact during a bidding process. This is a gap in the literature which needs to be 
addressed if more is to be learned about the governance role of abandoned 
acquisitions. 
 
6. Conclusion and Proposals for Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This chapter has reviewed the theory and empirical evidence surrounding corporate 
mergers and acquisition activity. In section 2, the motives for acquisition activity 
are discussed. The motives fall into two categories; motives which anticipate better 
performance and enhanced value as a result of acquisitions and motives which 
anticipate poorer performance, reducing value. Empirical work in this field is 
dominated by either event studies of share price returns or accounting studies of 
operating performance. In these studies, a large number of firm characteristics, 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process have been 
used as control instruments to distinguish differing impacts of acquisitions across 
companies in an effort to test the different theories. However, there are some 
major methodological issues with these techniques. Alternative research strategies 
would provide a different way of analysing acquisitions and add to our knowledge of 
acquisitions by answering questions in a way which event studies or accounting 
studies cannot.    
Abandoned acquisitions provide a different perspective on the acquisition process. 
In section 4, it is demonstrated that theoretical conceptions and empirical evidence 
suggest that the bidding process between announcement and completion is an 
important element in determining economic efficiency in the allocation of resources 
(Muehlfeld et al., 2007). The majority of studies which analyse the bidding process 
and its aftermath have focused on the disciplinary role of abandoned acquisitions 
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on target firms. They suggest that in some situations where abandonment was 
initiated by targets, information was revealed by a bid about the targets‟ 
management which produced management changes, strategic changes, financial 
restructuring afterwards. These tended to improve performance. Researchers point 
to this as evidence of the market for corporate control, interacting with internal 
governance mechanisms, being effective in disciplining self-serving managers, by 
removing them or forcing them to improve performance. 
However, abandoned acquisitions may also have a governance role in disciplining 
managers in bidding firms for pursuing bids which further their own preferences. 
Section 4 demonstrated that research investigating the impact of abandonment on 
bidders is more limited. While research has analysed the impact of abandonment on 
the subsequent stock market and accounting measures of performance regarding 
abandoned bidders, there has been little work on other aspects regarding the 
impact of abandonment on bidders. An analysis of the differential experiences of 
bidders after abandoned acquisitions should enhance our knowledge of the 
effectiveness of the acquisition process in disciplining self-serving managers 
following their own preferences. Differences across abandoned bidders in relation to 
qualitative issues such as organisational restructuring, management turnover, asset 
and financial restructuring and whether bidders become acquisition targets 
themselves may provide different evidence regarding the effectiveness of the 
acquisition process in disciplining self-serving managers of bidding companies. The 
findings of such an analysis would make a valuable contribution to our knowledge 
of the impact of corporate acquisition activity on the firms concerned.   
In addition, it would extend knowledge of abandoned acquisitions if more evidence 
was collected on the underlying mechanisms of the bidding process itself. This 
chapter has shown that the literature on target firms asserts that post-
abandonment changes in those companies involves the interaction of firm 
characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding 
process (see Jensen, 1986; Hirschleifer and Thakor, 1994 & 1998; Denis and 
Serrano, 1996), interacting in situations where poorly performing managers are 
disciplined and abandonment plays a governance role in targets.  
This analysis can be extended to bidding firms. Section 4 proposed that abandoned 
acquisitions may play a governance role in bidders too. However, this review has 
shown that research in this area is limited. Throughout section 5, this review has 
demonstrated the scarcity of literature regarding the board characteristics, 
ownership characteristics and managerial shareholding of bidders in abandoned 
acquisitions. Since these characteristics are important in providing the scope and 
incentives for managers to pursue bids reflecting their own preferences, this is an 
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important gap in the literature. More importantly, analysing the interaction of these 
characteristics of bidders, transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the 
bidding process can provide some guidance on the mechanisms of information 
revelation in a bidding process and identify the nature of the processes responsible 
for differences in the impact of abandonment on bidders – processes which lead to 
a disciplinary impact where abandoned acquisitions play a governance role, and 
processes which do not have a disciplinary impact and abandoned acquisitions do 
not play a governance role. By tracing the interaction of these variables through to 
the impact of abandonment, our understanding of the corporate governance role of 
the acquisition process for bidders will be enhanced. This contribution to knowledge 
will be the focus of research in this thesis. The conceptual innovations developed, 
and empirical innovations applied in this research, are discussed in the next two 
chapters.     
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Table 2.6 Summary of Empirical Evidence of Abandoned Acquisitions using Control 
Variables 
Panel A: Pre-bid Performance of Targets and Bidders 
Study Main Findings 
Limmack (1991) 
UK 
529 bidders and 552 targets 
between 1977-1986 
Targets of abandoned bids exhibited significant 
negative abnormal returns. 
Bidders in abandoned acquisitions exhibited 
insignificantly negative abnormal returns. The 
performance was not significantly different from 
bidders in completed acquisitions. 
Holl and Pickering (1988) 
UK 
50 abandoned mergers and 
50 successful mergers and 
33 contested bids between 
1965-1975 
Targets of abandoned bids had significantly worse 
pre-bid performance than targets of completed 
bids.  
Abandoned bidders had weaker pre-bid 
performance compared to successful bidders and 
their targets. 
Taffler and Holl (1991) 
UK  
129 targets of completed 
acquisitions, 55 abandoned 
targets and 76 bidders 
between 1977-81.  
Unsuccessful bidders were less profitable, less 
liquid and had higher financial risk compared to 
their targets.  
 
Panel B: Determinants of Abandonment 
Study Main Findings 
O‟Sullivan and Wong (1998) 
UK 
269 targets of completed 
bids and 62 targets of 
abandoned bids between 
1989-1995 
 
 
Target board size and composition did not have a 
significant influence on abandonment 
Presence of external ownership blocks in targets 
had no significant influence on outcome. 
Target management shareholdings had a 
significant influence on outcome. 
Kini, Kracow and Mian (2004) 
279 targets of successful 
tender offers between 1979-
1998 
 
Targets with smaller, more independent boards 
were more likely to be acquired. 
Targets with lower external ownership blocks 
were more likely to be acquired. 
Targets with higher managerial shareholding were 
more likely to be acquired.  
Holl and Kyriazis (1996) 
UK 
238 bids (133 friendly and 
105 hostile) 
177 completed and 60 
abandoned 
Target management resistance had a significant 
impact on outcome. 
The higher the bid premium, the more likely a bid 
was successful. 
Muelhfeld et al. (2007) 
US  
2632 completed and 983 
abandoned bids related to 
the newspaper sector 
between 1981-2000 
Target management resistance had a significant 
impact on outcome. 
Cash bids are more likely to be successful. 
Industrial relatedness had no significant impact 
on outcome. 
Sudarsanam (1995) 
UK 
238 hostile acquisitions 
between 1983-1989 
The use of equity financing reduces the likelihood 
of a successful acquisition. 
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Panel C: Differential Effects of Control Variables on the Impact of 
Abandonment  
Study Main Findings 
Franks, Mayer & Harris 
(1986) 
86 mergers referred to 
M.M.C. between 1963-1985 
UK 
MMC rejection has a negative impact on returns 
to target shareholders. 
MMC rejection has no significant impact on 
returns to bidder shareholders. 
Holl & Kyriasis (1997) 
238 bids between 1980-1989 
UK 
Abandoned target shareholders in hostile bids 
retain abnormal gains for at least two years 
afterwards. 
Chang and Suk (1998) 
US 
279 abandoned mergers 
between 1982-1990 
Managerial share ownership had an insignificant 
impact on the returns to bidders after 
abandonment. 
The means of payment had no significant impact 
of the returns to bidders around the 
announcement of abandonment. 
The number of rival bidders was not significant in 
determining variations in bidder returns at 
abandonment. 
Cole et al. (2006) 
US 
220 abandoned mergers 
between 1991-2000 
Cash bidders earned significantly positive 
abnormal returns around abandonment 
Non-cash bidders did not. 
  
Savur and Lu (2009) 
US 
1773 acquisitions between 
1978-2003 
Cash bidders did not earn significant abnormal 
returns after abandonment. 
Equity bidders did suffer significantly negative 
abnormal returns after abandonment. 
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Chapter Three: The Governance Role of Abandoned 
Acquisitions: A Novel Conceptual Framework 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Abandoned acquisitions may play a corporate governance role for acquiring firms. 
In certain circumstances, abandonment may lead to the disciplining of managers in 
bidding firms for attempting acquisitions, which further their own preferences such 
as control over resources, prestige and growth. However, as the literature review 
demonstrated, the evidence regarding the impact of abandonment on bidding firms 
is limited. There are periodic attempts to identify the causes of abandonment (for 
example Muehlfeld et al., 2007), or analyse the differential impact on share prices 
of bidding firm‟s characteristics and transaction characteristics, to determine the 
influence these have on the response of investors in bidding firms to abandonment 
(Cole et al., 2006). However, much is still not known. Unlike target firms, there has 
been no systematic attempt to analyse the governance role of acquisitions for 
bidding firms. Some studies suggest such an influence (see for example Lehn and 
Zhao, 2006). An investigation of the experience of bidding companies during 
abandoned acquisitions, and afterwards, would enhance knowledge of the situations 
where abandoned acquisitions have a governance role, compared to situations 
where abandoned acquisitions do not have a governance role. This research aims to 
make an original contribution to the literature on abandoned acquisitions, by 
investigating both the nature and scope of the impact of abandonment and the 
underlying mechanisms of abandonment in these different situations.  
The existing literature leaves several important research questions unanswered. 
While research has analysed the impact of abandonment on bidding firms through 
subsequent stock market and accounting measures of performance, there has been 
little work studying different aspects of impact which may provide guidance on 
post-abandonment discipline. An analysis of some of these qualitative changes in 
target firms, consistent with discipline, has been conducted (see for example, Denis 
& Serrano, 1996). However, the differential experiences of bidders after abandoned 
acquisitions in relation to appropriate organisational changes, management 
turnover, asset and financial restructuring, and whether bidders become acquisition 
targets themselves, have not been documented for bidding firms in abandoned 
acquisitions (Wong and O‟Sullivan, 2001). A systematic analysis of such changes in 
bidders should enhance our knowledge of the how abandoned acquisitions play a 
governance role in disciplining self-serving managers following their own 
preferences. Consequently, the following research questions can be formalised: 
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Answering these questions will enable the research to distinguish between bidders 
which experience discipline after abandonment from those which do not experience 
discipline. This should help reveal information about the anticipated impact of 
different abandoned acquisitions, distinguishing abandoned acquisitions which have 
a governance role from those which do not.  
In addition to answering the above questions regarding the impact of 
abandonment, the research intends to extend knowledge of the acquisition process 
itself, and particularly its governance role, by analysing the underlying mechanisms 
of abandonment. For target firms, the literature asserts that the governance role of 
abandoned acquisitions involves the interaction of certain firm characteristics, 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process to produce 
the post-abandonment discipline of under-performing managers (Hirschleifer and 
Thakor, 1994 & 1998). It may be anticipated that the governance role of 
abandoned acquisitions for bidding firms would involve the interaction of similar 
groups of variables. However, knowledge of the interaction of such characteristics 
in bidding firms, in abandoned acquisitions, is relatively sparse. Consequently, this 
research aims to contribute to the literature by addressing a further set of research 
questions: 
 
     
 
 
 
 
To do this effectively, a new approach to the analysis of the acquisition process has 
been adopted. The interaction of the characteristics of bidders, transaction 
characteristics and contingent factors, leading to changes in bidders after 
abandonment, suggests a causal process. In such a process, this research proposes 
that the phenomenon of abandoned acquisitions can be framed in terms of 
antecedent characteristics, interceding characteristics and outcomes (Steinberg, 
2007). To analyse the causal processes in abandoned acquisitions, the underlying 
What changes happen in bidding firms after an abandoned acquisition? 
Are these changes consistent with discipline? 
 
What is the nature of the underlying mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions 
which produced post-abandonment discipline of bidders‟ managers? 
What is the nature of the underlying mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions 
which did not produce post-abandonment discipline of bidders‟ managers? 
To what extent are the mechanisms different? 
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mechanisms present in abandoned acquisitions need to be identified. This requires 
a fresh approach to the analysis of abandoned acquisitions. This fresh approach 
involves two stages. Firstly, the research develops of a novel, multi-dimensional 
conceptual framework, reflecting the nature of the causal processes which define 
the distinctive underlying mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions. The framework 
must encapsulate the relevant bidding firm characteristics, transaction 
characteristics, contingent factors in the bidding process and outcomes of 
abandonment. Secondly, the research uses appropriate research methods to 
investigate the research questions and the conceptual framework in a valid way. In 
such a framework, the analysis of abandoned acquisitions requires the use of causal 
process tracing (CPT) to reveal, in a detailed, fine-grained manner, the different 
underlying mechanisms responsible for any differences in the experiences of 
bidders after abandonment. These conceptual and empirical innovations in the 
analysis of abandoned acquisitions will enhance understanding of its corporate 
governance role, particularly for bidding firms.   
This chapter discusses the development of the novel conceptual framework. The 
next chapter discusses the innovative application of causal process tracing in the 
conduct of fieldwork within the context of the conceptual framework. Both the novel 
conceptual framework and the application of causal process tracing represent 
aspects of the original contribution that this research makes to knowledge.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the development of the 
conceptual framework which supports the research effort. This proposes the 
interactions of variables suggested by different strands of existing literature - the 
interaction of variables in the causal processes of cases where abandoned 
acquisitions may play a governance role compared to cases where abandonment 
does not play a governance role. Section 3 explains how the disparate elements 
interact in different causal mechanisms, producing different anticipated outcomes 
after abandonment. Section 4 is the summary and conclusion.    
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2. Development of the Novel Conceptual Framework 
 
Answering the research questions specified in section 1 involves analysing the 
causal processes in abandoned acquisitions. This guided the development of the 
conceptual framework and the use of causal process tracing (CPT). Bennett and 
Ellman (2006) point to the use of CPT methods as a valid and useful tool for the 
analysis of complex causations. While CPT has been used in a variety of social 
sciences for theory development, it can be used deductively to test and refine 
existing theory (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Given the extensive literature for 
corporate acquisitions and corporate governance, it is appropriate to use a 
hypothetic- deductive approach to advance the novel conceptual framework for the 
research (Popper, 1968). Hence, a „theory first‟ approach is adopted to develop the 
novel conceptual framework. This is embedded within this existing theoretical and 
empirical literature explaining abandoned acquisitions. 
However, while the existing theoretical and empirical literature on target firms in 
abandoned acquisitions has suggested that certain characteristics of the firm, 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process play a role 
in abandonment and its aftermath, the analysis is fragmented. The literature either 
focuses on firm characteristics in the context of agency theory (Jensen, 1986), or, 
information revelation in the bidding process (Hirschleifer & Thakor, 1994 & 1998), 
or disciplinary changes in firms after abandonment (Denis & Serrano, 1996). There 
has been limited work drawing these elements together in the case of bidding 
firms. This involves investigating how firm characteristics, transaction 
characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process interact, producing 
abandonment and disciplinary changes in bidders afterwards. These interactions 
may be complex. During the acquisition process,  
“…the two firms, the market and investors continue to receive new 
information regarding the deal and firm values as the negotiation process 
unfolds.”  
(Hotchkiss et al., 2005, p.1) 
Such complexities have dissuaded significant work in the area (Weston et al., 
2004). However, such work is necessary to enhance our understanding of the 
governance role of abandoned acquisitions for bidding firms. It requires the 
different approach proposed by this research.    
Therefore, the research makes an original contribution to knowledge by developing 
a framework which characterises the acquisition process in a fresh way, capturing 
the complexities of the interaction of bidding firm characteristics, transaction 
characteristics and contingent factors. Therefore, this research characterises the 
acquisition process and its aftermath as a multifaceted causal network, with 
69 
 
antecedent variables interacting with interceding variables in complex ways to 
produce abandonment and impact bidders afterwards. This should reveal the 
different causal mechanisms which produce different outcomes after abandoned 
acquisitions. In some cases, the interaction may represent a governance 
mechanism whereby the impact is disciplinary. In other cases, the interaction will 
not represent a governance mechanism and the impact will not be disciplinary. By 
answering the research questions this research aim to identify differentiated meta-
causal mechanisms and outcomes (Miles and Huberman, 1994).   
This is a mechanism-based explanation for changes in bidders after abandonment. 
The mechanisms are real, though not necessarily material. The real but intangible 
nature of some mechanisms means they cannot be identified by direct observation. 
Their presence and action is therefore inferred. The mechanisms are also context 
dependent – dependent on configurations of antecedent variables. In some 
contexts the mechanisms have profound impacts, while in other contexts they are 
dormant (Richards, 2009).  
In order to address the research questions, there is a need to investigate how 
different characteristics and variables interact to produce abandonment, and how 
they provide guidance on subsequent changes in bidders. It includes three distinct 
groups of variables proposed by different elements of the literature, but drawn 
together to express the causal process through which abandonment takes place and 
determine its impact on the bidder. These groups are: 
 Antecedent bidder characteristics: (Characteristics of the bidding firm at the 
time of the abandoned bid): This is the context in which an abandoned bid takes 
place. If these characteristics are configured in a certain way, these provide the 
necessary scope and discretion for bids driven by managerial preferences. 
Hence, these characteristics may provide information about the anticipated 
gains from an acquisition and whether abandonment fulfils a governance role 
(Jensen, 1986; O‟Sullivan and Wong, 1998; Kini, et al., 2004; Gregory, 2005; 
Wright et al, 2002; Perry and Shivdasani, 2005; Paul, 2007). 
 Interceding variables: (Transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the 
bidding process): These interceding variables reveal mechanisms by which 
abandonment occurs. If these interceding variables are configured with the 
antecedent characteristics in a particular way to produce abandonment, they 
may be evidence of a governance role for abandoned acquisitions. However, if 
the configuration is different, it suggests a particular abandoned acquisition 
does not have a governance role (Hirschleifer and Thakor, 1994, Holl and 
Kyriazis, 1996; Officer, 2003; Arnold and Parker, 2007; Branch et al., 2008; 
Kummer and Steger, 2008). 
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 Outcome variables (Changes in bidders after abandonment). Some of the 
changes in bidders can be characterised as „disciplinary‟, and so, is the outcome 
of a causal process which fulfils a governance role. Other changes after 
abandonment will not be consistent with discipline so will be the outcome of a 
causal process which does not have a governance role. Indeed, if there is no 
impact this suggests abandonment does not have a governance role in those 
circumstances (Pickering, 1983; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Denis and Serrano, 
1996; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Franks and Mayer, 1996; Haynes et al., 2000; 
Huson et al., 2001; Perry and Shivdasani, 2005; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). 
Each of variables in these groups are discussed in the following sections. They will 
then be drawn together to propose a set of relationships between the variables 
whereby an abandoned acquisition may play a governance role – a „typological‟ 
framework (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
 
2.1 Outcomes: New Perspectives on the Differential Experiences of Bidders 
after Abandonment 
 
The first stage in the development of the causal processes involving abandoned 
acquisitions is establishing the outcome variables (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
These outcome variables are (i) changes in bidders after abandonment which can 
be characterised as disciplinary and (ii) changes in bidders after abandonment 
which cannot be characterised as disciplinary. There are several areas where 
changes in bidders can happen after abandonment which the literature interprets as 
discipline - the extent of governance changes in bidders after abandonment such as 
the replacement of senior managers, whether bidders are subsequently acquired, 
whether there is substantial asset / financial restructuring coupled with changes in 
strategy could suggest that the acquisition process operates as a corporate 
governance mechanism. The absence of these changes suggests no disciplinary 
outcome of abandonment. 
 
2.11 Dimensions of Change in Bidders after Abandonment 
 
Firstly, Pickering (1983) highlighted strategic changes in some of the bidding firms 
in his sample. Such strategic changes can be interpreted as disciplinary, especially 
if it is associated with other disciplinary changes. Secondly, the acquisition of 
ownership blocks after abandonment may be a disciplinary response to information 
revealed during the bidding process (Denis and Serrano, 1996). It is anticipated 
that the acquisition of ownership blocks may be associated with other changes after 
abandonment, since these ownership blocks will try to force changes in the firm. 
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Thirdly, several studies point to management changes as a disciplinary governance 
response in targets of abandoned bids (Franks and Mayer, 1996; Kennedy and 
Limmack, 1996; Huson et al, 2001). The same discipline could be imposed on the 
management of bidding firms in certain situations. The replacement of senior 
managers after abandonment may be the outcome of a causal process where an 
abandoned acquisition performs a governance role. If senior managers are not 
replaced, then, it is less likely that the abandoned acquisition had a disciplinary 
impact. 
Fourthly, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) found that bidders in many acquisitions with 
poor post-acquisition performance were themselves, subsequently acquired. This 
could be extended to bidders which propose bids driven by managerial preferences 
likely to have a detrimental effect on shareholders‟ returns. A subsequent 
acquisition or indeed bid for the company may be a disciplinary response to a 
causal process where an abandoned acquisition performs a governance role.  
Fifthly, studies show bidding companies engage in significant disposals of assets as 
shareholders force the divestment of poorly performing assets acquired by 
managers (Haynes et al., 2000). Such asset restructuring could be the disciplinary 
outcome of a causal process where abandonment plays a governance role (Perry 
and Shivdasani, 2005). In contrast, either asset acquisitions, or the absence of 
significant asset restructuring after abandonment, are not consistent with discipline. 
It would be anticipated that such outcomes would not be the result of abandoned 
acquisitions performing a governance role. Alternative causal mechanism in these 
abandoned acquisitions would be present.  
Sixthly, Barclay and Smith (1995) propose financial restructuring as part of a 
disciplinary response to managers pursuing investments which conflict with 
shareholders‟ interests. Increased gearing can be used to commit managers to 
significant interest payments and reduce the extent of available free cash flow to be 
misused by managers. Such financial restructuring could be part of a disciplinary 
reaction to abandonment and evidence of a governance role preventing a bid 
reflecting managerial preferences being completed. The absence of such 
restructuring suggests the abandoned acquisition does not perform a governance 
role.  
Table 3.1 documents dimensions of change after abandonment with their reference 
from the literature. 
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Table 3.1: Dimensions of Change in Bidders after Abandonment 
Changes after Abandonment Reference 
Strategic Changes Pickering (1983) 
 
Management Changes Franks and Mayer (1996), Kennedy and 
Limmack, (1996), Lehn and Zhao (2006) 
 
Acquisition Mitchell and Lehn (1990), Lehn and Zhao 
(2006) 
 
Asset Disposals Haynes et al. (2000), Perry and 
Shivdasani, (2005) 
 
Increased Gearing Jensen (1986), Barclay and Smith (1995) 
 
 
These are examples of changes that can arise in bidders after abandonment, but 
this list isn‟t exhaustive and there may be a range of other changes in bidders after 
abandonment. The conceptual framework and the nature of the research design 
enable these changes to be identified and analysed. 
 
2.12 Multiple Dimensions of Change: Disciplinary Governance Processes 
after Abandonment 
 
The existing literature focuses on the changes described above as evidence of 
discipline. It is anticipated that the bidding firms will experience significant changes 
along multiple dimensions. Therefore, in this conceptual framework it is proposed 
that the analysis should not focus on these changes independently. In order to 
further differentiate bidders after abandonment in order to clarify the disciplinary 
impact of abandoned acquisitions, particular sequences of changes after 
abandonment must be identified. These derive directly from the conceptualisation 
of abandoned acquisitions as a disciplinary causal process. The identification of 
particular sequences can provide further evidence, enabling the research to better 
distinguish a disciplinary process after abandonment from one which is non-
disciplinary. Hence, potential sequences of changes in bidders along the dimensions 
of change are developed. This reflects anticipated disciplinary processes after 
abandonment, enhancing the separation of cases.  
The different sequences proposed are displayed in Figures 3.1 to 3.4. The use of 
diagrams is a way of illustrating the presence of a disciplinary process. This 
represents the outcomes phase of the wider causal processes demonstrating a 
governance role for abandoned acquisitions (George & Bennett, 2005). These 
sequences suggest that certain changes after abandonment are triggers to a 
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disciplinary sequence after abandonment, while others changes are the outcome of 
the disciplinary sequence.  
In this conceptual framework, it is proposed the acquisition of ownership blocks, 
changes in senior management and announced changes in strategy, are not  
disciplinary outcomes. These changes can be triggers to a disciplinary process if 
they are followed by significant changes in the bidder through anticipated asset 
disposals, increased gearing and/or subsequent acquisition of the bidding firm. 
Asset disposals, increased gearing and subsequent acquisition of the bidder are 
significant disciplinary outcomes of the governance process which can be triggered 
by these initial changes or happen independently. The anticipated post-
abandonment disciplinary sequences are explained below. 
 
2.13 Acquisition of Ownership Blocks after Abandonment  
 
Derived from Denis and Serrano (1996) the acquisition of ownership blocks after 
abandonment may be a disciplinary response to information revealed during the 
bidding process. In this framework, it is proposed that the ownership block triggers 
a disciplinary process encompassing several possible sequences. Five different 
disciplinary sequences can be delineated. These sequences are labelled A-E in 
figure 3.1 and described below. 
 Sequence A: The acquisition of an ownership block leads to a change in strategy 
and the replacement of the CEO. This leads to substantial asset disposals, 
and/or increased gearing, or subsequent acquisition. 
 Sequence B: The acquisition of an ownership block leads to a change in 
strategy. This leads to substantial asset disposals, and/or increased gearing, or 
subsequent acquisition. 
 Sequence C: The acquisition of an ownership block leads directly to substantial 
asset disposals, and/or increased gearing, or subsequent acquisition. 
 Sequence D: The acquisition of an ownership block leads to the replacement of 
the CEO. This leads to substantial asset disposals, and/or increased gearing, or 
subsequent acquisition. 
 Sequence E: The acquisition of an ownership block leads to the replacement of 
the CEO and a change in strategy. This leads to substantial asset disposals, 
and/or increased gearing, or subsequent acquisition. 
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Figure 3.1: Disciplinary Sequences after Abandonment with Acquisition of 
Ownership Blocks as the Trigger 
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However, five further sequences can be delineated which are consistent with a non-
disciplinary outcome after abandonment. These are labelled A-E in figure 3.2 and 
described below: 
 Sequence A: The acquisition of an ownership block leads to a change in strategy 
and the replacement of the CEO. This leads to substantial asset acquisitions, 
and/or decreased gearing, or no further changes. 
 Sequence B: The acquisition of an ownership block leads to a change in 
strategy. This leads to substantial asset acquisitions, and/or decreased gearing, 
or no further changes. 
 Sequence C: The acquisition of an ownership block leads directly to substantial 
asset acquisitions, and/or decreased gearing, or no further changes. 
 Sequence D: The acquisition of an ownership block leads to the replacement of 
the CEO. This leads to substantial asset acquisitions, and/or decreased gearing, 
or no further changes. 
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 Sequence E: The acquisition of an ownership block leads to the replacement of 
the CEO and a change in strategy. This leads to substantial asset acquisitions, 
and/or decreased gearing, or no further changes. 
 
The presence of such sequences after abandonment suggests no disciplinary 
outcome and no governance role for abandoned acquisitions.  
 
Figure 3.2: Non-disciplinary sequence after Abandonment with 
Acquisition of Ownership Blocks as a trigger 
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2.14 Replacement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) after Abandonment 
 
The majority of studies view the replacement of a CEO as a disciplinary outcome. 
However, a CEO can be replaced for a number of reasons, and so, in itself may not 
be evidence of discipline. It is proposed in this framework, if the replacement is 
part of a disciplinary process, it should trigger further changes in the firm 
consistent with a disciplinary outcome. A number of sequences can be proposed. 
 Sequence A: The replacement of a CEO leads directly to substantial asset 
disposals, and/or increased gearing, or subsequent acquisition. 
 Sequence B: The replacement of a CEO leads to a change in strategy. This 
prompts substantial asset disposals, and/or increased gearing, or subsequent 
acquisition. 
Additionally, two further sequences can be delineated which are not consistent with 
a disciplinary outcome after abandonment. These are described below: 
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 Sequence C: The replacement of a CEO leads directly to substantial asset 
acquisitions, and/or decreased gearing, or no further changes. 
 Sequence D: The replacement of a CEO leads to a change in strategy. This 
prompts substantial asset acquisitions, and/or decreased gearing, or no further 
changes.  
The presence of such sequences after abandonment suggests no disciplinary 
outcome and no governance role. These proposed governance sequences (A-D) are 
illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Sequences of Changes after Abandonment with Replacement of the CEO 
as the trigger 
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2.15 Announced Changes in Strategy after Abandonment 
 
An announced change in strategy may be evidence of the start of a disciplinary 
process. If so, it should initiate a causal process which leads to further disciplinary 
changes in the firm. A number of sequences can be proposed.  
 Sequence A: An announced change in strategy prompts substantial asset 
disposals, and/or increased gearing, or subsequent acquisition. 
 Sequence B: An announced change in strategy leads to the replacement of a 
CEO. This prompts substantial asset disposals, and/or increased gearing, or 
subsequent acquisition. 
Furthermore, two further sequences can be delineated which are not consistent 
with a disciplinary outcome after abandonment. These are explained next. 
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 Sequence C: An announced change in strategy prompts substantial asset 
acquisitions, and/or decreased gearing, or no further changes. 
 Sequence D: An announced change in strategy leads to the replacement of a 
CEO. This prompts substantial asset acquisitions, and/or decreased gearing, or 
no further changes.  
The presence of such sequences after abandonment suggests no disciplinary 
outcome and no governance role. These sequences (A-D) are illustrated in figure 
3.4. 
Figure 3.4: Sequences of Changes after Abandonment with an Announced Change 
in Strategy as the Trigger 
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2.16 Summary 
 
This section has proposed different sequences of changes after abandonment which 
produce disciplinary outcomes, and the proposed sequences of changes which 
produce non-disciplinary outcomes. By framing the systematic analysis of the 
differential experience of bidding firms after abandoned acquisitions in this way, the 
research can answer the first set of research questions. This is a fresh perspective, 
enabling research to distinguish between bidding firms which experience discipline 
from those which do not experience discipline after abandoned acquisitions. 
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2.2 Antecedent Characteristics of the Bidder 
 
Differences in the characteristics of abandoned bidders may identify where 
abandoned bids play a governance role for some bidders and not for others. If an 
abandoned bidding process has a governance role and leads to disciplinary changes 
afterwards, then the literature suggests bidders involved in such a process may 
demonstrate distinctly different characteristics compared to those who do not 
endure disciplinary changes after abandonment. Some research highlights that the 
managers of older firms with low growth opportunities, yet substantial free cash 
flow, will have an incentive to excessively invest this cash to extend their control 
over resources, rather than return it to shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Gregory, 
2005). Acquisitions are one way of doing this. Hence, age, profitability, growth and 
the extent of free cash can be important antecedent characteristics providing the 
scope for acquisitions driven by managerial preferences. These are included in the 
framework as antecedent variables. 
In addition, differences in bidders‟ corporate governance characteristics may help 
explain the nature of the governance role exerted by abandoned acquisitions. 
Certain corporate governance characteristics present at the time of a bid can reveal 
information about the extent of monitoring of a company‟s management and the 
scope for opportunistic behaviour by managers through, for instance, excessive 
acquisitions. In this context, weak internal monitoring by the Board of Directors and 
weak external monitoring by shareholders can provide greater scope for managers 
pursuing self-aggrandisement at the expense of shareholders‟ interests. In addition, 
if weak incentives are in place to encourage managers to pursue shareholders‟ 
interests, then they may pursue bids reflecting their own interests (Wong and 
O‟Sullivan, 2001). Hence, monitoring and incentives can be important 
characteristics revealing whether or not abandoned acquisitions are driven by 
managerial preferences. Hence, these are included in the framework as antecedent 
variables. Table 3.2 highlights anticipated bidder characteristics and some 
theoretical and empirical references.   
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Table 3.2: Antecedent Characteristics of Bidders 
Bidder Characteristics Reference 
Age Jensen (1986) 
 
Free cash flow Jensen (1986), Gregory (2005) 
 
Performance Holl and Pickering (1988), Taffler and Holl 
(1991) 
 
Monitoring of Directors O‟Sullivan and Wong (1998), Sudarsanam 
(1995), Bange and Mazzeo (2004), Paul 
(2007) 
 
Incentives provided to Executive 
Directors 
O‟Sullivan and Wong (1999), Wright et al. 
(2002), Kini, Kracaw and Mian (2004) 
 
  
 
2.3 Interceding Variables 
 
2.31 Transaction Characteristics 
 
Further to the pattern of antecedent characteristics, bidders with distinctly different 
antecedent characteristics should produce acquisition transactions with very 
different characteristics.  These reveal the anticipated gains from acquisitions, 
distinguishing situations where abandonment play a governance role from 
situations where it doesn‟t. However, the information revealed by transaction 
characteristics in abandoned acquisitions may be complex. Different configurations 
of bid characteristics may suggest different causal processes in abandonment and 
the conceptual framework needed to incorporate this. These transaction 
characteristics and theoretical references are summarised in table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Transaction Characteristics  
Bid Characteristic Reference 
Industrial Relatedness Jensen (1986)  
Muehlfeld et al. (2007) 
 
Means of Payment Jensen, (1986)  
Myers and Majluf (1984) 
Hansen (1987) 
Travlos, (1987) 
Schleifer & Vishny (2003)  
 
Bid Premium Roll (1986) 
Holl and Kyriazis (1996) 
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The industrial relatedness of the two firms in an acquisition may reveal something 
about the underlying motives and the need for post-abandonment discipline. 
Acquisitions between two firms with a high degree of industrial relatedness are 
more likely to be driven by synergies, not managerial self-aggrandisement.  
Abandonment in such cases should not be part of a governance process producing 
post-abandonment discipline. Indeed, such cases may be more likely to fall foul of 
the competition authorities, producing abandonment (Muehlfeld et al., 2007). On 
the other hand, Jensen (1986) proposes that unrelated bids may be evidence of the 
growth motives of managers through excessive diversification. Thus, the more 
unrelated the relationship between the activities of the bidder, the more likely the 
causal process producing abandonment will have a governance role, producing 
post-abandonment discipline.   
The literature suggests that the means of payment may reveal information about 
the underlying motives for a bid. Hence, it may reveal something about the nature 
of the governance role exercised through abandoned acquisitions. Studies show 
that equity bids are more likely to be abandoned than cash bids because target 
shareholders prefer receiving spendable cash. A positive interpretation regarding 
the use of cash is that bidders have greater certainty about the post-acquisition 
gains from an acquisition (Travlos, 1987). On the other hand, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) suggest the use of equity may suggest uncertainty about the returns from a 
bid and a desire by bidders to share the uncertainty with target shareholders. 
Another group of studies suggest that bidders may use overvalued equity to get 
control of assets cheaply (Hanson, 1987); Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). None of 
these views suggest the use of equity as the means of payment is driven by 
managerial preferences. However, cash bids may be a sign of excess free cash 
being used by managers to extend resources under their control (Jensen, 1986). 
Alternatively, cash may be used by bidders to avoid issuing shares and expose 
themselves to increased monitoring by investors (Myers, 1984). Either way, in this 
framework, if configured with appropriately configured antecedent and interceding 
variables, the increased use of cash is more likely to be part of a disciplinary causal 
process. 
Studies show that the level of the bid premium offered may reveal something about 
the anticipated gains from a bid and may indicate the reasons for post-
abandonment discipline in bidding firms. Studies show that the lower the premium 
offered by bidders, the more likely that bids will be abandoned. However, similar to 
the means of payment, the decision regarding the premium offered is complex. Bids 
motivated by shareholder interest will try to pay as low a premium as possible to 
enable greater post-abandonment gains to be secured from the transaction. 
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Conversely, either managerial preferences or managerial hubris may produce 
higher premiums, making a bid more likely to succeed. Therefore, if such bids are 
abandoned, the more likely the causal process producing abandonment will have a 
governance role, resulting in post-abandonment discipline (Holl and Kyriasis, 1996).  
 
2.32 Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
 
The next group of interceding variables is contingent factors in the bidding process. 
The release of new information during the bidding process can significantly affect 
the risk and returns associated with a particular bid and therefore impact on the bid 
outcome (Hotchkiss et al. (2005). Implicitly, the nature of the information released 
can also influence the response of firms to abandonment.  
Negative information may be revealed about the motives of management, and the 
proposed outcomes of a bid (Hirschleifer and Thakor, 1994 & 1998; Paul, 2007). 
Negative information about a bidder may be revealed by the target management as 
a part of defence. The proposition is that negative information, configured with 
appropriate bidder and transaction characteristics may reveal information that a bid 
reflects managers‟ and not shareholders‟ interests. This may be consolidated with 
information within firms, causing disciplinary changes after abandonment.  
Evidence suggests that target management resistance is an important factor in 
abandonment. However, the reaction of target management to a bid is a difficult 
issue to interpret. Two distinct reasons can be advanced for resistance by target 
management. Firstly, target managers may be acting in shareholders‟ interests. If 
this is the case, it can be done either to elicit a higher offer from the bidder, or to 
deter a bid which is being pursued for bidder managers‟ preferences. In the former 
case, a link can be drawn between managerial resistance, the means of payment 
and the extent of the premium offered. In either situation, the target may look for a 
„white knight‟. Secondly, target management resistance is motivated by the 
entrenchment of their position in the firm. In such cases, the abandoned bid is 
likely to be part of a disciplinary process for targets, not bidders.  
Commercial information may be revealed about the bidding firm during the course 
of the bid process. However, negative commercial information can be revealed as 
part of the normal course of business and have an impact on a bid, especially an 
equity bid, when the information may lead to a decrease in the share price. This 
does not reveal information about the underlying motives for bids, but may reveal 
information about poorly performing managers, which may lead to post-
abandonment discipline (Savor and Lu, 2009).   
 
82 
 
There is a possibility that regulators are concerned about the competition aspects of 
a bid. If a bid is referred to the competition authorities, many bidders choose to 
abandon a bid because the cost of negotiating a bid through competition 
regulations may be prohibitively expensive. The attention of competition authorities 
is more likely to be drawn to related bids, pursued for synergistic gains. Hence, bids 
abandoned because of referral to the competition authorities are less likely to be 
part of a causal process, providing a governance role (Arnold and Parker, 2007). 
Rival bids emerge in a lot of acquisitions processes and can play a role in 
abandonment. A rival bid could be part of a white knight strategy adopted as a 
takeover defence, or evidence that the target‟s assets are sought after. Losing out 
to a rival bid could be a signal that the bidder is poorly managed or weak 
financially. Consequently, the bidder is unable to match a rival bid. On the other 
hand, a bidder may not respond to a higher bid by raising the price offered because 
they feel the target‟s assets are not worth it. Therefore, they avoid the „winner‟s 
curse‟, suggesting a lack of hubris among such managers (Kummer and Steger, 
2008). In either case, it is unlikely that the presence of a rival bid would indicate 
whether an abandoned acquisition is more likely to be part of a causal process 
providing a governance role. Table 3.4 summarises the contingent characteristics in 
the bidding process and their theoretical reference. 
Table 3.4: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
Characteristic of the Bidding Process Theoretical Reference 
Target Management Resistance Franks and Mayer (1996) 
Holl and Kyriazis (1997) 
 
Commercial Information Denis and Serrano (1996) 
Savor and Lu (2009) 
 
Information on Management Hirschleifer and Thakor (1994), 
(1998) 
Paul (2007) 
 
Referral to Competition Authorities Arnold and Parker (2007) 
 
Emergence of a Rival Bidder Officer (2003) 
Kummer and Steger(2008)  
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2.4 Summary of Novel Conceptual Framework 
  
From the preceding discussion, the anticipated elements and their proposed 
influence on the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions, is shown in figure 
3.5. Interactions between antecedent variables and interceding variables, coupled 
with associated outcomes, suggest some sort of causal process in abandoned 
acquisitions (George and Bennett, 2005). If the antecedent variables and 
interceding variables are configured in a particular way, producing disciplinary 
outcomes after abandonment, this will reveal the underlying mechanisms of the 
causal process by which abandoned acquisitions play a governance role. If the 
antecedent variables are configured with the interceding variables differently, 
producing outcomes after abandonment which are not disciplinary, this will reveal 
the underlying mechanisms of the causal process by which abandoned acquisitions 
do not play a governance role. In the latter scenarios, it is expected that the 
underlying causal mechanisms are different.     
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Figure 3.5: A Novel Conceptual Framework for Analysis of Governance Role of 
Abandoned Acquisitions 
  
Antecedent Firm Characteristics 
Age        Growth  
Profitability       Monitoring  
Free Cash       Incentives    
 
Transaction Characteristics 
Industrial Relatedness   Cash    Bid Premium  
Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
Negative Information about Bidder Management  Target Management Resistance  
Negative Commercial Information Referral to Competition 
Authorities   
Successful Rival Bid  
Disciplinary Process after Abandonment  
Voluntary Abandonment  
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3. A Disciplinary Pathology: Abandoned Acquisitions as part of a 
Disciplinary Causal Mechanism 
 
As the research is conducted in the context of causal process tracing, George and 
Bennett (2005) suggest the use of a typological theory. This is a set of 
contextualised relationships between variables that form a particular causal 
mechanism. They define a typological theory as one that: 
 
“…specifies independent variables, delineates them into categories for which 
the research will measure the cases and their outcomes, and provides the 
hypotheses on how these variables operate individually, but also contingent 
generalisations on how and under what conditions they behave in specified 
conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified dependent 
variables.” (p.235) 
By blending existing theoretical and empirical propositions in an original way, the 
conceptual framework can propose such a typological theory. Certain configurations 
of characteristics and contingent factors within abandoned acquisitions interact to 
cause abandonment, triggering disciplinary changes in the bidding company after 
abandonment. This proposed causal mechanism is termed the „disciplinary 
pathology‟. This is derived from theory, and so, carries causal weight (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
CPT proposes the use of a causal network narrative to describe the anticipated 
mechanism of the proposed pathology (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this case, the 
disciplinary pathology. This conforms to the definition quoted above, explaining the 
operation of variables individually, but also, how, and in what conditions, variables 
operate in configurations, to produce abandonment. The terminology highlighted by 
Steinberg (2007) is used to characterise the nature of relationships between 
variables. This terminology is explained in chapter 4. A typological disciplinary 
causal network would involve „nested‟ causal chain from increased age to higher 
profits to substantial free cash. A related causal path will run from increased 
maturity of assets producing low growth opportunities. These „related‟ causal paths 
create the antecedent conditions for acquisitions fulfilling managerial preferences. 
In the proposed disciplinary pathology these characteristics are „compounded‟ by 
weak corporate governance characteristics - weak monitoring and weak incentives 
within the firm – providing the opportunity for a transaction reflecting managerial 
preferences. A nested causal path runs from these antecedent characteristics to 
certain transaction characteristics –decreased industrial relatedness, cash financing, 
with higher premiums. The causal network proposes that these characteristics 
reveal negative information during the bidding process about the intentions of the 
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management which leads to voluntary abandonment. This produces a disciplinary 
process after abandonment. 
It is common to use diagrammatic representation of the causal process called a 
„causal network diagram‟ (Richards, 2009). This is a map of the configuration of 
antecedent variables, interceding variables, and outcomes relating to the 
disciplinary pathology. This is illustrated in figure 3.6.  
In the fieldwork stage, the proposed preliminary disciplinary causal pathology was 
tested against empirical events and characteristics revealed in the cases of 
abandoned bids investigated. It is hoped the fieldwork can highlight the key factors 
present, how they operate individually, but also together. This can characterise the 
nature of governance demonstrated in the cases investigated.  In addition, in cases 
without disciplinary outcomes, the anticipated causal processes will be different. In 
the fieldwork stage, alternate causal mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions can be 
proposed within the context of the broader conceptual framework.   
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Figure 3.6 Proposed Disciplinary Causal Network  
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4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the research questions which this thesis is attempting to 
answer. Given the nature of the research questions, the research makes an original 
contribution to knowledge by applying causal process tracing to the abandoned 
acquisition process and its aftermath. As part of this, a novel conceptual framework 
is developed. This blends existing theoretical conceptions of bidder characteristics, 
information revelation in the bidding process and disciplinary changes after 
abandonment in an innovative way. 
Within the conceptual framework, a typological disciplinary causal mechanism is 
proposed – a disciplinary pathology. The inclusion of alternative antecedent 
characteristics and different interceding variables enable alternative causal 
networks to be explored, and alternate causal processes of abandoned acquisitions 
identified. This would extend knowledge of the impact of abandonment on bidding 
companies. The preliminary disciplinary causal mechanism is tested in the fieldwork 
stage and amended and refined as it is tested against empirical events and 
characteristics revealed in the cases of abandoned bids investigated. This is needed 
to not only test the typological disciplinary governance process and refine it if 
necessary, but also identify alternate causal processes which produced different 
outcomes.  
The research questions and the nature of the conceptual framework that have been 
developed, have implications for the research methods to be adopted – the use of 
case studies and the innovative application of causal process tracing to abandoned 
acquisitions. These research methods will be outlined in the following chapter.    
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Chapter Four: The Pioneering Application of Causal 
Process Tracing to Abandoned Acquisitions 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Echoing Arthur (1994), the novel conceptual framework characterises the 
acquisition process as a messy and complicated interaction of antecedent firm 
characteristics, interceding transaction characteristics and contingent factors. These 
interactions determine the outcome and the impact on bidders afterwards. 
Therefore, this study offers a contribution to previous work through the analysis of 
the bidding process, from before the bid, through the bid process to abandonment, 
and the impact, if any, of that abandonment on the bidding companies 
subsequently. By doing so, this study intends to more critically understand the role 
of the takeover process, if any, in the corporate governance of bidding companies. 
Therefore, the aim of the research is: 
To investigate the role of the bid process in the corporate governance of 
bidders in abandoned acquisitions. 
The research objectives are: 
I. To identify the impact that abandoned bids can have on bidding companies. 
II. To investigate the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. 
III. To ascertain, how, and in what circumstances abandoned acquisitions have a 
disciplinary effect. 
IV. To ascertain how, and in what circumstances abandoned acquisitions do not 
have a disciplinary effect. 
In order to fully address the aim and objectives of the research, and answer the 
resulting research questions, a different approach to the analysis of the acquisition 
process is adopted. This requires a deeper, denser analysis of the acquisition 
process. The majority of existing studies involve large samples of acquisitions / 
abandoned acquisitions and focus on inferences drawn from significant statistical 
associations between variables. The characterisation of the abandoned acquisition 
process and its aftermath adopted in this study‟s novel conceptual framework is an 
attempt to complement these studies.  These studies have demonstrated a range of 
possible associations between variables which influence abandonment and its 
aftermath. The fresh conceptual framework developed as part of this research 
draws several different strands of literature together to derive a multifaceted causal 
network, where many elements interact, in potentially complex ways, to produce 
abandonment, and cause changes in bidders subsequently. The analysis of this rich 
interaction in causal processes requires an appropriate research strategy and 
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methods. Comparative case study analysis offers the richness in explanation 
required to address the research questions in the context of the conceptual 
framework (George and Bennett, 2005). This approach will complement statistical 
studies to provide a deeper, denser understanding of abandoned acquisitions and 
their aftermath.  
Bryman (2004) defines a case study as the detailed and intensive analysis of a 
single case. In this study, the case is defined as the bidding firm. Furthermore, 
Bryman (2004) highlights that research should focus on a particular aspect of a 
case. In this research, this aspect is the role of abandoned acquisitions in the 
corporate governance of bidding firms. Within this, a combination of within-case 
and cross-case analysis enables the deep, dense analysis of causal explanations 
required to explain why certain acquisitions are abandoned and why abandonment 
may affect bidding firms afterwards (George and Bennett, 2005).  
Within the case study strategy, a research method which could handle this 
framework is adopted - Causal Process Tracing (CPT). CPT is a research method 
which has emerged to analyse causal mechanisms to a depth unattainable by 
purely statistical techniques (Steinberg, 2007). CPT has not been applied to the 
analysis of acquisitions and the acquisition process. Yet, as Weston et al. (2004) 
point out, the bidding processes in acquisitions can be complex, requiring such an 
approach. Therefore, this thesis involves the novel application of CPT methods to 
the investigation of abandoned acquisitions. CPT enables this research to analyse 
the complexity of the interaction of firm characteristics, transaction characteristics 
and contingent factors in the bidding process which produces different outcomes in 
bidders after abandonment. It is appreciated that given the complexity of the 
acquisition process, it will be impossible to capture all of the possible interactions 
between the various characteristics and events. However, using CPT will enable the 
work to focus on those characteristics and factors, grounded in theory, which are 
revealed to be important. By doing so, it will enable the research to explore and 
identify classes of causal mechanisms by which abandoned acquisitions produce 
different outcomes. The typological network illustrates the anticipated configuration 
of variables in a certain types of causal mechanism. In this context, process tracing 
can be used deductively. However, it can also identify, inductively, the interactions 
which are revealed to be important in cases of a specified type. Consequently, 
theory can be progressed (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
The method requires two stages of fieldwork. Cumulatively, the analysis helps 
answer the series of research questions outlined in chapter 3 and adds to our 
knowledge of the impact of abandonment on bidding firms and abandoned 
acquisition processes. Firstly, in order to add to our knowledge regarding the 
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experience of bidding firms after abandonment, an analysis of anticipated 
disciplinary outcomes after abandonment is conducted. This analysis enables the 
research to distinguish cases on the basis of theory – cases whose experience is 
consistent with discipline (most-likely cases) and cases whose experience is not 
consistent with discipline (least-likely cases). The analysis of least-likely cases is 
particularly useful for extending theoretical understanding, by offering a 
counterfactual perspective (Richards, 2009). This separation of cases frames the 
second stage of the fieldwork (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
As the novel conceptual framework proposes, the acquisition process demonstrates 
complex inter-relationships between factors. At the second stage, a selection of 
most-likely and least likely cases are analysed using CPT. CPT is used to analyse 
the interaction of firm characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent 
factors in the bidding process to identify the underlying mechanisms present. 
Hence, the research can contribute to knowledge by identifying the conditions 
under which specified outcomes occur and the causal mechanisms through which 
they occur. From this, contingent generalisations may be proposed. These are 
particular meta-causal mechanisms – pathologies - which apply to particular groups 
of cases, yet allow for specific processes and interactions to differ from case to 
case. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the identification of 
abandoned acquisitions in the UK and case selection. Section 3 discusses the 
rationale for causal process tracing. Section 4 explains stage one of the fieldwork; 
the delineation of cases according to outcome of abandonment. Section 5 explains 
the methods adopted for stage two of the fieldwork; the data collection and 
analysis as part of the causal process tracing. Section 6 is the summary and 
conclusion.     
 
2. Identification of Abandoned Acquisitions and Case Selection 
 
The theoretical underpinning for this research is the governance role of abandoned 
acquisitions. This determines the nature of the cases selected for analysis (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). In developed capitalist economies, agency theory proposes 
joint stock companies, with dispersed share ownership, are most likely to have the 
weak monitoring and incentives, which enables the discretion for managers to 
pursue bids furthering their own interests (Jensen, 1986). The UK is chosen for 
analysis because it has a developed stock market, an active market for corporate 
control and all the companies in the sample would be governed by a common 
regulatory regime in both their general business activities and the acquisition 
process (Officer, 2003).  In the UK, it is Public Limited Companies (Plcs) which are 
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most likely to be the type of firms, with dispersed shareholding, where abandoned 
acquisitions are most likely to play a governance role, preventing bids furthering 
the interests of managers. Therefore, abandoned acquisitions involving UK Plcs as 
bidding firms are chosen for analysis.  
The cases are sourced from the Takeover Panel – the institution which, under the 
auspices of the London Stock Exchange, regulates bids for UK registered companies 
(see chapter 1 for a discussion of the role of the Takeover Panel). Each working 
day, the takeover panel publishes a „disclosure table‟ showing the offerees (target 
firms) and offerors (bidding firms), when revealed, of acquisitions currently in 
progress. While the focus of the takeover panel regulation is bids for UK registered 
companies, information on bidders is also recorded. This is of great use for this 
study. This source of bidders is useful due to the consistency in the collection of 
data adopted by the Panel. In the early stages of the research, a variety of sources 
was considered, but this led to problems identifying the stage to which a bid had 
progressed; mere rumours, informal talks, an informal bid or a formal bid. It is 
anticipated there is a great difference between the consequences of abandonment 
when companies are merely in talks and when a formal bid has been made. The use 
of the disclosure table, while restricting the number of potential takeovers to those 
with UK Plcs as targets, produces consistency in the nature of the abandoned bids, 
which is important for the validity of this research.   
Under the Code, the public phase of an acquisition starts when a target  (offeree) 
enters an „offer period‟ – this reveals that the company is subject to a bid. The 
identity of the bidder may not be revealed at this stage to allow negotiations to 
progress. However, if information is revealed, the Panel may force a bidding firm to 
make a „Rule 2.4‟ announcement - revealing the intention to make an offer. A 
bidder is not committed to making a formal offer, and may withdraw their bid at 
this stage without sanction (termed a „withdrawal‟). However, once a bidder makes 
a „Rule 2.5‟ announcement, it must publish the terms of their bid and post offer 
documents within 28 days (Takeover Code, 2011). Once documents are posted it is 
difficult for a bidder to voluntarily pull out of a bid. An abandonment at this stage 
(termed a „lapse‟) normally means that the target firm‟ shareholders have rejected 
a bid. However, other changes in material circumstances, such as referral to the 
competition authorities, can also cause a bid to lapse. Hence, the term 
„abandonment‟ means, either the bidders withdraw their bids or, allow their bids to 
lapse.  These events were identified through a relevant announcement through the 
London Stock Exchange‟s Regulatory News Service (RNS). Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
time-line of an abandoned bidding process. 
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Figure 4.1 Bid Process and Abandonment 
Private Period
Rule 2.4 
Announcement
Rule 2.5 
Announcement
Abandoned Bids
  
 
Cases of UK Plcs in abandoned acquisitions were selected between 1999 and 2005. 
It was not possible to retrieve sufficient data for cases before 1999 and, 2005 was 
the last possible year to allow sufficient time to elapse for observing the impact, if 
any, of abandonment. According to the Takeover Panel‟s annual report a total of 90 
lapsed bids and 23 withdrawn bids for UK Plcs occurred in this period. However, 
these bids included a variety of bidders, including UK Plcs, but also UK private 
limited companies and foreign bidders. As the focus of this research is the 
governance role of abandoned acquisitions in UK Plcs, this reduced the number of 
potential bids to 60 during this period. Due to data availability, and the fact that a 
number of companies were responsible for multiple abandoned bids, the number of 
bidding companies which can be analysed is 31. Despite this small absolute size, 
the group of cases represent approximately 50% of the abandoned bids involving 
UK Plcs during the period.  
 
3. Causal Process Tracing 
 
The majority of previous research in this field has involved large-n statistical 
analysis, identifying significant causal relationships between variables. This 
research seeks to complement these studies by investigating some the relationships 
identified by these statistical studies in more detail. The aim of the research is to 
produce a more refined understanding of abandoned acquisitions from before the 
bid, through the bidding process, to after abandonment. Consequently, the 
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proposed novel conceptual framework characterises the acquisition process as a 
complex causal mechanism,  involving antecedent firm characteristics, interacting 
with interceding variables relating to transaction characteristics, and contingent 
factors in the bidding process to produce differential outcomes after abandonment. 
Using this framework, the comparative analysis of a small number of cases can 
provide a depth and richness to the identification of causal mechanisms in 
phenomena like abandoned acquisitions (Bennett and Ellman, 2006). 
Causal process tracing (CPT), a qualitative analytical protocol, is appropriate in this 
context. CPT is a systematic way to envisaging economic causation within 
controlled case-study comparisons. Whereas large-n statistical analysis makes 
causal inferences from dependent to independent variables, analysing covariance 
between variables to determine which are significant. CPT is useful in this context 
because it builds on the statistical associations identified by large-n studies, 
conducting a fine-grained analysis of the nature and scale of the interactions 
between these variables in a small number of case studies. This multidimensional, 
fine-grained analysis of causal mechanisms enables the potentially complex 
interplay between many factors to be investigated in the way anticipated by the 
novel conceptual framework. Statistical analysis would not draw out this complex 
interplay.      
CPT is useful because it can incorporate theory-driven expectations – a deductive 
approach to analysis. This is appropriate given the rich, yet fragmented literature, 
on corporate acquisitions (see chapter two). This „theory-first‟ approach is adopted 
in the development of the typological „disciplinary pathology‟. The causal network 
blends the existing fragmented literature in an innovative fashion to illustrate and 
explain the causal mechanism. Chapter three explains this tentative causal network 
through which abandoned acquisitions may play a governance role. The deductive 
nature of the research helps the identification of key themes within the dataset. 
Early conceptualisation in framing the research questions, samples, and codes for 
variables and events, enhances the powers of inference and gives the typological 
network a chance of working out (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Typological theorising within the context of the conceptual framework develops the 
anticipated configuration of variables in certain types of cases. Each observable 
step in the causal path of an abandoned acquisition, and its aftermath, is analysed 
by reference to the conceptual framework and the typological disciplinary pathology 
derived from the framework. The iteration between theory and data, and between 
within-case and cross-case comparisons, is a key advantage of using typological 
theorising. However, typological theorising is susceptible to erroneous inferences if 
relevant variables are omitted. Rigorous within-case analysis used in conjunction 
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with cross-case analysis can enhance the measurement of independent variables 
which reduces the risks of mistaken inferences (Bennett and Ellman, 2006). This 
research utilises such analysis (see section 5 of this chapter for a description of the 
analytical protocol for within-case and cross-case comparisons).   
There is a strong basis for a causal process, if it can establish an uninterrupted 
causal path linking causes to outcomes at the appropriate level specified by theory. 
However, the predictions or expectations must be present. George and Bennett 
(2005: p.30) point out, 
 “…if even one step in the hypothesised causal process in a particular case is 
not as predicted, then the historical explanation needs to be modified.”  
Evidence that a single intervening variable in the causal process is contrary to 
expectations, strongly disputes the hypothesis. Then, the inferential and 
explanatory value of the hypothesised causal mechanism is diminished.  
Process tracing is useful in this context. It can help identify, inductively, the 
interactions which took place in cases. This is best done in the context of 
comparative case studies where a deeper, more nuanced analysis can explore 
interactions between existing variables and new variables which may have been left 
out of the initial framework but, which appear to be important in a specific 
abandoned acquisition process. The analysis of distinctly different cases can enable 
this. Firstly, most-likely cases can be identified where, with reference to theory, 
abandoned acquisitions are anticipated to play a governance role, evidenced by 
changes afterwards consistent with discipline. Secondly, least-likely cases can be 
identified where, with reference to theory, outcomes of abandonment suggest the 
process of abandoned acquisitions did not play a governance role (Yin, 2003; 
Richards, 2009). 
Thus, the research can test the configurations of variables in the proposed 
typological disciplinary causal network, but also revise and refine it in the light of 
empirical observations. The nature of the interactions in the most-likely cases can 
be assessed. This enables the research to make further contributions to knowledge 
by proposing a tentative causal network illustrating the conditions under which 
disciplinary outcomes occur and the causal mechanisms through which they occur. 
However, in addition, in cases where the outcomes are not consistent with 
discipline, the research can propose alternative causal mechanisms where 
abandoned acquisitions may not play a governance role. This is the approach 
adopted in this work. From this, contingent generalisations may be proposed. These 
are particular meta-causal mechanisms which apply to particular groups of cases, 
yet allow for specific processes and interactions to differ from case to case. 
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Pierson (2004) emphasises that the CPT method is particularly useful where specific 
patterns of timing and sequence matter. This suggests that there is a linear, 
temporal sequence of events to a particular outcome, which Boone and Mulherin 
(2007) infer is important in a bidding process. However, the acquisition process 
may not be so linear. Blatter and Blume (2008) point to ideas about causal 
configurations. Here temporal sequences are not as important. Instead, intense 
links and/or complex interactions between various causal factors are important. 
There can be interaction effects between factors. Their co-existence may accelerate 
or moderate their impact on a causal process. In addition, the contingent factors 
may only work in specific contexts. Finally, a first casual factor may be a necessary 
pre-condition for the activation of a second at a later stage. This could be the case 
in an abandoned acquisition process where certain contingent factors interact, not 
necessarily in a uniform, neat temporal fashion, to produce a particular outcome, in 
this case, changes in bidders after abandonment. Several types of causal 
relationships are delineated in the literature: 
o Nested causation: One characteristic is a necessary, but insufficient precondition 
for another variable (eg. high profitability produces high free cash flow). 
 
o Compound causation: Two characteristics are both necessary for a subsequent 
variable, but are not necessary conditions for one another. Together, they 
amplify each other‟s effects on a subsequent characteristic (free cash flow and 
weak monitoring provide the scope and discretion for value-destroying bids). 
 
o Relational causation: The relationship between two characteristics produces a 
causal effect on subsequent characteristics (managerial resistance and low offer 
price may produce a rival bid). 
(Steinberg, 2007) 
Acquisitions that involve similar causal configurations can result in very different 
outcomes – multi-finality. On the other hand, acquisitions which involve different 
causal configurations can produce similar outcomes – equi-finality. There may be 
contingent characteristics or factors which are critical junctures in the bidding 
process that could have large consequences. These contingent events may reveal 
information about companies which can be used by shareholders and analysts to 
make judgements on the management of these companies which produces 
abandonment and disciplinary changes subsequently (Bennett and Ellman, 2006).  
Another problem is that there may be more than one hypothesised causal 
mechanism consistent with any given set of evidence. In such cases, it may be 
difficult to discern which explanation is accurate or, whether the alternative 
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explanations are complementary. Rigorous theorising should enable some 
explanations to be omitted, and therefore, enable analysis to draw inferences for a 
causal process. This includes the identification of all potentially relevant theoretical 
variables and hypotheses, and rigorous analysis of the same type of events, to 
observe repeated patterns of causal mechanisms.  
The fieldwork is broken down into two stages. The starting point for the conceptual 
framework, and consequently the starting point for the empirical work of the 
research, is the experience of bidders after abandonment. This contributes to 
knowledge about the differential impact of abandonment on bidding firms. In 
addition, the results of this analysis are used to select cases based on the 
dependent variable – the outcomes after abandonment (George and Bennett, 
2005). This selection is theory-driven, arising from the literature on the governance 
role of acquisitions. Therefore, the first stage of the fieldwork is a qualitative data 
analysis of the outcome of abandonment on 31 abandoned bids and bidders using 
secondary data. These findings are used to distinguish two groups of companies; (i) 
most-likely cases involving firms which endure a disciplinary process and; (ii) 
counter-factual, least-likely cases involving firms who do not endure a disciplinary 
process after abandonment (Richards, 2009).  
At the second stage, the outcomes from Stage 1 are used to select a small number 
of cases with different outcomes of abandonment. This stage involved analysing 
both primary and secondary data using CPT to explore in detail the underlying 
mechanisms in the different cases to make tentative propositions about the nature 
of the governance role of abandoned acquisitions (George and Bennett, 2005). The 
final stage of the analysis is to develop different causal mechanisms to explain the 
different outcomes. This is done using causal network diagrams of the anticipated 
causal configurations / mechanisms (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
4. Stage 1: Experience of Bidders after Abandoned Acquisitions 
 
This stage of the fieldwork enables the research to address the following research 
questions stated in chapter 3. 
 
o What changes happen in bidding firms after an abandoned acquisition? 
 
o Are these changes consistent with discipline? 
 
o Are these changes not consistent with discipline? 
 
Answering these questions will enable the research to distinguish between bidders 
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which experience discipline after abandonment from those which do not experience 
discipline. 
 
4.1 Data Collection and Coding of Variables 
 
Analysis of the firms involves cross-case comparisons. The first stage in the 
analysis is distinguishing the bidding firms according to outcome variables. 
Selecting on the dependent variable – the dimensions of change in bidders after 
abandonment was a useful way of classifying the firms according to corporate 
governance (Bennett and Ellman, 2006). These outcome variables are (i) changes 
in bidders after abandonment which could be characterised as disciplinary and (ii) 
changes in bidders after abandonment which could not be characterised as 
disciplinary. In the conceptual framework several patterns of quantitative and 
qualitative changes in bidders after abandonment are characterised as discipline.  
Operational measures which could be valid measures of these changes were 
developed. These could be either quantitative or qualitative in nature. This requires 
some structure to the collection of data. This stage of the research focuses on 
secondary, documentary sources. There are three types of documents used. For 
each case, data is collected for the three year period before and three year period 
after the abandoned bid. This enables sufficient lead time before to analyse the 
context of an abandoned bid and sufficient time afterwards, to analyse the impact 
of abandonment on bidders. The sources of secondary data are:   
I. Company Reports from 3 years before to 3 years after the abandoned bid 
(sourced from company websites or databases such as FAME) 
II. Press / Trade Journal Reports from UK Publications (sourced from the NexisUK 
Database) 
III. Company announcements made through the Regulatory News Service (RNS) 
of the London Stock Exchange (sourced from the NexisUK Database) 
 
All of these sources are in the public domain and in relation to sources I and III in 
particular, there are accepted principles and practices underpinning the production 
of such documents. Hence, they can be utilised effectively in such research (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2003). However, given the nature of the sample in this 
research, it is anticipated there will be heterogeneity across such sources (Bryman, 
2004). The authors in each organisation are different and, given the variation in the 
size and importance of companies, the extent of secondary documentation available 
is different. Thus, while the documents may be authentic and meaningful, there 
may be a concern as to whether they are credible and representative. Therefore, 
one of the reasons for using a variety of secondary sources is to enable their 
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interrogation and examination in as broad a context as possible, to mitigate 
possible problems relating to credibility and representativeness (Bryman, 2004).  
Templates are used to collect quantitative and qualitative data for each group of 
characteristics and factors which reflected the scale and nature of each element as 
described in the conceptual framework. These templates went through a number of 
drafts and refinements, using feedback from supervisors, conference presentations 
and research seminars to make sure they were both representative and valid 
measures of the conceptualisation of post-abandonment discipline (King, 1998). 
These templates formed the basis for the coding of the data shown in appendix 2.  
 
4.2 Data Analysis   
 
Within-case analysis involves classifying the bidding firms according to whether 
there is, or is not, a disciplinary process after abandonment. This is taken forward 
and used to guide the investigation of the abandoned bidding process. To do this 
several data-reduction methods are adopted.  
Firstly, the dependent variable - the changes in bidders after abandonment - is 
divided into its component parts and analysed separately. Secondly, cases are 
ordered in relation to the operational measures of the proposed changes illustrated 
in table 4.1, using measures of significance based on established theoretical and 
empirical conceptualisation. By adopting this methodological trail, the robustness of 
the research in differentiating cases according to the dependent variable is retained 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
Boundaries are used to determine the significance of the different dimensions of 
change in the bidders after abandonment. Some of the measures were binary in 
nature and the binary classification adopted in determining significance is 
consistent with this. Significant strategic changes within two years of abandonment 
are identified through consistent phrases in secondary data sources. Significant 
management changes are revealed by replacement of the chief executive within 
two years of abandonment. The acquisition of more than 5% of a firm‟s share 
capital within one year of abandonment is defined as a significant ownership block. 
A company is defined as subject to an acquisition if there is a successful bid within 
three years of their own abandoned bid. 
Other measures are continuous and the binary classification determining 
significance is based on the statistical distribution of the values of the operational 
variables across the cases. Firms are deemed to have made significant asset 
disposals if their real value of net acquisitions (disposals) is in the lowest quartile 
for the distribution of this operational variable across the cases. In addition, a 
100 
 
policy of asset sales is also evidenced by the analysis of company reports and 
regulatory news announcements. Firms are deemed to have made significant 
increases in gearing if their change in gearing ratio compared to the pre-bid period 
is in the top quartile for the distribution of the operational variable across the 
cases. This is consistent with the approach to classification taken by Paul (2007). 
These relative determinants of significance are appropriate because the focus of the 
research is differentiating the experiences of the bidding firms in abandoned 
acquisitions. Table 4.1 summarises the operational measures and their determinant 
of significance for each of the dimensions of change after abandonment.  
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Table 4.1 Operational Measures of Changes in Bidders after Abandonment and 
measure of significance 
Change Operational Measures  Determinant of Significance 
Significant 
Strategic 
Changes 
Evidence of announced 
changes in strategy within 
two years 
Codes used for secondary 
data: 
„strategic review‟ 
„new direction‟, „reorientation‟ 
„shareholder activism‟ 
 
Binary Classification 
 
Yes –significant 
No – not significant 
 
Significant 
Management 
Changes 
Replacement of the chief 
executive within two years of 
abandonment 
 
Binary Classification 
 
Yes –significant 
No – not significant 
 
Significant 
Asset 
Restructuring 
Total real value of Net 
Acquisitions (Disposals) as a 
percentage of total assets 
within three years of 
abandonment 
 
Binary Classification 
 
Yes: If case is in first quartile of 
distribution for samples bidders shows 
discipline through a high level of 
disposals 
 
No: If in second, third or fourth 
quartiles. 
  
Ownership 
Changes 
Shareholder blocks (>5%) 
acquired within three years of 
abandonment 
 
Binary Classification 
 
Yes –significant 
No – not significant 
 
Subsequent 
Acquisition 
Successful bid for Company 
within 3 years of abandoned 
bid  
 
Binary Classification 
 
Yes –significant 
No – not significant 
 
Financial 
Restructuring 
Average of gearing ratio in 3 
years after bid compared to 
the average level 3 years 
before the bid. 
Binary Classification 
 
Yes: If case is in fourth quartile of 
distribution for the cases of bidders, 
shows evidence of discipline through 
the bonding associated with increased 
debt.   
 
No: If case is in first, second or third 
quartiles. 
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4.3 Disciplinary Sequences after Abandonment 
 
In order to distinguish companies fully according to disciplinary sequences after 
abandonment, causal process tracing is used to identify the sequence of changes 
that happened in each bidder after abandonment. It is anticipated that some 
changes may be disciplinary triggers for subsequent anticipated outcomes if a 
disciplinary process occurred. Chapter 3 discusses the development of several 
possible time-ordered disciplinary sequences based around the acquisition of 
ownership blocks, and/or management changes, and/or strategic changes. From 
this it can be discerned which disciplinary triggers (ownership changes, 
management changes or strategy changes), are important contingent factors 
(„predictors‟ in Miles and Huberman parlance) on a case-by-case basis. It is 
hypothesised that these changes are not disciplinary outcomes in themselves. 
Instead, these changes are part of a disciplinary sequence arising from the 
abandoned acquisition, if they lead to appropriate significant asset disposals, and/or 
increased gearing, or subsequent acquisition as final outcomes. Conversely, these 
changes are not part of a disciplinary process if they do not produce significant 
asset disposals, and/or increased gearing, or subsequent acquisition as final 
outcomes. In addition, this can mean no further significant changes, affecting 
bidders, after these triggers. 
 
4.4 Outcome Sequences 
 
To conduct within-case analysis, the timings of changes in the bidders after 
abandonment are found from company reports and regulatory news 
announcements as part of the secondary data collection. A time ordered display like 
that proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) is developed based around figures 
3.1-3.4 shown in chapter 3. The time-ordered displays were trialled and tested 
through feedback from written work and presentations at workshops and 
conferences. Consequently, a visual representation of the sequence of changes for 
each bidder after abandonment is derived. These represent the outcome fragment 
of the extended causal network for each case.  
Then, cross-case analysis is conducted. This is done by categorising the companies 
according to the final changes after abandonment to discover which companies 
have common outcomes. These companies are grouped together to compare their 
sequences of changes after abandonment. This enables the identification of the 
replication of sequences, if any, across cases; and particularly, to distinguish the 
significance of certain contingent factors, in triggering different types of sequences 
after abandonment. Some of these sequences are classed as „disciplinary‟ – 
producing final outcomes after abandonment consistent with those proposed in the 
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conceptual framework. Other sequences are classed as „non-disciplinary‟ – 
producing final outcomes after abandonment not consistent with post-abandonment 
discipline. Hence, firms are separated according to these differential outcome 
sequences (Yin, 2003). This analysis will add to knowledge about the experience of 
bidders after abandonment. The findings of this analysis are discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
5. Stage 2: Derivation of Causal Pathologies in Abandoned Acquisitions 
 
The next stage of analysis is to trace the causal mechanisms of the cases to 
analyse whether these provide any guidance on subsequent changes in the bidding 
companies. The findings of the analysis at stage 1 are used as a basis for 
categorising the firms. Cases which demonstrated sequences of significant changes 
after abandonment which, according to theory, are consistent with „disciplinary‟ 
governance processes are categorised as „most-likely‟ cases. In these cases, it is 
proposed that the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions played a 
governance role, producing discipline afterwards. On the other hand, cases which 
demonstrated sequences of changes after abandonment which, according to theory, 
are not consistent with „disciplinary‟ processes are categorised as „least-likely‟ 
cases. In these cases, it is proposed that the causal mechanisms are different, 
producing no discipline afterwards. (Yin, 2003; Richards, 2009).  
The choice of cases with different outcomes enables a deeper analysis of the nature 
of the different causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. Firstly, analysing 
both most-likely and counterfactual least-likely cases enables the research to 
identify whether their causal mechanisms are different. This is a test of the 
typological causal network proposed in the conceptual framework. If there is no 
difference in the causal mechanisms of most-likely compared to most-likely cases, 
this casts doubt on the disciplinary impact of abandoned acquisitions. However, if 
differences in the causal mechanisms, the research can propose tentative 
configurations of characteristics and contingent factors necessary for particular 
outcomes. For most-likely cases, the typological causal network could be refined in 
the light of evidence (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For least-likely cases, the 
research can propose alternative causal mechanisms. This would provide a deeper, 
denser understanding of the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions, 
showing if, and, how they perform a governance role, producing disciplinary 
outcomes.. This represents one of the contributions of this research (Yin, 2003).  
The strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a 
combination of within-case and cross-case comparisons.  These are useful even 
when there are only a few cases (George and Bennett, 2005). Therefore, this is the 
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approach adopted here.  
 
5.1 Data Collection 
 
For this stage of the fieldwork, both secondary documentary evidence and primary 
data are collected. The sources of secondary documentary evidence are the same 
as stage 1 (for a discussion of methodological issues surrounding this data see 
section 4.1 above). The source of primary data involved semi-structured interviews 
with important decision-makers in the selected cases. The intention is to interview 
the executive directors from both bidding companies and target companies. These 
individuals would provide a rich, detailed and unique perspective triangulating with 
the documentary evidence in contributing to understanding the corporate 
governance role of an abandoned acquisition process. This enables deeper, 
contextualised causal process mechanisms to be identified and analysed.    
In addition, several approaches have been adopted to enhance the validity of the 
research. The first has been to interview individuals from a wider range of 
perspectives of the bidding process. These include corporate lawyers and advisors 
in the bidding process and UK regulators. These contextual interviews were 
conducted after the interviews with the directors of the bidding companies, enabling 
the issues raised in the earlier interviews to be presented to these „knowledgeable 
participants‟ in the acquisition process (Beardsworth and Keil, 1992).  The choice of 
a variety of decision-makers in the bidding process enables diverse perspectives to 
be included, providing further triangulation of evidence. This enhances the 
credibility and representativeness of the analysis (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The 
second approach is to ensure the casual process tracing analytical techniques is 
appropriate for the case-study research (George and Bennett, 2005).  
 
5.2 Triangulating Primary and Secondary Data  
 
Given the nature of the research questions and the analytical protocol adopted, a 
semi-structured interview protocol is the appropriate approach to take. The 
hypothetico-deductive approach to the research requires focus in data collection 
which is best provided by some structure to interviews. In addition, the analysis of 
the cases involved cross-case comparisons. This requires some structure to the 
collection of data, but allows openness in responses, which „elite‟ interviewees such 
as the executive directors of Plcs may anticipate (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). 
Therefore, semi-structured interviews enhanced the reliability of the analysis, by 
making the comparison of data across interviews easier.  The process of 
formulating questions proposed by Bryman (2004) was adopted. This is shown in 
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figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2 Framework for formulating and conducting semi-structured interviews 
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Source: Bryman (2004)
 
 
 
Two sources guide the general interview topics. In order to address the specific 
research questions relating to abandoned acquisitions, the conceptual framework 
guide the general characteristics and factors to be discussed. The first stage of 
analysis helps set the context of each interview, depending on whether the case is 
classified as having disciplinary outcomes or non-disciplinary outcomes. In addition, 
in order to triangulate the primary data with specific evidence from secondary 
sources, the latter sources are analysed first. This highlights particular topics which 
can form the structure for each interview. These topics and issues for discussion are 
distilled into questions guided by the criteria suggested by Kvala (1996). Once the 
first interview was conducted, the flexibility of a semi-structured approach enables 
novel issues raised during the interview to be picked up immediately through 
supplementary questions. In addition, the issues raised in the early interviews helps 
revise the topics and questions for later interviews, so that the lines of thought 
identified by the earlier interviewees can be presented to later interviewees. This is 
particularly useful in the contextual interviews with analysts and regulators 
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conducted late in the cycle of interviews where such lines of thought enhance the 
relevance of the data collected.  
During the fieldwork, all of the interviews were conducted by the researcher to 
ensure consistency and all were recorded verbatim using audio equipment. As soon 
as possible after an interview, a reflection on the interview was conducted. Full 
transcription was conducted shortly after the interview. This was done by the 
researcher, because even though it was time-consuming, it was thought that the 
process of transcription would trigger memories from the interview which would be 
useful for the coding and analysis of the data. In addition, the recording and full 
transcription of the interviews adds to the robustness of the research in several 
ways: 
 Helps correct natural limitations of memory 
 Enables more thorough examination of the evidence 
 Enables repeated examination 
 Enables public scrutiny which avoids bias.     
(Bryman, 2004) 
 
 
5.3 Approaching Potential Interviewees 
 
Research was carried out to identify relevant executive directors in the bidders and 
targets of selected cases. These executives are senior board members who would 
have been deeply involved in decision-making before, during and after the bidding 
process. Given the period of time that had elapsed between the abandoned bid and 
the time of the interview, many had moved on. This was particularly the case for 
target companies which had been acquired subsequent to the abandoned bid. This 
made the task of finding current contact details for potential interviewees more 
difficult. Fortunately, the FAME database is a useful source of information about 
directors‟ current directorships. However, even this contained out-of-date or 
incomplete information for some individuals. This made it impossible to trace some 
directors. 
Contact with potential interviewees in selected cases was through email where 
possible or alternatively through a letter. The format of the email/letter had a 
standard format (reproduced in appendix 1). The letter stated the background to 
the research, the details of the case and the issues to be raised in the interview, 
including why the director‟s perspective would be valuable. The interviews were to 
be conducted within the ethical guidelines surrounding the conduct of research in 
the Nottingham Business School. As a result, a statement of these ethical 
guidelines was included in the email. In some cases, an email was sufficient to 
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make contact and gain agreement. However, in some cases it was sufficient to 
receive a rejection. If no response was received, the email / letter was followed up 
by a telephone call(s) either directly to the potential interviewee, or their office.  
Of ten requests made for interviews with target directors, no responses were 
received. Of ten requests made for interviews with bidding directors, eight 
responses were received. Consequently, four directors of bidding firms, at executive 
level were interviewed. In addition, contextual interviews with two corporate 
lawyers and one regulator were also conducted.  
This was a great outcome, given that such elite individuals are busy and may have 
concerns about confidentiality relating to such important, strategic decisions, such 
as acquisitions. Hence, to be able to interview these individuals for an extended 
period provides fruitful, relevant and unique perspectives on abandoned 
acquisitions, enhancing the validity of the research.  
 
5.4 Data Analysis Protocol 
 
5.41 Within-Case Analysis 
 
The use of quantitative and qualitative data analysis of secondary sources also 
enables the establishing of a relevant interview structure that facilitates coding 
prior to interviews. In addition, the interviews are coded in the same way as the 
secondary data to ensure the frequency of key phrases/terms are noted and to 
thematically reduce the data (King, 1998). This enhances the validity of the 
findings. The process of coding and analysis is discussed in detail below. 
 
5.42 Process of Coding for Primary and Secondary Data 
 
From the conceptual framework, codes are established in relation to the firm 
characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding 
process prior to the fieldwork. Both the primary and secondary data for each case 
are interrogated with reference to the codes. Relevant information and phrases in 
the documents are identified, coded and allocated to particular characteristics and 
factors across the three categories. This enables the cases to be rated for each 
characteristic and contingent factor in relation to theory.  
Consistent with Bryman (2004), an iterative process is adopted to complete the 
coding process. Semi-open coding is used because, while the extensive theory and 
evidence of acquisitions has proposed characteristics and factors which may reveal 
information about the nature of the governance role provided by abandoned 
acquisitions, new codes can be developed which better portray the role of 
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characteristics or factors in causal mechanisms. In addition, codes in relation to 
new characteristics or factors are developed when data suggest these are important 
aspects of the causal mechanism in a case.  
Coding is started early in the data collection process. This means „active‟ reading of 
documents before the interviews to help frame the structure of the interviews, 
enabling a better triangulation of evidence. In addition, interviews are transcribed 
at an early stage (completed within several days of the interview). This facilitates 
the coding of documents and allocating information and phrases to characteristics 
or factors. Then, the documents and interview transcripts are read again to revise 
and clarify the significance, frequency and context of data and phrases, to 
thematically reduce the data. By continually referencing the data to underlying 
conceptual ideas, the research focuses the thematic reduction of data, enhancing 
the validity of the findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In addition, new codes for 
characteristics and indeed characteristics, not included, which arise in the analysis 
of early cases can be developed and used to interrogate data from all of the cases. 
This means returning to previous cases and analysing data in the context of new 
data and codes. The codes established for each category of characteristics and 
contingent factors are discussed below. 
 
5.43 Bidder Characteristics 
 
From the conceptual framework, it is proposed the characteristics of bidders in the 
period before, and at the time of an abandoned bid can reveal information about 
the nature of governance in a company. In addition to quantitative operational 
variables established for earlier stages of the fieldwork, coding was established for 
qualitative aspects of firm characteristics. 
The typological causal network proposes that companies which were being 
disciplined after abandonment for proposing acquisitions pursuing managerial 
preferences should be „mature‟, have „weak‟ monitoring, „weak‟ incentives, „high‟ 
profits, „high‟ free cash flow, „‟low‟ growth and acquisitiveness. Hence, these form 
the basis for codes in the analysis of the qualitative secondary and primary data to 
categorise companies in relation to these characteristics.  
However, additionally, analysis of some cases revealed that information about the 
behaviour and motivations of the directors of bidding companies can be provided by 
their strategy in the pre-bid period. The nature of the strategy could provide 
evidence about the rationale for a bid and provide some guidance on the firm‟s 
subsequent activities. Hence, this is incorporated as an additional bidder 
characteristic. Table 4.2 illustrates the codes for bidder characteristics. 
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Table 4.2 Codes used for Bidder Characteristics 
Contingent  
Characteristic 
Codes 
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
 
Ownership Structure „concentrated‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
Managerial 
Incentives 
„weak‟ 
„strong‟ 
 
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ 
Author‟s calculation of real value of net 
acquisitions in three years prior to the 
abandoned bid  
Strategy „acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Author‟s calculation of real value of net capital 
and financial investment expenditure in three 
years prior to the abandoned bid 
Performance „profitable‟ 
„not profitable‟ 
„free cash‟ 
Author‟s calculation of average level of free 
cash in three years prior to the abandoned bid 
„low growth‟ 
 
 
5.44 Transaction Characteristics 
 
From the conceptual framework, it is anticipated there are several bid 
characteristics which can reveal information, which impacts on the course of a bid, 
and its outcome. The typological „disciplinary‟ causal network proposes that 
companies disciplined after abandonment for proposing acquisitions against 
shareholder‟s interests should be making „unrelated‟, „conglomerate‟, „diversifying‟ 
bids, pursuing excessive diversification. These should be financed using „cash‟. On 
the other hand, a bid may be in a „related‟ sector with „synergy‟ or „consolidation‟ as 
the stated rationale. As a result, these codes are also used to sort the data. In 
addition, preliminary analysis of the primary and secondary data revealed other 
codes in relation to transaction characteristics which were considered important in 
the cases analysed. These were „managerial inefficiency‟ and „opportunism‟. Hence, 
this expanded the codes included for analysis in relation to this characteristic.  
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In addition to the issue of cash as a means of payment, theory and empirical 
evidence suggest that „uncertainty‟ relating to the use of „equity‟ can have an 
important bearing on whether a bid is abandoned or not. Again, preliminary 
analysis of the primary and secondary data revealed other codes in relation to bid 
characteristics which were considered important in the cases analysed. These were 
issues surrounding „excessive debt‟ and the use of „share power‟ as an aspect of 
decisions around the means of payment. Hence, this expanded the codes included 
for analysis of this transaction characteristic. 
Preliminary analysis of primary and secondary data showed the conditions attached 
to a bid may reveal important information. Many bids have „standard‟ conditions, 
notably the acceptance condition, but, the inclusion of „non-standard‟ conditions 
may reveal information. Table 4.3 shows the codes used for each transaction 
characteristic and the sources of evidence.  
Table 4.3 Codes used for Transaction Characteristics 
Bid  
Characteristic 
Codes 
 
Bid Rationale 
  
 
„synergy‟, „consolidation‟,  
„related‟  
„unrelated‟, „conglomerate‟, „diversification‟ 
„managerial inefficiency‟ 
„opportunism‟ 
 
 
Means of 
Payment 
 
„cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
 
 
Merger or 
Acquisition 
 
„recommended‟ 
„not recommended‟ 
 
 
Conditions 
 
„standard‟ 
„non-standard‟ 
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5.45 Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
 
From the conceptual framework, there are a number of contingent factors which 
theory suggests are important in an abandoned bidding process. They may have an 
important role to play in the underlying mechanisms governing the subsequent 
impact of abandonment. 
The typological disciplinary network proposes that „negative information‟ about the 
motives of bidder‟s management will be the critical contingent factor causing 
abandonment. It is proposed this will lead to a significant disciplinary process in 
bidders after abandonment. 
However, theory and empirical evidence propose a number of other contingent 
factors which may be important in abandonment. Therefore, codes are derived for 
these possible contingent factors to assess their importance in the causal process of 
an abandonment acquisition. The value of a bid and the means of payment can be 
critical contingent factors in abandonment. Hence, codes are adopted to assess the 
scale and nature of these factors in the bidding process for each case. This includes 
possible interactions with other variables. The codes are, „fair value‟ 
„undervaluation‟, „opportunistic‟, „means of payment‟, „‟bid premium‟. The reaction 
of target management to a bid can play a critical role in the outcome of a bid. 
Again, codes are adopted to assess the scale and nature of this factor in the bidding 
process. The codes, „hostile‟ and „friendly‟ relate to the nature of target 
management reaction, while the codes‟ „shareholder value‟ and „management 
entrenchment‟ relate to the revealed motives of target management. Information 
revealed about a bidder during a bidding process can play an important role. Lots of 
different types of information can be revealed about bidders and codes were 
developed to reflect this range. This includes „positive‟ and „negative‟ information. 
In addition, the type of information needs to be discerned. Hence, the codes reflect 
this: „commercial‟, „financial‟ and „management‟ information. The preliminary 
analysis of primary and secondary data revealed different types of information. 
Hence, the codes were revised accordingly. Similarly, information can be revealed 
about targets in the abandoned bidding process. Lots of different types of 
information can be revealed about targets and codes were developed to reflect this 
range. These codes were similar to the codes adopted for bidding firms. Preliminary 
analysis of primary and secondary data revealed different types of information. 
Hence, the codes were revised accordingly.  
The presence of a rival bidder can have a critical impact on whether a bid is 
abandoned. Hence, codes are developed to reflect the scale and nature of the 
influence a rival bidder has on the bidding process. This can interact with other 
variables including valuation, the means of payment and target management 
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reaction. Hence, codes are derived to reflect this. Evidence suggests that referral of 
a bid to the competition authorities is a trigger for abandonment. The role this 
played in abandonment needs to be assessed. Finally, the nature of abandonment 
was included as a contingent factor in the bidding process. How far did the bid 
progress? Did the bidder make a rule 2.5 announcement? Or withdraw before that? 
Was the abandonment „voluntary‟ or „involuntary‟? Table 4.4 shows the codes for 
each contingent factor in the bidding process and the sources of evidence.  
Table 4.4 The Codes for each contingent factor in the bidding process 
Contingent Factor 
 
Codes 
 
Valuation 
Extent and nature of the 
impact of valuation on 
abandonment 
 
 
„fair value‟, „undervaluation‟, „opportunistic‟,  
„means of payment‟, „premium‟. 
 
 
Target Management 
Reaction 
Nature of and motive for 
resistance.  
 
 
 „friendly‟, „hostile‟, „shareholder value‟, 
„management entrenchment‟. 
 
 
Information about Bidder 
Nature of information 
revealed about bidder  
 
 
„positive information‟, „negative information‟, 
„commercial‟ „financial‟, „management‟,  
„share price effect‟. 
 
 
Information about Target  
Nature of information 
revealed about target 
 
 
„positive information‟, „negative information‟, 
„commercial‟, „financial‟, „management‟, 
„share price effect‟. 
 
 
Rival Bid 
Timing, motive and means of 
payment of rival bidder 
 
 
„rival bid‟, „cash‟, „premium‟, „white knight‟, 
„competition‟ 
 
 
Competition Issues 
 
„competition problems‟,  
„referral to competition commission‟. 
 
 
Nature of Abandonment 
 
„withdrawn‟, „lapse‟, „voluntary‟, „involuntary‟. 
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5.46 Derivation of Causal Networks for Cases  
 
In each case, the findings from the analysis of primary and secondary data enable 
the categorisation of each variable in relation to the established codes. For each 
case, the coded data is drawn together to write a case summary.  This is the first 
step in combining the discrete elements of data into an evidential chain which has a 
causal logic (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The next was developing fragments of 
the causal network for each case– antecedent bidder characteristics, transaction 
characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process. Each characteristic 
was rated according to the codes, (high or low, weak or strong), depending on the 
nature of the variable. Characteristics which are anticipated to have a causal 
relationship are linked by lines and the nature of the link is illustrated by a label 
and an arrow. Directional arrows are used to show temporal sequences between 
certain characteristics and later ones it appears to influence. The development of 
these fragments enables the observation of how each characteristic related to other 
characteristics within each fragment.  
Then, these fragments are brought together to derive a causal network diagram, 
which is an illustrates how the different fragments fit together in each case of 
abandonment – which characteristics are present/absent and how the variables 
interact in the proposed causal mechanism (Steinberg, 2007). 
Causal network narratives are written to tell the chronological story of the network 
– the pathology of the abandoned bid and its outcome. The key here is to explore 
the causal configuration which triggered abandonment in each case. This explains 
the importance of particular antecedent bidder characteristics, transaction 
characteristics and contingent factors in abandonment. Furthermore, the narrative 
enables an opportunity for expansion by being explicit about causation. The 
narrative explains the nature of the revealed causal interaction between 
characteristics and factors and whether the configuration of variables has a 
significant influence on changes in the bidder subsequently and the nature of that 
influence (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
The derivation of the causal network diagram and the drafting of the causal 
network narrative should be iterative. It involves constructing a network, 
independent reflection and re-specification of the network. Then, the narrative is 
redrafted to improve coherence and check there is consistency between the two 
analytical outputs (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For the most-likely cases, a 
deductive approach is taken, comparing their causal networks against the 
typological network. For the least-likely cases, an inductive approach is taken. 
Chapter six discusses the findings of the within-case analysis. 
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5.5 Cross-case Analysis 
 
Evidence is drawn from each case and analysed together. The principles adopted 
for the cross-case analysis are those proposed by Miles and Huberman, (1994).  
The comparative analysis is done in the context of the outcomes identified. The 
causal networks are assembled and those with common outcomes grouped 
together. In this research, while each case had different specific outcomes, two 
broad classes are anticipated: (1) Companies which endured disciplinary sequences 
after abandonment and (2) companies which did not endure disciplinary sequences 
after abandonment. Within each case, the causal stream is isolated. Streams that 
were similar are matched across cases with similar outcomes. While similarities 
between cases are identified, case-specific factors can be maintained. Pattern-
matching is used to cluster cases around core replicated configurations which 
produced the same outcome theme (Yin, 2003). These matched patterns had the 
following characteristics: 
 The core replicated configurations on the causal path are the same. 
 The immediate predictor characteristics are the same. 
 The common characteristics have the same rating. 
 The outcome theme is the same (Disciplinary / non-disciplinary outcome) 
 Narrative confirms the similarity of outcome derived from the causal 
mechanism.  
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
The final stage of the cross-case analysis is to develop different meta-causal 
mechanisms to explain the different outcomes. Miles and Huberman (1994) define a 
causal mechanism as,  
“A network of variables with causal connections among them, drawn from 
multiple case analysis. Although empirically grounded it is essentially a 
higher-order effort to derive a set of testable propositions about networks of 
variables and interrelationships.”  
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.222) 
The key to this research is deriving a network of interrelationships between bidder 
characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding 
process for each distinctive outcome; (1) disciplinary outcomes (2) non-disciplinary 
outcomes (Miles and Huberman, 1994). It is acknowledged that the complexity of 
the abandoned bidding process and the small scale of the fieldwork means the 
proposed causal mechanisms will be provisional, contingent generalisations which 
are propositions for further analysis. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the methods adopted in the two stages of fieldwork, 
demonstrating the careful, methodical approach to the collection and analysis of 
data adopted in the research. The methods employed derive from the aim and 
objectives of the research and the resultant research questions. A major concern is 
the potential messiness and complexity of abandoned acquisitions. Chapter three 
describes the novel conceptual framework developed as part of this research, in 
order to address the complexity of the process of abandoned acquisitions. The 
framework characterises the underlying mechanisms present in the process of 
abandoned acquisitions. This depiction of the process integrates existing theoretical 
concepts about fragments of the acquisition process in a novel way. These 
fragments are antecedent bidder characteristics, information revelation in the 
bidding process and disciplinary changes after abandonment.  
This chapter has explained how comparative case study analysis offers the richness 
in explanation required to address the research questions in the context of the 
conceptual framework.  In this study, the case is defined as an abandoned 
corporate acquisition. The aspect which is the focus of investigation is the role of 
abandoned acquisitions in the corporate governance of bidding firms.  
Within the case study strategy, this thesis involves the novel application of CPT 
methods to the investigation of abandoned acquisitions. CPT was suitable because 
this method could handle the analysis of the mechanisms inherent in the 
framework. CPT enables this research to analyse the complexity of the interaction 
of firm characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the 
bidding process which produces different outcomes in bidders after abandonment.  
Cumulatively, the fieldwork stages contribute to knowledge by applying CPT 
methodology in the context of the original conceptual framework. The aim of the 
fieldwork is to identify the conditions under which specified outcomes in bidding 
firms occur and the causal mechanisms through which they occur. From this, 
contingent generalisations may be proposed. These are particular meta-causal 
mechanisms – pathologies of abandoned acquisitions - which apply to particular 
groups of cases, while allowing for specific processes and interactions to differ from 
case to case. 
Codes are established in relation to theoretical conceptions regarding bidder 
characteristics, transaction characteristics, contingent factors in the bidding process 
prior to the fieldwork. The fieldwork involves the collection of data from 
documentary sources, semi-structured interviews with executives of bidding 
companies and informed participants in the market for corporate control. This mix 
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of sources is crucial to developing an understanding of the underlying mechanisms 
of abandoned acquisitions. Together, they offer a triangulation of evidence which 
will enhance the validity of the findings. Both the primary and secondary data for 
each case are interrogated with reference to the codes in order to thematically 
reduce the data. Using coding templates, relevant information and phrases in the 
documents are identified, coded and allocated to particular bidder characteristics, 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process. This 
enables the cases to be rated for each characteristic and contingent factor in 
relation to theoretical propositions. Semi-open coding is vital since it enables new 
characteristics or factors to be identified, offering the potential for unexpected 
processes and interactions to emerge.   
Chapters five, six and seven will present and discuss the findings from the fieldwork 
stage of the thesis. Chapter five will present the findings of the analysis of the 
experience of bidders after abandonment. Chapters six and seven will present and 
discuss the findings of the within-case and cross-case analysis of underlying 
mechanisms present in categories of cases selected. 
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Chapter Five: New Perspectives on the Experience of 
Failed Bidding Firms after Abandoned Acquisitions 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The experience of bidding firms after abandoned acquisitions can provide some 
indication of the governance role in disciplining their managers provided by the 
market for corporate control. However, there is a dearth of studies examining many 
aspects of the experience of bidding firms, particularly in the context of the UK. 
This research aims to address this gap by investigating new aspects of the 
experience of bidders in a novel manner. This investigation is encapsulated in the 
following research questions previously advanced in chapter three:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research represents the acquisition process and its aftermath as a complex 
process involving bidder characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent 
factors in the bidding process interacting to cause abandonment and lead to 
disciplinary outcomes subsequently. The theoretical and methodological innovations 
developed in this thesis address this complexity of merger and acquisition activity. 
This extends to the post-abandonment period. Little is known about the nature of 
the disciplinary process, if any, after abandonment. The literature of corporate 
governance and acquisitions has identified a number of variables which represent 
disciplinary changes after abandonment. However, unlike the majority of the 
existing literature, it is proposed that these changes cannot be considered in 
isolation. The experience of bidders after abandonment involves multiple, linked 
dimensions. In the conceptual framework, these multiple dimensions are linked in 
sequences of change which represented possible disciplinary processes after 
abandonment. Alternatively, different sequences of change are proposed which are 
not consistent with discipline. By analysing the sequences of changes in bidders 
with reference to the proposed sequences, more can be learned about the 
experience of bidders after abandonment, particularly the nature of the disciplinary 
process. This chapter discusses the findings of this analysis.    
The fieldwork is cumulative. In addition to enhancing our knowledge of the 
experience of bidding firms after abandonment, the second stage of the fieldwork 
builds on this analysis. The findings of this analysis are used to select cases for the 
What changes happen in bidding firms after an abandoned acquisition? 
Are these changes consistent with discipline? 
Are these changes not consistent with discipline? 
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second stage. The second stage is a detailed analysis of the processes of 
abandoned acquisitions using causal process tracing. This is consistent with the 
methodical approach to causal process tracing – choosing cases on the dependent 
variable (outcome(s) after abandonment). The selection is theory driven. Given the 
variety of potential outcomes, cases consistent with a disciplinary process can be 
used to assess the nature of the governance role of abandoned acquisitions – 
„most-likely‟ cases. Furthermore, counterfactual cases revealing outcomes not 
consistent with discipline can also be identified to analysis alternative processes 
evident in abandoned acquisitions - least-likely‟ cases - (Yin, 2003).    
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reveals stylised facts about the 31 cases 
of abandoned bids selected for analysis. Section 3 reveals the classification of cases 
across the anticipated dimensions of change after abandonment. Section 4 
discusses the sequences of changes evident in the cases. Section 5 distils the 
analysis into the classification of cases into (1) proposed disciplinary sequences 
and, (2) non-disciplinary sequences. Section 6 discusses the findings. Section 7 is 
the summary and conclusion. 
 
2. Characteristics of Abandoned Bidders  
 
Given the research concentrates on the governance role of abandoned acquisitions, 
the bidding firms chosen for analysis are those likely to suffer agency problems 
through a separation of ownership and control. In the UK, these are more likely to 
be public limited companies (Plcs). The cases of bidding companies are drawn from 
abandoned bids which occurred between 1999 and 2005. The explanation for the 
selected cases is provided in chapter four. Figure 5.3 illustrates the total number of 
abandoned acquisitions involving UK Plcs as bidders and the number of cases 
included in this research. The 31 cases represent 49% of the total number of 
abandoned bids by UK Plcs recorded by the Takeover Panel in the time period.  
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Figure 5.1: Total number of abandoned acquisitions involving UK PLCs as bidders 
and the number of cases used in fieldwork: 1999-2005     
   
 
Source: The Takeover Panel 
 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Cases of Bidders 
Summary Statistic Age (Years) Total Assets (£ 000s) 
Mean 42.87 648554.38 
Median 22 125900 
Maximum 305 6632991 
Minimum 1 588 
1st Quartile 9 28657 
3rd Quartile 64 520600 
 
The mean age of the bidding firms was approximately 43 years which was 
significantly higher than the median age of 22. However, this distinction is 
deceptive. There was a great range of ages from one firm incorporated a year 
before their abandoned bid to one firm incorporated for 305 years. This latter 
outlying case greatly affected the value of the mean. Indeed, nearly a third of the 
firms were incorporated for 10 years or less at the time of their abandoned bids. 
This pattern suggests that a high proportion of young bidders tended to abandon 
acquisitions. Younger firms, in new industries have substantial organic growth 
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potential. As new industries mature, consolidation occurs in these industries, 
involving many mergers and acquisitions, some of which may be abandoned.  
The average value of total assets among the cases was £648.554 million. The 
average is influenced by several very large firms in the sample, including large 
financial firms and one large mining firm. Therefore, the median value of total 
assets was £125.9 million. This suggests there was a sizable group of small firms in 
the sample. Indeed, a quarter of the sample had a book value of less than or equal 
to £28.66 million. The small sizes are reflected in the listings characteristics of 
some of these firms. Five of the smallest firms were listed on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) – the stock market in the UK for smaller, growing 
companies.   
Therefore, the selection of cases has a younger, smaller orientation. However, 
despite this, the cases are diverse. At the time of their abandoned bids, the firms 
were large and small, old and young, listed on the main exchange, but also listed 
on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). In addition, the firms came from a 
broad range of industrial classifications, with services being the biggest grouping. 
Within that, seven of the firms were classified as financial services. Of the 
remainder, ten firms operated primarily in manufacturing and two in primary 
products. This diversity was useful, because it raises the potential for a greater 
variety of experiences after abandonment, aiding investigation relating to the 
research questions.  
 
3. Experience of Bidding Firms after Abandonment: Classification of Cases 
across Dimensions of Change  
 
The identification and classification of firms across the dimensions of change was 
the first stage of the process of data reduction and analysis. The impact of 
abandonment on the bidding firms were separated into different aspects / 
dimensions of change in bidders after abandonment. Using the criteria specified in 
chapter four, the 31 companies were classified according to the different aspects of 
change after abandonment. In addition to anticipated changes, disciplinary or 
otherwise, the analysis allowed for unanticipated outcomes to be recorded. Indeed, 
such unanticipated outcomes did arise.  
The results indicate that all of the bidding firms demonstrated changes across one 
or more dimensions after abandonment. Some firms exhibited significant changes 
consistent with discipline, while others exhibited significant changes inconsistent 
with discipline. Some firms demonstrated changes after abandonment which is not 
anticipated by the corporate governance literature - four firms entered 
administration within three years of abandonment. Some of the firms demonstrated 
121 
 
significant changes across multiple dimensions of impact after abandonment. These 
firms are included in the findings across all of the appropriate dimensions. This 
finding supports the proposition that, rather than the impact of abandonment being 
one dimensional, it is multidimensional. This suggests there may be links between 
dimensions of change, implying a process where significant changes in one 
dimension led to subsequent changes in other dimensions. This is discussed further 
in section 5 below.  
 
3.1 Disciplinary Changes after Abandonment 
 
There was evidence of significant changes across all of the dimensions, consistent 
with post-abandonment discipline on bidding managers. However, the changes 
experienced differed greatly across the firms identified. Table 5.2 illustrates the 
number and percentage of cases which demonstrated each significant dimension of 
change after abandonment. The variable names are shown in brackets.    
 
Table 5.2: Percentage of Companies which demonstrated „Disciplinary‟ dimensions 
of Change after Abandonment 
Dimensions of Change Number of 
Firms  
% 
Significant Blocks of Share Acquired 
(>5%) (BLOCK) 
16 50% 
Replacement of CEO (CEO) 14 45% 
Significant Strategic Changes 
(Statement in annual report) (STRAT) 
8 26% 
Subsequently Acquired (ACQR) 4 13% 
Significant Asset Disposals (Defined as 
bottom quartile of distribution for 23 
firms) (DISP) 
6 25% 
Significant Increase in Gearing (Defined as 
top quartile of distribution for 23 firms) 
(UGEAR) 
5 16% 
  
The acquisition of ownership blocks by „active‟ investors after abandonment may be 
a response to information revealed during the bidding process about the 
performance / actions of managers. The blocks may be obtained to force 
disciplinary changes in the firm (Denis and Serrano, 1996). The acquisition of 
significant blocks of shares by investors (>5% of share capital) showed the 
greatest incidence in the sample. Approximately 50% of firms had at least one 
significant block acquired in the year after abandonment. A small number of firms 
had multiple blocks acquired, including one with four such blocks acquired within a 
year of abandonment. Hence, the acquisition of significant ownership blocks may 
lead to other disciplinary changes (see section 5).  
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The literature hypothesises that the replacement of a CEO may be a punishment for 
proposing acquisitions with poor prospects (Franks and Mayer, 1996). This 
replacement is proposed as a possible disciplinary response to information revealed 
by an abandoned acquisition. 45% of the firms replaced their CEO within two years 
of abandonment.  
Pickering, (1983) proposes that the abandonment of a bid may lead to a reflection 
regarding the strategies of firms. The changes in these cases are consistent with a 
significant impact of abandonment on these companies‟ strategies. 26% of the 
cases made significant strategic announcements after abandonment as reported in 
their annual report. For instance, one of the company‟s report stated the 
abandoned acquisition represented the “…closing of one chapter and the opening of 
another…”. Another company‟s annual report highlighted “strategic repositioning” 
within months of their abandoned bid. If the strategic changes were part of a 
disciplinary process, these strategic changes should be evident in other subsequent 
changes, particularly appropriate asset and financial restructuring (see section 5 
below).  
Significant net disposals are consistent with a disciplinary response to abandonment 
whereby the bidder unwinds excessive acquisitiveness prior to the abandonment 
bid (Haynes et al. (2000). The hypothesis is that such information about excessive 
acquisitiveness is revealed by the abandoned bid. Abandonment is forced and 
disciplinary disposals occur. Some of the firms could not be classified in this area 
because they were either acquired or went into administration within three years of 
abandonment and didn‟t have sufficient data. Of the remaining firms, a quarter of 
the firms - the bottom quartile for net acquisitions (disposals) - are defined as 
having made significant asset disposals. The median value of net disposals within 
three years of their abandoned bids, for this category of firms, was 6.9% of total 
assets.  
Debt is proposed as a „bonding‟ mechanism for managers to discipline them to 
focus on shareholders‟ interests (Barclay and Smith Jr, 2005). With significant debt 
to service, there is little free cash available for discretionary spending by managers. 
For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, some of the firms could not be 
classified in this dimension. Of the remaining firms, those in the top quartile for the 
percentage point change in gearing are defined as having made significant 
increases in gearing compared to the pre-bid period. These firms had gearing ratios 
more than 43.9 percentage points above their pre-bid three-year average. 
A subsequent acquisition is consistent with discipline imposed by the market for 
corporate control. An abandoned bid reveals weaknesses in the firm which produces 
a disciplinary acquisition afterwards (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). Four firms were 
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acquired within three years of their abandoned bids, suggesting discipline imposed 
by the market for corporate control for pursuing „bad‟ bids.  
 
 
3.2 Non-Disciplinary Changes 
 
Some of the firms displayed evidence of significant changes which are not 
consistent with post-abandonment discipline. These changes include significant 
asset acquisitions, significant decreases in gearing and firms entering 
administration within three years of the abandoned bid. Table 5.3 illustrates the 
number and percentage of firms experiencing these significant dimensions of 
change after abandonment. The variable names are in brackets.    
 
Table 5.3 Aspects of Changes in Bidders after Abandonment inconsistent with 
Disciplinary Changes  
Aspects of Changes after 
Abandonment 
n % 
Significant Asset Purchases (ACQUIS) 
(Defined as top quartile for distribution 
of 23 firms)  
6 25% 
Significant Decreases in Gearing 
(DGEAR) (Defined as bottom quartile for 
distribution of 23 firms) 
6 25% 
Entering Administration (ADMIN) 4 13% 
 
Significant asset acquisitions are defined as net acquisitions in the top quartile for 
the sample. After removing firms either acquired or, which entered administration 
within three years of abandonment, the top quartile each made net acquisitions of 
more than 10% of total assets. Indeed, two of these firms made net acquisitions 
equivalent to 50% of total assets in the three years after their abandoned bids. 
Firms conducting significant reductions in gearing are defined as those in the 
bottom quartile for the distribution of this variable. This meant decreases of 19 
percentage points or more. However, several of the firms made much greater 
reductions – more than 50 percentage points compared to their pre-abandonment 
level.  
Four companies went into administration within three years of abandonment. This 
was an outcome not anticipated by the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
governance role of acquisitions in the context of discipline.  
These outcomes are not consistent with post-abandonment discipline as conceived 
by existing literature. However, such firms represent a counterfactual experience 
after abandonment implying different types of causal processes involving 
abandoned acquisitions.    
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4. Multiple Dimensions of Change 
 
A majority of cases exhibited significant changes across several dimensions of 
impact. It is anticipated that the changes will be related in some way and the 
sequence of changes after abandonment would enhance knowledge of the nature of 
the impact of abandoned acquisitions and the role of abandoned acquisitions in the 
corporate governance of bidding companies.  
The cases were ordered in the context of the dimensions of impact after 
abandonment in the way suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). This enabled 
the identification of „high cases‟ - cases with multiple dimensions consistent with a 
„disciplinary‟ response to abandonment; and „low cases‟ - companies which 
demonstrated little evidence of disciplinary changes after abandonment, but there 
were significant changes nonetheless. This indicates the abandoned bidding process 
had some sort of impact. This would contribute to the process of case selection for 
subsequent deeper analysis. In line with the conceptual framework, the changes 
are separated into trigger variables (BLOCK, STRAT and CEO), and outcome 
variables (DISP, UGEAR, ACQR, ACQA DGEAR and ADMIN).  
Table 5.4 illustrates the ordering of cases according to the dimensions of change 
after abandonment. Panel A show the pattern of trigger and outcome variables for 
the cases demonstrating the highest number of dimensions consistent with 
discipline. Panel B shows the pattern of trigger and outcome variables for the cases 
demonstrating the highest number of dimensions consistent with no evidence of 
discipline. Panel C shows the pattern of variables for cases where there were no 
significant outcomes, but some trigger variables were present.   
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Table 5.4: Dimensions of Change in Bidding Firms after Abandoned Acquisitions 
 
Panel A Disciplinary Outcomes 
 Triggers Outcomes 
Case BLOCK STRA
T 
CEO DISP UGEA
R 
ACQR ACQA DGEA
R 
ADMI
N 
FUT X X X X X     
MFL X  X X      
WHI  X  X      
SGM  X  X      
SLE  X  X      
          
LLD X X X  X     
MHT   X  X     
ABN X    X     
          
CAT X X    X    
NWT X  X   X    
CTB X  X   X    
BOS      X    
 
Panel B Alternative Significant Outcomes 
 Triggers Outcomes 
Case BLOCK STRA
T 
CEO DISP UGEA
R 
ACQ ACQA DGEA
R 
ADMIN 
SPW   X      X 
RSG   X      X 
REG   X      X 
PHB         X 
          
GLD X X X    X X  
VMH X  X    X X  
MEL X    X  X   
GPG   X    X   
TRG       X   
ROM       X   
HWL       X   
          
SNW X  X     X  
TEY        X  
PTH        X  
 
Panel C No Significant Outcomes 
 Triggers Outcomes 
Case BLOCK STRA
T 
CEO DISP UGEA
R 
ACQ ACQA DGEA
R 
ADMIN 
DOL X  X       
PGT   X       
AGA   X       
CMI X         
MIC X         
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For some companies, the evidence suggests abandonment had an extensive 
impact, producing many changes. For other firms, abandonment had little impact. 
Panel A illustrates the „most likely‟ cases - Those bidding companies with many 
aspects / dimensions consistent with a disciplinary process. In the first case (FUT), 
there was evidence of significant changes in all of the aspects consistent with 
discipline. This is a unique case in this sample. However, FUT shares similarities 
with other firms in panel A. All of these firms conducted significant asset disposals 
in the three years after abandonment. In all of the firms, asset disposals were not 
conducted independently. Asset disposals were associated with trigger variables – 
either the acquisition of significant ownership blocks, and/or changes in strategy, 
and/or replacements of the CEO. This suggests a sequence of events, perhaps a 
disciplinary sequence of events, in these firms after abandonment. Such sequences 
are discussed further in the section 5 below.  
In addition to conducting significant disposals, FUT raised gearing levels 
significantly in the post-abandonment period. For other cases, increased gearing, 
while not associated with other disciplinary outcomes, was also associated with 
anticipated disciplinary triggers- either the acquisition of ownership blocks, and/or 
changes in strategy and/or replacements of the CEO. This is consistent with a 
disciplinary process involving significantly higher levels of debt, acting as a „bonding 
mechanism‟, to limit the discretion of managers to pursue their own goals. As with 
asset disposals, none of these firms increased gearing without experiencing other 
significant changes too. Again, this provides support for the concept of a 
disciplinary process after abandonment. This is discussed further in the section 5 
below. There is one case, MEL, where the acquisition of a significant ownership 
block was associated, not only with a significant increase in gearing, but also, 
significant acquisitions after abandonment. It may be that, while asset acquisitions 
are not consistent with discipline, the use of debt to finance such acquisitions 
supports its use as a bonding mechanism.  
Four of the companies were acquired within three years of abandonment. In three 
of the cases, an announced change in strategy and/or replacement of the CEO also 
occurred, suggesting some sort of disciplinary process. However, there is one case 
where the firm was acquired within three years of abandonment without any other 
significant changes present. This suggests that the nature of the impact of 
abandonment was different in this case compared to the others. Perhaps, in this 
case, this pattern distinguishes this subsequent acquisition as non-disciplinary. 
Panel B shows the cases which demonstrated significant outcomes inconsistent with 
discipline. There was a group of cases which went into administration within three 
years of abandonment. This wasn‟t anticipated to be part of a disciplinary 
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governance process. However, in three of the four cases, the CEO was replaced 
between the time of abandonment and administration, suggesting a process.  
The second group shown in panel B made substantial acquisitions in the three years 
after abandonment. Some made these substantial acquisitions after abandonment 
with no evidence of other substantial changes. However, some companies made 
substantial acquisitions and also endured other changes consistent with post-
abandonment discipline – changes in strategy, and/or replacement of the CEO. This 
implies an alternative non-disciplinary process involving abandoned acquisitions.  
The final group of companies in panel B reduced gearing levels by a significant 
amount after their abandoned acquisitions. In one case, this was associated with 
the acquisition of significant blocks of shares and the replacement of the CEO. In 
contrast, the remaining cases in this group experienced no other significant 
changes after abandonment. This suggests the abandonment had a limited impact, 
not consistent with post-abandonment discipline.  
Panel C shows the cases where there were significant changes in variables 
proposed as triggers for a disciplinary process. However, no subsequent changes 
happened as a result of the triggers. In some of the cases, the CEO was replaced, 
but no other significant changes happened afterwards. This indicates the 
replacement of the CEO, in these cases, may not have represented post-
abandonment discipline. There may be other reasons why the CEOs were replaced, 
for example retirement. Furthermore, in two other cases, significant blocks of 
shares were acquired, but nothing else of significance happened.  
 
  
128 
 
5. Sequences of Changes in Bidders after Abandonment 
 
By tracing the sequence of changes in bidders, more can be learned about the 
nature and scale of the impact of abandonment on bidding firms. This can help 
determine the characteristics of sequences of significant changes which were 
disciplinary compared to sequences of changes which were not disciplinary. As 
proposed in chapter 3, an abandoned acquisition may trigger a disciplinary process 
which could follow a number of different sequences. Firms were grouped according 
to final outcomes after abandonment and the sequences of changes which led to 
these outcomes were identified. This approach would enable the analysis to identify 
the character of each process much more clearly. The findings are reported in the 
following manner. Sequences with hypothesised disciplinary outcomes are reported 
in section 5.1 below. Sequences with alternative outcomes are reported in section 
5.2. Sequences with no significant outcomes are reported in section 5.3.  
 
 
5.1 Disciplinary Sequences 
 
A variety of outcomes after abandonment are consistent with post-abandonment 
discipline. In some cases, the final outcomes in the sequences traced were net 
disposals. Indeed, asset disposals always happened as the outcome of a sequence 
of events after abandonment. It was never conducted independent of other 
significant dimensions of change after abandonment. There were a number of 
different sequences revealed across the firms which produced significant net 
disposals - evidence of equi-finality. Figure 5.2 illustrates the different sequences 
revealed. 
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Figure 5.2: Revealed Sequences of Change resulting in Asset Disposals 
 
UGEAR CEO STRAT DISP
Cases
BLOCK
Outcome
FUT
BLOCK CEO DISP MFL
Path
STRAT DISP
WHI
SGM
SLE
In two of the cases, the acquisition of ownership blocks occurred first in a 
sequence, triggering a disciplinary sequence ending with asset disposals. This 
supports the argument that investors react to abandonment by buying significant 
stakes in abandoned bidders and disciplining the bidding management for proposing 
„value-destroying‟ bids (Denis and Serrano, 1996). There is no desire to change 
ownership, just exert control. Such blocks are followed by a variety of sequences 
involving intervening variables. In the case of FUT, the acquisition of a significant 
ownership block was followed by a significant increase in gearing, CEO 
replacement, an announced change in strategy and ended with significant net 
disposals. In this case, higher gearing was not an outcome, but a contingent factor 
in the disciplinary process. In MFL‟s case, the replacement of the CEO was followed 
with net disposals. Again, this adds weight to the interpretation that, in these 
cases, the abandoned acquisition had a strong disciplinary impact, centering on the 
replacement of the CEO. This led to a retrenchment in the activities of the firms, 
evidenced by significant net disposals.  
In the three remaining cases, announced changes in strategy happened 
immediately after abandonment, producing significant net disposals. Statements by 
the firms relating to their changes in strategy highlighted asset disposals as an 
important aspect. In the cases of FUT and MFL, the replacement of the CEO 
prompted a change in strategy. However, in these latter cases, there was no such 
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trigger. The changes in strategy announced appear to have been prompted directly 
by abandonment. These findings extend the findings of Paul (2007) to abandoned 
acquisitions. She found significant asset downsizing after completed „bad‟ 
acquisitions – acquisitions associated with negative abnormal returns around 
announcement. Here, asset disposals occurred after a variety of disciplinary 
processes. This suggests that, in these cases, a „bad‟ acquisition is abandoned, 
producing a disciplinary process in the bidding firms. This implies a governance role 
for the abandoned acquisition. 
Significant increases in gearing appeared unexpectedly as an intervening variable in 
the post-abandonment sequence in the case of FUT. However, this variable 
occurred as a final outcome in several other cases. This was consistent with post-
abandonment discipline through bonding in the way suggested by Barclay and 
Smith (1995). Figure 5.3 illustrates the different sequences revealed. As an 
outcome, UGEAR did not appear independently. It was prompted by two different 
triggers, BLOCK and CEO. The presence of these interceding variables supports the 
interpretation of UGEAR as a bonding mechanism imposed as part of a disciplinary 
process after abandonment. In the process experienced by LLD, the existing CEO is 
replaced and their replacement is bonded to performance through higher gearing. 
In the process experienced by MHT, ownership blocks exerted control over existing 
managers. In ABN‟s case, there were no evidence of blocks acquired, but the 
replacement of the CEO was followed by higher gearing levels.   
Figure 5.3: Revealed Sequences of Changes resulting in Increased Gearing  
 
CEO STRAT UGEAR
Cases
BLOCK
Outcome
LLD
BLOCK
Path
ABN
TEY
PTH
UGEAR
CEO UGEAR
DGEAR
MHT
BLOCK CEO DGEAR SNW
 
131 
 
Of the failed bidders which were subsequently acquired, there is evidence of equi-
finality in the sequences of change experienced. Figure 5.4 illustrates these 
different sequences. One firm was acquired after abandonment without evidence of 
associated changes in other dimensions. However, in the other cases there were 
intervening variables. In two of the cases, the CEOs were replaced. However, no 
other significant changes happened. In other cases, CEO replacement was followed 
by changes in strategy coupled with other disciplinary outcomes like asset disposals 
or increased gearing. However, this didn‟t happen in these cases. This suggests 
that, if new CEOs do not make significant changes to remedy problems in the firms, 
further discipline may be imposed through the market for corporate control. In the 
final case, CAT, a significant ownership block was acquired by a partner as part of a 
joint venture. Ultimately, this led to the company being acquired by the same 
partner.   
  
Figure 5.4: Revealed Sequences of Changes leading to Subsequent Acquisition   
 
CEO ACQR
CasesOutcome
NWT
CTB
BOS
Path
ACQR
BLOCK ACQR CAT
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Much literature on the governance role of acquisitions interpret the replacement of 
a CEO as a disciplinary outcome (Huson et al., 2001). Indeed, in some of the cases 
in this study, the replacement of the firms‟ CEOs was the only significant outcome 
after abandonment. There were no further significant changes afterwards, 
particularly the further disciplinary changes which might be anticipated. In one of 
the cases, the replacement was preceded by the acquisition of a significant 
ownership block. However, in the remaining cases, CEO replacement happened 
independently. In the conceptual framework, it was proposed that the replacement 
of CEOs should be a trigger for asset / financial restructuring in bidding firms as 
part of a disciplinary process, making definite changes in the firms. Where no 
further significant changes happened in the bidders relating to asset / financial 
restructuring, this weakens the disciplinary interpretation of such replacements. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the revealed sequences with CEO as the final event. 
 
Figure 5.5: Revealed Sequences of Changes resulting in CEO replacement and no 
further Changes  
 
CEO
Cases
BLOCK
Outcome
DOL
CEO
PGT
AGA
Path
BLOCK CMI
BLOCK MIC
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5.2 Non-Disciplinary Sequences 
 
Significant asset acquisitions are outcomes not consistent with discipline. In the 
causal sequences revealed in cases which made significant asset acquisitions, there 
is evidence of equi-finality. Figure 5.6 illustrates the sequences revealed. In three 
of the cases significant asset acquisitions were conducted without any prior triggers 
in the bidders. However, in several firms, there were triggers. In other cases, 
BLOCK was the trigger to the sequence of changes after abandonment. In some, 
this led to the CEOs being replaced before significant acquisitions were pursued. In 
a number of cases, these asset acquisitions were coupled with substantial 
decreases in debt levels. However, in one case (MEL), significant asset acquisitions 
were coupled with significant increases in gearing as part of the financing. 
Figure 5.6: Revealed Sequences of Changes resulting in Asset Acquisitions 
 
CEO STRAT
ACQUA
DGEAR
Cases
BLOCK
Outcome
GLD
BLOCK CEO VMH
Path
GPG
TRG
ROM
HWL
ACQUA
DGEAR
CEO ACQUA
ACQUA
BLOCK
ACQUA
UGEAR
MEL
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Firms entering administration within three years of abandonment was an outcome 
not consistent with discipline according to the literature on corporate governance 
and acquisitions. However, it was the fate for four of the abandoned bidders 
analysed. Figure 5.7 illustrates the sequences of changes revealed for these firms. 
In one firm, administration happened without any prior triggers. In contrast, for the 
three remaining cases, administration was preceded by CEO replacement. This 
suggests a process of change after abandonment. This could be interpreted as the 
disciplinary removal of a CEO, for poor performance, revealed during the bidding 
process. However, the new CEO may have been unable to improve performance by 
making significant changes. Consequently, further discipline was imposed through 
the corporate reorganisation associated with administration.     
 
Figure 5.7: Sequences of Changes resulting in Administration 
CEO ADMIN
CasesOutcome
SPW
RSG
REG
PHB
Path
ADMIN
 
 
In addition to GLD and VMH, three additional firms reduced their gearing levels by 
significant amounts in the post-abandonment period. Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
revealed sequences for these cases. In two of the cases, this happened without any 
significant trigger. In one case, SNW, the decrease in gearing was the outcome of a 
process starting with the acquisition of an ownership block and involving the 
replacement of the CEO, suggesting a process of change after abandonment, albeit 
one inconsistent with discipline. However, one possible interpretation is that 
shareholders may have been concerned about the high levels of debt in the firm 
and sought new management to reduce the debt burden.    
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5.3 No Significant Sequences 
 
Two firms had significant ownership blocks acquired after their abandoned 
acquisitions. However, there is no evidence of significant changes across any other 
dimension of changes after abandonment. This suggests that the abandoned 
acquisition had little impact on the firms concerned. On the other hand, significant 
changes imposed by the ownership block may not have been captured by this 
analysis. These changes could relate to organisational structure, managerial 
responsibilities or other qualitative variables. This requires further investigation, 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
  
6. Discussion of Findings 
 
The investigation of the experience of bidders after abandonment has identified a 
variety of causal sequences present in bidding firms after abandonment. George 
and Bennett (2005) highlight this possibility of multi-finality in causal processes – 
similar causal patterns leading to different outcomes. This is the pattern revealed 
for these cases of failed bidders. Sequences after abandonment demonstrating 
similar triggers and interceding variables can be part of very different causal 
processes, producing very different outcomes; some consistent with discipline, 
some not.  
There were cases where the acquisition of ownership blocks led to CEO 
replacement, and then announced changes in strategy. In some of the cases this 
led to significant net disposals. However, in other cases this path led to significant 
net acquisitions. These distinct patterns were replicated across a number of cases. 
Meanwhile, CEO replacements led to changes in strategy and significant net 
acquisitions. However, it also led to different outcomes - firms being the target of 
subsequent acquisitions or being forced into administration. Generally, an 
announced change in strategy produced significant net disposals. This outcome is 
consistent with a disciplinary process.      
This evidence supports the proposition of the conceptual framework that the 
acquisition of ownership blocks / announced changes in strategy / replacement of 
CEOs may not be unique to disciplinary processes. They can be part of different 
processes, each with contrasting natures. In themselves, such changes cannot 
reveal the nature of a process. If such changes are part of a process, then 
something else needs to happen, as a result of these changes, to determine the 
nature of the process. Therefore, the analysis suggests it is the final outcome which 
characterises the nature of a sequence of changes after abandonment.  
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As a result, three scenarios can be identified: 
1. Disciplinary sequences: abandonment has a significant outcome suggesting 
a disciplinary role. 
2. Non-disciplinary sequences: Abandonment has a significant outcome, but no 
disciplinary role. 
3. Non-disciplinary sequences: Abandonment has an insignificant impact, no 
disciplinary role. 
 
6.1 Disciplinary Sequences 
 
With disciplinary outcomes, there is evidence of equi-finality - different causal paths 
to the same outcome. Disciplinary outcomes could be triggered by acquisition of 
ownership blocks, or announced changes in strategy, or the replacement of CEOs. A 
variety of patterns relating to interceding variables emerges. In some cases, the 
final outcome was significant net disposals. Indeed, as an outcome, asset disposals 
always occurred at the end of a sequence of changes. It never happened 
independently. There were a number of different sequences revealed. However, 
announced changes in strategy were prominent in all of the paths to this outcome. 
Interestingly, where a change in strategy is the first response to abandonment, this 
always led to significant net disposals. This never produced alternative outcomes. 
Indeed, the statements by those firms revealing the changes in strategy highlighted 
asset sales as a crucial aspect. In none of these cases did changes in strategy pre-
empt the replacement of a CEO. These findings are consistent with Lehn and Zhao 
(2006). An incumbent CEO who addressed the implications of abandonment and 
announced a change in strategy was given an opportunity to implement it. Hence 
the changes in strategy led directly to asset disposals. However, where a CEO was 
replaced, this sometimes led to a change in strategy and asset disposals. This 
suggests a governance role for abandoned acquisitions with the abandoned bidding 
process being a critical juncture for the strategic direction of the company. In these 
cases, abandonment produced a change in strategy entailing the disposal of a 
significant percentage of assets. 
However, in cases where BLOCK, CEO or STRAT did not lead to significant changes 
through appropriate asset or financial restructuring, monitors may have taken this 
as a signal that these changes had not been enough to address the problems in the 
firm. This necessitated discipline through the market for corporate control or 
through the reorganisation associated with administration. For instance, in a 
number of cases, replacement of the CEO preceded being acquired or going into 
administration. This suggests that CEO replacement was an attempt to address 
problems in the company revealed during the abandoned acquisition. Consequently, 
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subsequent acquisition or administration could be interpreted as a discipline on new 
managers failing to deal with the problems identified during the abandoned bid. 
This sequence suggests abandoned acquisitions may have a governance role, 
revealing information about problems in these firms.    
It is revealing that none of the bidding companies which had significant ownership 
blocks acquired as the initial response to abandonment, consequently entered 
administration. The acquisition of ownership blocks were prominent in the 
sequences of changes leading to anticipated outcomes. However, with 
administration, given the severity of the outcome, it could be argued that the 
problems which forced administration were revealed in the bidding process, 
deterring subsequent investment.  
It is proposed by the corporate governance literature that the replacement of the 
CEO could be a disciplinary outcome (Franks and Mayer, 1996). In the conceptual 
framework, it was proposed that the replacement of a CEO was part of a 
disciplinary sequence, triggering subsequent changes in firms. This study proposes 
the interpretation of CEO replacement needs to be set in the context of the process 
of which it forms a part. The findings support this interpretation. In a number of the 
firms, CEO replacements led to announced changes in strategy. Where this 
happened, the firm tended to stay as a going concern and significant asset and/or 
financial restructuring was pursued. Conversely, in several cases, the replacement 
of the CEO produced no further significant changes within three years of 
abandonment. This weakens the interpretation of such replacement as discipline in 
these cases, since it would be anticipated that the firm would require further asset 
and/or financial restructuring. Where there was none, the abandoned acquisition 
had little impact, implying no governance role. These findings suggest that CEO 
replacement independently, is not disciplinary. In order to be interpreted as 
disciplinary, such replacement needed to be linked with further substantial changes 
in firms, consistent with discipline.  
 
6.2 Non-Disciplinary Sequences 
 
There is evidence of equi-finality across the bidding firms which experienced non-
disciplinary outcomes. Actually, in a number of cases, there is no evidence of a 
process at all. The absence was more likely in firms where the outcome was not 
consistent with post-abandonment discipline. Some of these firms made significant 
asset acquisitions within three years of their abandoned acquisition, without any 
preceding significant events. Similarly, some firms decreased gearing significantly 
after abandonment without any preceding events.  However, these outcomes were 
also the result of different sequences of changes after abandonment. Indeed, these 
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sequences were remarkably similar to the sequences for some of the firms which 
endured disciplinary outcomes.  
In these cases, CEO replacements led to announced changes in strategy. Where 
this happened, the firm tended to stay as a going concern and significant asset 
acquisitions conducted. In such circumstances, CEO replacement may not have 
been disciplinary, and the process itself not disciplinary. However, a disciplinary 
interpretation could be placed on such sequences. A CEO could be replaced, not for 
an overall acquisition strategy, but the proposal of the specific poor acquisition 
transaction which was abandoned. Consequently, their replacements were tasked 
with continuing the acquisition strategy, which is then pursued successfully. This 
interpretation, while not expected, suggest such sequences of changes requires 
further investigation. 
 
6.3 No Significant Sequences 
 
There were several firms which endured the acquisition of ownership blocks with no 
further significant asset restructuring and/or financial restructuring, which would be 
anticipated if abandonment had triggered a disciplinary response. In addition, these 
companies were not acquired, nor entered administration. One interpretation of 
these patterns suggests that, without substantial asset and /or financial 
restructuring, these changes intimated no governance role for the abandoned 
bidding process, in these firms. Another interpretation is that other disciplinary 
changes, not captured by this analysis, were triggered consequently. This requires 
further investigation. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This analysis has contributed to knowledge by investigating the nature of discipline 
imposed by the market for corporate control on bidding firms. This chapter has 
discussed the culmination of the abandoned acquisition process – the impact of 
abandonment on bidders.  
This stage of the fieldwork investigated the presence of sequences of related 
dimensions of change in bidders after abandonment. This helps identify the nature 
of the impact of abandonment on bidding firms. The study extends existing work on 
the impact of both completed and abandoned acquisitions, by identifying the 
presence of different causal sequences after abandonment. The analysis suggests 
the period after abandonment was characterised in some cases by disciplinary 
processes which produced disciplinary outcomes and, in other cases, processes 
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which generated no disciplinary outcomes. In addition, there were cases with no 
evidence of a sequential process at all.  
This study extends the work of Boone (2000), Perry and Shivdasani (2005) and 
Paul (2007). They identified asset disposals as a disciplinary response to poor 
performance, evidenced in different ways. In this research, assets disposals were 
generally the result of a process consistent with discipline originating in an 
abandoned acquisition. This suggests information was revealed in the bidding 
process about the efficacy of executives‟ acquisition proposals. In some cases 
where bidders were subsequently acquired, this study found evidence of a 
disciplinary process. This complements the results of Mitchell and Lehn (1990). In 
their study, bad bidders became good targets. The findings here distinguished firms 
where managers who proposed bad bids, may signal this and become good targets.  
On the other hand, this study found that non-disciplinary outcomes, particularly 
significant asset acquisitions, were experienced in a number of cases with no 
evidence of disciplinary triggers. However, such outcomes were also the result of 
sequences of changes. This differential impact may suggest different causal 
mechanisms in the abandoned acquisition and its aftermath which require further 
investigation.    
There were great similarities between the intervening variables across a number of 
cases with disciplinary outcomes and cases with non-disciplinary outcomes, 
particularly asset acquisitions and asset disposals. The acquisition of ownership 
blocks, CEO replacements and resultant changes in strategy were common aspects 
in sequences producing these different outcomes. This suggests that these 
variables are not unique to a disciplinary process in the way proposed by parts of 
the governance literature. This study extends current knowledge by showing that 
the role of such variables is more nuanced, dependent on the specific circumstances 
of firms. This suggests the nature of discipline imposed may be different depending 
on firm specific characteristics and factors in the abandoned acquisition. More 
research into the role of these changes in bidders after abandonment is required, 
particularly to see whether there is a replication of patterns across a larger number 
of firms.     
Subsequent chapters will build on this work to investigate the causal mechanisms 
evident in cases which produce different outcomes. As a result of the analysis 
discussed in this chapter, the firms were placed into two categories. The first set 
included the cases exhibiting a disciplinary process after abandonment, leading to a 
disciplinary outcome – „most-likely cases. The second set included the firms 
exhibiting either, processes leading to non-disciplinary outcomes or no process at 
all – „least-likely cases (Yin, 2003). Within each category, several firms were 
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identified. These firms were used as the cases for investigation in stage 2 of the 
fieldwork. 
Identifying a small number of cases with different outcomes after abandonment 
enables the second group of research questions to be addressed. What are the 
underlying causal mechanisms which produce different outcomes? Is there any 
difference between the causal mechanisms of cases exhibiting disciplinary 
processes after abandonment and the cases which do not? By tracing the causal 
paths back through the bidding process to before the abandoned bid, the research 
can identify the nature of the interrelationships between characteristics and 
contingent factors which form the causal mechanisms of abandonment. This would 
help to determine whether the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions can 
provide any insight into the different experiences of firms afterwards. 
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Chapter Six: Within-Case Analysis - Causal 
Mechanisms involving Failed Bidders in Abandoned 
Acquisitions 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The research aims to investigate the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. 
More can be learned about the acquisition process by identifying the conditions 
under which specified outcomes occur, and the causal mechanisms through which 
they occur. Stage 1 of the fieldwork investigates the experience of failed bidders 
after abandonment, to identify the dimensions to the different processes of change 
after abandonment. Stage 2 of the fieldwork builds on the findings of that work to 
answer the second set of research questions posed in chapter 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
On the basis of the finding at stage one, the bidding firms are split into two 
categories. Firstly, those firms which experience sequences of changes after 
abandonment, consistent with a disciplinary process, are classified as „most-likely‟ 
cases. Secondly, those firms which demonstrate sequences of change not 
consistent with a disciplinary process are classified as „least-likely‟ cases (Yin, 
2003). This is consistent with accepted methodological practice using causal 
process tracing (Miles and Huberman, 1994).   
Table 6.1 shows the cases of firms exhibiting disciplinary sequences after 
abandonment and the example cases from this category analysed using causal 
process tracing (CPT). These cases were chosen because they represent valid 
examples of „most-likely‟ cases, where, according to theory, the process of 
abandonment is most likely to play a governance role (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Consequently, the typological network derived as an original aspect of this research 
could be tested in the light of the empirical evidence revealed at the fieldwork 
stage. 
In the most-likely cases, the sequences of change were heterogeneous, but they 
produced outcomes consistent with discipline – asset disposals, increases in gearing 
or subsequent acquisition. By drawing on this heterogeneity, the research can 
What is the nature of the underlying mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions 
which produces post-abandonment discipline of bidders‟ managers? 
What is the nature of the underlying mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions 
which does not produce post-abandonment discipline of bidders‟ managers? 
To what extent are the mechanisms different? 
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distinguish subtle, but potentially significant differences in the observed 
mechanisms, if any exist.  
Table 6.1: Example Cases exhibiting Disciplinary sequences after Abandonment  
Cases in 
Wider 
Sample 
Example Cases analysed using Causal Process Tracing (CPT) 
SLET 
WHI 
WHI announced a change in strategy within weeks of 
the abandoned bid, followed by the significant net 
disposal of assets and the return of proceeds to 
shareholders through share repurchases and higher 
dividends. 
MFL 
WHI 
SGM 
FUT 
FUT 
FUT had blocks of shares acquired followed by 
increases in Gearing. Then the CEO was replaced 
leading to an announced change in strategy and 
significant net disposals after abandonment. 
LLD 
MHT 
ABN 
CAT 
CAT 
Significant ownership block acquired by joint venture 
partner. This led to subsequent acquisition by the 
joint venture partner. 
NWT 
CTB 
BOS 
 
Table 6.2 shows the cases of firms exhibiting non-disciplinary sequences after 
abandonment and the example cases from this category analysed using causal 
process tracing (CPT). These cases were chosen because they represent valid 
examples of „least-likely‟ cases, where, according to theory, the process of 
abandonment is least-likely to play a governance role (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
Table 6.2: Example Cases exhibiting Non-Disciplinary sequences after 
Abandonment  
Case in 
Wider 
Sample 
Example Cases analysed using Causal Process Tracing (CPT) 
TRG 
TRG Significant Asset Acquisitions 
ROM 
HWL 
SNW 
GLD 
MEL 
Significant ownership block acquired followed by an 
increased in gearing and significant asset acquisitions 
 
VMH 
MEL 
GPG 
SPW 
REG 
Entered Administration 
 
RSG 
TRG 
PHB 
TEY 
PTH 
No significant changes after abandonment 
 
PTH 
DOL 
PGT 
AGA 
MIC 
No significant changes after abandonment 
 
CMI 
MIC 
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The literature on CPT emphasises the importance of such counterfactual cases, 
where the dependent variable implies that the typological theory is not confirmed - 
cases where the post-abandonment experience of bidders is not consistent with 
discipline (Richards, 2009). Consequently, one would anticipate that these cases 
involved alternative non-disciplinary causal mechanisms producing no post-
abandonment discipline.  
However, this may not be the case. It may be that cases with disciplinary outcomes 
and cases with non-disciplinary outcomes have similar causal mechanisms 
producing abandonment. But, by analysing different types of cases, the research 
can investigate whether the causal mechanisms of most-likely and least-likely cases 
are different. However, if there are differences, the research can identify how, and 
in what circumstances, the different causal mechanisms arise.  Miles and Huberman 
(1994) highlight the methodological importance of both within-case and cross-case 
analysis, within CPT, in drawing out the causal processes present in case studies. 
This would provide a deeper, denser understanding of the causal mechanisms of 
abandoned acquisition and whether they can provide guidance on the subsequent 
activities of bidding firms. This chapter will present the findings of the within-case 
analysis. The following chapter will present the findings of the cross-case analysis.  
Employing the conceptual framework, codes were established in relation to the firm 
characteristics, transaction characteristics, contingent factors in the bidding process 
and outcomes after abandonment. Both the primary and secondary data for each 
case were interrogated with reference to the codes. Relevant information and 
phrases in the documents were identified, coded and allocated to particular 
characteristics and factors across the four categories. This enabled the cases to be 
rated for each characteristic and contingent factor in relation to the conceptual 
framework.  
Fragments of the causal process were analysed separately under the different 
groups of characteristics and contingent factors. Data from the case was 
categorised according to the codes used for analysis (see chapter four). In addition, 
new relevant characteristics were identified and incorporated into the analysis. The 
categorisation for each case is shown in Appendix B. These fragments are drawn 
together to propose a tentative „causal network‟, reflecting the apparent causal 
mechanism for each abandoned acquisition and its aftermath. A „causal network 
diagram is a visual illustration of the network. A causal network narrative is written 
to explain the causal network (Miles and Hberman, 1994).  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the findings for the most-likely 
cases. Section 3 presents the findings for the least-likely cases. For each case, a 
case history is presented to give the reader an understanding of its important 
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points. Then, there is a discussion of the causal process tracing conducted in the 
case, drawing each fragment together to propose a parsimonious causal network. 
This is illustrated diagrammatically and described using a causal network narrative 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). The key to the diagrams used to illustrate the causal 
networks is shown below.1 Section 4 is the summary and conclusion. 
 
 
 
  
                                           
1 For an explanation of these relationships, see chapters three and four. 
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2. Most-Likely Cases  
 
2.1 The Case of WHI 
 
2.11 Case History 
 
In May 1999, WHI announced the intended acquisition of the entire UK operations 
of the Target. It was an agreed acquisition for the pub operations, which were the 
target of a hostile bid from a rival pub chain. WHI stated: 
[The acquisition] “…provides growth in the eating out, pub and budget hotel 
market.” 
       (RNS Statement, 25/5/1999) 
WHI‟s historical origins were in brewing and pubs. Its main Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) was „Beer Manufacture‟. However, over time it had become a 
broader leisure company incorporating restaurants, hotels, coffee outlets, leisure 
centres and off licenses. Hence, the firm‟s broad strategy was: 
“UK hospitality, out-of-home leisure.” 
       (Company Annual Report) 
Brewing and pubs are mature sectors of the economy, highly concentrated, with 
low growth potential. WHI‟s brewing division held a 15.7% share of the UK market 
at the time of the bid (Bid announcement). However, these sectors generated 
substantial free cash for the firm. Consequently, the firm was generating 
substantial free cash, but with little growth prospects. Indeed, the firm was 
committing a lot of free cash to significant organic and acquisition investment 
expenditure – 20% and 10.85% of total assets, respectively, in three years before 
the abandoned bid. In addition, the company paid generous dividends of 48.4% of 
net profits. This produced a negative free cash flow (-5.45% of total assets in the 
year before the abandoned bid). The evidence suggests the organic and acquisition 
investment spending was in hotel and leisure assets, where anticipated growth was 
higher. There was little evidence of investment in brewing, so the residual was paid 
out as the high dividends disclosed above.       
This company context underpinned the proposed acquisition of the UK operations of 
the Target. The context of the industry also influenced the proposed acquisition. 
The use of an acquisition reflected the maturity of the pub market, where there 
were few opportunities for organic growth. Further growth could only be achieved 
through acquisitions. This was highlighted by the popularity of the UK operations of 
the Target, attracting several bids. For WHI, the acquisition was an opportunity to 
achieve further growth and also “cost savings” (RNS Announcement, 25/5/1999). 
Another important factor, in the bid and the bidding process, was the regulatory 
environment in which WHI operated. A report by the Monopoly and Mergers 
146 
 
Commission (MMC), in 1989, into competition in the brewing and related pub 
sector, found a complex monopoly situation existed. The report concluded that a 
small number of brewers, including WHI, owned a large number of pubs, enabling 
them to restrict choice. In addition, through exclusive supply arrangements, the 
choices available to consumers in independent pubs were also restricted. On the 
basis of the report, The Supply of Beer (Tied Estate) Orders Act (1989) was 
enacted. This restricted the number of licensed premises which brewers could own 
to 2,000, limiting the growth potential of brewers further in this mature market. At 
the time of the abandoned bid, WHI‟s pub estate numbered 1,700. The proposed 
acquisition would take it above the threshold established by the legislation. 
At the time of the abandoned bid, the firm had an atomistic ownership structure, 
suggesting little incentive for shareholders to monitor managers. However, the 64% 
of non-executive directors suggested an independent board. The executive directors 
(EDs) held 0.69% of shares, indicating little incentives consistent with shareholders‟ 
interests.  
The agreed takeover by WHI was financed with a mixture of cash and equity. 
However, the equity component represented 99% of the financing (Bid Document). 
This valued the Target at £2.3 bn. The Target had rejected a rival offer, highlighting 
the many uncertain aspects of it – the delayed completion date, the need for tax 
clearance and the rival‟s „threats to walk-away‟ if the bid was not accepted. 
Aware of the regulation regarding pub ownership, WHI stated in its bid documents 
that it: 
 “…will separate its brewing interests following completion of the 
acquisitions.”     
(Bid Document)   
This was a non-standard condition of the bid, which WHI hoped would enable it to 
hold more than the 2,000 pubs allowed under the legislation. This non-standard 
condition caused great uncertainty. Press reports during the bid process implied 
that WHI were “thinking the unthinkable”, by disposing of their brewing business. 
In addition, the rival bidder and other pub owners criticised the terms of the merger 
arguing it would lead to greater concentration in the brewing industry and greater 
monopoly power for brewers in dictating supply terms. In a statement, the Rival 
bidder said (the merger): 
 “..raises significant regulatory issues.” 
(RNS Statement, 23/6/1999) 
The uncertainty prompted a decline in WHI‟s share price of 4.7%. This decline 
raised concerns about the value of the bid, requiring WHI to increase its offer twice, 
eventually offering £2.8 bn – still almost completely financed using equity. 
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Negative information revealed about the bidder during the bidding process added to 
the uncertainty. This related to its poor management of the bidding process. The 
company negotiated with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), but press reports 
suggested they did not manage the relationship well. After meetings, the OFT 
reported there were issues of concern, but the bidder suggested formally that there 
were no issues of concern. It announced [WHI]: 
“…has had discussions with the OFT and supplied all information which the 
OFT has requested.” 
(RNS Statement, 25/6/1999) 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) referred the bid to the OFT for an 
investigation stating that the concentration of off-licenses in some areas and 
brewing was anti-competitive. After the referral, the Bidder‟s board stated [The 
company]: 
 “…will not proceed with the transaction or therefore with the inquiry”. 
(RNS Announcement, 15/7/1999) 
In addition, the statement read: 
“…it [WHI] has serious concerns about the implications for competition 
policy which arise from this decision.” 
(RNS Announcement, 15/7/1999) 
The announcement further questioned whether the rival bid should be allowed to 
progress in the light of its regulatory implications. Despite this, the rival bid was not 
referred to the OFT and succeeded later in the year.      
After abandonment, a market analyst commented,  
“Strategic development is probably going to be away from brewing and pubs 
– they are caught in a bit of bind as to how to resolve the situation there in 
the long term […] but the company does have quite important strategic 
issues to address”. 
(Press report) 
Indeed, there was a strategic review of the firm‟s activities. This led to a strategic 
restructuring of the company, which suggests a disciplinary process after 
abandonment through the refocusing of activities. There were net disposals of 6.9% 
of total assets in the three years after abandonment, involving a reorientation away 
from brewing and pubs (low growth) towards hotels and leisure (high growth). This 
was evidenced by the acquisition of a large hotel chain in the year after 
abandonment and the disposals of brewing and pubs – the regulatory environment 
leaving little room for growth in that area. A large proportion of the realised value 
of the pub estate was returned to shareholders.  
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2.12 Causal Network Narrative  
 
The evidence suggests a causal network for WHI which does not conform to the 
anticipated network proposed for a disciplinary governance mechanism, However, 
there is evidence that the outcomes of abandonment can be traced to aspects of 
the acquisition process and that the process played a governance role. These 
involved the interaction of certain characteristics of the bidder, the industry, 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process. Appendix 
2a demonstrates the coding of primary and secondary data for WHI, using the 
templates derived from the conceptual framework. This was used to produce the 
causal network diagram, reflecting the underlying mechanism present in this case.  
This causal network diagram is illustrated in figure 6.1. The causal network 
narrative which explains the mechanisms underpinning the diagram is presented in 
the following sections. The numbers in brackets relate each part of the causal 
network narrative to the corresponding characteristic or factors illustrated in the 
causal network diagram. 
 
2.13 Bidder Characteristics 
 
The evidence suggests that several characteristics of the bidder were important 
causal factors in the abandoned acquisition. There was a nested causal path from 
maturity (1) to low growth (2) to acquisitions (3). The maturity of the company‟s 
traditional brewing and pub activities meant there was low organic growth 
potential, requiring an acquisition investment strategy to generate growth. At the 
same time, these assets were highly profitable, producing substantial free cash. 
However, there is little evidence that the acquisition pursued was driven by 
managerial preferences. It was intended to produce higher growth in the firm. 
Hence, these characteristics are not important in this causal network, disputing the 
typological disciplinary network. In addition, corporate governance characteristics 
relating to monitoring and incentives suggest little discretion for managers to 
pursue their own interests. Hence, it is proposed that these characteristics had little 
role to play in the causal mechanism and do not feature in the causal network. The 
critical antecedent variable in the causal path is the low growth potential of the 
assets. A nested causal path can be drawn from this characteristic, through the 
acquisition strategy, to the identity of the Target - a firm with a high degree of 
industrial relatedness (4).      
In addition, the maturity of the market and the vertical links between brewing and 
pub ownership created the regulatory environment the firm faced (5). Legislation 
restricted the number of pubs that brewers such as WHI could own. This suggests 
this regulatory environment is an antecedent industry characteristic, necessitating 
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the proposed sale of the brewing interests of WHI (6). Its implications would cause 
WHI to breach the threshold for pub ownership defined by legislation.  
 
 
2.14 Transaction Characteristics 
 
A nested causal path can be derived from the low growth potential of assets to the 
related bid. In addition, there is relational causation between the industrial 
relatedness of the two firms, and the regulatory environment within which WHI 
operated. These forced WHI to include the non-standard condition of the bid – the 
sale of its brewing interests (6) - to satisfy the requirements of the Beer Orders 
Act. This non-standard condition was the critical characteristic in the causal 
process, producing abandonment and disciplinary outcomes afterwards.  
 
2.15 Contingent Characteristics in the Bidding Process 
 
A nested causal path can be traced from the non-standard condition of the bid to 
the strategic uncertainty about the rationale for the bid and its role in the wider 
strategy of the firm (7). The management of WHI was never able to overcome this 
uncertainty. The choice of equity (8), while not linked with the firm‟s 
characteristics, exacerbated the uncertainty. The use of equity financing 
transmitted the strategic uncertainty surrounding the bid, through the decrease in 
WHI‟S share price, to a decrease in the bid‟s inherent value (9). In addition, the 
presence of a rival bidder (10) and their vociferous opposition to the proposed 
disposal of brewing added further to the uncertainty. The referral of the acquisition 
(11) for a detailed investigation to the OFT was the trigger for abandonment (12). 
The referral, coupled with the other contingent factors, created too many strategic 
uncertainties around the proposed acquisition. Hence, there was an interaction of 
several antecedents and intervening factors contributing to the strategic 
uncertainty. This caused abandonment and the disciplinary sequence afterwards. In 
the bidding process, the causal mechanism did not operate in a neat temporal 
fashion. There was a configuration of characteristics and factors which interacted in 
a compound manner to heighten the strategic uncertainty in the causal mechanism. 
This supports the type of causal configuration highlighted by Blume and Blatter 
(2008).    
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2.16 After Abandonment 
 
After abandonment, WHI conducted a strategic review of its activities. The decision 
was taken to divest its brewing and pub assets (13). This enabled more focused 
governance in all of the activities of the firm (14). Management could concentrate 
on these core activities, without being concerned about the implications of their 
decisions for other parts of the business, which had created the strategic 
uncertainty surrounding the abandoned bid. WHI itself could: 
“…grow its share of those segments of the expanding UK leisure market that 
are consistent with its core skills and experience.” 
(Bid Documents) 
Hence, the abandoned bid played a governance role, leading to a process of 
restructuring and reorientation in WHI. 
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Figure 6.1: Proposed Causal Network for WHI 
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2.2 The Case of FUT 
 
2.21 Case History  
 
Formed in 1984, FUT was a media company, publishing special interest magazines 
and websites. On 14/2/05, FUT and Target announced a merger involving a 
recommended offer valuing the Target at £31.6mn, a 35.5% premium to the 
Target‟s value at the time of the announcement. In recommending the offer, Target 
CEO stated, the offer: 
“…represented a fair value for shareholders.” 
(RNS Announcement, 14/2/05) 
The equity offer meant: 
 
“…shareholders could share in the financial and commercial improvements 
that resulted from the merger.” 
(RNS Announcement, 14/2/05) 
FUT stated that the acquisition would enable the firm to enhance its position in 
special interest magazines, where the Target possessed valuable assets. This 
facilitated further growth, consistent with the growth strategy announced in the 
previous year‟s annual report: 
“ A doubling of the size of the company within 5 years.” 
(Company Annual Report, 2004) 
The acquisition would make FUT the “…3rd largest magazine publisher in the UK and 
the 2nd largest publisher of special interest consumer magazines.” 
  (Bid Documents) 
 
In 2001, several years earlier, the situation was very different. The director 
reported that excessive growth in the 1990s had left the company overstretched:  
“…the company was close to the edge of a cliff. Overstretched, with a small 
management team operating in more than a dozen countries with a 
ludicrous amount of debt. We fired half the board, half the staff.” 
 (Interview with Director) 
Then: 
“…there was a glorious period […] where the company was debt-free, with a 
rising amount of net cash.” 
 (Interview with Director) 
Secondary data demonstrate this. Profits were rising and free cash was an average 
of 11% of net assets in three years prior to abandoned bid. The director continued: 
“So, the question […] what the devil are we going to do with it?” 
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FUT began to engage in organic and acquisition investment. Rather than acquire 
whole companies, FUT acquired specific assets of other firms including magazine 
titles and websites. This led to a growth in net assets of 18.9% between 2002 and 
2005. This growth was formalised in the strategy announced in the annual report of 
2004. Hence, FUT was seeking opportunities to grow. The potential acquisition of 
the Target was one such opportunity. 
The UK special interest magazine sector was dominated by three firms. FUT and 
Target were two. The third was EMAP, which was much larger and the market 
leader. Hence, in an aggregate sense, the special interest magazine market was 
mature and highly concentrated. However, in individual segments, competition was 
intense and dynamic, with rivals publishing multiple titles. New market segments 
were being developed continuously (eg. computer games) and competition 
extended to new media formats, notably internet publishing. By 2005, FUT 
published 30 websites (Company Annual Report, 2005, p.3). This also extended to 
geographical competition. By 2005, FUT operated in four countries (Company 
Annual Report, 2005, p.3). This created a dynamic industrial environment. As a 
result, the director commented: 
“We‟re always looking at our competitors, to see what they are doing [...] in 
this case, could we think about acquiring them.” 
An acquisition between two of the three major firms in the UK market would enable 
significant synergies to be realised, generating increased scale and financial 
strength. FUT intended to rationalise the Target‟s portfolio by divesting business 
titles and concentrating on consumer titles. The acquisition would also enable FUT 
to diversify further. Due to the Target‟s portfolio, „Computer Games‟ would fall from 
46% of FUT‟s revenues to 25% (Bid Documents). However, the acquisition of the 
Target, a whole company, would be significantly larger than previous acquisitions.   
The Target was in trouble. It had issued a profits warning and replaced its chief 
executive and finance director. Its share price had declined substantially, so FUT‟s 
Board of directors saw an opportunity to acquire Target at a favourable price. In 
this environment, the Target management indicated a willingness to merge the two 
firms. After negotiation over the price and terms, the Target Board was prepared to 
recommend the offer to their firm‟s shareholders.    
Equity was used as the means of payment. The director made the following 
statements providing the argument for the equity-financing: 
“We should use as much of our share power as possible.” 
 “…debt is more dangerous than people think.” 
“The proportionate of debt to profits […] if you get that wrong, that gives far 
too much power to the banks…” 
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Hence, instead of been burdened with increased borrowing and the financial 
distress this could create, the company decided to pay for the transaction using 
shares.  
The merger had significant implications for competition and the director recognised 
this. However, despite the risk that the merger would be prohibited, he stated the 
Board felt it was worth pursuing: 
“…our view, after consultation, was that there was an extremely small 
chance, no guarantees, but there was an extremely small chance, having 
met the OFT officials, of having the bid referred to the Competition 
Commission.” 
The director suggested that FUT felt the area of overlap was in a very narrow 
segment of the market relating to computer games magazines. Therefore, the 
„consumer interest‟ - the basis for referrals of mergers for investigation - would not 
be damaged. However, the OFT referred the merger to the Competition 
Commission for further investigation on 14/4/05. The basis of the referral was: 
“…concerns that the combination of the largest supplier of computer games 
magazines with its largest competitor may be expected to lead to a 
lessening of competition in the UK.” 
(OFT Press release, 14/4/05)      
The director expressed concern about the judgement of the OFT. They had used a 
narrow definition of the „consumer interest‟. He argued that, at the time of the 
referral, it was likely that the Target would go bankrupt, which indeed it did. This 
would have left FUT as the sole supplier in the market. Instead, if the merger had 
have been approved, it would have produced synergies, which would have 
benefitted consumers. The bid automatically lapsed and FUT decided to abandon 
the acquisition of the whole Target, announcing: 
“It is not in [FUT‟s] shareholders‟ interests to pursue the bid. We have 
instructed the OFT to cancel the referral as we do not see it in our interests 
to pursue the bid.” 
(RNS Announcement, 14/4/2005) 
After abandonment, FUT decided to restructure the deal. Instead of acquiring the 
entire firm, FUT acquired some specific assets of Target. The director reflected: 
“We immediately held a senior meeting in the company and we recognised 
we could walk away […] we were concerned that from under our nose, 
assets that we thought were effectively ours would disappear.” 
The acquisition of specific assets meant a cash deal financed with debt. A price of 
£30.5mn was agreed, producing a substantial increase in gearing for FUT. This was 
something the firm had been keen to avoid.  
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Soon after these assets were acquired, according to the director interviewed, the 
CEO proposed a much larger acquisition than the one just abandoned, in another 
country. The chief executive‟s enthusiasm for the growth strategy: 
“…led to a worry that the senior management would become overextended.” 
In addition, 
“the assets of Target which we cherry-picked, whichever way you look at it, 
they either underperformed, and/or, we paid too much for them […] so 
suddenly the debt-to-profit figure didn‟t look good.” 
The chief executive was replaced and the firm moved from an expansive acquisition 
strategy to one of disposals and consolidation as the company attempted to reduce 
its debt burden. In the year after the replacement of the CEO, there were net 
disposals of 4.9% of total assets. 
 
2.22 Causal Network Narrative 
 
The disciplinary sequence after abandonment involved the replacement of the CEO, 
an announced change in strategy, followed by net disposals. This means that FUT 
was categorised as a „most-likely‟ case. Hence, it was anticipated that its causal 
network would be consistent with the typological disciplinary network. However, 
while its network possesses some similar features, there are differences. Analysis 
suggests that certain bidder characteristics, transaction characteristics and 
contingent factors were important in determining the disciplinary process after 
abandonment. Appendix 2b demonstrates the coding of primary and secondary 
data for FUT, using the templates derived from the conceptual framework. This was 
used to produce the causal network diagram, reflecting the underlying mechanism 
present in this case.  This causal network diagram is illustrated in figure 6.2. The 
causal network narrative which explains the mechanisms underpinning the diagram 
is presented in the following sections. The numbers in brackets relate each part of 
the causal network narrative to the corresponding characteristic or factors 
illustrated in the causal network diagram. 
 
2.23 Bidder Characteristics 
 
The bidder characteristics for FUT worked out as follows. The company was mature, 
but, evidence suggests its maturity did not place a significant role in the causal 
process. The origins of the process lie in the restructuring conducted in 2001 (1). It 
started generating profits (2), producing substantial free cash (3). In addition, it 
was operating in a dynamic industrial environment (4) with substantial growth 
potential (5). Hence two nested causal paths can be traced, producing the strategy 
of growth, involving organic investment, but also acquisitions (6). The path running 
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from restructuring, through high profits to high free cash suggests that managerial 
preferences rather than shareholders‟ interests may have been dominant in 
pursuing the strategy. However, the firm did not face a moribund business 
environment. In contrast to what the disciplinary network anticipates FUT was 
operating in a dynamic business sector. In addition, the firm‟s corporate 
governance characteristics were not consistent with the disciplinary network. These 
indicate strong monitoring by both the board and outside shareholders, consistent 
with corporate governance theory and the Combined Code applicable at the time. 
Hence, there is no evidence these characteristics provided the discretion for FUT‟s 
managers to pursue their own interests. However, these characteristics, particularly 
the board, have an important role to play in the abandonment of the subsequent, 
larger acquisition.  
 
2.24 Transaction Characteristics 
 
The abandoned bid can be traced to the company‟s growth strategy and hence 
further back to the substantial free cash available. There was the underlying growth 
strategy of the bidder, but the timing and identity of the Target was opportunistic 
(7). FUT was seeking opportunities to grow. The acquisition of the Target was such 
an opportunity. The Target was in trouble, willing to be bought and offered 
substantial potential synergies. Hence, the related nature of the Target (8) was the 
outcome of opportunism.  
With its substantial free cash flow, the disciplinary network proposes that FUT 
should have used cash. However, instead of being burdened with increased 
borrowing and the financial distress this could create, the company decided to pay 
for the transaction using shares. The firm was trying to use its share power, so the 
equity-financing can be traced to the opportunism underpinning the timing of the 
bid (9), but also the memory of the debt burden that nearly destroyed the firm in 
2001. However, the equity-financing had no further role in the causal process of 
abandonment. 
 
2.25 Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
 
The bidding process in this case was relatively straightforward. The evidence 
overwhelmingly suggests the referral of the bid by the OFT to the Competition 
Commission for a detailed investigation was the critical contingent in this 
abandoned bidding process. It forced FUT to abandon its bid for the entire capital of 
Target and led to the restructuring of the deal subsequently. Hence, a nested 
causal path can be traced from the relatedness of Target (8), through the referral 
of the bid to the Competition Commission (10) to abandonment (11).  
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2.26 After Abandonment  
 
Abandonment offered another course of action to the bidder, which it took, but 
which had a significant impact on subsequent events. The deal was restructured to 
buy particular assets of the Target (12). The increase in gearing levels (13) after 
abandonment was caused by the restructuring of the deal, and consequently, 
abandonment. In addition, the events after abandonment were driven by several 
characteristics of the bidder. The evidence suggests a direct causal influence 
deriving from the substantial free cash of the bidder, through the growth strategy 
initiated before the abandoned bid, to the continued pursuit of acquisitions after it, 
evidenced by the subsequent larger acquisition, proposed by the CEO (14). The free 
cash was a necessary condition for the growth strategy, which in turn was 
necessary for the pursuit of a further acquisition. However, it was the proposal of 
this later acquisition which created uncertainty among the bidder‟s directors and 
not the abandoned one.  
It is at this point that monitoring by the board of directors becomes an important 
causal factor (15). The directors weighed the information about the strategy of the 
company in the light of the increased debt burden, and the proposed further bid. 
This didn‟t happen with the earlier bid. The added information provided by the 
restructured deal, and the resultant increased gearing, changed their view of the 
growth strategy. This suggests information was revealed during a bidding process 
and used by directors in a way similar to that proposed by Hirschleifer and Thakor 
(1998). Together, these events and characteristics were instrumental in instigating 
a disciplinary governance process (16). The chief executive was replaced and the 
company changed from an acquisition strategy, to one of disposals and 
consolidation, as the company attempted to reduce its debt burden. However, the 
further proposal was causally related to the increased debt incurred by the 
restructuring of the abandoned deal in triggering discipline. However, the 
disciplining happened in the context of the firm‟s growth strategy, and the 
monitoring provided by the board of directors. Independently, these factors were 
not sufficient to trigger a disciplinary process after abandonment, but acting in a 
compound manner, they were. The CEO was replaced and the firm began a process 
of consolidation, disposing of assets.  
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Figure 6.2: Proposed Causal Network for FUT  
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2.3 The Case of CAT  
 
2.31 Case History 
 
On 24/1/03, CAT and the Target, two small firms in the developing biotechnology 
sector, announced their intention to merge. The merger involved the Target‟s 
shareholders exchanging shares in Target for shares in CAT. The bid was 
recommended by Target managers to their shareholders.  
CAT was a biotech company. It was first listed in 1997. It had a research group 
with products in the pipeline. By 2003, it had 5 products in pre-clinical development 
and 15 products in discovery. It had a strong intellectual property position, 
particularly in world-leading antibodies. However, as a relatively young company in 
its growth phase, it still had substantial cash reserves from its IPO from which to 
finance investments, but was generating a small turnover and making large losses. 
At the time of the abandoned bid, the company had net cash and liquid resources of 
£123.7mn. Its goal was to develop products to the stage where revenues could be 
drawn from them and the company would become self-sustaining. The scarcity of 
cash available and the restricted ability of the company to finance its product 
development was a recurrent theme in the company‟s annual report. The same 
statement quoted below about the availability of financing appears in several 
annual reports, spanning the abandoned bid: 
[The company], “…will continue to consider these sources (revenue streams 
and equity finance), though there can be no assurance that the company 
can generate significant revenue nor that equity finance will be available on 
acceptable terms or at all.” 
(Company Annual Report, 2003) 
Indeed, the director referred to it indirectly when discussing CAT‟s strategy in the 
pre-abandonment period: 
“The business model […] was a statistical game. There would be lots of drug 
development that would fail and for that model to work, companies need a 
broad span of business and funnel down into one successful product. It was 
a model which required a lot of scale and therefore quite a lot of money to 
get things, if not all the way to the market, to a point where you could retain 
significant value before bringing in a partner.” 
CAT‟s strategy involved acquisitions, but was broader than that. There were a 
number of strategic interactions between CAT and partners. 
[We were], “...seeking partners to exploit the technology, either through 
joint ventures, licensing or indeed acquisitions. We [the bidder] already had 
some joint ventures and licensing arrangements. This [the bid] was part of 
that strategy.” 
160 
 
Acquisitions were part of a broader strategy that involved constant interaction 
between companies in the biotechnology industry. Companies attempted to spot 
opportunities for beneficial collaboration in a variety of ways. The director 
commented: 
“We talked to everyone. It was the nature of the industry to do deals with 
others.”  
Company‟s board characteristics met the corporate governance requirements 
accepted at the time. With more than 50% of the board comprised of non-executive 
directors, its board structure suggests independence and strong monitoring. In 
addition, there was substantial concentration in the firm‟s ownership structure, 
suggesting strong monitoring by outside investors. However, the executive 
directors owned an insignificant proportion of shares, suggesting weak incentives.   
Both CAT and the Target had discussed the potential synergies from linking their 
portfolio of assets. In addition, like CAT, the Target had raised substantial cash 
from issuing equity in the late 1990s. It had cash reserves of £130mn. Hence, the 
enhanced cash resources that would be available to the merged enterprise were 
attractive. CAT‟s director commented: 
“To find a company with an interesting portfolio and some cash was rare.” 
 
Therefore, CAT‟s management spotted an opportunity to remedy its financing 
problems, and worked to take advantage of the opportunity. According to the 
director: 
[The Target], “…just happened to become available and just happened to fit 
into the strategy. That‟s how we came to it.” 
“It [the bid] was too good an opportunity to let slip by. [It was] …too good 
an opportunity to miss.” 
Bid Documents were posted to shareholders on 2/2/03. It was an all-equity offer of 
0.362 CAT shares for each Target share. The bid valued the Target at £109.6mn, a 
premium of 28.2% on its market value at that moment. The director noted there 
was a need to use equity in order to retain cash in the enlarged enterprise. 
“The rationale for the bid would be undermined if cash were used. If it were, 
the enlarged company would have cash resources that were substantial, but 
were insufficient to meet the bidders‟ needs going forward. Funding issues 
were an on-going problem and it would have compounded the funding 
problem.” 
The bid was recommended by the Target managers. The Target shareholders were 
encouraged to accept the merger in order to share in the future benefits provided 
by the merging of the two companies resources. In this context, an equity bid was 
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acceptable to Target shareholders. A Target director commented that, through the 
equity bid, target shareholders could: 
“…benefit from the strengthened opportunities for the combined company.” 
(RNS Announcement, 24/1/03) 
Almost immediately, and entirely coincidentally, a portfolio investment decision by 
a US financial institution led to their sale of CAT shares. It led to a gradual decline 
in the share price to a level where uncertainty about the value of the bid began to 
be raised. A position CAT‟s director acknowledged: 
“This meant that the value of the bid drifted down to a point where the value 
of the offer was equivalent to underlying cash in [the Target].”  
  
At this point, acceptances from Target shareholders began to dry up. In response, 
the UK market leader announced a rival cash bid for Target at a premium to CAT‟s 
offer. In its bid document, the rival bidder admitted that their bid was: 
 “…opportunistic, taking advantage of the situation to acquire assets at a 
discount.”  
(RNS announcement, 26/2/03) 
This approach was rebuffed by Target‟s management. However, CAT‟s offer was 
further jeopardised by the revelation that there was a dispute over royalties on 
licenses in the USA. This created added uncertainty in the market and CAT‟s share 
price fell by 17% on the announcement. CAT‟s director recalled: 
“…the cataclysmic decline put a nail in the coffin of the bid.” 
 
The bid was no longer viable. The Target tried to elicit a higher bid from CAT, 
including a cash component. However, as the director commented: 
 “…in our view that [using cash] would be self-defeating.” 
[With cash], “The deal wouldn‟t have made sense. We would have been 
building a bigger beast, with the same amount of cash to fuel it.” 
Consequently, no higher bid was proposed and Target‟s management had to 
withdraw their support from CAT, eventually recommending the rival bid after 
discussions with other parties did not lead anywhere. At that time, with insufficient 
acceptances, CAT‟s offer officially lapsed. The rival bid succeeded a few weeks later.  
After abandonment, CAT engaged in further strategic interactions with other firms. 
When the opportunity to complete the acquisition disappeared, CAT investigated an 
alternative strategy: 
“A strategy to cement a very large alliance with a single party. Leverage 
value of platform by charging for access to someone with downstream 
expertise to pull products through.” 
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The director of the CAT didn‟t view this negatively: 
“Strategy meanders! An event happens and leads to a particular strategy. 
Something else happens and this takes the company off in another 
direction.”  
“The deal […] would have taken the company in a particular direction. The 
failed bid meant a new strategy.” 
Eventually, CAT was acquired by the firm with which they had developed the 
alliance.  
“We recognised at the time that the possibility of being bought out at the 
right price was a satisfactory outcome for shareholders.” 
 
 
2.32 Causal Network Narrative 
 
The disciplinary sequence after abandonment involving the subsequent acquisition 
of CAT meant this was categorised as a most-likely case, whereby the abandoned 
acquisition played a governance role. Hence, it was anticipated that its causal 
network would be consistent with the typological disciplinary network. However, the 
evidence suggests that the outcome, while consistent with the disciplinary 
hypothesis, may not have been disciplinary at all. Instead, the causal network 
suggests a different causal process, driven by specific bidder characteristics, 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process. Appendix 
2c demonstrates the coding of primary and secondary data for CAT, using the 
templates derived from the conceptual framework. This was used to produce the 
causal network diagram, reflecting the underlying mechanism present in this case.  
This causal network diagram is illustrated in figure 6.3. The causal network 
narrative which explains the mechanisms underpinning the diagram is presented in 
the following sections. The numbers in brackets relate each part of the causal 
network narrative to the corresponding characteristic or factors illustrated in the 
causal network diagram. 
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2.33 Bidder Characteristics 
 
CAT was a „young‟ company in the new dynamic biotechnology sector. It did not 
generate profits yet, so was relying on the cash raised through its stock market 
flotation to sustain its growth to the point where it achieved self-sustaining 
profitability. These characteristics are not consistent with the proposed disciplinary 
configuration. This evidence suggests that the financial constraint was an important 
characteristic of the bidder at the time of the abandoned bid and it derived from the 
age of the company (1) and its lack of profitability (2). This suggests a nested 
causal path from age through profitability to low free cash (3). In addition, the new, 
dynamic nature of the industry (4) provided plentiful opportunities for high growth 
(5). A relational causal path can be traced between high growth and low free cash 
to the strategic interaction which the company was pursuing (6). The bid was part 
of the strategic interaction. 
Evidence relating to the board and ownership structure at the time of the bid does 
not suggest poor monitoring and incentives, providing the discretion corporate 
governance theory suggests is necessary for managers to pursue bids driven by 
managerial preferences. In addition, there is no evidence to suggest these 
characteristics had an important influence in the causal mechanisms producing 
abandonment. Hence, these characteristics are not included in the causal network 
for this abandoned bid. 
Since acquisition activity was part of broader strategy that involved constant 
interaction between companies in the industry, a more localised, short-term nested 
causal path can be traced as a branch of the main path stemming from the strategy 
of CAT before the bid to the choice of the Target.   
 
2.34 Transaction Characteristics 
 
Several linked characteristics of the bid stand out as being important to the 
pathology of abandonment. As with the firm characteristics, these characteristics 
are not consistent with the proposed disciplinary configuration. A causal path can 
be traced from the characteristics of the firm to the choice of the Target and the 
transaction characteristics. Firstly, a causal link can be drawn from the strategy of 
the bidder to the industrial relatedness of the Target. The merger is part of the 
strategic interaction in the biotechnology industry. However, there is no evidence 
that this line of causation stretched any further into the acquisition process. The 
relatedness of Target was not a critical factor in the pathology of abandonment. 
Secondly, opportunism played a role in the bid too (7). The acquisition was an 
opportunity to pursue CAT‟s strategy, but particularly, ease the company‟s financial 
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constraints. Thirdly, the funding constraint necessitated the choice of equity as the 
means of payment (8). There was a need to retain cash in the enlarged enterprise. 
However, evidence suggests the decision to use equity-financing in the acquisition 
was the critical contingent characteristic in the pathology of this abandoned bid. 
The choice exposed the value of the bid to contingent events in the bidding process, 
which detrimentally affected the company‟s share price. This nested causal chain, 
deriving from equity can be traced right into the bidding process which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.35 Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
 
Target management support for the bid suggests this was not a critical factor in this 
abandoned bid and does not feature in the causal process. This suggests that the 
transaction was part of the strategic interaction in the biotechnology industry, 
particularly consolidation among the many firms that emerged at the outset of the 
industry‟s life.  
In this case, the evidence suggests the use of equity financing was the critical 
juncture in the causal network. This is inconsistent with the proposed causal 
network which hypothesises that disciplinary processes are more likely to involve 
cash financing. The equity financing exposed the value of the bid to a number of 
contingent events during the acquisition process that influenced the share price and 
hence the implied value of the bid.  
At the time that the bid was announced, there were no valuation concerns about 
the offer. According to the bid documents, the offer price was viewed as a „fair 
value‟. However, events - share selling (9) and negative commercial information 
(10) - became important contingent factors in abandonment because their negative 
impact on the bid was exacerbated by the choice of equity as the means of 
payment. This demonstrated the weakness of using equity as a means of payment 
(Hansen, 1987). The use of equity financing meant the value of the bid was 
uncertain (11). A nested causal path can be traced from this valuation uncertainty 
to the rival bid. The decrease in the value of the offer prompted a rival bidder to 
enter the bidding (12), offering the certainty of cash, attractive to target 
shareholders. Ultimately, these factors caused the Target management to switch 
their recommendation and meant the opportunity for CAT to acquire the Target 
disappeared (13). This led to abandonment (14). The evidence suggests this 
pathology is localised and related to the immediate bidding process. There is no 
evidence of a lasting impact on the bidder.  
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2.36 After Abandonment 
 
A subsequent acquisition of CAT suggests a disciplinary process. The detailed 
template analysis was intended to assess the nature of the process. A nested path 
can be traced directly from the characteristics of the bidder before the abandoned 
bidding process (its low free cash, it high growth potential and policy of strategic 
interaction) to the alternative strategies pursued after abandonment leading to the 
strategic alliance (15) and the eventual acquisition of the bidder by its significant 
partner (16). On the subject of the eventual acquisition of the company after 
abandonment, the director admitted that several bids had been received, but 
underplayed this, stating: 
“We talked to everyone. It was the nature of the industry to do deals with 
others.” 
Discussions with other companies were happening all the time. These were not a 
major issue. The company made bids, they received bids. They were comfortable 
about that. However, the evidence suggests that abandonment may have signalled 
a weakness in CAT which attracted bids. The obvious weakness was the funding 
constraints. When put to CAT‟s director, this was disputed: 
“…the company stood up on its own terms. It was a success. It generated 
products. This would have been taken forward […] within the parameters of 
the strategic alliance.” 
Thus, this suggests the company felt the need to be acquired was not desperate, 
and so was able to reject bids before the right deal was offered. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the subsequent acquisition was the outcome of a 
disciplinary process for bidding managers, but a way of realising shareholder value.   
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Figure 6.3: Proposed Causal Network for CAT 
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3. Least-Likely Cases 
 
3.1 The Case of TRG 
 
3.11 Case History 
 
On 13/11/03, TRG, the bidding firm in this case, announced merger talks with the 
Target. The bidder was a large, mature company owning several high street 
restaurant chains. Target was a younger, smaller chain of restaurants still owned 
and controlled by founding management team. Merger talks continued for several 
weeks with press speculation about whether the merger would occur. On 18/12/03 
the terms of a recommended takeover of the Target by TRG were revealed.  It was 
a part cash-share (40:60) offer, valuing the Target at £168mn.  
Two years before, in 2001, TRG was called a „basket case‟ (Press report, 18/11/03).  
“The company had lost its way. It had dissipated its efforts in too many 
brands in this market…the popular catering market,” 
(Interview with Executive Chairman, Sunday Telegraph, 11/1/04) 
The management of the company was replaced and the new team had engaged in 
restructuring and reorientation up to the time of the bid for the Target. In the three 
years prior to the bid there were high levels of asset turnover, involving high levels 
of net investment spending (a real value in the three years 2000-2003 equating to 
33.7% of total assets in 2003). There is little evidence of acquisitiveness in the pre-
bid period. The restructuring is consistent with enhanced governance. This is 
supported by comments made by the chief executive at the time: 
“The idea [of restructuring] was to bring focus.”    
(Interview with Executive Chairman, Sunday Telegraph, 11/1/04) 
Expansive acquisitions would be inconsistent with this strategy. The company was 
generating relatively high levels of free cash flow (3.4% of total assets in 2003) and 
was a generous dividend payer (88% payout ratio). However, this latter figure 
suggests a lack of internal growth opportunities. There were press reports 
intimating that the company was considered “stale”, lacking internal investment 
opportunities (Investors Chronicle, 21/11/03). Further growth could only be 
achieved through acquisitions. This suggests the lack of growth opportunities was 
determined by the characteristics of the bidder, rather than the maturity of the 
market.  
The board of directors was dominated by the executive directors suggesting weak 
monitoring by that mechanism. However, there was a concentrated ownership 
structure with a 5-shareholder concentration ratio of 50%. This provides a great 
incentive for monitoring by these shareholders. As a mature company, its executive 
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directors held an extremely small proportion of share capital – 0.02% at the time of 
bid. 
The bid for Target was the first major acquisition since 2001, suggesting the start 
of an acquisition strategy.  
“Inevitably, you look around at what else is happening. To us, the most 
admired competition on the high street was [Target].” 
(Interview with Executive Chairman, Sunday Telegraph, 11/1/04) 
The Target company was a pasta and pizza chain still owned and managed by its 
founders, who had a history of developing restaurant groups and selling them to 
more established concerns, like TRG. The Target demonstrated strong 
entrepreneurial flair. The founders were looking for an exit for their investment and 
have been gradually selling shares, holding 16% at the time of the bid.  The 
acquisition by TRG was considered to be an opportunity for „exit‟, enabling the 
founders to move onto another project. 
The acquisition was an opportunity for TRG to acquire some entrepreneurial flair to 
stimulate growth. Indeed, one of the conditions of the bid was that important 
members of the Target would join the board of the merged enterprise. In addition, 
it was proposed that the merger would create a company with a strong growth 
potential and a leading position in the UK dining market. Market analysts suggested 
that there were strong complementarities between the companies‟ portfolios – TRG 
in out-of-town restaurants; the Target in high-street chains. 
Bid talks dragged on for several weeks.  Press speculation about problems between 
the companies forced them to issue a joint statement stating that “due diligence 
had been materially completed” and “terms substantially agreed” (RNS 
announcement, 11/12/2003). TRG‟s chief executive recalled: 
“The negotiations […] took a long time to see if the chemistry worked.” 
 (Interview with Executive Chairman, Sunday Telegraph, 11/1/2004) 
Eventually, terms were agreed and announced on 18/12/03. The means of payment 
for the bid was a combination of 40% cash and 60% equity, valuing the Target at 
168mn. The substantial cash element provided target management / investors with 
a return on their investment in the Target, which they were looking for. The equity 
portion gave Target shareholders an opportunity to “share in the growth of the 
enlarged group” (Bid Document). 
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Target was considered an attractive proposition and press comment and trading 
statements, during the bidding process, reiterated the point. Investors Chronicle, 
the financial publication advised:  
“Target shareholders ought to hold out for a tasty slice of the action to 
reflect what they‟re bringing to the table.” [Bidder should] “…sweeten offer 
by lifting cash element to 50%...”  
(Investor‟s Chronicle, 21/11/2003) 
This suggested TRG‟s offer was insufficient. However, Target management seemed 
content with the price offered and were happy to recommend the bid. 
On 10/1/04, news of a potential rival bid emerged. Rival, a private equity group 
which already owned another restaurant chain announced that it was considering a 
bid for the Target at a premium to the bid by TRG. The board of Target reiterated 
their support for TRG‟s bid, but stated that: 
“…any proposal would be judged on its merits”.  
(RNS announcement, 10/1/2004) 
On 19/1/04 the merger between TRG and Target was given clearance by the Office 
of Fair Trading. A day later, TRG announced that it had acceptances from 47% of 
Target„s shareholders. On the same day, Rival reiterated the possibility of a bid. 
TRG responded by stating: 
 
“…that its offer was the only one on the table and that [the Rival] had not 
made a formal offer.” 
(RNS announcement, 10/1/2004) 
 
On 23/1/04 Target received an indication of a possible offer from Rival, subject to 
pre-conditions. It is a cash offer at a substantial premium to TRG‟s. The board of 
the Target commented that a bid at that level was extremely attractive and advised 
shareholders that had not already accepted TRG‟s offer to take no further action. 
After the announcement of a possible rival offer, very few further acceptances were 
received by TRG. Acceptances rose from 47.7% to 47.9% between 26/1/04 and 
3/2/04.1 On that day, the Takeover Panel instructed the Rival to make a formal bid 
for Target by 13/2/04 or, withdraw from the bidding process. On that date, the 
Rival made its formal bid and Target‟s directors withdrew their support for TRG‟s 
bid, encouraging shareholders to accept the new offer. TRG allowed its bid to lapse 
and withdrew from the bidding contest. In a statement, the company said that: 
“…overpaying would have jeopardised their position. We wanted the right 
deal at the right price.”  
(RNS announcement, 13/2/2004) 
 
                                           
1 Data from RNS announcements. 
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The bidder stated after the abandonment: 
“Financing, part of which was to finance the abandoned takeover is viewed 
as a launch pad to developing [the Bidder].” 
(RNS announcement, 13/2/2004) 
The use of the term „launch-pad‟ suggests a new start. However, the abandoned bid 
itself was an aborted new start. The bidder pursued extensive acquisition activity in 
the period after abandonment – net acquisitions amounting to 52% of total assets 
in the three years after abandonment. 
 
 
3.12 Causal Network Narrative 
 
The disciplinary sequence after abandonment involved significant net acquisitions 
by TRG. This meant this case was categorised as a least-likely case. It was 
anticipated that the abandoned acquisition did not play a governance role. Hence, it 
was anticipated that its causal network would not be consistent with the typological 
disciplinary network. Therefore, the causal network may suggest a different causal 
mechanism, driven by specific bidder characteristics, transaction characteristics and 
contingent factors in the bidding process. Appendix 2d demonstrates the coding of 
primary and secondary data for TRG, using the templates derived from the 
conceptual framework. This was used to produce the causal network diagram, 
reflecting the underlying mechanism present in this case.  This causal network 
diagram is illustrated in figure 6.4. The causal network narrative which explains the 
mechanisms underpinning the diagram is presented in the following sections. The 
numbers in brackets relate each part of the causal network narrative to the 
corresponding characteristic or factors illustrated in the causal network diagram. 
 
3.13 Bidder Characteristics 
 
TRG‟s corporate governance characteristics show it was a mature company in the 
mature restaurant sector. The firm had the weak board monitoring which corporate 
governance theory proposes facilitates managerial discretion. The low managerial 
shareholding also suggests that senior managers would have an incentive to pursue 
their own interests, at the expense of their shareholders. Unexpectedly, these 
characteristics are consistent with the proposed disciplinary configuration. However, 
there is no evidence to suggest these characteristics were important factors in the 
process of the abandoned acquisition. There is no evidence the acquisition was a 
poor decision. It was worthwhile, enhancing shareholder value for the bidder. 
Abandonment related to other causal factors and, in addition, the activities after 
abandonment were not consistent with discipline. Other characteristics of TRG were 
important. 
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After the crisis of 2001, the firm began to generate profits (1) and free cash (2), 
again unexpectedly consistent with the disciplinary configuration. There is little 
evidence of acquisitiveness in the pre-bid period, but no significant disposals either, 
which is inconsistent with the disciplinary hypothesis. However, the firm lacked 
internal investment opportunities. The initiation of an acquisition investment, which 
the abandoned bid represented, provides evidence the company recognised high 
growth may only have been possible through acquisition investment. The existence 
of low internal investment opportunities is a company trait consistent with Jensen 
(1986). Hence, another nested causal path can be traced from the maturity of the 
company (3), to its low internal growth prospects (4). The combination of the 
nested paths, culminating in high free cash and low growth prospects respectively, 
led to the pursuit of growth through acquisitions (5).   
A nested causal path can be traced directly from the bidder‟s characteristics, 
particularly from its low growth to the substantial acquisition activity after 
abandonment. Events after abandonment were related to the long term strategy of 
promoting growth, evident before the abandoned bid, rather than some disciplinary 
process stemming from the pathology of abandonment. Another more localised 
nested causal chain can be traced as a branch stemming from the strategy of 
pursuing growth, through acquisitions, to the abandoned bid. The evidence 
suggests this localised causal path involved characteristics and events which did not 
produce a significant disciplinary impact. 
 
3.14 Transaction Characteristics 
 
The transaction characteristics derived directly from the acquisition strategy of TRG. 
The industrial relatedness between TRG and Target was strong. This suggests 
synergy was a strong element in the rationale for the bid. The bid documents 
highlighted strong synergies between the bidder and the target, particularly the 
complementary portfolio of restaurants. Furthermore, the target management were 
viewed as “bright entrepreneurs” in the sector. The acquisition was an opportunity 
to bring in entrepreneurial flair to stimulate growth. This led to certain 
characteristics of the transaction; seats on the board of the merged company for 
target management and the decision to use some equity in the means of payment.  
Hence, a nested path can be traced back from the transaction characteristics to 
TRG‟s acquisition strategy to enhance growth. However, the industrial relatedness 
between the two firms was not important to the causal process of abandonment. 
The causal process which led to abandonment stems from the opportunistic offer 
price (6) and the decision to use equity financing (7).  
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3.15 Contingent factors in the Bidding Process 
 
The evidence suggests that the level of TRG‟s offer was an important factor in the 
bidding process which caused the abandonment. A related causal variable was the 
high equity element in the means of payment. Both were important in raising 
valuation concerns (8), but it was the announcement of a higher rival cash offer 
(9), which was the critical contingent factor in the pathology of abandonment. 
Hence the value and financing of the offer, while necessary, were not sufficient 
factors to cause abandonment.  The higher rival cash bid compounded the 
undervaluation associated with TRG‟s offer and led the target management to 
switch their recommendation (10) from TRG‟s bid to the rival one. This suggests 
that maximising shareholder value was the key for them in accepting a bid. By 
switching their recommendation from TRG‟s bid to the new one, the Target 
management showed they wanted to maximise value for themselves and 
shareholders by accepting the highest bid.   
This causal process combines with the opportunistic nature of the bid. At the outset 
of the bidding process, the conditions existed for the opportunity to make a bid for 
the Target at a favourable offer price, but the appearance of a higher rival cash bid 
removed the favourable conditions. It was better for the bidder to abandon the 
acquisition, rather than raise its bid and suffer the „winner‟s curse‟ (11) (Roll, 
1986).  
The casual process removed the opportunity for TRG and it was decided to let the 
offer lapse (12). The causal process ended. This pathology was localised and 
related to the immediate bidding process. There is no evidence that the effects of 
this pathology are significant in the aftermath of the bid.  
 
 
3.16 After Abandonment 
 
The bidder pursued extensive acquisition activity in the period after abandonment – 
net acquisitions amounting to 52% of net assets in the three years after 
abandonment (13). This suggests that TRG was able to fulfil its growth strategy by 
pursuing different, successful acquisitions. As anticipated, this evidence does not 
imply the abandoned acquisition played a disciplinary governance role. Events after 
abandonment were a continuation of the strategy adopted before abandonment. 
This stems directly from the bidders characteristics at the time of the abandoned 
bid.   
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Figure 6.4: Proposed Causal Network for TRG 
 
 
 
  
Older 
Age (3)
B
id
d
e
r 
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s Higher 
Profits 
(1)
More 
Opportunistic 
(6)
Low 
Valuation 
(8)
Higher 
Rival Cash 
Bid (9)
Voluntary 
Abandonment 
(12)
T
ra
n
s
a
c
ti
o
n
 
C
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
s
ti
c
s
C
o
n
ti
n
g
e
n
t 
F
a
c
to
rs
A
ft
e
r 
A
b
a
n
d
o
n
m
e
n
t
Lower 
Growth (4)
Substantial 
Acquisition 
Activity (13)
Acquisition Growth 
Strategy (5)
Greater 
Equity  (7) 
Switched 
Recommendation 
(10) 
Higher Free 
cash
(2)
Opportunity 
Disappears 
(11)
174 
 
3.2 The Case of MEL 
 
3.21 Case History 
 
On 4/11/04, MEL announced a possible offer for the Target at between 140 and 
150p per share, financed by MEL shares and cash – 1 MEL share and 45p in cash.  
The Target immediately responded, stating that the bid was hostile, involved no 
discussions with the board of the Target and shareholders should reject the bid.  
MEL had been floated on the Alternative Investment Market in October 2003, just a 
year before the bid for the Target. It was a cash shell, with a market capitalisation 
of £17mn. It had a strategy of, 
“…acquiring companies and businesses whose performance [MEL‟s] directors 
believe can be improved to create shareholder value.”  
(Bid Document) 
Hence, the firm had little corporate history. There was a small senior management 
team of 3, with only 1 non-executive director on the board. The senior 
management team were founders and held 7.4% of the shares between them. As a 
new, small, listed company, ownership was relatively concentrated, with eight 
institutions owning 63.3% of the firm‟s shares. In their previous role as part of the 
management of WAS Plc, the team suggested it had a strong record of delivering 
enhanced value for shareholders, producing a compound return of 18% per annum 
over a 12 year period (Bid Documents). 
 
The evidence suggests that the Target of the bid was viewed as an opportunity for 
MEL to pursue its stated strategy. The Target was a building products group, which 
had struggled to generate strong performance since 2000. Restructuring had taken 
place and a new chief executive had been appointed to try and revive the firm‟s 
fortunes. Contrasting their performance at WAS with the Target‟s recent poor 
performance, MEL‟s bid documents stated: 
 
“…Target has consistently delivered to its shareholders: poor share price 
performance, poor management, poor strategy and value destroying 
acquisitions, poor and declining margins.” 
(Bid Document) 
MEL stated that the Target‟s performance represented a “damning indictment of the 
performance of [Target‟s] board in delivering shareholder value” (Bid Document), 
particularly criticising the new CEO of the target firm. The bid document stated: 
“Your board has already destroyed a great deal of value simply through the 
poor running of the business.” 
(Bid Document) 
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MEL‟s management team thought they could improve performance by managing 
the Target better. In response, the Target management stated that they were 
committed to shareholder value and would consider seriously any offer they 
received. Further, they issued a defence document criticising the management of 
MEL and suggested that the indicated value and structure of the deal undervalued 
the Target. They advised shareholders to take no action with regard to the bid. 
Further, the Target‟s management stated they would consider offers. They 
announced [MEL‟s bid] was a, “…catalyst for a number of other parties to express 
interest in the group‟s business.” (RNS Statement, 13/12/04). 
MEL decided to use a mixture of cash and shares to finance the acquisition – 45p 
cash and 1 MEL share valued at 100p - valuing the Target at 145p per share.  MEL‟s 
use of its own shares to finance the acquisition drew strong criticism from the board 
of the Target. The target management commented: 
“Given the relative size of the companies, the upshot of a takeover would be 
to give Target‟s shareholders replacement shares in their own company.” 
 
“Any upside in the value of [Target] would be shared with [MEL‟s] 
management and other shareholders of [MEL], instead of being retained 
fully for the benefit of [Target‟s] shareholders.” 
The bidding process continued with acrimonious exchanges. On the day MEL posted 
their bid documents, they warned Target‟s shareholders that the target 
management may frustrate the bid by holding a “fire sale” which would realise a lot 
less value for shareholders (RNS statement, 29/11/04). Target‟s statements 
continually focused on the terms of the deal, emphasising its undervaluation of the 
Target and: 
“…deprived shareholders of a substantial element of the upside we are 
confident we can deliver.” 
(RNS statement, 29/11/04) 
An appreciation in the price of MEL‟s shares increased the implied value of the offer 
to 172.5p per share, 39% higher than the original bid. Despite this, the Target‟s 
management continued to reject the offer.  
On 13/12/04, Target announced that it had reached an agreement with a Rival 
company, a US diversified technology and manufacturing group, to acquire Target. 
They were making a cash bid of 191.6p per share. The board of Target considered 
the bid by the rival to be very attractive, much more attractive than the MEL offer. 
The Target management firmly recommended the rival offer.  
On 20/12/04, MEL, having received acceptances from less than 5% of Target‟s 
shares stated that their “…conditions had not been met and it would allow its offer 
to lapse.” The Rival‟s bid progressed and in early 2005 was completed.   
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MEL‟s directors underplayed the impact of the abandonment. The abandoned bid 
was one of many options and one revealed:  
“…the failure of one such bid therefore had no impact on the company or 
lasting effects…”  
(Interview with Director) 
Indeed, several large acquisitions were pursued in the months after abandonment, 
financed by a combination of a share issue and increased borrowing. Some of these 
companies were subsequently disposed. This was consistent with the company‟s 
strategy, improving performance in underperforming target companies.  
 
3.22 Causal Network Narrative 
 
MEL endured changes after abandonment which was consistent with a disciplinary 
process. It increased its gearing by 112 percentage points which suggests a 
disciplinary response to abandonment, bonding managers to exert greater effort. 
However, at the same time this increase in gearing coincided with two significant 
acquisitions, equivalent to ten times the existing net assets of the company. This 
was the reason for the additional borrowing.  Since MEL is labelled a „turnaround 
finance‟ company, some of these assets where then sold for a higher value. This 
was equivalent to 18 times net assets at the time of the abandoned bid.  
Taken together, this configuration of changes in MEL after abandonment does not 
illustrate evidence of a disciplinary process after abandonment. This suggests the 
abandoned bidding process did not play a governance role. Instead, the 
configuration of firm characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent 
factors in the bidding process, indicates a different causal mechanism of 
abandonment. Appendix 2e demonstrates the coding of primary and secondary 
data for MEL, using the templates derived from the conceptual framework. This was 
used to produce the causal network diagram, reflecting the underlying mechanism 
present in this case.  This causal network diagram is illustrated in figure 6.5. The 
causal network narrative which explains the mechanisms underpinning the diagram 
is presented in the following sections. The numbers in brackets relate each part of 
the causal network narrative to the corresponding characteristic or factors 
illustrated in the causal network diagram. 
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3.23 Bidder Characteristics 
 
MEL was a newly listed company, Hence, it was a young „cash shell‟, not trading 
fully, scanning the market looking for opportunities to acquire poorly performing 
companies, raise performance and gain from the value improvement (3). This 
demonstrates the features of a „disciplinary‟ acquisition, with MEL the agent of 
change in the Target (Manne, 1965). 
While the company exhibited weak board independence, its relatively concentrated 
share ownership structure ensured strong monitoring and incentives - the directors 
owned significant blocks of shares. This suggests the appropriate incentives for the 
managers to pursue value-enhancing acquisitions (1).  
A direct causal path can be traced directly from the experience and stated skills of 
MEL‟s management team (2), to its strategy of acquiring underperforming 
companies to improve their performance, to not only the abandoned bid, but also 
the substantial acquisition activity after the abandonment. The company‟s buying 
and selling of companies after the abandoned acquisition is consistent with the 
stated strategy beforehand.      
A causal path can be traced from the stated strategy of the company to the 
characteristics of the abandoned bid – the opportunistic acquisition of a poorly 
performing company. This is a more localised causal process, traced as a branch 
stemming from the main causal path. 
 
3.24 Transaction Characteristics 
 
The bid was consistent with the company‟s strategy and the characteristics of the 
transaction can be traced to that. The bid was an opportunity to acquire 
underperforming assets cheaply and this led to certain characteristics of the bid; 
the opportunistic offer price and the use of a high proportion of equity as financing. 
Part of this governance role is consistent with opportunism whereby the target is 
acquired for a relatively cheap price, performance is improved and the acquirer 
gains from selling the company for a higher price. Hence, the strategy of the bidder 
and the resulting transaction characteristics suggest this acquisition process, rather 
than playing a governance role for the bidding firm, did so for the target firm 
(O‟Sullivan and Wong, 2005). 
The choice of equity as the means of payment is related to this opportunism. MEL 
planned to use its own shares to pay approximately 60% of the cost of the 
acquisition. This meant it did not have to commit a substantial amount of its own 
capital to the transaction, but reap rewards from better performance anticipated in 
the future.   
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The opportunistic nature of the bid (4) and the choice of equity (5) exhibited 
compound causation on the acquisition process through their influence on the 
reaction of target management. This reaction, and its impact on the acquisition 
process, is discussed further in the next section. 
 
3.25 Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
 
There were several critical interrelated events in the bidding process which could be 
traced back to the opportunistic nature of the bid and the high equity component in 
financing. The target management‟s resistance focused on the value of the bid, 
particularly the equity component. Given the stated rationale for the bid – 
performance improvement by replacing poorly performing managers - this could be 
interpreted as target managers being motivated by „managerial entrenchment‟. 
However, the target‟s management stated they would consider offers. This 
suggests target managers realised that the company would be sold, so wanted to 
get the maximum value for shareholders.  
However, they believed that MEL‟s offer undervalued the Target. They were 
particularly critical of the equity component – suggesting the bid merely 
represented a dilution of the Target‟s shareholders‟ position by sharing any 
performance improvement with MEL‟s shareholders. The opportunistic nature of the 
bid and the equity financing displayed a relational causal process, producing target 
management resistance (6). In themselves, they were necessary, but not sufficient 
to provoke managerial resistance. However, together they were sufficient to elicit 
resistance, because of the perceived low value of MEL‟s bid (7). 
An alternative higher rival cash bid (8) emerged, which was recommended by the 
Target management. This was a more attractive option because it gave the 
shareholders the certainty of cash and avoided the dilution of ownership inherent in 
MEL‟s offer (Chang et al., 2009). Managerial resistance led to the higher cash bid, 
which combined to frustrate MEL‟s bid. The higher rival bid compounded the 
valuation concerns about the offer. This path of causation is derived from the 
opportunistic nature of the bid. Having only received 4.1% acceptances from the 
Target‟s shareholders, MEL allowed its bid to lapse. The conditions which created 
the opportunity to acquire the target profitably had disappeared (9). This suggests 
a „rational‟ decision that if changing conditions, produced in this case by the higher 
rival cash bid, meant the acquisition was no longer profitable, it was better to 
abandon it (10). This would avoid getting drawn into a bidding contest, potentially 
suffering the „winner‟s curse‟.  
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3.26 After Abandonment 
 
This pathology is localised and related to the immediate bidding process. There is 
no verification that the effects of this pathology are significant in the aftermath of 
the bid. Events after abandonment were related to the long term strategy of the 
firm. Companies were acquired shortly after abandonment (11), using equity and 
debt financing. The companies were restructured by the management of MEL to 
realise value. Some of the companies were sold in 2008 for a substantial return 
(12).  
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Figure 6.5: Proposed Causal Network for MEL 
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3.3 The Case of REG 
 
3.31 Case History 
 
On 8/6/05 the Target, a late night bar operator, announced it had received an 
unsolicited offer from REG, a rival late night bar operator. Both firms were relatively 
young, operating bar chains specialising in late night drinking. Both were 
struggling. REG, the bidder, was making low profits and had been trying to reduce 
costs in the period between 2001 and 2004. It had disposed of assets equivalent to 
14.9% of total assets in that time. REG‟s director recalled:  
““The previous year, the bidder had got itself into a lot of trouble. 
Performance issues, issues of governance and that sort of stuff. The 
previous management team had been removed, and myself and the 
chairman came in, having just sold a business, to try and restore its 
fortunes…” 
These governance problems are demonstrated by the firm‟s relatively weak 
governance characteristics. There was a low percentage of NED‟s on the board, 
dispersed shareholding and weak incentives for senior managers.  
The strategy adopted by the new management was strongly influenced by the 
firm‟s problems. These problems were derived from the situation in the late night 
drinking sector. The director commented [it was]: 
“…obvious that [REG] and a number of other players in the sector were sub-
scale. The overheads were too big for the type of business, not getting the 
benefits of purchasing power…we were finding organic growth more and 
more difficult to get, therefore, consolidation became an obvious picture.” 
REG was faced with low organic growth potential. The management perceived 
substantial excess capacity in the industry and the best way to remove it was 
through an acquisition. Therefore, consolidation was the key issue underpinning 
REG‟s bid for the Target. The synergistic benefits would be derived from economies 
of scale. The director made several comments, evidencing this: 
“There were quite a number of small players around, not many of whom 
were publicly quoted.” 
 “We did the same things. We bought the same things, so purchasing power; 
we could reduce the purchasing overhead.” 
“…a hell of an amount of research went into identifying that there were 
synergistic benefits to be had.‟  
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In late 2004, REG approached the Target informally on a number of occasions 
proposing a merger. The Target rebuffed the advances of REG. Early in 2005, REG 
tried again. The director continued: 
“I don‟t recall exactly what the share prices were, but if you track the 
target‟s share price … you‟ll see it had come-off quite a lot. So there was an 
opportunity for us (REG) to offer a significant premium to their shareholders 
in order to make them happy.” 
Indeed, the Target‟s share price had fallen from 760p at the start of 2005 to 573p 
by the beginning of May - a decrease of 23.3%. 
Consequently, REG made another approach to the Target. This bid was also 
rejected. However, information about the approach was leaked to the market, 
causing the Target‟s share price to appreciate by 10%. Due to the unusual share 
price movements, the Takeover Panel forced the Target to make a statement, 
regarding the unsolicited bid by REG. This was made on 8/6/05. It also revealed 
that earlier bids had been received from REG. In the statement, it outlined the 
reasons for the rejection. The indicative offer “undervalued” the Target. It was 
“share-based”, and there was “…little strategic fit between the two very different 
businesses”. (RNS Statement, 8/6/05). On the same day, REG released a 
statement, making public the indicative terms of its bid. It was an equity offer, with 
a partial cash alternative of 30%. The bid valued the Target at 820p per share – a 
29% premium on the closing price on 7/6/05. The director of REG said the high 
equity component was chosen to:  
“…minimise the amount of cash going out of the business”.  
The Target‟s share price rose 65p to 700p after the revelation of REG‟s bid. 
Conversely, REG‟s share price fell 31p to 772p. Several weeks passed without any 
further movement. Then, the Takeover Panel issued a PUSU (Put up or shut up) 
ultimatum, giving REG a deadline of 25/7/05 to make a formal bid. If REG didn‟t 
make a formal bid by that date, it would be prevented from making a bid for six 
months. REG revealed its trading results for the year to 2/7/05, stating: 
“Trading…is ahead of original expectations.”  
 (RNS Statement, 2/7/05) 
It also emphasised the restructuring which had taken place since the new 
management had taken over, and the expected improvements to come.  
On 12/7/05, REG released a statement detailing what it considered to be a “final 
offer” for the Target. The new offer was 975p per share with an enhanced cash 
component equivalent to 45% of the financing. In the same statement, REG 
highlighted the poor trading results of the Target announced during the bidding 
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process, suggesting “the final offer should be very attractive to [Target] 
shareholders in current circumstances” (RNS Statement, 12/7/05).  
This higher offer was rejected by the Target board. Indeed, in a statement, it 
revealed that the Target had received three additional all-cash offers from private 
equity groups (RNS statement, 13/7/05). REG‟s director commented: 
“…it became obvious that there was a rival bid and it was not a trade player. 
It was a „take-private‟ and that was quite obvious.”   
“…we went to see the top 5 or 6 shareholders and we presented our case to 
them and they seemed reasonably comfortable with it, but nobody was 
prepared to give us irrevocable undertakings ... All the shareholders wanted 
was a maximum „cash-out‟.” 
 Given the revelation of rival offers, REG criticised the Target‟s management: 
“Following its request to the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers for the 
imposition of a put-up or shut-up deadline, [REG] is surprised that [the 
Target] appears to be running a public auction process and inviting offers 
from third parties.” 
(RNS statement, 13/7/05) 
On 18/7/05, REG announced that it did not want to engage in a competitive process 
and withdrew its indicative offer. A quotation attributed to the chairman stated: 
“[REG] regrets the decision by the [Target‟s] board not to cooperate with 
[REG‟s] proposal, which I believe would have increased value for both 
groups of shareholders. However, we are not prepared to overpay.” 
(Quote from Chief Executive in RNS statement, 18/7/05) 
Further, REG called the abandonment a “lost opportunity” for the industry (RNS 
statement, 18.7.05).The director commented: 
“…it got to the point, well, we had raised our bid on three occasions and in 
the end we decided that this was getting too rich for us, we can‟t make this 
work.” 
“It is a clear mathematical point where you clearly say there is a point where 
you cannot make it work.” 
The director reflected further on the bid abandonment: 
“From the point of view of abandonment, there can be positive impact. 
Okay, that didn‟t happen. Let‟s lick our wounds and get back to what we 
know best.” 
Evidence suggests the bidder continued to focus on the strategy of consolidation. 
The regulatory environment tightened with the introduction of the smoking ban in 
pubs during 2006. REG acquired a restaurant chain during 2006 in an attempt to 
diversify and place less reliance on pubs. The company itself received several bids 
after the abandonment. The director commented, [the]: 
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“…industry still needs consolidation. Insulate the industry from recession and 
regulatory changes. Better overheads and purchasing power, if nothing 
else.” 
The director revealed the board were prepared to sell, but: 
“…we couldn‟t persuade the shareholders. Shareholders believed that if 
there was a bid at 123 [pence per share], they could get a little more.” 
Unfortunately, the bid was not raised and through 2007 and into 2008, 
unfavourable market conditions, and the failure to consolidate, forced REG to enter 
administration in 2008. REG‟s director also highlighted the plight of the other firms 
in the sector. One of the rival private equity bids succeeded in acquiring the Target 
at a price of 1070p per share. However, REG‟s director stated: 
“…we were really surprised by the ultimate „take-out‟ price.” 
“Of course, the one thing you can never, ever change is what you paid for it 
[the target]. You can do all sorts of other things, but you can‟t change what 
you paid for it.” 
The director suggested that the rival bidder had paid too high a price and stated 
that as a result it had gone through significant restructuring since 2005.  
 
3.32 Causal Network Narrative 
 
REG made an acquisition and received several unsuccessful bids after its 
abandoned bid. However, the ultimate outcome for the firm after abandonment was 
administration. The firm entered administration in 2008 and went through 
subsequent restructuring. Since administration is not anticipated as a disciplinary 
outcome, it shouldn‟t be expected that the causal configuration of characteristics 
and contingent factors will be consistent with the disciplinary configuration. While 
some of REG‟s characteristics are consistent with the proposed disciplinary network, 
other aspects do not. Overall, the network suggests the causal mechanism for REG 
does not match the network proposed by the typological disciplinary theory. A 
different causal network was revealed. Appendix 2f demonstrates the coding of 
primary and secondary data for REG, using the templates derived from the 
conceptual framework. This was used to produce the causal network diagram, 
reflecting the underlying mechanism present in this case.  This causal network 
diagram is illustrated in figure 6.6. The causal network narrative which explains the 
mechanisms underpinning the diagram is presented in the following sections. The 
numbers in brackets relate each part of the causal network narrative to the 
corresponding characteristic or factors illustrated in the causal network diagram. 
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3.33 Bidder Characteristics 
 
REG had been struggling, with low profitability and net asset disposals of 14.9% in 
the three years before the abandoned bid. REG‟s problems arose from the low 
organic growth available to the firm due to the lack of scale in the industry. The 
identification of these issues by REG‟s management suggests that these 
characteristics were the origin of the causal path leading to the bid for the Target. A 
nested causal chain can be drawn from low growth (1) to low profitability (2) to low 
free cash (3) and significant disposals in the pre-bid period (4). This culminates in a 
disciplinary process before the abandoned bid, in which the management team 
were replaced (5). This suggests a disciplinary process had already taken place 
before the abandoned bid, producing a change in management. However, even 
after the disciplinary replacement, REG still exhibited weak monitoring of managers 
and weak incentives for managers. Despite this, the strategy of the company was 
more influenced by the performance problems which led to the replacement of its 
managers and not managerial interests enabled by poor governance mechanisms. 
Therefore, these are not relevant characteristics for the causal network of 
abandonment and its aftermath, so are not included. 
The new management was looking for opportunities to complete acquisitions to 
realise consolidation and the evidence suggests this outcome of the disciplinary 
process was the critical rationale for the proposed acquisition. Consequently, a 
further link in the nested causal chain can be added running from the disciplinary 
process to the consolidation strategy which REG was attempting to pursue (6).  
Indeed, the analysis indicates a nested causal path can be traced directly from the 
bidder‟s characteristics, particularly REG‟s poor performance before abandonment 
and the perceived need for consolidation in the late night pub sector. The 
abandoned bid was intended to be part of this strategy. After abandonment, the 
sequence of events was consistent with a continuation of this strategy involving 
further attempts at consolidation, either by acquiring or being acquired. According 
to the bidding management, it didn‟t matter which. Unfortunately, the necessary 
consolidation was not achieved and the firm was forced into administration.   
Furthermore, the evidence suggests a localised causal configuration relating to 
abandonment. This can be traced as a branch from REG‟s main strategy. The 
consolidation strategy led REG to identify a target with which the bidder could 
achieve the necessary consolidation. This led to certain transaction characteristics, 
some of which were important elements in the pathology of abandonment.  
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3.34 Transaction Characteristics 
 
Deriving from the REG‟s stated strategy, „synergy‟ and „consolidation‟ were the key 
factors providing the rationale for the bid. Consequently, the Target operated in the 
same industry as REG, so there was a high degree of industrial relatedness 
between the two firms. Therefore, a strong nested causal path can be drawn 
between the strategy of the bidder and the identity of the Target as „related‟. REG‟s 
director argued both sets of shareholders would benefit from greater consolidation. 
However, the evidence suggests that the industrial relatedness of the Target was 
not important in the pathology of abandonment. As a result, it is not included as 
part of the causal network. 
Another characteristic of the bid was the opportunism evident in choosing the 
specific target. It was available for acquisition, since it was one of the few public 
limited companies available in the sector. The greater liquidity of the Target‟s 
ownership made it easier to acquire than a private firm. In addition, the merger of 
two public companies would enable greater corporate governance economies to be 
realised. The Target‟s share price had declined, creating an opportunity to acquire 
the Target more cheaply.  
In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that there is a causal link between 
the characteristics of the bidder and the means of payment. The offer was a mixed 
cash-equity offer. According to the director, the high equity element was chosen to,  
“…minimise the amount of cash going out of the business”.  
This suggests some liquidity issues in the company, which constrained REG in its 
choice of financing. These liquidity issues derived from the firm‟s poor performance, 
resulting in low free cash and the need to retain cash. The opportunistic nature of 
the bid (7), and the related decision regarding the use of equity (8), had important 
implications for the pathology of abandonment.       
 
3.35 Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
 
The evidence suggests that the opportunistic bid and the choice of equity were 
necessary, but not sufficient to cause abandonment. Several contingent factors 
during the bidding process were necessary to compound the impact of these 
transaction characteristics. In this case, managerial resistance was the key 
contingent factor in abandonment (9). Without a management recommendation, 
REG was not prepared to make a formal bid. Resistance was driven by a perception 
that the offer was too low (10). This could be interpreted as target managers being 
motivated by the maximisation of shareholder value.  
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But, the managerial resistance was compounded by the presence of potential rival 
bidders, prepared to pay a higher premium, using cash (11). Despite REG raising 
its bid substantially (12), the Target continued to resist. This suggests the Target 
wanted to receive the highest possible amount of cash. As REG‟s director noted, 
this was the more attractive option because it gave the Target‟s shareholders an 
exit (Holl and Kyriazis, 1996). Thus, while there was no explicit relationship 
between REG‟s choice of equity and the rival bid, these factors compounded one 
another to emphasise the lower value of REG‟s bid.   
REG voluntary withdrew its bid before committing to the process with a rule 2.5 
announcement. It wanted to avoid being drawn into a „bidding war‟ and paying too 
high a price (the „winner‟s curse‟ in competitive bidding). This suggests a rational 
decision by REG‟s management consistent with shareholders‟ interests. Once the 
opportunity disappeared (13), REG abandoned the acquisition (14). REG‟s 
management considered that the price paid for the Target was too high and were 
relieved to walk away.  
 
3.36 After Abandonment 
 
However, this causal configuration for abandonment, relating to the value of the bid 
had little impact on the events after abandonment. The strategy of the bidder was 
not altered by the abandoned bidding process, supporting the view that it did not 
play a governance role. Events after abandonment were typified by further 
attempts to achieve the consolidation (15), which was a necessary condition for the 
abandoned bid. Unfavourable market conditions and the inability to achieve 
consolidation forced the company into administration (16).  
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Figure 6.6: Proposed Causal Network for REG 
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3.4 The Case of MIC 
 
3.41 Case History 
 
On 28/4/2005, it was announced that MIC was planning a cash/equity offer of 50p 
in cash and 0.3758 MIC shares for the Target. MIC‟S bid was in response to an 
earlier cash bid of 71p by another firm, recommended by the target‟s board. The 
initial bid had been at a premium of 25.7% to the target‟s market value and the 
rival had already received 49.8% acceptances from target shareholders. MIC‟s bid 
was at a premium of 14.1% to the rival bid and the target board immediately 
switched their recommendation to MIC‟s higher offer.  
MIC had been incorporated for 31 years at the time of the abandoned bid, but 
operated in a dynamic and growing business environment. It was a business-to-
business firm offering software and consultancy to the financial services sector. 
With the rise of internet banking and increased use of IT in finance and accounting, 
MIC had developed several marketable products.  It had started generating profits 
and had free cash of 4% at the time of the bid. There was an expressed desire to 
grow in the medium term, with a stated acquisition strategy. Consequently, as 
stated in the annual report, there was no distribution of profits. 
“Consistent with the Group‟s acquisition strategy, MIC does not at present 
pay a dividend.” 
(Company Annual Report, 2005) 
This acquisition strategy was evidence by net acquisitions equivalent to 9.8% of 
total assets in three years between 2002-2004. The annual report made reference 
to a “rapid acquisitions integration model”, enabling MIC to integrate acquired 
assets quickly. This helped to drive the acquisition strategy forward. The firm was:  
“…looking to secure suitable acquisitions in the future if the opportunity 
arises”.  
(Company Annual Report) 
 
The annual report refers to an intention to: 
“…explore potential further opportunities that may enhance shareholder 
value”. 
(Company Annual Report) 
The company was open about its growth strategy through acquisitions and the 
abandoned bid must be considered in this context.   
The firm had strong corporate governance characteristics. It had a majority of non-
executive directors on its board. Despite its maturity, it had a relatively 
concentrated ownership structure, with the directors themselves holding 10% of 
share capital of the company. This suggests no conflict between managers and 
other shareholders.  
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The bid for the related Target was consistent with MIC‟s growth strategy, creating 
substantial potential synergies. In the bid announcement, it was stated the 
transaction would: 
“…provide [MIC] with a significantly increased presence in the financial 
services sector.” “Provide an opportunity to market [MIC‟s] complementary 
software offerings to target‟s customer base.” 
“…enlarged group will benefit from having an increased presence and 
expanded client base, with a broader range of software and service 
offerings”. 
(RNS announcement, 28/4/05) 
The timing and choice of the Target was opportunistic. Target was already the 
subject of a recommended bid by Rival offering 71p in cash. MIC‟s bid valued 
Target at 81p, a premium of 14.1% over Rival‟s bid. Consistent with their strategy 
of keeping cash to reinvest in the business, MIC offered a cash/equity combination 
in a ratio of 60:40 respectively. Target management immediately switched their 
recommendation to the higher offer from MIC. Rival immediately responded to 
MIC‟s bid with a statement encouraging the target shareholders to: 
 “…take no action”, commenting on the “significant paper element” [Equity] 
in MIC‟s bid and, “the absence of a full cash alternative.” 
(RNS Announcement, 28/4/05) 
However, the next day, MIC responded, stating it had 54.5% irrevocable 
undertakings from Target shareholders. 1 However, several days later, the Rival 
raised its cash offer to 85.5p. MIC responded, stating it was not prepared to raise 
its offer. It withdrew its bid, stating: 
“…it was not in shareholders‟ interests to raise its offer”.  
(RNS Announcement, 13/5/05) 
Rival‟s bid was declared unconditional several weeks later. Consequently, MIC 
received an inducement fee from Target. 
After abandonment, MIC pursued significant alternative acquisitions in the same 
year as the abandoned bid. Three acquisitions, equivalent to 10% of total assets, 
were completed, suggesting MIC sought alternative opportunities to pursue its 
medium term growth strategy. After that, the annual reports suggest that MIC was 
integrating the acquisitions, focusing on organic development primarily, but looking 
for acquisition opportunities wherever these arose. However, no further acquisitions 
were made within three years of the abandoned bid.  
 
 
                                           
1 RNS announcement 29/4/05 
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3.42 Causal Network Narrative 
 
The series of significant acquisitions after abandonment means that MIC was 
categorised as a „least-likely‟ case. It is anticipated that the abandoned acquisition 
did not play a governance role. Hence, it was anticipated that its causal network 
would be very different from the typological disciplinary network. This is indeed the 
case. The causal network suggests a different causal mechanism in abandonment, 
driven by specific bidder characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent 
factors in the bidding process, which did not have a lasting impact. Appendix 2g 
demonstrates the coding of primary and secondary data for MIC, using the 
templates derived from the conceptual framework. This was used to produce the 
causal network diagram, reflecting the underlying mechanism present in this case.  
This causal network diagram is illustrated in figure 6.7. The causal network 
narrative which explains the mechanisms underpinning the diagram is presented in 
the following sections. The numbers in brackets relate each part of the causal 
network narrative to the corresponding characteristic or factors illustrated in the 
causal network diagram. 
 
3.43 Bidder Characteristics 
 
The evidence suggests several bidder characteristics were important causal factors 
in the abandoned bid and its aftermath. A nested causal path runs from high profits 
(1) to high free cash (2). There was a dynamic corporate environment (3) 
generating high growth potential (4). Together, these causal paths exhibited 
compound causation, enabling a strategy of high organic and acquisition investment 
(5). 
There is little evidence that the investment strategy was driven by managerial 
interests in conflict with shareholders. MIC‟s corporate governance characteristics 
suggested strong monitoring (6) and strong incentives (7). With such 
characteristics, it is less likely that managers will make value-destroying decisions. 
Hence, the abandoned bidding process has little impact on MIC subsequently. 
Indeed, the analysis suggests that the biggest influence on the bidder in the 
aftermath of abandonment was not the abandoned bid, or factors of events related 
to it, but the strategy of organic and acquisition investment (5). 
A nested causal path can be traced from the bidder‟s free cash, growth objectives 
and the announced acquisitions and investment strategy to the substantial 
acquisitions (16), pursued in the same year as the abandoned bid. These were 
integrated over subsequent years.  
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3.44 Transaction Characteristics 
 
A localised causal path can be traced as a branch of the main path stemming from 
MIC‟s high organic and acquisition investment strategy. The bid was consistent with 
MIC‟s strategy. The identity of Target involved a high degree of industrial 
relatedness, producing significant synergies. However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the industrial relatedness of the Target played a significant role in 
abandonment. Hence, it is not included as a causal factor.  
More important to the causal mechanism was the opportunistic nature of the bid 
(8). Using the signal of an existing bid (9), MIC spotted an opportunity to acquire 
the Target at a favourable price. This opportunism extended to the choice of 
financing. MIC used a mixture of cash / equity to finance the transaction (10). 
There was no all-cash alternative. The management of MIC did not want to see too 
much cash leave the company, evidenced by the reluctance to pay dividends.  
Some equity was included as a result. However, the offer price and the means of 
payment, while necessary, were not sufficient to cause abandonment. Additional 
factors were important in the causal mechanism of abandonment. These important 
contingent factors are discussed in the next section. 
 
3.45 Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
 
Initially, the Target board initially viewed the offer of MIC to be: 
“…fair and reasonable…” (RNS Announcement, 28/4/2005) 
They switched their recommendation from the Rival‟s all-cash offer (11). Their 
decisions were based on achieving the highest possible value for their shareholders 
since they were prepared to switch their recommendation to a higher bid. The value 
of MIC‟s offer was only considered to be too low (13) once the Rival raised its cash 
offer above the implied value of MIC‟s bid (12). Hence, the raised offer is the critical 
contingent factor in the pathology of abandonment. Without it, with the amount of 
acceptances received, the bid of MIC would almost certainly have succeeded. 
Instead, MIC‟s management decided to withdraw their bid. As the bid was 
opportunistic, the company had a price in mind and did not want to pay too much 
for the Target.  
Once, the existing bidder raised their offer, the conditions which gave rise to the 
opportunity no longer existed (14),  so MIC was prepared to walk away (15) and 
sought other opportunities after abandonment (16). The decision to abandon can 
be related to the „winner‟s curse‟. MIC did not want to overpay. This could stem 
from strong monitoring and incentives within the firm. Pursuing the bid was no 
longer on shareholders‟ interests, so it was abandoned. This can be related to the 
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statement in one of the company‟s annual reports in the pre-bid period where it 
acknowledged: 
“…there is no guarantee that suitable acquisitions will be identified or 
transactions completed”. 
(Company Annual Report, 2004) 
This abandonment was one of those transactions that MIC was not able to 
complete. This pathology of abandonment was localised and related to the 
immediate bidding process.  
 
3.46 After Abandonment 
 
There is no verification that the effects of this pathology are significant in the 
aftermath of the bid. In this case, events after abandonment were related to the 
long term strategy of promoting growth in the bidder rather than a disciplinary 
process stemming from the causal mechanisms producing abandonment. 
 
It is only the presence of the higher cash offer and the value/financing which 
caused the target management to switch their recommendation. Then, this causal 
path interacts with the opportunistic nature of the transaction to remove the 
opportunity for MIC and cause abandonment.  
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Figure 6.7: Proposed Causal Network for MIC 
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3.5 The Case of PTH 
 
3.51 Case History 
 
On 16/10/2003, PTH made a hostile bid for the Target. The intention of the bid was 
to gain control of another company, GRO, in which the Target had a 29.34% stake. 
GRO had property assets which PTH wished to acquire.  
PTH was a property investment company. It had been incorporated for 72 years, 
engaging in a variety of activities. However, since 1980, it had traded exclusively in 
property. The company had expanded slowly, purchasing properties and acquiring 
other property investment companies. The company achieved a full listing on the 
London Stock Exchange in 1994, but by 2003, it was still a relatively small 
company with a market capitalisation of £26.69mn.  
Its corporate governance characteristics show it was a mature company with a 
board structure which comprised more than 50% of NEDs. The dispersed outside 
shareholding suggests weak monitoring, but the Chairman/Chief Executive held 
25% of the share capital, indicating strong incentives for him to pursue acquisitions 
fulfilling shareholders‟ interests. Indeed, the presentation and tone of the annual 
report suggests firm control exercised by the chairman / chief executive. The 
strategy of the company was consistent with shareholder value. The annual report 
prior to the abandoned bid was explicit about the company‟s goals, 
“Utilising our experience in the real estate sector [the mission] is to make as 
much money (real profits) as possible, and grow the net assets of the 
Company with the capital we have available to us…” 
(Company Annual Report, 2003) 
PTH was profitable, generating significant free cash. The company accounts show 
that this was committed to substantial capital and financial investment spending (a 
real value equivalent to 16.3% of total assets in 3 years prior to abandoned bid). 
These investments left little free cash (-7% of net assets at the time of the bid). 
There is no evidence of significant acquisition activity in the pre-bid period.  
The bid for the Target was part of a contest for control of GRO. Having acquired 
Target, given its resultant holdings in GRO, PTH would have had effective control of 
the latter. The bid was financed using cash, valuing Target at 577p per share. At 
the same time as making the bid for Target, PTH put forward a resolution to replace 
the directors of GRO with their own directors at the AGM. This bid was rejected by 
the target board with the statement: 
“(The Bidder) is making an opportunistic attempt to secure control of the 
company without paying an appropriate premium.”        
(RNS Announcement, 24/10/2003) 
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The resolution to replace the directors was defeated at the AGM. On the same day, 
PTH raised its cash offer for the Target by 27.5% to 735p per share. Target board 
immediately recommended the revised bid, paving the way for PTH to control GRO. 
However, only ten days later, a rival joint venture emerged involving a private 
equity group and two directors of the Target. They offered 760p per share. Given 
the substantial stake of the two directors in Target, this rival bid was immediately 
declared unconditional. PTH immediately withdrew its offer. PTH sold its stake in 
Target for a profit of £450,000. On completion of the deal, the joint venture was 
obliged under the takeover code to make a bid for GRO. This they did successfully 
in 2004.  
After abandonment, PTH continued to trade its property portfolio to generate 
returns. This involved buying and selling properties – in the year after the 
abandoned bid, the firm sold its headquarters in central London for £8.8mn. 
However, while bids were made for other small property companies, none were 
completed. In addition, there were no significant management changes in the 
aftermath of abandonment. The only significant financial restructuring was a 
substantial reduction in gearing equivalent to 69.2% percentage points in the 
gearing percentage.   
 
3.52 Causal Network Narrative 
 
The disciplinary sequence after abandonment involving the significant decrease in 
gearing after abandonment meant PTH was categorised as a „least-likely‟ case, 
whereby the abandoned acquisition did not play a governance role. Hence, it was 
anticipated that its causal network would be very different from the typological 
disciplinary network. Therefore, the causal network suggests a different causal 
process, driven by specific bidder characteristics, transaction characteristics and 
contingent factors in the bidding process, which did not have a lasting impact. 
Appendix 2h demonstrates the coding of primary and secondary data for PTH, using 
the templates derived from the conceptual framework. This was used to produce 
the causal network diagram, reflecting the underlying mechanism present in this 
case.  This causal network diagram is illustrated in figure 6.8. The causal network 
narrative which explains the mechanisms underpinning the diagram is presented in 
the following sections. The numbers in brackets relate each part of the causal 
network narrative to the corresponding characteristic or factors illustrated in the 
causal network diagram. 
 
 
 
197 
 
3.53 Bidder Characteristics 
 
Evidence suggests PTH was a mature (1), profitable company (2), generating 
substantial free cash (3). The free cash was used for substantial capital and 
financial investment spending, rather than acquisition spending. This derived from 
opportunities for substantial organic growth (4) and a desire to pursue it, to 
generate higher profits. This is evidenced by the direct mission stated in the 
Company‟s annual report. However, the strategy did not preclude acquisitions in 
the future. Hence, while the higher free cash and high growth were independent, 
they combined to determine the strategy to be pursued by PTH.  
PTH‟s corporate governance characteristics demonstrate strong monitoring and 
strong incentives for managers. Despite achieving a listing on the London Stock 
Exchange in 1994, the directors, and particularly the Chairman / chief executive, 
retained a significant ownership and control stake in the firm. Therefore, there was 
no separation of ownership and control and the bid would have been unlikely to 
damage shareholders‟ interests. This pattern is anticipated in such a least-likely 
case. The abandoned bid in this case was not likely to have had a governance role. 
Indeed, there is no evidence these corporate governance characteristics played any 
role in the abandoned bid‟s causal mechanism. Other characteristics and events 
were significant.  
There is evidence of a nested causal path from the bidder‟s strategy to pursue any 
investments (5) which produce a high level of profits. This was done primarily using 
capital and financial spending, but also acquisitions where appropriate. In addition, 
a nested causal path can be traced from its strategy to the activities of the 
company after abandonment involving its continued investment and, unsuccessful, 
acquisition strategy.  
 
3.54 Transaction Characteristics 
 
A localised causal chain can be traced from the strategy of the company before the 
abandoned bid to the target of the bid. The Target was a major shareholder of 
GRO, another property investment company. PTH was pursuing the property assets 
of GRO, consistent with their strategy of making property investments from which it 
could generate profits. The bid was opportunistic (6), used as leverage in the 
contest for control for GRO. If PTH‟s attempt to gain control of GRO directly by 
replacing directors failed, the acquisition of the Target would enable it do it 
indirectly. Another characteristic of the bid was related to PTH‟s strategy. The firm 
was a property investment company, so focused on that activity – investing in and 
managing property assets. There is no evidence of diversification. The contest for 
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control, of which the abandoned acquisition was an instrument, involved highly 
related property companies. However, there is no evidence to suggest the extent of 
the industrial relatedness of the Target was a link in the causal chain to 
abandonment. Additionally, the decision to use cash was not related to the 
opportunistic nature of the transaction, or the strategy being pursued by PTH. With 
such a small bidder (market capitalisation of £26.69mn), with ownership and 
control of PTH concentrated in the hands of the management, particularly the 
chairman and chief executive, the use of equity would have diluted their position in 
the firm. Hence, they would prefer the use of cash instead (Chang, et al., 2009). 
This is particularly the case with real estate firms, which rely on debt financing to 
maintain managements‟ control. 
 
3.55 Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
 
The opportunistic nature of the bid led to opposition from Target management (8), 
derived from the perceived low valuation placed by the offer on Target (7). There 
began a nested causal path leading to abandonment. After the resolution to oust 
the directors of GRO was rejected (9), PTH raised its offer (10). This price was 
recommended by the board of the Target (11) which suggests the higher premium 
and cash were now acceptable. This implies the earlier managerial resistance was 
motivated by shareholder value, rather than managerial intransigence. In addition, 
no valuation issues arose at this stage of the bidding process, suggesting the bid 
was a „fair value‟. 
 
The critical contingent factor in this abandoned bidding process was the higher rival 
cash bid (12) which was immediately declared unconditional. It also suggests that 
the emergence of the rival bid was defensive. In order to maintain control of GRO, 
they were forced to seek a „white knight‟ in the form of the private equity firm to 
aid their bid for Target through an MBO. Since the directors themselves were major 
shareholders, the bid was immediately declared unconditional, causing PTH‟s bid to 
lapse. The opportunity disappeared (13) and the bid was abandoned (14).  
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3.56 After Abandonment 
 
After abandonment, PTH sold its stake in the Target for a substantial profit. 
However, the evidence suggests that the causal path ends there. Neither the 
transaction characteristics nor the contingent factors in the bidding process had any 
causal role in the further activities of the bidder after abandonment. PTH made a 
number of unsuccessful bids for individual property assets and companies, but 
continued to manage its portfolio of property assets to generate return (15). The 
only significant change in the bidder was the substantial reduction in gearing in the 
three years after this abandoned bid, an outcome not consistent with discipline 
(16). This evidence does not imply a governance process after abandonment, but a 
meandering strategy consistent with the goals of enhancing shareholder value.  
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Figure 6.8: Proposed Causal Network for PTH 
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4. Summary and Conclusion  
 
This chapter has presented and discussed the findings of the Causal Process Tracing 
(CPT) for each case. Case histories have been presented. The findings of the 
analysis of each case has been described. From this, causal networks have been 
derived, illustrating the underlying causal mechanisms of each case. Causal 
network narratives describe these underlying causal mechanisms. 
None of the most-likely cases revealed a causal network consistent with the 
proposed typological disciplinary network. This suggests the proposed network 
needs refining in the light of this, albeit limited, evidence. In two of the cases, WHI 
and FUT, there is evidence that the causal path of abandonment had an impact 
subsequently, leading to disciplinary changes in the firms. In these cases, evidence 
suggests the abandoned acquisitions had a disciplinary impact, shaping the 
subsequent strategic direction of the firms concerned. In these cases, the bidders‟ 
characteristics were compounded by the identity of particular targets to reveal 
information, particularly uncertainty, surrounding the bidders‟ strategies. 
Consequently, strategic changes were made.  
In the six remaining cases, the events after abandonment can be separated from 
the causal mechanisms of abandonment. In these cases, the abandoned bid arose 
from the long-term strategies of the bidders – consolidation, growth-seeking, asset-
seeking. However, the pathology of abandonment was localised. Abandonment 
revolves around the price offered by the bidding firms – in all of these cases, the 
firms don‟t offer a high enough price. The circumstances which produce this differ 
from case to case. In some cases, the low offer price is compounded by a high 
equity component, creating uncertainty around a bid. This led to managerial 
resistance in some cases. In all of the cases, the bidders lost out to a higher rival 
cash bid, which they were unwilling to match. In these cases, it is evident that the 
process of abandonment had no lasting impact. The firms moved on and pursued 
different strategies to achieve their goals.   
The next stage of the research involves cross-case analysis in order to develop 
some meta-causal networks involving abandoned acquisitions. This will help to 
answer the research questions proposed in chapter 3.  These are particular meta-
causal mechanisms – pathologies of abandoned acquisitions - which apply to 
particular groups of cases, yet allow for specific processes and interactions to differ 
from case to case. Consequently, the research can contribute to knowledge by 
identifying the conditions under which specified outcomes, disciplinary or otherwise, 
occur and the causal mechanisms through which they occur. 
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Chapter Seven: Cross-Case Analysis - Proposed 
Pathologies of Abandoned Acquisitions 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A novel aspect of this research involves the development of a conceptual 
framework which characterises the underlying mechanisms of abandoned 
acquisitions as the interaction of antecedent characteristics, interceding factors 
producing different outcomes afterwards. Within the context of this framework a 
typological „disciplinary‟ causal network is proposed whereby abandoned 
acquisitions play a governance role. Analysis of the fieldwork interviews and 
secondary documentation involved the novel application of casual processing 
methods to answer the questions, which the research attempts to address. This 
facilitates the testing of configurations of variables proposed in the typological 
disciplinary causal network, and revising and refining them in the light of empirical 
observations. In contrast, where the outcomes were not consistent with discipline, 
and hence, the causal mechanisms may not be disciplinary, the research can 
contribute to knowledge by proposing alternative causal mechanisms revealed in 
cases where abandoned acquisitions may not play a governance role.  
Chapter five discusses the case-selection process separating the cases into „most-
likely‟ and „least-likely‟ cases. This is consistent with selecting on the dependent 
variable (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Chapter six discusses the findings of the 
„Within-case‟ analysis. This chapter discusses the findings of the „Cross-case‟ 
analysis, which builds on the within case analysis. The cross-case analysis 
compares the causal configurations of cases together, using prediction-outcome 
displays and cross-case networking (George and Bennett, 2005). Distinctions and 
similarities across the cases were identified. The causal configurations for these 
outcomes were compared across the cases to identify common or distinctive 
characteristics and factors so that cases can be clustered together, fragments of 
the causal networks derived and „meta- causal configurations‟ proposed. From this, 
the research makes a contribution to knowledge by developing preliminary meta-
causal networks; contingent generalisations which summarise the underlying 
mechanisms identified in different types of abandoned acquisitions. These meta-
causal networks – pathologies – demonstrate the conditions under which specified 
outcomes occur and the causal mechanisms, pathologies, through which they 
occur.   
Some of the companies demonstrated sequences of changes after abandonment 
consistent with a disciplinary governance process. While some cases demonstrated 
aspects of the proposed typological configuration, none revealed a matching causal 
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network. This suggests the actual progress of bidders post-abandonment is less 
predictable than existing dominant theory suggest. More attention is required to be 
given to the factors at play in actual failed bids and how they interact in the causal 
mechanisms of abandonment. It is hoped that this research can assist in 
highlighting some of these key characteristics and factors, and their interactions. It 
is accepted that, given the limited scale of the research, these findings will be 
tentative, proposals to be taken forward in further research. Through analysing 
these key factors, this research proposes two distinct types of causal networks in 
abandoned acquisitions, experienced by the cases investigated. One type of 
network is proposed which characterises a causal mechanism where abandoned 
acquisitions played a governance role and have a significant impact subsequently - 
termed „strategic uncertainty‟. A second type of causal network is proposed where 
cases revealed a very different pathology. These cases of abandoned acquisitions 
had no governance role – termed „valuation uncertainty‟. This aspect of the 
research answers the second set of research questions,  making a contribution to 
our knowledge of the underlying mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. The 
questions are: 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Each fragment of the causal networks will be 
discussed separately. Section 2 will discuss the antecedent bidder characteristics. 
Section 3 will discuss transaction characteristics and Section 4 will discuss 
contingent factors in the bidding process. Section 5 will present the proposed meta-
causal configurations based on the within-case and cross-case analysis. Section 6 is 
the conclusion.  
 
 
  
What is the nature of the underlying mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions 
which produced post-abandonment discipline of bidders‟ managers? 
What is the nature of the underlying mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions 
which did not produce post-abandonment discipline of bidders‟ managers? 
To what extent are the mechanisms different? 
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2. Antecedent Bidder Characteristics 
 
The typological disciplinary network proposes compound causation between two 
nested causal paths in relation to antecedent characteristics (see chapter three for 
a description of this typological network). Firstly, older, more mature assets 
produce low organic growth opportunities for a firm. Secondly, higher profits 
generate higher free cash. Under the proposed network, these compounded casual 
paths create the necessary conditions for acquisitions driven by managerial 
preferences, and hence, the need for discipline. However, these are not sufficient 
conditions for acquisitions driven by managerial preferences. These factors need to 
be reinforced by the scope provided by weak corporate governance characteristics 
relating to monitoring and managerial incentives. Under the proposed network, 
these causal characteristics act in tandem to produce the scope and opportunity for 
acquisitions driven by managerial preferences. Consequently, abandoned 
acquisition play a governance role, where the proposed value-destroying‟ bid is 
stopped, producing post-abandonment discipline. Therefore, it is anticipated that 
most-likely cases should exhibit such antecedent characteristics.   
However, the analysis shows that there are no distinctive differences between the 
pattern of characteristics for most-likely disciplinary cases and least-likely non-
disciplinary cases. Two of the three most-likely disciplinary cases (WHI and FUT) 
demonstrated a nested causal path running from high profits to high free cash, 
consistent with the typological disciplinary framework. In WHI‟s case, this path was 
compounded by the low growth prospects of its mature assets in pubs and brewing. 
In both cases, the causal paths led to stated growth strategies. Indeed, there is 
evidence from both cases which suggests the senior managers felt they had to do 
something with the free cash.  A quotation from the director of FUT highlights the 
matter: 
“There was a glorious period … where the company was debt-free, with a 
rising amount of net cash. So, the question throughout those three years; 
what the devil are we going to do with it?” 
The thinking suggests pressure from shareholders to invest the free cash to 
generate higher returns through growth. Indeed, when this point about free cash 
was put to a corporate lawyer in a contextual interview, they stated: 
“…shareholders won‟t tolerate a large amount of free cash.” 
       (Interview with corporate lawyer) 
This is consistent with traditional finance theory. Either free-cash is paid out to 
shareholders as dividends or used for productive investment, anticipating positive 
net present values. So, high free cash will produce high internal investment and 
high external investment (acquisitions). The danger is that managers, in a drive to 
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retain control of free cash, will pursue excessive acquisitions – producing negative 
net present values (Jensen, 1986).   
There are similarities between this pattern of antecedent characteristics and that 
exhibited by some of the least-likely cases.  Several of these firms (TRG, MIC and 
PTH) reveal a nested causal path from high profits through high free cash to a 
strategy of acquisition investment for growth similar to that exhibited by WHI and 
FUT. MIC stated clearly in its annual report before their abandoned bid, 
“…there will be no payment of dividends. Profits will be reinvested to finance 
acquisitions.” 
        (Company Annual Report) 
One of the other least-likely firms, TRG, shows the same pattern of bidder 
characteristics as WHI, particularly the lack of internal growth opportunities and the 
need to pursue acquisitions to drive higher growth. Press reports prior to TRG‟s 
abandoned bid intimated that the firm was considered “stale” (press report), 
lacking internal investment opportunities. Similarly, analyst‟s reports emphasised 
that WHI‟s traditional brewing and pub assets offered low growth potential. Apart 
from these two companies, poor growth prospects are not significant characteristics 
of the remaining firms, across both groups of cases. The remaining firms which 
exhibited a nested causal path from high profits to high free cash, revealed high 
internal growth prospects. In all of these cases, the abandoned acquisitions could 
be interpreted as attempts to pursue investment to use free cash to generate 
higher growth. Hence, while free cash may be a necessary condition, it is not 
sufficient, on its own, to trigger an acquisition pursuing managerial preferences. It 
needs to be configured with other distinctive characteristics to produce a 
disciplinary process. 
In contrast, the remaining most-likely case, CAT, which was subsequently acquired, 
exhibited very different characteristics from those proposed by the typological 
disciplinary network. It was young, unprofitable, and suffering liquidity problems. 
However, this pattern is not unique. CAT shared these characteristics with REG, 
which entered administration within three years of abandonment. However, the 
firms did not share other characteristics. CAT operated in a dynamic business 
environment, with high organic growth prospects. Meanwhile, REG demonstrated 
other characteristics consistent with the typological disciplinary network.  It was 
operating in a mature sector, with few growth opportunities from its existing 
assets. This led to a strategy of consolidation: 
“We were finding organic growth more and more difficult to get, therefore, 
consolidation became an obvious picture.” 
(Interview with REG‟s Director) 
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Indeed, some of these characteristics are similar to WHI and TRG, suggesting REG 
may have had similar problems at the time of its abandoned bid – particularly a low 
growth potential. Meanwhile, CAT was in a young industry, exhibiting growth 
potential. However, the firm was experiencing funding constraints, a repeated 
concern expressed in a number of annual reports both, before, and after the 
abandoned bid:  
[CAT] “…will continue to consider these sources (revenue streams and 
equity finance), though there can be no assurance that the company can 
generate significant revenue nor that equity finance will be available on 
acceptable terms or at all.” 
(Company annual report) 
This influenced its policy of “strategic interaction” before the abandoned bid, where 
finance considerations were a crucial factor in CAT‟s decisions. The director 
commented:  
[The model]  “…required a lot of scale and therefore quite a lot of money to 
get things, if not all the way to the market, to a point where you could retain 
significant value before bringing in a partner.”  
The findings indicate that no distinctive pattern emerges for these characteristics 
for the different families of cases. This suggests these characteristics, while 
necessary, are not sufficient contingent characteristics, differentiating cases where 
abandoned acquisitions played a governance role to ones where abandoned 
acquisitions did not play a governance role.  
In addition to the scope that free cash provides, the typological disciplinary 
framework proposes that weak corporate governance characteristics provides 
bidders‟ managers with the discretion to pursue acquisitions driven by managerial 
and not shareholders‟ interests. It is proposed in the typological disciplinary 
network that weak monitoring and weak incentives act in a compound causal 
relationship with free cash to produce such bids. As a result, it would be anticipated 
that different patterns of corporate governance characteristics for bidders which 
experience post-abandonment discipline from those which don‟t.   
The findings of the analysis suggest a pattern, but again, there is no clear 
separation between the characteristics of the most-likely and least-likely cases. All 
of the most-likely disciplinary cases exhibited weak incentives for managers, 
through insignificant share ownership. However, only WHI demonstrated weak 
board and shareholder monitoring. However, TRG, a least-likely case exhibited 
similar weak monitoring and weak incentives creating the discretion necessary for 
bids driven by managerial interests. Hence, the corporate governance 
characteristics of both of these cases were consistent with the anticipated 
antecedent bidder characteristics for the typological disciplinary network.  All of the 
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remaining least-likely cases exhibited the strong corporate governance 
characteristics - strong monitoring and strong incentives for executive directors - 
anticipated in cases without disciplinary outcomes. This is consistent with Cornett et 
al. (2004) who found that managerial shareholding is associated with higher bidder 
returns, anticipating positive gains. Here, in a different way, this research supports 
these findings, Significant managerial shareholding is unlikely to have disciplinary 
consequences afterwards.  
Therefore, in this fragment of the causal network, the cases most consistent with 
the typological disciplinary network are WHI and TRG, firms with very different 
outcomes. FUT shared many similar characteristics with WHI and TRG. However, it 
demonstrated strong monitoring provided by an independent board and a 
concentrated ownership structure. CAT‟s very different set of antecedent 
characteristics suggests that the characteristics proposed in the typological network 
may not be the only ones which are necessary to produce a disciplinary process 
through an abandoned acquisition. One interpretation is that the disciplinary 
network may have a variety of possible configurations of bidder characteristics as 
antecedent characteristics. Another interpretation is that CAT‟s acquisition after 
abandonment was not disciplinary, and so, the abandoned acquisition was not part 
of a disciplinary process.   
These fragments of the firms‟ causal networks are illustrated in figure 7.1. The 
figure illustrates evidence of multi-finality in the causal networks of abandoned 
bids. This is demonstrated in cases WHI and TRG. Firms with very similar 
antecedent characteristics experienced very different outcomes after abandonment. 
This suggests anticipated bidder characteristics – high profits, high free cash, low 
growth and weak governance - while necessary, are not sufficient to indicate a 
governance role for abandoned acquisitions, producing disciplinary outcomes 
subsequently. They need to be configured with appropriate patterns of transaction 
characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process to create a disciplinary 
causal mechanism in abandoned acquisitions. This suggests the critical juncture 
distinguishing disciplinary and non-disciplinary causal mechanisms lie in these 
characteristics and factors and not antecedent bidder characteristics. These 
fragments of the causal networks are discussed in sections 3 and 4. 
In addition, the figure shows there is evidence of equi-finality in this fragment of 
the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. For example, TRG shared similar 
non-disciplinary outcomes with MIC and MEL - engaging in substantial acquisitions 
after abandonment. However, its antecedent characteristics in relation to corporate 
governance characteristics and anticipated growth potential are very different. 
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Figure 7.1 Fragment of Causal Networks (Bidder Characteristics) 
 
Higher Profits
Higher  Free-
cash 
Weak Monitoring
Weak Incentives  
Non-disciplinary Outcomes
Increased 
maturity 
Lower Growth  Disciplinary Outcomes
Weak / Strong 
Incentives  
Weak / Strong 
Monitoring
Non-disciplinary Outcomes
Multifinality
TRG 
and 
WHI
Equifinality
Higher Profits
Higher  Free-
cash 
Increased 
maturity 
Higher / Lower 
Growth  
TRG 
Compared 
to MIC 
and MEL
 
 
 
3. Transaction Characteristics  
  
The typological disciplinary causal network proposes that acquisitions driven by 
managerial preferences may be evidenced by excessive diversification (unrelated 
targets), offering higher premiums and financed with cash (retaining free cash). 
However, none of the most-likely cases exhibited these characteristics. Instead, the 
most-likely cases demonstrated patterns for these characteristics which were not 
only different from the proposed disciplinary network, but the same as the pattern 
for the majority of the least-likely cases. In general, all of the cases showed 
consistency in these transaction characteristics. Therefore, these were not critical 
characteristics, distinguishing disciplinary causal mechanisms from non-disciplinary 
causal mechanisms across these cases of abandoned acquisitions.  
Firstly, in all of the cases, the bidding firms were attempting to acquire related 
targets – indeed targets in the same industry sector - emphasising the synergistic 
benefits to be derived from the acquisitions in their bid documents. In fact, it 
seemed standard to make such claims in the bid documents. The director of CAT 
mentioned this in an understated manner:  
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“…standard one about synergy, avoiding duplication, [pauses], PLCs have a 
lot of corporate governance baggage which costs money and the merger 
removes those costs.” 
In all of the cases, most-likely and least-likely, the related target could be traced to 
the rationale for the bid and the bidder‟s strategy. If a bid was part of a growth 
strategy, the identity of the target was consistent with that (cases TRG, MIC, MEL, 
PTH and FUT). If a bidder‟s strategy was to achieve cost savings through 
consolidation, then the bid was consistent with this (Cases REG and WHI). In CAT‟s 
case, there were several objectives – growth and synergies, particularly financial 
synergies. Again, there is no distinction between most-likely and least-likely cases.   
Secondly, the literature suggests the means of payment, particularly the use of 
cash-financing, compounded with appropriate bidder characteristics, may convey 
information to investors about the motives of managers (Gregory, 2005). This may 
trigger a disciplinary process in the bidders. There is little evidence of this pattern 
in these cases. In fact, PTH, the one company which used solely cash as a means of 
payment endured no significant disciplinary changes after abandonment. The 
remaining bidding firms, whether most-likely or least-likely, used equity as the 
major element of financing. This lack of distinction suggests financing was not a 
critical factor in itself in revealing information about excessive free cash, and hence, 
trigger a disciplinary process. The evidence suggests different factors were 
important in the financing decision. In some cases, evidence suggests the use of 
equity-financing was motivated by opportunism (Weston et al. (2004). Firms were 
exploiting their “share power” – using overvalued equity to acquire assets for a 
lower real value. This is consistent with the findings of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
Invariably, the payment of cash involves drawing facilities - debt. A number of the 
firms expressed concern about debt levels, in a way that echoes the conclusions of 
Gadhaum et al. (2003). For instance, the director of FUT commented: 
“we should use as much of our share power as possible, and by doing that 
we will not incur any further bank debt…My feeling is that debt is more 
dangerous…The proportion of debt to profits (is crucial), because if you get 
that wrong, that gives far too much power to the banks”.  
In addition, rather than being unconcerned about the offer price and premium, as 
the disciplinary causal network proposes, most of the bidders expressed concern 
about over-paying. This includes both cases most-likely to have a disciplinary 
network and those least-likely to have a disciplinary network. „Opportunism‟ was a 
term used frequently by interviewees.  Opportunities arose and bids were made. 
Several comments by interviewees illustrate the point: 
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“It [the bid] was too good an opportunity to let slip by. Too good an 
opportunity to miss.” 
(Interview with CAT‟s Director) 
“I don‟t recall exactly what the share prices were, but if you track the 
target‟s share price … you‟ll see it had come-off quite a lot. So there was an 
opportunity for us to offer a significant premium to their shareholders in 
order to make them happy.”  
(Interview with REG‟s Director) 
 
“We‟re always looking at our competitors, to see what they are doing … in 
this case, could we think about acquiring them.” 
(Interview with FUT‟s Director) 
 
In the contextual interviewees with a regulator, it was agreed that opportunism is 
important in the timing of bids:  
“There is a short window of opportunity before a company falls into other 
hands. They [bidders] lose a potential opportunity to acquire the assets.”   
(Interview with Regulator) 
The analysis suggests this opportunism was an important aspect of all of the cases, 
indicating a compound relationship between price and the means of payment in the 
causal mechanisms which led to abandonment. This is discussed further in section 
4.2 below.  
A transaction characteristic not included in the typological framework became 
important in WHI‟s causal mechanism. This was not present in the causal 
mechanisms of the other cases. This unique feature of WHI‟s bid was the non-
standard condition attached to the bid - the proposed sale of its brewing  assets to 
satisfy the regulatory requirements under the Beer Orders Act (1989). The causal 
network for WHI suggests this was a critical contingent characteristic of that bid 
which distinguishes it from the other cases. The proposed sale of brewing had a 
nested causal chain deriving from the strategy of WHI to generate higher growth 
from its pub assets. Its mature pub assets had a low organic growth potential. This 
issue is not unique to WHI. REG and TRG were also firms struggling to achieve 
organic growth: 
“We were finding organic growth more and more difficult to get, therefore, 
consolidation became an obvious picture.” 
(Interview with REG‟s Director)  
However, WHI‟s case can be distinguished by the competition regulations which 
influenced decision-making around the bid. The maturity of the market, and its 
concentrated nature meant competition-related legislation in the Beer Orders Act 
(1989) existed. This forced WHI to include the non-standard condition. It is at this 
point that WHI‟s causal network separates from TRG‟s, which led to a very different 
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experience for both companies in the bidding process and explains the differential 
outcomes after abandonment. The non-standard condition was a critical factor in 
WHI‟s causal process to abandonment. No such conditions were evident in TRG‟s 
case, producing a very different causal process (this is discussed further in sections 
4 and 5 below).   
 
4. Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process  
 
Ultimately, all of the bids were abandoned because the bidders decided not to 
proceed, but the process by which this happened was very different. In fact, the 
cases show the complexity of bidding processes referred to by Weston el at. 
(2004). Despite this, the cross-case analysis discerned two general causal 
mechanisms, replicated across the different cases of abandoned acquisitions. This 
enables cases with similar patterns to be classified. Each of these patterns is 
discussed below.   
 
4.1 Strategic Uncertainty revealed in the Bidding Process 
 
Two of the three most-likely cases (WHI and FUT) involved the referral of their bid 
to the Competition Commission as the trigger for abandonment. This may suggest 
there is something distinctive about a bidding process involving competition 
problems which leads to disciplinary outcomes afterwards. However, their industry‟s 
positions were very different. Despite this, the causal mechanisms producing 
changes after abandonment exhibited some similarities.     
There were several factors in WHI‟s case absent from FUT‟s. These factors 
interacted to cause abandonment and contributed greatly to the disciplinary 
changes in WHI subsequently. The unique casual path experienced by WHI can be 
traced to this case‟s critical distinguishing feature - the condition of the transaction, 
in which WHI planned to divest its brewing assets.  This non-standard condition was 
caused by the regulatory environment in which WHI operated. This created a lot of 
uncertainty around the bid and its rationale. The use of equity was unrelated to the 
rationale for the bid and the resulting non-standard condition, but, it compounded 
the uncertainty surrounding the bid. The uncertainty led to share selling, decreasing 
the firm‟s share price and reducing the implied value of the bid.  
“What normally happens is that a bidder‟s share price goes down because 
shareholders are concerned about a bid, and particularly that bidders will 
overpay. With a cash bid, it doesn‟t matter, but if its paper, it certainly does. 
Clearly, a share price going down decreases the value of a deal.  
(Interview with Corporate Lawyer) 
 
212 
 
A further compounding factor was the presence of a rival bidder, continually issuing 
press releases questioning the proposed sale of brewing by WHI, and its 
implications for competition. Furthermore, the revelation of information about 
WHI‟s difficult negotiations with the competition authorities, added to the 
uncertainty. All of these factors interacted in a compound fashion to exacerbate the 
uncertainty surrounding the bid. So, while uncertainty didn‟t trigger abandonment, 
it contributed greatly through the compound causal influences exerted by these 
factors. 
In the aftermath of abandonment a market analyst commented, “…strategic 
development is probably going to be away from brewing and pubs”. This indeed 
happened. In the 18 months after abandonment there was a strategic restructuring 
of the company, with the brewing division and the pub estate divested and the 
recouped funds returned to shareholders. This suggests the process of 
abandonment and the uncertainty created by the abandoned bid did reveal 
information, but not about the intentions of managers to pursue their own 
preferences. Instead, information was revealed about the WHI‟s strategic direction. 
The abandonment played a governance role in disciplining managers into 
restructuring and re-orientating the firm, in order to pursue a strategic direction 
acceptable to shareholders. With too many uncertainties, the firm needed to 
reconsider not only the role of this particular acquisition in its strategy, but, its 
actual strategy. This had to be done in the context of the industry and the resulting 
regulatory environment, which left little room for growth in brewing and pubs within 
the same company. The divesting of brewing and pubs was a disciplinary response 
to information revealed in the bidding process about WHI‟s strategy. It enabled 
more focused governance, not only in brewing and pubs, but in WHI itself. It could 
focus on its strategy of developing its leisure business.    
In contrast to WHI‟s causal pathology, FUT‟s exhibited little uncertainty. There was 
no rival bidder, no non-standard conditions, and little suggesting that competition 
concerns would be a problem. Indeed, evidence suggests the referral of the bid to 
the competition authorities was a surprise. FUT‟s director commented: 
“We were therefore very surprised that it was announced within the 
prescribed timetable that this matter would be referred to the Competition 
Commission.” 
Despite this major difference in their causal mechanisms, events surrounding FUT 
after the abandonment of its bid revealed a causal pathology similar to WHI‟s. It 
was only after abandonment that uncertainty arose. However, the evidence 
suggests this was linked to the abandoned bid. In FUT‟s case, there was no 
immediate disciplinary response to abandonment. FUT‟s response to abandonment 
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was to restructure the deal and pay cash for cherry-picked assets of the target. 
However, the nature of this transaction meant it had to be paid for using cash, 
financed by debt. This was done despite the concerns expressed by the director 
about debt financing. However, FUT‟s director justifies this because they feared 
losing the opportunity: 
“At the time, we immediately held a senior meeting in the company and we 
recognised we could walk away…” 
“So we were concerned that from under our nose, assets that we thought 
were effectively ours would disappear.” 
This is further evidence of the opportunism present in decision-making around 
acquisitions. It was only after a few months, when the CEO of FUT proposed a 
“further, yet larger bid”, that concerns were raised by fellow directors. This 
proposal acted in a compound fashion with the higher debts to create uncertainty 
among the CEO‟s fellow directors. FUT‟s director revealed: 
“The assets of [Target] which we cherry-picked, whichever way you look at 
it, they either underperformed or, and/or, we paid too much for them. So, 
sticking all of that together, so our £22mn [profit] was dropping and the 
£5mn (profit) from [target‟s] assets wasn‟t there and dropping, and we paid 
too much, so suddenly the debt-to-profit figure didn‟t look good.” 
FUT‟s director commented that there was a concern,  
“…senior management would become over-extended and the chief executive 
had his credibility eroded.”  
The proposal of this later acquisition, compounded by the higher debt levels, 
created strategic uncertainty. This instigated the disciplinary process in FUT 
whereby the CEO was replaced and significant asset disposals conducted. Board 
members combined different strands of information to make judgements about the 
effectiveness of the CEO‟s strategy. This is similar process to the one modelled by 
Hirschleifer and Thakor (1994, 1998) for target firms in abandoned acquisitions. In 
this case, it is observed in a bidding firm, supporting the concept of a disciplinary 
process.  
The strategic uncertainty is similar to WHI‟s causal pathology. However, in WHI‟s 
case the revelation of information happened during the public phase of the 
acquisition process and the strategic uncertainty relating to the bid was raised by 
external scrutiny – outside shareholders, market analysts and press reports. The 
striking aspect of FUT‟s process is that the later acquisition proposal was not made 
public. It was stopped before any public process developed. The proposal by the 
CEO, coupled with the higher debt burden associated with the previously 
restructured deal, prompted an internal disciplinary process. This suggests that 
solely examining the public bidding process may only provide a partial picture of 
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evidence of discipline.  Discipline may be imposed at any point of the bidding 
process, from the initial proposal, during the private phase, through the public 
phase by internal and / or external governance mechanisms. There is no evidence 
from these cases to indicate at what point governance may be imposed. But, the 
evidence suggests it may be related to internal or external monitors‟ uncertainty 
about the rationale for the bid. It may depend on qualitative aspects of monitoring 
within these companies enabling the identification of acquisition proposals which 
may not be in shareholders‟ interests and need to be abandoned. This was 
supported by a corporate lawyer interviewed: 
“If a bid is in the offing, bidder shareholders get onto management. Ask 
them what they are up to? What are they doing?”     
(Interview with lawyer) 
This scrutiny, either internal or external, is conducted in the context of information 
revealed by other characteristics or factors. Together, these lead to doubts about 
an acquisition‟s strategic rationale, cause abandonment and instigate a subsequent 
disciplinary process. This reveals aspects of the causal mechanisms by which 
abandoned acquisitions played a governance role in these cases. Based on the 
common patterns of these cases a disciplinary meta-causal network involving key 
factors in these cases can be proposed. This is discussed in section 5.1.  
 
4.2 Valuation Uncertainty in the Bidding Process 
 
The remaining cases exhibited a replicated pattern, involving contingent factors in 
the bidding process, based around the offer price. A low offer price with insufficient 
acceptances, ultimately led to voluntary abandonment. But a number of different 
configurations of factors contributed to different causal networks around valuation 
in specific cases. A prominent aspect of these causal mechanisms was that, unlike 
strategic uncertainty, events in the bidding processes had little impact 
subsequently. Hence, the causal networks of these cases revealed a localised 
pathology for abandonment. The causal processes stopped at abandonment. The 
experience of these bidders after abandonment were not determined by the 
abandoned bidding processes, but by other factors. Actually, the causal networks of 
these abandoned acquisitions appear like branches of the bidders‟ main strategic 
paths.  
The localised causal paths derived from the opportunistic nature of the bids 
highlighted in section 3 above. Valuation arises in all of these cases as the critical 
contingent factor in abandonment. In a contextual interview a corporate lawyer 
highlighted the difficulties which arise in determining the price of a publicly quoted 
company. 
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“Target shares are just like antiques. £100 today, £110 tomorrow, £150 the 
day after that. The bidding price is not an exact science. Advisors suggest 
traditionally to offer a premium of 30%, but a premium to what. Average 
(price) over previous year. Yesterday‟s? The calculation of what price can be 
offered is just a mirage. It is crude!” 
“The absolute value of a company does not drive bidding. At best, you are 
guessing what it (a company) is worth. What bidders are really doing is 
seeking a recommendation at a particular price, irrespective of what it‟s 
worth.”  
This creates pricing uncertainty. Consequently, bidders have a rough rule of thumb 
in determining the price to bid in order to generate a positive rate of return. But, 
the price offered must generate an opportunity to produce a positive rate of return 
(Weston et al, 2004). However, the cases experiencing this particular pathway 
demonstrated that, while the initial price offered by bidders may achieve a positive 
rate of return, contingent events in the bidding process eroded the opportunity. The 
firms didn‟t offer a high enough price, demonstrated by the contingent factors 
which arose in the bidding process.  
The evidence also suggests the use of equity was opportunistic too. The majority of 
cases which exhibited this causal path decided to use either wholly or partly equity-
financing. As the discussion in section 3 above suggests, the firms were attempting 
to use their “share power” in order to acquire assets relatively cheaply (Shliefer and 
Vishny, 2003). Hence, the combination of price and equity exhibited a relational 
causal process to create „valuation uncertainty‟. However, in the cases which 
experienced this causal path, the valuation uncertainty was exacerbated by one, or 
more additional contingent characteristics. In several cases, the relative low offer 
price and equity financing exposed the bid to managerial resistance, which focused 
on these issues as the crux of their defence. This is evidenced by the following 
statements by some of the target managers in response to bids: 
“The bidder is making an opportunistic attempt to secure control of the 
company without paying an appropriate premium.” 
(RNS announcement by PTH‟s target) 
 “The bid does not represent a „fair value‟  
(RNS announcement by REG‟s target). 
[Using equity means], “…given the relative size of the companies, the 
upshot of a takeover would be to give the target‟s shareholders replacement 
shares in their own company.”  
(RNS announcement by MEL‟s target) 
In the cases with managerial resistance, a higher rival cash bid emerged as the 
target management sought to increase the price their shareholders received. These 
events suggest that target managers were driven by shareholders‟ interests and not 
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their own entrenchment. As the UK regulator commented, even if there is 
managerial resistance: 
“If the target is happy, it may allow the bid to run on. It may attract a 
higher price.” 
Therefore, even if an initial bid was recommended, the target management tended 
to leave their options open, allowing the possibility for a rival bid. For instance, in 
TRG‟s case, once the possibility of a rival bid emerged, the target management 
stated, “…any proposal would be judged on its merits.” In several cases (TRG, PTH 
and CAT), once a higher rival bid emerged, the target management were content to 
switch their recommendation in the pursuit of higher value for shareholders. These 
rival cash bids were more attractive to target shareholders, consistent with 
previous research that higher cash bids are more likely to be successful 
(Sudarsanam, 1995). Target shareholders prefer the certainty of cash, evidenced 
by the more positive share price reactions to cash bids compared to equity or 
cash/equity bids (Savor & Lu, 2009). As one corporate lawyer observed: [Target] 
“Shareholders take any cash offer, within limits, no matter what the board 
says.” 
This helps to explain why some hostile bidders (REG and PTH) withdrew their bid 
rather than incur the costs of pursuing a hostile process. In the presence of rival 
cash management buyouts (MBOs) these firms felt it would be too costly to 
succeed. For instance REG‟s director commented: 
“…they were quite obviously planning a „take-private‟ 
transaction…[pause]…and this was being lined up at the same time as we 
were going through our process…Well, we went to see the top 5 or 6 
shareholders and we presented our case to them and they seemed 
reasonably comfortable with it, but nobody was prepared to give us 
irrevocable undertakings, which is what you want to get. All the 
shareholders wanted was a maximum „cash-out‟, which is ultimately what 
they got.”  
(Interview with REG‟s director) 
In CAT‟s case, several unrelated causal events had a detrimental effect on the value 
of the bid because of the decision to use equity-financing. One factor was a 
portfolio decision by a US financial institution to start selling the company‟s shares. 
The second was a negative commercial announcement. Again, the use of equity 
compounded the impact of these contingent events on the value of the bid. An 
opportunistic cash bid by a rival firm completed the causal configuration, which 
interacted with the opportunistic nature of CAT‟s bid to produce voluntary 
abandonment. CAT‟s director commented:  
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“The amount of cash that we would have had to put in to make it stand-up 
against the rival offer would have undermined the arguments for the bid. 
The deal wouldn‟t have made sense.” 
(Interview with CAT‟S director) 
When a higher rival bid emerged, removing the opportunity, CAT abandoned its bid. 
Therefore, in these cases, contingent factors arose which eroded the opportunity. 
Consequently, the bidders either withdrew their bid or allowed it to lapse and 
“walked away.” They did not raise their offer price. These contingent events were 
compounded by the opportunistic nature of a bid, leading to abandonment. Either 
firms withdrew their bid before making a rule 2.5 announcement or allowed it to 
lapse after making a rule 2.5 announcement. The firms moved on. Several 
quotations illustrate the decision-making process: 
“…it was not in shareholders‟ interests to raise its offer”. (MIC) 
Company wanted, “…the right deal at the right price.” (TRG) 
their „…conditions had not been met and it would allow its offer to lapse.‟ 
(MEL) 
“We couldn‟t make it work at that price. It wouldn‟t have been profitable at 
that price.” (REG) 
The voluntary abandonments do not suggest that managers were intent on 
pursuing bids at whatever cost, but hoping to make opportunistic returns on 
acquisition investments. Abandonment avoids the „winner‟s curse‟. In the cases of 
MIC and MEL, the managers held significant blocks of shares in the firms, 
supporting Anderson et al.(2004), who suggest that such managers are unlikely to 
suffer from hubris. 
These bids had a clear rationale, consistent with the bidders‟ strategies. Indeed, 
events after abandonment can be traced back to the companies‟ strategies before 
abandonment, but not transaction characteristics or contingent factors in the 
bidding process. As a result, this causal pathology is very different from that 
revealed for WHI and FUT. Indeed, REG‟s director suggested a sense of relief at 
abandonment: 
“…running a takeover can have a big impact. From the point of view of 
abandonment, there can be positive impact. Okay, that didn‟t happen. Let‟s 
lick our wounds and get back to what we know best.” 
 
For instance, in CAT‟s case, when the bid failed, the evidence suggests funding 
constraints were the major causal factor in future strategies. This eventually caused 
the company to be bought by another firm, “…at the right price.” Hence, the nature 
of the subsequent acquisition does not appear disciplinary, but part of strategic 
interaction among firms in the industry to take CAT‟s R&D forward to the 
marketplace. The director of CAT commented: 
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“I wouldn‟t over-emphasise the impact of abandonment. Strategy meanders! 
An event happens and leads to a particular strategy. Something else 
happens and this takes the company off in another direction.” 
Indeed, this description is consistent with the other companies which did not 
experience outcomes after abandonment consistent with discipline. This includes 
TRG, MIC and MEL. Indeed, MEL directors stated: 
“…the failure of one such bid therefore had no impact on the company or 
lasting effects…”   
All three firms pursued significant acquisitions after abandonment. Indeed, despite 
having very similar antecedent characteristics to WHI, TRG experienced very 
different outcomes after abandonment. This was largely down to the different 
nature of the contingent factors in abandoned bidding process. This will be 
discussed further in section 5. 
Meanwhile, the rationale for REG‟s bid was to achieve consolidation in their sector 
and this characterised their actions after abandonment. This involved making bids, 
but also receiving bids, as the REG‟s director revealed: 
“We had a subsequent bid in 2006 which we got pretty close to selling. The 
bid was allegedly at 1.23 (per share), which we would have been delighted 
with…”  
The failure to achieve the necessary consolidation, by acquiring another firm or 
being acquired, meant that REG was forced eventually to go into administration.  
Based on the common patterns of these cases a meta-causal network, involving the 
interaction of these different causal characteristics and factors interacting, can be 
proposed. This is discussed in section 5.2.  
 
5. Causal Pathologies 
 
The interrogation of the cases revealed interesting results. Individual cases had 
distinctive qualities and this demonstrates the messiness of economic life, which 
validates the approach to the analysis of abandoned acquisitions adopted in this 
work. The causal process tracing has enabled the research to identify two distinct 
„groups‟ of cases.  
One group had causal networks involving a combination of characteristics and 
contingent factors, suggesting abandoned acquisitions played a governance role, 
leading to disciplinary changes subsequently. However, these causal networks 
suggest different combinations of characteristics and contingent factors to the 
typological disciplinary network. This suggests the underlying disciplinary causal 
mechanism did not work in the way proposed. As a result of analysis, this research 
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can propose a tentative network of characteristics and contingent factors which 
appeared to produce disciplinary outcomes. This configuration is discussed in 
section 5.1 below.  
The second group had causal networks demonstrating combinations of 
characteristics and contingent events whereby abandoned acquisitions did not 
perform a disciplinary governance role. A configuration of characteristics and 
contingent factors demonstrating this underlying causal mechanism is discussed in 
section 5.2 below. Some of the cases across both groups shared similar 
characteristics, but, they had specific critical contingent factors, which were crucial 
elements in distinguishing the different natures of the causal mechanisms of these  
abandoned acquisitions.   
 
5.1 Strategic Uncertainty 
 
The first configuration suggests a causal pathology in which abandoned acquisitions 
play a governance role. This is evident from the revealed configurations for cases 
WHI and FUT. This is termed „strategic uncertainty‟. The cases exhibited consistent 
antecedent characteristics. A nested causal path was revealed from higher profits, 
to higher free cash to the pursuit of growth, resulting in the abandoned bid. These 
characteristics are consistent with the disciplinary causal network. Hence, they 
were necessary antecedent characteristics for a disciplinary process. However, the 
analysis suggests these characteristics were not sufficient in these cases. Many of 
the cases, particularly TRG, which did not experience disciplinary outcomes after 
abandonments, demonstrated these antecedent characteristics – evidence of multi-
finality. Acquisitions were a way to achieve higher growth, particularly in WHI and 
TRG‟s cases, where the maturity of their existing assets offered limited growth 
opportunities. These antecedent characteristics did not reveal evidence of a poorly 
conceived acquisition, requiring termination and a strategic reconsideration. Hence, 
in the proposed pathology, these antecedent characteristics are configured with 
particular transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process. 
It is this configuration which suggests the abandoned acquisition plays a 
disciplinary governance role.  
There is nothing distinctive in the monitoring and incentives provided in WHI and 
FUT compared to the firms who experienced very different causal pathologies in 
their abandoned acquisitions. Hence, the presence of significant ownership blocks, 
independent boards and significant managerial incentives did not signal which firms 
provide the scope for managers to pursue acquisitions furthering their own 
interests. Hence, these characteristics have been excluded as important elements 
in this causal pathology. However, qualitative aspects of monitoring by the board 
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and active shareholders are important. Therefore, such monitoring is included as a 
causal characteristic in the proposed network. 
The two cases which indicated this pathology had certain transaction characteristics 
which revealed information about the uncertain merits of the bids in the context of 
the companies‟ strategies. In WHI‟s case, the uncertainty arose because of the non-
standard conditions proposing the sale of the firm‟s traditional brewing assets. The 
proposed sale of these core assets led to significant uncertainty both inside and 
outside the firm about its strategic direction. In FUT‟s case, it was the identity of a 
proposed target which created concerns within the board of directors about its 
growth strategy. Therefore, in both cases, internal and/or external monitors 
combined their own information about the firms‟ strategies, characteristics and 
industry context, with that provided by the transaction characteristics of the bids 
(sale of brewing assets / larger target). They used this to judge that the proposed 
acquisition was not worthwhile. This is consistent with Hirschleifer and Thakor‟s 
model (1994, 1998). In addition, in WHI‟s case specifically, the use of equity 
financing compounded the strategic uncertainty, transmitting it to the value of the 
bid.1 
As a result of the strategic uncertainty highlighted by internal or external 
monitoring, the acquisitions were abandoned, followed by sequences of discipline, 
ending in different strategies being adopted by both firms (strategic reorientation 
for WHI / organic growth for FUT). The sequences of change for both firms after 
abandonment ended with significant asset disposals.   
 
 
5.11 Strategic Uncertainty – Causal Network Narrative 
 
These cases suggest a refined causal network for the disciplinary pathology 
developed as part of this research. This is illustrated in figure 7.2. The key for the 
figures is shown at the end of section 5. A nested causal path runs from higher 
profits (1) to higher free cash flow (2) to the pursuit of higher growth (3). This 
produces more acquisitions (4). However, information revealed by certain 
transaction characteristics (5) about the role of the bid in the strategies of the 
firms, is combined with information about the strategies of the firms by internal / 
external monitors (6). This raises strategic uncertainty regarding the bids (7). 
Greater equity financing compounds the uncertainty by transmitting it to the value 
of the bid (8). The acquisition is abandoned (9), producing a disciplinary sequence 
afterwards (10), ending in significant net disposals (11).    
                                           
1 The compound causal influence of equity financing is not restricted to this 
proposed pathology. It also has an important role to play in the second pathology 
of abandoned acquisitions discussed in section 5.2 below.   
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Figure 7.2: A Causal Pathology for an Abandoned Acquisition: Strategic Uncertainty 
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5.2 Valuation Uncertainty 
 
In contrast to the first pathology, the second one suggests a causal network where 
abandonment does not play a governance role. This pathology was evident in the 
causal networks for cases CAT, TRG, MIC, MEL, REG and PTH. These firms exhibited 
different configurations of antecedent characteristics. Some were very young, some 
mature. Some had substantial profits with high free cash producing a growth 
strategy through acquisitions. Others were not profitable, suffering liquidity 
problems resulting in very different strategies. Therefore, the cases demonstrating 
this causal pathology illustrated equi-finality in their causal mechanisms. Different 
combinations of antecedent characteristics produced the same outcome.   
Despite the very different configurations of antecedent characteristics, the causal 
networks of these cases displayed great similarities in their configurations of 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors. These similarities surrounded 
concerns about the price offered. The price offered was not high enough to 
complete the acquisition. The critical contingent characteristic of these abandoned 
acquisitions was the decision about the initial price offered. The price offered is 
based on opportunism. Firms took advantage of an opportunity that presented 
itself.  
Uncertainty about the value of the bid was compounded by the choice of equity 
financing. The decision to use equity financing was based on opportunism. Firms 
were using their “share power” (overvalued equity) to acquire assets at an effective 
discount (Shliefer and Vishny, 2003). In some cases, the price and means of 
payment led to managerial resistance, which produced higher rival cash bids. 
However, a higher rival cash bid did not require managerial resistance as an 
interceding variable. Cases without managerial resistance also had higher rival cash 
bids as compounding factors in their causal networks. This shows that target 
shareholders prefer the certainty of cash to the uncertainty of equity. In CAT‟s 
network, the decision to use equity financing compounded the impact of negative 
commercial information on the value of its offer. Consequently, this causal 
pathology is called „valuation uncertainty‟. 
In all of the cases, the causal network ended with voluntary abandonment related 
to price. Once a higher rival cash bid emerged, the opportunity disappeared and the 
firm‟s abandoned their bids, searching for alternative opportunities to exploit. The 
firms did not want to pay too high a price, avoiding the winner‟s curse (Roll, 1986). 
There is no suggestion that the bidders got the price wrong. However, the difficulty 
of pricing listed target firms accurately was discussed in section 4.2 above. In these 
cases, the firms got the price wrong, trying to shade it to increase the returns. The 
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danger with such a decision is that it increases the likelihood that a bid will not be 
accepted (Weston el al, 2004).   
In these causal mechanisms, the abandoned acquisitions had no significant impact 
on the bidding firms. Indeed, after abandonment, the distinctive characteristic 
which determined their activities after abandonment was their strategies before the 
abandoned bids. Indeed, CAT, which was subsequently acquired after abandonment 
– an expected disciplinary outcome – exhibited a causal mechanism consistent with 
„valuation uncertainty‟, not „strategic uncertainty‟. In CAT‟s case, despite 
subsequent events, there is no evidence suggesting, being acquired, was discipline 
arising out of the abandoned bidding process.   
 
5.21 Valuation Uncertainty – Causal Network Narrative 
 
An alternative causal network can be derived illustrating this proposed pathology. 
In cases consistent with this network, abandoned acquisitions do not play a 
governance role. This is shown in figure 7.3. A nested causal path runs from either 
higher profits (1), to higher free cash (2) to a growth strategy (3) through 
acquisitions (8). On the other hand, lower profits (4) producing lower free cash (5) 
and alternative consolidation strategies (6) through acquisitions (7).  Lower profits 
(4) and lower free cash (5) also produce a strategy of interaction with related firms 
(7). Greater opportunism (9) leads to a lower valuation (12) and also greater equity 
financing (10), compounding the lower valuation (12).  Higher rival cash bids (11) 
exacerbate the valuation uncertainty (12), removing the opportunity for the bidder 
and leading to voluntary abandonment (13). Managerial resistance and negative 
commercial information can be part of the causal mechanism, accentuating the 
valuation uncertainty. However, the pathology of abandonment is localised. The 
events after abandonment are not traced to the causal process of abandonment. 
Instead, in such cases, the actions after abandonment (14) are determined by the 
strategies before abandonment. If the strategy was one of growth (3), then the 
actions after abandonment are consistent with that – evident in cases MEL, MIC, 
TRG, PTH. If the strategy was one of consolidation, then the actions after 
abandonment are consistent with that – evident in case REG (6). If the strategy 
involved a variety of interactions with other related firms (7), then the actions after 
abandonment are consistent with that – evident in case CAT.  
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Figure 7.3: A Causal Pathology for an Abandoned Acquisition: Valuation Uncertainty  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The research has analysed abandoned acquisitions in a novel way using causal 
process tracing. The findings suggest that, in certain circumstances, an abandoned 
bidding process may play an important governance role. In other circumstances, 
abandoned acquisitions do not play a governance role. This research contributes to 
knowledge by proposing two distinct types of meta-causal mechanisms derived 
from the analysis of the cases of abandoned acquisitions investigated. These are 
proposals showing how, and in what circumstances, different causal mechanisms 
produce different outcomes, disciplinary or otherwise. One disciplinary meta-causal 
network demonstrates a tentative causal network which is a refined version of the 
typological disciplinary network. In this network, the abandoned acquisitions play a 
governance role. Certain characteristics and factors interact in a causal mechanism 
producing „strategic uncertainty‟ surrounding the bid. In these cases, this prompted 
abandonment and disciplinary changes after abandonment - notably, net disposals. 
In addition, this research proposes an alternative type of meta-causal network. This 
is represented by a different set of causal configurations revealing „valuation 
uncertainty‟ in a bid. Such abandoned acquisitions have a limited pathology, based 
on the opportunistic nature of bidding, and so, have no significant impact on 
bidders after abandonment. The chapter has highlighted key factors identified in 
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the cases investigated, illustrating these different causal mechanisms. It is 
accepted that, given the small number of cases investigated, these findings are 
intentionally provisional. More work needs to be done to refine further the causal 
mechanisms present in abandoned acquisitions. This can help delineate further, the 
nature of the causal mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions, learning more about 
the ways they perform a governance role.        
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
 
1. Overview 
 
This thesis has been structured around an empirical investigation of the experience 
of bidding firms in abandoned acquisitions.  
Theoretical Contribution: Existing research suggests that, in certain 
circumstances, abandoned acquisitions may have a governance role. However, 
there has been little work analysing how, and in what circumstances, abandonment 
performs this role, especially concerning bidding firms. This research has addressed 
this complex issue, by developing a multi-dimensional conceptual framework to 
analyse the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. This is absent from 
much previous work. 
Research Methods: This research has used Causal Process Tracing (CPT) method, 
not previously employed in this literature. This method enabled the analysis of 
detailed qualitative information, in the context of the conceptual framework, in a 
way alternative, wholly statistically-based approaches cannot. This has enabled the 
research to complement these studies, refining existing theoretical explanations 
surrounding the governance role of abandoned acquisitions. 
Empirical Findings: The empirical investigation has produced some exciting 
findings, enabling the proposal of two causal pathologies; how, and in what 
circumstances, abandoned acquisitions exhibit a particular pathology. These 
propose configurations of variables which deepens  existing explanations about the 
governance role of abandoned acquisitions. Two pathologies can be proposed. A 
disciplinary pathology can be traced to causal mechanisms characterised by 
strategic uncertainty, raised by information revealed during the bidding process. An 
alternative pathology termed „Valuation Uncertainty‟ can be traced to causal 
mechanisms surrounding price.  
Policy Implications: The conceptual and empirical innovations which have been 
utilised enabled the analysis of the complex interactions of characteristics and 
factors, which are important for the path of acquisitions. Existing theories do not 
explain these interactions adequately. The refined understanding that this research 
design offers can contribute to enhancing mechanisms of corporate governance.  
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This chapter discusses each of these aspects. Section 2 will provide a summary of 
the research findings. Sections 3 and 4 will explain the significant contributions of 
the research to both academic debate and the practice of mergers and acquisitions 
respectively. Section 5 will discuss the limitations of the research, together with 
aspects of the acquisition process and abandonment which require further 
examination. Final reflections on the research are presented in section 6.        
 
2. Research Objectives and Findings 
 
This thesis has sought to make a contribution to the field of corporate governance 
and acquisitions. It has aimed to extend the theoretical understanding of the 
governance role of abandoned acquisitions in disciplining self-interested managers 
of bidders. Research objectives were derived from this aim: 
I. To identify the impact that abandoned bids can have on bidding companies. 
II. To investigate the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. 
III. To ascertain, how, and in what circumstances abandoned acquisitions have a 
disciplinary effect. 
IV. To ascertain how, and in what circumstances abandoned acquisitions do not 
have a disciplinary effect. 
In order to address the research objectives, there was a need to investigate how 
different characteristics and variables interact, producing different causal 
mechanisms of abandonment and providing guidance on the subsequent 
experiences of bidders.  
In order to meet the aim and objectives, the research was divided into two sets of 
research questions. The first set addressed objective one, by asking whether 
changes in certain aspects of activity after abandonment were, or were not, 
consistent with discipline. The novel aspect of this analysis was that the 
conceptualisation of the experiences of bidders after abandonment was broadened 
and deepened by developing a number of sequences of changes in bidders after 
abandonment. By characterising the period after abandonment in this way, the 
research traced the experience of bidders after abandonment in a novel manner. 
This traced in a detailed way, the nature of the different processes – disciplinary or 
non-disciplinary - which happened after abandonment.  
This analysis has produced a number of interesting findings, showing the 
idiosyncrasies associated with the impact of abandonment. There was little 
consistency in the sequences of changes in bidders after abandonment. Despite 
this, patterns can be discerned. There were great similarities between variables 
across a number of cases with disciplinary outcomes and cases with non-
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disciplinary outcomes, particularly asset acquisitions and asset disposals. Arising 
after abandoned acquisitions, asset disposals as a disciplinary outcome, were 
always the outcome of a number of sequences consistent with discipline, involving 
primarily changes in strategy and management changes. Alternatively, significant 
asset acquisitions were experienced in a number of cases. In some cases, 
significant asset acquisitions occurred after similar sequences which produced asset 
disposals. Both scenarios could be interpreted as disciplinary, producing different 
outcomes. However, in other cases, asset acquisitions occurred without any 
associated changes, weakening the disciplinary interpretation of this outcome.   
As a result of this interpretation, these results suggest that certain variables, 
normally categorised as disciplinary by the existing literature, were not always part 
of a disciplinary process. Firstly, the acquisition of ownership blocks was present in 
many cases, triggering different sequences. Some of the sequences produced 
disciplinary outcomes. However, some did not. Secondly, the replacement of a CEO 
may not be a disciplinary outcome. Indeed, in many cases it was an interceding 
variable, not an outcome. The evidence suggests such replacement was part of a 
number of different sequences after abandonment. It could be proposed that, if 
such replacement is disciplinary, it needs to be followed by changes in strategy and 
significant net disposals involving the unravelling of the previous CEO‟s actions. On 
the other hand, if the replacement of the CEO is not disciplinary, no further changes 
occur or it is followed by substantial acquisitions afterwards. Another interpretation 
is that the acquisitions (by a new CEO) could be part of a change of vision, and part 
of a disciplinary process. More analysis needs to be conducted on these sequences 
after abandonment, to learn more about the situations in which the replacement of 
the CEO is disciplinary.    
The second set of research questions built on the first set. These addressed 
objectives two, three and four. This focused on an investigation into the causal 
mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions, analysing the ways in which firm 
characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent events interact to 
produce abandonment and changes afterwards. A typological theory was proposed, 
containing a certain configuration of characteristics and contingent factors within 
abandoned acquisitions interacting to cause abandonment, triggering disciplinary 
changes in the bidding company after abandonment (see chapter three). A 
typological disciplinary causal mechanism would involve a „nested‟ causal chain 
from increased age to higher profits to substantial free cash. A related causal path 
will run from increased maturity of assets producing low growth opportunities. 
These „related‟ causal paths create the antecedent conditions for acquisitions 
fulfilling managerial preferences. In the proposed disciplinary pathology these 
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characteristics are „compounded‟ by weak corporate governance characteristics - 
weak monitoring and weak incentives within the firm – providing the opportunity 
for a transaction reflecting managerial preferences. A nested causal path runs from 
these antecedent characteristics to certain transaction characteristics (decreased 
industrial relatedness, cash financing, with higher premiums). The causal 
mechanism proposes that these characteristics reveal negative information during 
the bidding process about the intentions of the management which leads to 
voluntary abandonment. This produces a disciplinary process after abandonment. 
In addition, in cases without disciplinary outcomes, the anticipated causal processes 
will be different.  
Building on the analysis of the experiences of bidders after abandonment, a 
selection of „most-likely‟ (disciplinary) and „least-likely‟ (non-disciplinary) cases was 
made. Two most-likely cases exhibited causal mechanisms whereby the abandoned 
acquisitions played a governance role producing post-abandonment discipline. 
These cases have enabled the refining of the proposed typological causal 
mechanism. The bidding firms displayed consistent characteristics – high free cash, 
with low growth prospects – and sought an opportunity to grow by acquiring 
another firm. The identity of the target and its role in the strategy of the bidder 
were the crucial transaction characteristics in these mechanisms. However, while 
necessary, these were not sufficient conditions to cause abandonment. The 
disciplinary nature of the process is contingent on the interaction between these 
characteristics and others. The information is aggregated with information provided 
by other characteristics about the bidder (proposed sale of brewing, increased debt 
burden), producing strategic uncertainty about the merits of bids in the context of 
companies‟ strategies. This uncertainty leads to abandonment and a disciplinary 
response through a change in strategy and net disposals. However, the disciplinary 
impact is not for pursuing self-interest, but making poor strategic decisions. 
In most instances, the least-likely cases exhibited causal mechanisms which were 
consistent with their non-disciplinary process after abandonment. The causal 
mechanisms did not play a governance role. Indeed, in these cases, the abandoned 
acquisition produced no impact on strategy, asset restructuring or financial 
restructuring. Any changes after abandonment were determined by the 
characteristics and strategy of the bidder before abandonment. The pathology of 
abandonment was localised, relating to the inadequate price offered by the bidder – 
termed „valuation uncertainty‟. However, this, while necessary was not sufficient to 
cause abandonment in the cases examined. An inadequate price was configured 
with one or more additional factors to produce abandonment – equity financing, 
target managerial resistance, higher rival cash bidders and negative commercial 
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information. In all of the cases, the bidders were not prepared to raise their price, 
abandoning their bid. There is no evidence that causal mechanisms of 
abandonment influenced subsequent events. Hence, afterwards, they sought 
alternative opportunities. In most of the cases, they were able to pursue alternative 
opportunities. As one director concluded: 
“…I wouldn‟t over-emphasise the impact of abandonment. Strategy 
meanders! An event happens and leads to a particular strategy. Something 
else happens and this takes the company off in another direction.” 
(Interview with director of CAT)  
These cases illustrated another important aspect of the market for corporate 
control. Target shareholders and managers are motivated by gaining the highest 
possible price for their company. Target managers have a duty to achieve the 
highest possible price. If they and their shareholders think they can receive a 
higher price, particularly paid in cash, they will wait. If they receive a higher bid, 
target management are prepared to switch their recommendation. This happened in 
several of the cases, suggesting these target managers were acting in line with 
their duty to enhance shareholders‟ wealth. 
Another important finding related to classifying outcomes after abandonment. 
Consistent with theory, the subsequent acquisition of CAT was classified as a 
disciplinary outcome. However, the detailed fine-grained analysis of CPT suggests 
this was not a disciplinary outcome. There is little evidence of a link between the 
subsequent acquisition and the abandoned bid. Instead, CAT experienced a 
localised pathology involving valuation uncertainty. Indeed, CAT‟s managers 
supported the subsequent acquisition, suggesting it was a good outcome for 
shareholders. This suggests that researchers must be careful in categorising an 
outcome as disciplinary, and proposing an association between two events – in this 
case abandonment and subsequent acquisition. It is important to derive a clear 
causal connection between the two events. In this case, CPT has enabled an 
apparent association between abandonment and subsequent acquisition to be 
discounted, demonstrating the validity of the approach which has been taken in this 
thesis.  
 
3. Academic Contributions 
 
The thesis has sought to make a contribution in the field of corporate governance 
and abandoned acquisitions. Cumulatively, the thesis was structured to meet the 
aim and objectives of the research. Within several elements of the research, 
academic contributions have been made; conceptual innovations, pioneering 
application of research methods and exciting findings through the fieldwork. This 
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section details each of these contributions in the context of the wider research on 
this topic. 
This thesis was also an opportunity to complement existing research by analysing 
abandoned acquisitions using a different approach. With case study analysis, this 
research has been able to analyse the causal processes of abandoned acquisitions 
and their aftermath in a detailed manner, addressing different questions and 
producing important, novel findings, identifying causal pathologies of abandoned 
acquisitions. This deepens understanding of abandoned acquisitions and their 
aftermath.  
Much of the existing literature is fragmented. The existing theoretical and empirical 
literature has explored various aspects of the acquisition process and its impact on 
the firms involved, including the impact of acquisitions on the firms concerned 
using ex-ante share price studies and ex-post accounting studies, across a large 
sample of acquisitions. These studies have attempted to determine whether 
economic or managerial motives dominate the acquisition decision (Powell and 
Stark, 2001; Savor and Lu, 2009; Gregory, 2005; Bild et al., 2006). Similar 
approaches have been used to determine whether economic or managerial motives 
dominate the abandonment decision (Taffler and Holl, 1991; Limmack, 1994; 
Franks and Mayer, 1996; Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Savor and Lu, 2009). In these 
studies, a large number of firm characteristics, transaction characteristics and 
contingent factors in the bidding process have been used as control instruments. 
These have been used to distinguish the differing impacts of acquisitions across 
companies in an effort to test the different theories. These include the pre-bid 
performance of targets and bidders in hostile and friendly bids, to test the 
disciplinary hypothesis (O‟Sullivan and Wong, 1998; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003); the 
corporate governance characteristics of bidders and targets, to distinguish 
economic and managerial motives (Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; O‟Sullivan and Wong, 
1998; Huson et al., 2001, Bange and Mazzeo, 2004; Kini et al., 2004; Perry and 
Shivdasani, 2005; Chen et al., 2007), and transaction characteristics such as the 
means of payment (Schiefer and Vishny, 2003; Chang et al., 2009), industrial 
relatedness (Peltier, 2004) and bid premium (Franks and Mayer, 1996). Since 
managerial resistance is important to the probability of abandonment (Wong and 
O‟Sullivan, 2001), studies have investigated this extensively (Holl and Kyriazis, 
1996).  
However, there had been little attempt to link the causal process of abandonment 
and its aftermath, particularly analysing how, and in what circumstances, different 
configurations of variables cause abandonment and disciplinary changes after 
abandonment. Linking the two aspects and identifying different configurations of 
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variables is one of the contributions of this thesis to the academic debate 
surrounding abandoned acquisitions.  
This detailed analysis involved blending the existing disparate elements of the 
theoretical and empirical literature to „fine-tune‟ the nature of the causal 
mechanisms which subsequently produce differential impacts on bidders; bidder 
characteristics (Jensen, 1986; O‟Sullivan and Wong, 1998; Kini et al., 2004; 
Gregory, 2005; Wright et al, 2002; Perry and Shivdasani, 2005; Paul, 2007); 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors in the bidding process 
(Hirschleifer and Thakor, 1994, Holl and Kyriazis, 1996; Officer, 2003; Arnold and 
Parker, 2007; Branch et al., 2008; Kummer and Steger, 2008); changes in bidders 
after abandonment (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Denis & Serrano, 1996; Franks and 
Mayer, 1996; Boone, 2000; Lehn and Zhao, 2006).  
Drawing together these strands of the literature has required conceptual 
innovations in framing the analysis of abandoned acquisitions; both in measuring 
the impact of abandonment on bidders and characterising the causal mechanisms 
of abandoned acquisitions. The development of a novel, multi-dimensional 
conceptual framework, blending existing theories of acquisitions and corporate 
governance, has enabled the research to characterise the complex interactions 
between multiple characteristics and factors which arise in abandoned acquisitions. 
It was proposed that certain configurations of these groups of variables would 
signal a causal mechanism which has a disciplinary pathology, producing a 
disciplinary process after abandonment. This was distilled into the typological 
disciplinary pathology. Alternative configurations of these variables would signal a 
causal mechanism which has no disciplinary pathology, producing no evident 
disciplinary outcomes after abandonment.  
This thesis has shown that this new conceptualisation is a valid framework, useful 
as a structure for further research on abandoned acquisitions and the acquisition 
process. It complements large-n statistically-based frameworks in several ways.  
Firstly, statistical studies on this topic have revealed a range of possible variables 
which influence abandonment and its aftermath. This framework complements this 
work by enabling a fine-grained, multidimensional analysis of relationships between 
independent variables and outcomes. It facilitates the identification of detailed 
causal processes, contingencies accounted for and the complex interplay between 
the full range of possible factors investigated. This can be done most effectively in 
small-n comparative case studies. Such studies avoids concerns about data 
availability across a sample, and degrees of freedom limitations, present in 
statistical analysis involving small-n studies. Secondly, the interrelationships 
between variables which can only be identified through CPT can inform the design 
234 
 
and conduct of large-n statistical research. This can test the relationships in a wider 
sample, enabling statistical generalisations to be made. This iterative interaction of 
small-n qualitative research and large-n statistical research produces a richer, 
deeper and fuller understanding of abandoned acquisitions. Indeed, it is hoped that 
the findings of this thesis will be used in this way.          
Using this framework, the fieldwork part of the research has involved identifying 
and exploring most-likely cases, to investigate the proposed disciplinary pathology, 
refining theoretical conceptions of the governance role of abandoned acquisitions in 
the light of empirical evidence. Conversely, counterfactual least-likely cases were 
analysed to investigate alternative causal mechanisms (Richards, 2009). The 
analysis has produced some important findings, providing detailed insights into the 
underlying mechanisms in abandoned acquisitions - the conditions under which 
specified outcomes occur and the causal mechanisms through which they occur. 
These are contingent generalisations which deepens existing theoretical 
explanations regarding the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions (see 
section 2 of this chapter). These propose configurations of variables, showing how 
they interact in different types of causal mechanisms. 
Firstly, a causal mechanism through which abandoned acquisitions play a 
governance role is proposed. The findings are important to the study of acquisition 
activity because they provide a more fine-tuned explanation of how, and in what 
circumstances, abandoned acquisitions play a governance role. Information 
revelation is important in this causal mechanism in a way which supports 
Hirschleifer and Thakor‟s (1998) assertions regarding target firms. The disciplinary 
nature of this process is characterised by information aggregation provided by the 
configuration of bidder characteristics, the identity of the target and implications of 
the acquisition (sale of core assets or increased debt). This configuration creates 
strategic uncertainty. Managers are forced to abandon the bids because of the 
uncertainty created. The detailed analysis in this research reveals that the discipline 
imposed afterwards is not for pursuing self-interest, but pursuing poor strategic 
decisions.  
Secondly, a causal mechanism through which abandoned acquisitions do not play a 
governance role is proposed. This causal mechanism is consistent with previous 
evidence surrounding the influence of the bid premium on whether a bid is 
abandoned or not (Holl and Kyriazis, 2004). This research adds to previous work by 
demonstrating the complex nature of interactions between bidder characteristics, 
transaction characteristics and contingent factors which produces abandonment. 
Acquisitions are highly opportunistic. Any configurations of characteristics and 
factors which remove opportunities mean bidders are either unwilling, or unable, to 
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pay the necessary premium. An inadequate price was configured with one or more 
additional factors to produce abandonment – equity financing, target managerial 
resistance, higher rival cash bidders and negative commercial information. In all of 
the cases, the bidders were not prepared to raise their price, abandoning their bid. 
In addition, this thesis has added to knowledge about the experience of failed 
bidders by conceptualising the impact of abandonment differently. Much existing 
research focuses on analysing the impact of abandonment on the wealth of 
shareholders of bidding firms, either through changes in share prices or accounting 
measures of performance. As chapter two demonstrated, studies have shown 
conflicting results. Consistent with the multi-dimensional framework adopted, the 
conceptualisation of impact was broadened and deepened by developing a number 
of sequences of changes in bidders after abandonment. These sequences comprised 
a number of qualitative changes derived from the corporate governance literature; 
organisational changes (Pickering, 1983), management turnover (Huson et al., 
2001; Lehn and Zhao, 2006), asset restructuring (Thompson et al., 2000; Perry 
and Shivdasani, 2005) and financial restructuring (Stulz, 1990) and whether 
bidders become acquisition targets themselves (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). By 
characterising the period after abandonment in this way, the research has traced 
the experience of bidders after abandonment in a novel manner, identifying, in a 
more thorough way, the nature of the different processes – disciplinary or non-
disciplinary - which happened after abandonment.  
Furthermore, an empirical method not utilised before in the analysis of abandoned 
acquisitions, but, which complemented the conceptualisation of the bidding process, 
was employed. The detailed investigation enabled by causal process tracing (CPT) 
allowed the analysis of the complex mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions. This 
method, used extensively in history, politics and international relations, had not 
been utilised to analyse acquisitions. CPT has been crucial in capturing the 
subtleties and nuances involved in the causal mechanisms anticipated by the 
conceptual framework. CPT has enabled this research to analyse the complexity of 
the interaction of firm characteristics, transaction characteristics and contingent 
factors in the bidding process which produces different outcomes in bidders after 
abandonment. These insights would have been difficult to achieve with statistical 
analysis. Following this pioneering work, further research is needed, replicating the 
use of CPT in abandoned acquisitions, to develop and refine its application in this 
intriguing area of mergers and acquisitions. 
Also important to capturing the nuances of abandoned acquisitions have been the 
sources of evidence. The triangulation of documentary sources, particularly 
Regulatory News Service (RNS) statements, with data from interviews with the 
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directors of bidding firms, regulators and corporate lawyers, has been vital to 
drawing out the timing and significance of interactions between variables in the 
bidding process. This research has demonstrated the usefulness of such sources in 
the analysis of abandoned acquisitions.     
 
4. Contribution to Policy and Practice 
 
The refined understanding that this research design offers can contribute to 
enhancing mechanisms of corporate governance. Specifically, the research 
highlights several issues of interest to policy-makers and practitioners in 
acquisitions. The regulation of the acquisition process in the UK, through the 
Takeover Code, places great emphasis on information revelation. Accurate 
information plays an important role in UK stock markets for making appropriate 
investment decisions, providing finance to those who will use it most effectively. 
This research has shown that information revelation is important in a bidding 
process. However, in the cases investigated, it is a triangulation of information, 
revealed in particular situations, which is used by non-executive directors, 
shareholders and market analysts to make judgements about the benefits from an 
acquisition. The implications of these findings for policy are that more effort should 
be made to enhance the flow of information that is revealed in the bid process 
about bidding companies.  
Furthermore, the evidence raises questions about the centrality of shareholder 
dispersion and managerial incentives in providing effective corporate governance. 
Indeed, the research has revealed that the process of monitoring and intervention 
is more nuanced than the general metrics recommended by the Takeover Code and 
Combined Code imply. It is the qualitative aspects of monitoring provided by 
directors, shareholders and market analysts which were important in the two cases 
where abandonment played a governance role. This is consistent with the increased 
emphasis placed on shareholder „activism‟ in the Combined Code in the UK. Such 
active monitoring and engagement before, during and after acquisition should have 
a positive effect on acquisition decisions, producing enhanced shareholder value.  
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5. Suggestions for Further Research 
 
This research suggests that, in some cases, the limits placed on firms by the lack of 
organic growth available in their industry, produced the need for acquisitions. In 
one case, this produced contingent problems related to regulation which 
contributed to the uncertainty surrounding the bid. Industry characteristics can 
contribute to abandonment, but require changes in strategy afterwards because of 
the need to find different strategies to pursue growth (the case of WHI). Additional 
research could analyse further the interaction between industry characteristics and 
bidder characteristics in producing bids.          
The evidence raises questions about the centrality of shareholder dispersion and 
managerial incentives in providing effective corporate governance. These measures 
were not significantly different for the two sets of cases – „most-likely‟ disciplinary 
case and „least-likely‟ non-disciplinary cases. Boards or shareholders intervened in 
bids to force abandonment. Indeed, the research revealed that the process of 
monitoring and intervention was more nuanced than anticipated. It is the 
qualitative aspects of monitoring which were important in the two cases where 
abandonment played a governance role. The evidence suggests that information 
revealed by a bid – through target or non-standard conditions - was weighed by 
monitors with other information about bidders, in judging the benefits to be derived 
from a particular transaction. This is consistent with Hirschleifer and Thakor (1998). 
This area requires further work. More needs to be understood about the specific 
circumstances in which boards / shareholders intervene to force abandonment. In 
addition, the nature of their intervention needs to be investigated. By doing this, 
the role of boards and shareholders in disciplining managers, both during and after 
the acquisition process, can be more clearly understood.   
In none of the cases was abandonment viewed negatively. In the cases 
experiencing valuation uncertainty, the market for corporate control enabled 
resources to be allocated to the highest bidder – those who claimed to be able to 
use the target‟s resources most efficiently. But, the failed bidders in these cases – 
those not able or willing to pay a higher price – did not view abandonment 
negatively. They „walked away‟ from the acquisition, pursuing alternative 
opportunities. Some, like MEL‟s management were indifferent about failure. Others, 
like REG‟s management said they were relieved, though this could be ex-post 
rationalisation. In the cases experiencing strategic uncertainty, the abandoned 
acquisitions played a governance role. The investments were effectively scrutinised 
by monitors, either board or external monitors. Abandonment in these cases had a 
positive impact, preventing an uncertain acquisition being completed, but also 
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initiating a disciplinary sequence producing improvements in the use of resources 
by the firms.  
Further work on the impact of abandonment on bidding firms could produce greater 
clarification in classifying sequences of changes in bidders after abandonment. This 
thesis has classified sequences as disciplinary and non-disciplinary, determined by 
the final outcomes. Further work could investigate why similar sequences of 
changes after abandonment produce very different outcomes. This could further 
deepen our knowledge of the nature of discipline imposed after abandoned 
acquisitions.   
 
6. Final Reflections 
 
Acquisition activity remains an important aspect of corporate activity in developed 
economies, particularly those with active markets for corporate control like the UK. 
Acquisitions receive a lot of attention in both academic studies and the media. 
However, despite the vast literature on acquisitions, there are many aspects which 
are understood only partially. Abandoned acquisitions represent a significant aspect 
of acquisition activity which has been under-researched. This thesis has proposed 
the refinement of existing conceptions concerning the governance role of 
abandoned acquisitions. The methodological approach has revealed the complex 
nature of the interactions between the causal variables in different cases. It has 
shown, in a detailed manner, the mechanisms through which abandoned 
acquisitions play a governance role in disciplining managers to pursue actions in the 
interest of shareholders. These valid methods need to be replicated in further work 
to assess the significance of the interactions of characteristics and contingent 
factors. Further research which enhances the understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms of the acquisition process will help the practice of managers and policy 
towards improved corporate governance which is reflected in enhanced shareholder 
wealth.       
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Appendix One: Email / Letter to Interviewees 
 
Dear XXXX, 
I am currently doing research into abandoned corporate takeovers in the UK. My PhD 
thesis is investigating the role of abandoned corporate takeovers in corporate 
governance. I rang your company telephone number today and was told that I could 
email you directly at this address.  
One of cases I am interested in is the bid by XXXX for XXXX in XXXX. As a director of 
XXXX at the time, you can provide a uniquely detailed and subtle perspective on 
abandoned takeovers and their aftermath that will greatly enhance my research findings 
and contribute to our understanding of the corporate governance role of takeovers 
generally.  
There are specific issues that I want to address in the interview including: 
· The activities of the company in the period before the abandoned bid. 
· The terms of the bid, particularly the use of equity as a means of payment.  
· The effect of target managerial resistance on the bidding process. 
· The effect of rival bids on the bidding process. 
· The causes of abandonment. 
· How abandonment affected management decisions subsequently, if at all.  
 
A project such as this inevitably raises significant issues about research ethics. My 
research will be conducted fully in accordance with the guidelines laid down by 
Nottingham Trent University, which require that I conduct interviews and manage the 
information gained very carefully. The guidelines are shown below.  
I am hoping I could do the interview in early / mid November if that is possible, and 
Mondays, Thursdays or Fridays are good for me. Though, of course I am grateful for any 
time you can spare so will be as flexible as possible.  
Thank you for your help. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Michael McCann 
Nottingham Business School 
Nottingham Trent University 
Burton Street 
Nottingham  
NG1 4BU 
Direct Telephone – 0115 848 2451 
Email: michael.mccann@ntu.ac.uk 
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Research Ethical Guidelines 
1.  The information above outlines the project but if you wish to know more about it, 
please ask. 
2.  Each interview will be tape-recorded and/or recorded by hand. All information 
obtained will be confidential, held securely and accessed only by myself. In the thesis 
and all subsequent outputs from the project, pseudonyms will be used to identify 
both companies and interviewees.  
2.  Unless you give express permission, I shall not identify you by name in any 
subsequent outputs from the project. These will, primarily, take the form of a 
doctoral thesis, and academic journal articles preceded by conference papers. 
4.  During the interview, if there is any question you do not wish to answer, you may do 
so without any reason needing to be given. If you wish to terminate the interview at 
any stage, again you can do so without needing to explain that decision. 
5.   It is an important part of my research project that I interview individuals involved in 
several abandoned takeovers. Adopting a key principle from the Radcliffe Guidelines, 
which govern interviews with the UK Civil Service, I shall not use information in such 
a way that relations between or within firms and individuals are damaged: the aim is 
thus to ensure the written outputs do not embarrass any individual or organisation, 
for example through seeking to determine individuals or organisations being „right or 
wrong‟ in any issue. 
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Appendix Two: Coding Templates for Causal Process 
Tracing 
 
 
a) Case WHI 
 
b) Case FUT 
 
c) Case CAT 
 
d) Case TRG 
 
e) Case MEL 
 
f) Case REG 
 
g) Case MIC 
 
h) Case PTH 
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a) Case WHI 
 
Table a1: Bidder Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
100 years old.  
(FAME Database) 
„mature‟ 
Mature company originating in the brewing sector. 
Diversified into other related sectors.  
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Proportion of NEDs 
on board greater 
than 50% 
64% of board were NEDs.  
(Company Annual Report) 
„strong‟ 
Suggests strong monitoring by the board. No 
corporate governance issues.  
Ownership 
Structure 
„concentrated‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
Widely dispersed shareholding. No 
institutional or non-institutional 
ownership blocks. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„dispersed‟, „weak‟ 
Suggests a weak incentive to monitor by outside 
shareholders. 
Managerial 
Incentives 
„weak‟ 
„strong‟ 
 
At time of abandoned bid, managerial 
shareholding was 0.69%.  
(Company Annual Report) 
„weak‟ 
According to Agency theory, suggests poor 
incentives for managers to pursue shareholders‟ 
interests. 
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Acquisitions of 10.85% of Net Assets in 
three years prior to abandoned bid.  
Investment expenditure equivalent to 
20% of Net Assets in three years prior to 
abandoned bid. 
„acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Substantial amount of cash was generated by 
brewing and pubs. However, data on free cash 
data implied all of it was committed. Used to 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Free cash flow is -5.45% of net assets. 
(Company Annual Report and authors 
calculations) 
finance acquisitions and investment in leisure and 
hospitality sector. Little used to finance investment 
in brewing. 
 
 
Table a2: Transaction Characteristics  
 
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Bid Rationale 
  
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟  
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial 
inefficiency‟ 
 
 “Strategic and financial benefits that will 
be derived from combining these brands 
will enhance shareholder value 
significantly.” 
Extend strategy of “UK hospitality-based, 
out-of-home leisure”.  
Firm could: “…grow its share of those 
segments of the expanding UK leisure 
market that are consistent with its core 
skills and experience.” 
(Bid Document) 
 
Bid document refers to „cost savings‟. 
(RNS Announcement, 25/5/1999) 
 
„Asset-seeking‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟ 
 
Seeking related assets. Target‟s pub estate. 
Looking to extend its pub estate.  
 
Use of an acquisition reflected the maturity of 
the market. Lack of organic growth 
opportunities meant the need for an acquisition 
to drive growth.  
 
Means of Payment 
and Price 
„cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
Predominantly an equity-financed bid. 
99% of financing from WHI‟s share.  
 
£2.3 bn valuation of the Target 
(Bid Document) 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
 
Bidder looking to use its share power to acquire 
assets.  
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
 
Merger or 
Acquisition 
„recommended‟ 
„unrecommended‟ 
 
A friendly bid. Favoured by board of 
target. 
(RNS announcements)  
„recommended‟ 
Conditions „acceptances‟ 
„Non-standard 
conditions‟ 
Standard 90% acceptances. Usual 
approval of both groups of shareholders. 
 
In addition, WHI stated in the bid 
document that it: 
 
 “…will separate its brewing interests 
following completion of the acquisitions.”     
 
(Bid Document)   
„Non-standard condition‟ 
 
The proposed acquisition would take it above 
the threshold established by the Beer Orders 
Act (1989). Hence, WHI, aware of the 
regulations, decided it would separate off its 
brewing interests. This was viewed as a radical 
step. Deal considered so important that the firm 
was forced to include this condition. It hoped 
the action would enable it to overcome the 
regulatory issues.  
 
Table a3: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process  
 
Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Valuation „fair value‟, 
„undervaluation‟, 
„opportunistic‟,  
„means of payment‟, 
„premium‟. 
 
Initially, no concerns were raised about the 
value of the offer. 
 
Share price fell by 4.7%, reducing the value of 
the bid. The value of bid questioned when 
share price declined, since the rival bid was 
worth more. WHI raised the value of its bid to 
£2.8bn.  
„fair value‟ 
Initially, no concerns were raised about the 
offer price, but once the uncertainty 
surrounding the sale of its brewing interests 
arose, the share price declined, causing 
valuation concerns.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
(RNS Statement, 2/7/1999) 
 
Target 
Management 
Reaction 
 
„friendly‟,  
„hostile‟,  
„shareholder value‟, 
„management 
entrenchment‟. 
 
 
A friendly bid. Target Board continually 
supported WHI‟s bid: 
The Target had rejected a rival bid, 
highlighting the uncertain aspects. In contrast, 
WHI‟s bid offered Target shareholders, “better 
value, speedier completion, greater certainty”. 
(RNS Statement, 23/6/1999) 
 
„friendly‟ 
„shareholder value‟ 
Information 
about Bidder 
„positive information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟ 
„financial‟, 
„management‟,  
„share price effect‟. 
 
Bidder made the suggestion that their brewing 
interests would be sold to overcome 
regulatory issues. 
It was viewed as “thinking the unthinkable”. 
(Press report, 25/9/1999)  
The deal was considered so important that the 
company was prepared to do it. 
 
Rival bidder and other pub-chains were 
concerned about the concentration in brewing 
that would result if brewing was sold to an 
existing supplier. There would only be three 
remaining brewers in the sector. They would 
have the power to restrict choice by dictating 
supply terms. Other pub chains wanted to stop 
WHI being able to dispose of brewing. The 
rival bidder stated (the bid): 
 
„negative information‟ 
„management‟ 
„share price effect‟ 
 
Viewed as well-managed and well-regarded. 
Incapable of pursuing acquisitions. 
 
Uncertainties surrounding the bidding process 
leads to share price decline. Institutional 
investors concerned that there was too many 
uncertainties and conditions attached to the 
purchase. 
 
WHIT shares less than two-thirds of their high-
point in 1999.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
“..raises significant regulatory issues.” 
(RNS Announcement, 23/6/1999) 
  
Poor liaison with the competition authorities.  
 
Poor management of the bid process.  
(Press Reports) 
Information 
about Target  
„positive information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟, 
„financial‟, 
„management‟, 
„share price effect‟. 
NONE  
Rival Bid „rival bid‟,  
„cash‟,  
„premium‟. 
 
Rival private equity bidder offering cash. 
 
Target had rejected the rival offer. Lots of 
uncertainty surrounding the rival bid.   
(RNS Statements) 
 
An aggressive bidder who conducted 
vociferous opposition to WHI‟s bid. Rival bid 
forced WHI to continually reiterate the 
benefits of its bid to shareholders.  
 
Bidder CEO commented: 
“In a nutshell our agreement is superior in 
„rival‟ 
„cash‟ 
 
A rival cash bidder.  
 
„aggressive‟ 
 
Aggressive rival able to use tactics to thwart 
WHI. 
 
A vociferous takeover contest. Use of regulatory 
news announcements to put case to 
shareholders and criticise the rival bid.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
every respect for Target shareholders.” 
(RNS Statement, 25/5/1999) 
 
A few weeks later, after another exchange of 
RNS statements, WHI emphasised the, 
“superior value, greater certainty and quicker 
completion”.  
(RNS Statement, 24/6/1999) 
Competition 
Issues 
„competition 
problems‟, „referral to 
competition 
commission‟. 
 
Competition problems were a concern from 
the start. Company tried to allay concerns by 
proposing to sell brewing business. This 
created opposition among pub-chains. 
Emphasised by rival bidder. (The bid): 
“…raises significant regulatory issues”.  
(RNS Statement, 23/6/1999) 
 
WHI countered that the rival bid raised similar 
regulatory issues. Success of rival bidder 
would, “…lead to a substantial increase in the 
market power of (Rival)”. 
WHI attempted to get a referral of the rival 
bid.   
(RNS Statement, 28/6/1999) 
 
Held talks with the OFT, but reports suggest 
they did not manage the relationship well. OFT 
suggested there were issues of concern, but 
„competition problems‟ 
„referral to competition authorities‟ 
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
bidder suggested otherwise. 
(WHI) has had discussions with the OFT and 
supplied all information which the OFT has 
requested.” 
(RNS Statement, 25/6/1999) 
 
Bid was eventually referred. 
“Concentration of off-licenses in some areas 
and brewing was anti-competitive.” 
(RNS Announcement, 15/7/1999)  
Nature of 
Abandonment 
„withdrawn‟, 
„lapse‟, 
„voluntary‟ 
involuntary‟. 
 
Bid was referred to competition authorities. 
 
Board‟ “…will not proceed with the transaction 
or therefore with the inquiry”. 
Worried about the impact on the rest of the 
business. “Commercial effects…of the long 
delay imposed by the Secretary of State‟s 
decision.” 
(RNS Statement, 15/7/1999) 
 
Further, WHI raised concerns about 
competition policy in this area: 
“…it (WHI) has serious concerns about the 
implications for competition policy which arise 
from this decision.” 
(RNS Announcement, 15/7/1999) 
„lapse‟ 
„voluntary‟ 
 
Bidder realised that the bid was dead. Not just 
referral to the competition authorities, but the 
strategies and restructuring needed to make bid 
work created too many uncertainties. 
 
Concerned about the direct and indirect costs of 
trying to engage with the OFT. 
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Table a4: Post- Abandonment 
 
Dimension Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Strategic 
Changes 
„strategic review‟ 
„new direction‟, 
„reorientation‟ 
 
“Strategic development is probably going to be 
away from brewing and pubs – they are caught 
in a bit of bind as to how to resolve the 
situation there in the long term … but the 
company does have quite important strategic 
issues to address”. 
(Press Report, 25/9/1999) 
 
“Good progress was made towards Whitbread‟s 
objective of becoming the UK‟s leading leisure 
company.” 
(Company Annual Report) 
„strategic review‟ 
„reorientation‟ 
 
A need for a new strategic direction.  
 
Move away from brewing – low growth to 
higher growth leisure sectors - hotels, 
restaurants.  
Management 
Changes 
„replacement‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
NONE 
 
 
Asset 
Restructuring 
„disposals‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
 
„acquisitions‟ 
„Growth‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
Acquisition of Hotel Group  
 
The disposal of the Brewing interests in May 
2000. 
 
Sale of the Pubs & Bars division in 2000.  
 
Net Disposals equivalent to 6.9% of Net Assets 
in three years after abandonment. Majority 
occurred within 18 months. 
„acquisitions‟ and „disposals‟ 
 
Consistent with a disciplinary process 
involving strategic re-orientation.  
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Dimension Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
   
WHI returned 75% of the net proceeds to 
shareholders. 
(Correspondence with Director, Company 
Annual Report) 
Subsequently 
Acquired 
„takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bids‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
None  
 
 
 
 
N/A 
Financial 
Restructuring 
„borrowing‟ 
„dividends‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
Returned 75% of net proceeds from sale of 
pubs and bars to shareholders. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
 
 
„dividends‟ 
„excess cash‟ 
 
Disposed of low growth sector. Realised 
value returned to shareholders. Consistent 
with disciplinary process involving 
returning excess cash to shareholders. 
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b) Case FUT 
 
Table b1: Bidder Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence and Sources  Revealed Codes and Comments 
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
21 years old. 
(FAME Database) 
„mature‟ 
No significant issues there. 
Mature company. Developing a new 
sector. 
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Proportion of NEDs 
on board greater 
than 50% 
66% of board are NEDs. Conforms to Combined code at 
the time. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„strong‟ 
Strong monitoring. 
No governance problems.  
Ownership 
Structure 
„concentrated‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„weak‟ 
„strong‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
One institution with 21.12% of share capital. 
Three other institutions with more that 5% of capital. 
Several others with over 3% of share capital. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„concentrated‟, „strong‟ 
Strong monitoring. In 2001, may 
have had an influence in replacing 
the board and „downsizing‟ the 
company.  
 
Managerial 
Incentives 
Significant 
proportion of 
shares owned by 
managers. 
1.61% of share capital. 
(Company Annual Report) 
Insignificant holdings by managers. 
According to agency theory, there 
were poor incentives for managers.  
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Published data suggest a substantial acquisition 
programme in pre-bid period. A growth in real assets of 
18.9%. 
Substantial average free cash of 11%. 
„acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Substantial amount of free cash, 
with debt being paid-off. A growth 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence and Sources  Revealed Codes and Comments 
(Company Annual Reports and author‟s calculations) 
 
The Director commented: “… from May 2003, the company 
engaged in a small number of bolt-on acquisitions, cash 
acquisitions. But, after all that, we still had a substantial 
amount of cash.” 
(Interview with Director) 
strategy developed to utilise free 
cash. 
 
Strategy  “In 2001, company was close to the edge of a cliff. 
Overstretched, with a small management team operating 
in more than a dozen countries with a ludicrous amount of 
debt. We fired half the board, half the staff. A new 
chairman came in and I came in as the new finance 
director in November 2001.” 
“There was a glorious period … where the company was 
debt-free, with a rising amount of net cash. So, the 
question throughout those three years; what the devil are 
we going to do with it?” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
Growth strategy initiated by chief executive and announced 
in Annual Report a year before the abandoned bid. 
Targeted a, “… doubling of the size of the company within 
five years”.  
(Company Annual Report, 2004) 
 
„growth‟ 
 
A rising amount of cash. 
Quotation - “What the devil are we 
going to do with it?” Echoes idea of a 
need for growth.  
 
Market forces bring pressure to drive 
higher growth. The underlying logic: 
“We must do something. This is 
something. Therefore we must do 
this.” 
 
 
  
Performance „profitable‟ 
„not profitable‟ 
„free cash‟ 
Substantial profits. 
 
“…we still had a substantial amount of cash.” 
„profitable‟ 
„free cash‟ 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence and Sources  Revealed Codes and Comments 
 (Interview with Director) 
 
Substantial free-cash 11.1% of net assets. 
(Company Annual Report and author‟s calculations) 
 
Table b2: Transaction Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Bid Rationale 
  
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟  
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial 
inefficiency‟ 
 
There was a dynamic business environment. A mature 
market, but opportunities for organic and acquisitive 
growth. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
“It was perfectly natural from a competitive point of view. 
We‟re always looking at our competitors, to see what they 
are doing. Are there assets to out-trade or lessons to learn 
from them? Or in this case, could we think about acquiring 
them. So, the general proposition was let‟s have a look at 
this smaller company, (the target) and see if it‟s in a 
strong or weak position. From the analysis of the publicly 
available information, I believe, if memory serves me 
correctly, it was having a tough time…” 
 
An acquisition between two of the three major firms in the 
UK market would enable significant synergies to be 
realised, generating increased scale and financial strength. 
 
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟ 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
In addition, “…a serious of announcements suggested it 
(the Target) was getting into serious trouble. In no 
particular order, there was a profits warning, debt was 
going up and not down, they replaced their chief executive 
and finance director. Things you would not expect to 
happen in a matter of weeks.”  
 
“So, given our general position, our cash position which 
was positive for three years, our profit position. We 
thought we should have a serious look at this company.”  
(Interview with Director) 
„opportunism‟ 
FUT seeking opportunities to grow. 
The Target is such an opportunity. It 
was in trouble, so there is an 
opportunity to acquire it at a 
favourable price. 
Means of 
Payment and 
Price 
„cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
 
The bid was equity-financed - 10 FUT shares for every 
83.25 Target shares. There was a partial cash alternative. 
Equity offer means that Target shareholders “…can share in 
financial and commercial improvements.” This creates 
uncertainty for target shareholders compared to a cash 
bid. 
(Bid Document on RNS, RNS Statement by Target, 
14/2/2005) 
  
“we should use as much of our share power as possible, 
and by doing that we will not incur any further bank debt. 
My feeling is that debt is more dangerous. Very easy to say 
this in 2010, but debt is more dangerous than people 
think.” 
 
“The proportionate of debt to profits (is crucial), because if 
you get that wrong, that gives far too much power to the 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
 
FUT was using its share power to 
acquire assets. 
 
 
„debt‟ 
 
The firm wanted to avoid using debt. 
They were concerned about the 
impact that debt would have on the 
firm‟s financial position. The firm 
would have an unsustainable debt 
burden. 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
banks, mainly because the company has weakened itself 
rather than strengthened itself…So, from a lowpoint of 
20p, at the time of our rights issue, through to the end of 
2004 when it was about 80p, a quadrupling of the share 
price…we were trying to use as much of share power…” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
 
Merger or 
Acquisition 
„recommended‟ 
„unrecommended‟ 
 
The bid was recommended by target management. An 
inducement fee was included to encourage Bidder to make 
an offer. If offer was withdrawn, Target would pay Bidder 
the sum of £300,000.  
(Bid Document) 
„recommended‟ 
„shareholder value‟ 
 
Target board in favour of bid.  
Conditions „standard‟ 
„non-standard‟ 
Standard conditions to bid. 
(Bid Document) 
„standard conditions‟ 
 
Table b3: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process  
Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Comments 
Valuation „fair value‟, 
„undervaluation‟, 
„opportunistic‟,  
„means of 
payment‟, 
„premium‟. 
 
The implied premium was 35.5%. It features strongly in 
the recommendation that the bid represented a “fair 
value”. The target directors have been advised, and 
consider that the terms of the offer to be “fair and 
reasonable”. This takes into account the “commercial 
assessments of target directors”. 
(Bid Document) 
 
„fair value‟ 
 
No evidence that there was an issue 
with the value of the bid. 
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Comments 
Target 
Management 
Reaction 
„friendly‟,  
„hostile‟,  
„shareholder value‟, 
„management 
entrenchment‟. 
 
Target firm was in favour of the acquisition. Target CEO 
stated, the offer: 
“…represented a fair value for shareholders.” 
(RNS Announcement, 14/2/05) 
  
„friendly‟ 
„shareholder value‟ 
 
New management team in Target 
were looking to sell the assets for as 
much as possible to create 
shareholder value. 
  
Information 
about Bidder 
„positive 
information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟ 
„financial‟, 
„management‟,  
„share price effect‟. 
None No other information emerged during 
the bidding period about the bidder. 
Information 
about Target  
„positive 
information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟, 
„financial‟, 
„management‟, 
„share price effect‟. 
 
The Target announced that it was re-launching some 
magazine titles during the currency of the bid.  
(RNS announcement, 11/3/2005) 
 
„positive information‟ 
„commercial‟ 
Rival Bid „rival bid‟,  
„cash‟,  
There was no rival bid. If a rival bid had have arisen and 
been accepted, this would have triggered the payment of 
A rival bid didn‟t emerge during the 
bidding process, but, concern about a 
268 
 
Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Comments 
„premium‟. 
 
the inducement fee.  
(Bid Document) 
 
“We were concerned that it was a possibility.” 
 
“You don‟t know what the other side is up to between 
times. They could be courting two parties. So, we didn‟t 
think there was a major risk, but we acknowledged there 
was a risk.” 
 
“Then and now, as with the vast majority of takeover 
deals, the standard conditions is that if a bid is referred, it 
lapses. They (the target) was in a desperate situation, our 
perception was that someone else would come along and 
potentially move quite quickly and buy for a cheap price 
some of the more valuable magazines and assets. It was 
something we could believe would quite quickly be a 
reality.” “So we were concerned that from under our nose, 
assets that we thought were effectively ours would 
disappear.” 
(Interview with Director) 
potential rival bid was crucial to the 
change in approach adopted after the 
bid was referred to the Competition 
Commission. 
Competition 
Issues 
„competition 
problems‟, „referral 
to competition 
commission‟. 
 
The bid documents highlight the potential competition 
issues. Following the acquisition, Bidder would become the 
“3rd largest consumer magazine publisher in the UK. “2nd 
largest UK publisher of special interest consumer 
magazines.” A combination of the magazine portfolios 
would enable Bidder to have increased scale and financial 
„competition problems‟ 
„referral to competition commission‟ 
 
Given the nature of the sector and the 
fact that the acquisition was between 
two firms within the sector, there was 
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Comments 
strength. 
(Bid Document) 
 
OFT commented that Bidder and Target operated in the 
same or adjacent sectors. On that basis, the OFT would 
investigate whether the bid would be referred.  
(RNS Statement, 15/2/2005) 
 
“So, we engaged with our lawyers, did a serious amount of 
work to see if there were any areas of overlap … in our 
view, after consultation, was that there was an extremely 
small chance, no guarantees, but there was an extremely 
small chance, having met the OFT officials of having the 
bid referred to the Competition Commission.” 
“We were therefore very surprised that it was announced 
within the prescribed time table that this matter would be 
referred to the Competition Commission.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
Two months later, the OFT referred the bid to the 
Competition Commission for investigation. The basis of the 
referral was “…supply of certain special interest consumer 
magazines in the UK.” 
“Combination of the largest supplier of consumer games 
magazines in the UK, with its largest competitor may be 
expected to lead to a substantial lessening of competition 
in the UK.” 
a potential for competition issues, and 
so, it arose. This was the major 
contingent factor in abandonment.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Comments 
(RNS Statement, 14/4/2005)  
 
 “Then and now, as with the vast majority of takeover 
deals, the standard conditions is that if a bid is referred, it 
lapses.” 
(Interview with Director) 
Nature of 
Abandonment 
„withdrawn‟, 
„lapse‟, 
„voluntary‟ 
involuntary‟. 
 
“It is not in … bidder‟s … shareholders‟ interests to pursue 
the bid”. 
“We have instructed the OFT to cancel the referral as we 
do not see it in our interests to pursue the bid.” 
(RNS Statement, 14/4/2005) 
 
“So, suddenly at the end of March 2005, we were left with 
the situation were our plan was in shreds, and with the 
benefit of hindsight we should have walked away.”  
 
“At the time, we immediately held a senior meeting in the 
company and we recognised we could walk away and the 
consequence of that would be to write-off of professional 
fees in the normal way.” 
 
“We were sitting there thinking we have been very public 
about this. We have identified the assets that were making 
money.” 
 
“So we were concerned that from under our nose, assets 
that we thought were effectively ours would disappear. And 
„lapse‟ 
„involuntary‟ 
 
Standard condition to allow the bid to 
lapse. No other significant trigger to 
abandonment, but forced another 
course of action on the bidder, which 
had more serious consequences.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Comments 
so we hatched a plan which was essentially, and with 
hindsight we shouldn‟t have done, but we all sat around 
and tried to cherry-pick the assets.” 
(Interview with Director) 
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Table b4: Post- Abandonment 
Dimension Code Evidence Revealed Codes 
Strategic 
Changes 
„strategic review‟ 
„new direction‟, 
„reorientation‟ 
 
“At the time, we immediately held a senior meeting in the 
company and we recognised we could walk away…” 
  
“We thought we would decide the ones we want and the 
price we would pay…We made the mistake of coming up 
with this so called cherry-picked list of about 44 titles and 
negotiated a price with them of £30.5 mn in cash.”  
 
“the assets of (Target) which we cherry-picked, whichever 
way you look at it, they either underperformed or, and/or, 
we paid too much for them. So, sticking all of that 
together, so our £22mn (profit) was dropping and the 
£5mn (profit) from (target‟s) assets wasn‟t there and 
dropping, and we paid too much, so suddenly the debt-to-
profit figure didn‟t look good.” 
 
The growth strategy “…led to a worry that the senior 
management may become over-extended and the chief 
executive had his credibility eroded. The decision to move 
from an acquisition strategy to an organic mode in 2006.” 
(Interview with Director) 
„strategic review‟ 
 
No immediate review. 
 
Initially, the deal was restructured. 
Only after the CEO proposed another, 
bigger acquisition, were concerns 
raised. 
 
 
Management 
Changes 
„replacement‟ 
„discipline‟ 
 
CEO was replaced in the year following the bid. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
“Debt was a factor (in the change in strategy), but there is 
another reason, and it is not a matter of public record, but 
„replacement‟ 
„discipline‟ 
 
Proposed a „value-destroying‟ 
acquisition.  
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Dimension Code Evidence Revealed Codes 
if you scratch your head long enough you would work it 
out, given the chief executive left shortly afterwards … 
within weeks of us acquiring the assets of the target, he 
(the chief executive) was keen for (Bidder) to seek to 
acquire a yet larger deal, of a significant multiple of the 
abandoned deal in an overseas company, which in my 
opinion would have killed the company. And he (the CEO) 
put himself in a minority of one (of the board).  
(Interview with Director) 
Raised concerns among other board 
members about strategic direction of 
the company. This initiated a 
disciplinary process which started with 
the removal of the CEO.  
Asset 
Restructuring 
„disposals‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
 
 
Net Disposal equivalent to 4.9% of net assets.  
(Company Annual Report and author‟s calculations) 
 
The growth strategy “…led to a worry that the senior 
management may become over-extended and the chief 
executive had his credibility eroded. The decision to move 
from an acquisition strategy to an organic mode in 2006…” 
(Interview with Director) 
„disposals‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
 
Part of the retrenchment after the 
replacement of the CEO.  
 
Being Acquired 
 
No Issues 
 
No issues 
 
 
N/A 
Financial 
Restructuring 
„borrowing‟ 
 
 
 
62 percentage point rise in gearing compared to pre-bid 
level. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
“…and from that moment, to this day, we have been in 
debt.” 
(Interview with Director) 
„borrowing‟ 
 
No evidence that increased debt was 
part of bonding. Instead, it was part 
of the restructured deal.  
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c) Case CAT 
 
Table c1: Bidder Characteristics  
Characteristics Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments  
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
Company was 10 years old at time of bid. 
Biotechnology sector 
(FAME database) 
„young‟ 
Young company in a young sector. 
 
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Proportion of NEDs 
on board greater 
than 50% 
Meets the requirements of Combined Code at the time with 
50% of board being NEDs. 
(Company Annual Report, 2003) 
„strong‟ 
Suggests strong board monitoring. 
Ownership 
Structure 
„concentrated‟ 
„strong‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
A reasonably concentrated structure. 4 institutional 
ownership blocks held a total of 31% of share capital. 
(Company Annual Report, 2003) 
 
„concentrated‟ 
„strong‟ 
„institutional‟ 
Suggests strong monitoring by outside 
shareholders.  
Managerial 
Incentives 
„strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Significant 
proportion of 
shares owned by 
managers 
Managers held 2% of total share capital. Insignificant 
proportion of shares owned by managers.  
(Company Annual Report, 2003) 
 
„weak‟ 
Weak incentives provided to managers. 
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
“We (the bidder) already had some joint ventures and 
licensing arrangements.” 
“For instance, in the year before the bid for … target…, 
Bidder…had a failed bid for another company. If that had 
„acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Already made an aborted bid for 
another company in previous year. 
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have succeeded, then the bid for …target…would probably 
never had happened.” 
(Interview with director) 
Strategy Acquisition 
Strategy 
I think there was the belief in the strategy … that drug 
development was a statistical game. There would be lots of 
drug development that would fail and for that model to 
work, companies need a broad span of business and funnel 
down into one successful product. It was a model that 
required a lot of scale and therefore quite a lot of money to 
get things, if not all the way to the market, to a point 
where you could retain significant value before bringing in 
a partner.”  
We were, “seeking partners to exploit the technology, 
either through joint ventures, licensing or indeed 
acquisitions. We (the bidder) already had some joint 
ventures and licensing arrangements. This was part of that 
strategy.” 
“We talked to everyone. It was the nature of the industry 
to do deals with others.”  
Annual reports demonstrate examples of licensing and joint 
ventures. 
(Interview with Director) 
Not really an acquisition strategy, but a 
broader strategy of engagement with 
potential partners to exploit the 
resources of the company.  
 
This industry involves a lot of strategic 
interaction. 
Acquisition activity is part of broader 
strategy that involves constant 
interaction between companies.  
Companies attempt to spot 
opportunities for beneficial 
collaboration. 
 
Performance „profitable‟ 
„Not profitable‟ 
„free cash‟ 
Average pre-bid return on capital employed was  
-10.8%. 
(Company Annual Reports and author‟s calculations) 
„Not profitable‟ 
The company was a young company in 
its early growth phase. Lots of cash 
raised, but committed to R&D. Not 
profitable. 
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Table c2: Transaction Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Bid Rationale 
  
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟  
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial 
inefficiency‟ 
 
Sharing portfolio of assets and financial resources key. 
The enlarged group would create strong synergies with a 
stronger and broader product portfolio. Stronger 
development and discovery capabilities and financial 
resources to build pipeline and drive further growth. 
(Bid Document) 
 
The Director Commented: 
The Company was “…seeking partners to exploit the 
technology, either through joint ventures, licensing or 
indeed acquisitions.” 
“A prerequisite, hold-on, a necessary condition, but not a 
sufficient condition was cash. There were lots of 
companies with interesting portfolios of assets and no 
cash. To find a company with an interesting portfolio and 
some cash was rare.” 
 
“In 2000, what looked like a bubble and was a stock 
market bubble, an enthusiasm for biotech companies. 
Two of the big exponents at the time were …the bidder 
and target. The two companies funded aggressively. 
Bidder raised, we raised £93mn in March 2000, GOS 
raised over £100mn in November.” 
 
“We talked to everyone. It was the nature of the industry 
to do deals with others.”  
„synergy‟ 
 
The sharing of the portfolio of assets and 
financial resources key. So, synergistic 
benefits were important- particularly cash. 
This had an influence in the choice of the 
means of payment (see below).  
 
Another issue that arose was 
„opportunism‟. This was not viewed 
negatively. The bid was an opportunity to 
bring together resources. Had to be taken 
despite the risks. This involved a range of 
relationships with other companies. 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
“It (the target) just happened to become available and 
just happened to fit into the strategy. That‟s how we 
came to it.” 
“…it was an opportunity that won‟t come around again. It 
(the bid) was too good an opportunity to let slip by. Too 
good an opportunity to miss.” 
(Interview with Director) 
Means of 
Payment and 
Price 
 
„cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
 
The bid was an all-equity one. Offering 0.362 CAT shares 
for each target share. Valued target at 195.5p per share. 
A 28.2% premium. 
(Bid Document) 
 
“The rationale for the bid would be undermined if cash 
were used. If it were, the enlarged company would have 
cash resources that were substantial, but were 
insufficient to meet the bidders‟ needs going forward. 
Funding issues were an on-going problem and it would 
have compounded the funding problem. A prerequisite, 
the way of doing this was with shares. Keep cash to 
invest in the business to fund investments rather than 
returning it to shareholders.”  
(Interview with Director) 
 
This phrase is used in a series of annual reports: 
 “…will continue to consider these sources (revenue 
streams and equity finance), though there can be no 
assurance that the company can generate significant 
revenue nor that equity finance will be available on 
„equity‟ 
„funding problem‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
 
The use of equity as the means of 
payment was a liquidity issue. Keep cash 
in enlarged business to take forward. 
 
Firm continually referred to funding 
issues. This suggests financial weakness 
at this stage of the company‟s 
development where product development 
has not reached the stage where the 
company was self-financing.  
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
acceptable terms or at all.” 
(Company Annual Report, 2003) 
 
“The other concern was, (pause), you‟re open to the 
possibility of a rival cash offer. Cash is more attractive as 
a consideration than paper. It offers more possibilities, 
more opportunities, for the acquirer. Its textbook stuff 
that you‟re more vulnerable to someone coming in and 
offering cash. We did look around, but didn‟t think that 
anybody intervening with cash was likely.” 
(Interview with Director) 
Merger or 
Acquisition 
„recommended‟ 
„unrecommended‟ 
 
The bid was recommended. It was a merger.  
The bid was recommended by the target management. 
The Target chairman, stated that the equity bid means 
that shareholders „will benefit from the strengthened 
opportunities for the combined company.‟ 
(RNS Announcement, 24/1/2003) 
 
The target shareholders will have 36% of merged group. 
They will share in future company growth. The combined 
firm will have “greater financial strength”, “greater 
flexibility”, in meeting future funding requirements. 
(RNS Announcement, 24/1/2003) 
 
The Bidder director commented: 
“It was a merger, but I think the distinction between a 
takeover and merger is an arcane one.” “Structurally 
whether this was done as a scheme rather than a merger 
A merger of companies at the same stage 
of development. 
 
Suggests that the merger was part of the 
growth and development of the industry, 
particularly consolidation among the many 
start-up firms that emerged at the outset 
of the industry. 
 
Target Shareholders encouraged to accept 
the bid in order to share in the future 
benefits provided by the merging of the 
two companies resources. 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
doesn‟t make a great deal of difference. So, it started 
with an informal approach and informal discussions. 
Bidder…was the larger in terms of scale and market 
capitalisation, but it was better to present it as a merger 
rather than a takeover.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
 
Conditions „acceptance 
conditions‟ 
„standard 
conditions‟ 
„non-standard 
conditions‟ 
90% acceptance condition 
(Bid Document)  
„Standard conditions‟ 
 
 
Table c3: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process  
Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Valuation „fair value‟, 
„undervaluation‟, 
„opportunistic‟,  
„means of payment‟, 
„premium‟. 
 
Bidder director comments: 
“The equity bid was at a 28.2% premium to target‟s 
current share price. The merger viewed as beneficial to 
both parties. At outset, the price and terms was not 
considered a problem.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
“Pretty much after (the bid was announced) there was a 
At the outset, bid viewed as a „fair 
value‟. 
 
„undervaluation‟ 
The gradual share price decline 
happened before the announcement 
of negative information. It suggests 
that the sell-off by the US institution 
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
constant decline in the share price. We attributed this to… 
a US financial institution… selling shares, and the price had 
been drifting down. This meant that the value of the bid 
drifted down to a point where the value of the offer was 
equivalent to underlying cash in …the target.”  
(Interview with Director) 
 
It was then that the rival bid emerged. Then, “3-4 weeks 
after RIVAL‟s announcement that we announced …the 
royalty dispute. The share plummeted, losing £1 in a day. 
In terms of the outcome of the offer, you can speculate 
what would have happened, but the cataclysmic decline 
put a nail in the coffin of the bid.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
was associated with a portfolio 
decision on their part. 
 
This reduced the value of the bid to 
the extent that valuation issues 
arose. Supports the idea that equity 
bids are in a weak position. A 
situation the director of the bidder 
acknowledged. Commented on by 
advisors as well. 
 
Then, rival bid emerged. 
 
Finally, the announcement of 
negative information about the 
bidder reduced the share price to the 
extent that the value of the bid was 
no longer viable.  
Target 
Management 
Reaction 
„friendly‟,  
„hostile‟,  
„shareholder value‟, 
„management 
entrenchment‟. 
 
“The CEO…He hadn‟t been long in post. He looked at 
Target‟s portfolio and felt that if you looked at Target‟s 
portfolio, the bid was a good outcome for them.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
The Target‟s chairman, stated that the equity bid means 
that shareholders „will benefit from the strengthened 
opportunities for the combined company.‟ 
(RNS announcement, 24/1/2003) 
„friendly‟  
 
„shareholder value‟ 
Target management focusing on 
what‟s best for shareholders. They 
stated that the merger was in the 
best interests of Target 
shareholders.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
 
The Target‟s shareholders will have 36% of merged group. 
They will share in company growth. The combined firm will 
have “greater financial strength”, “greater flexibility”, in 
meeting future funding requirements. 
(RNS announcement, 24/1/2003) 
 
 
Keep that view throughout, Even after the rival bid, Target 
management believed bid enabled their shareholders to 
enjoy “future benefits”. 
(RNS announcement, 14/3/2003) 
 
Eventually forced to switch recommendation in interests of 
shareholder value. 
(RNS announcement, 14/4/2003) 
 
 
Information 
about Bidder 
„positive information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟ 
„financial‟, 
„management‟,  
„share price effect‟. 
 
The announcement of the royalty dispute happened in the 
middle of the bid process. The uncertainty regarding the 
extent of royalties due to bidder led to a 17% drop in its 
share price. This decreased the value of the bid to 168p 
per share, creating an opportunity for rival bid.   
(RNS Announcement, 14/3/2003) 
 
“…the cataclysmic decline put a nail in the coffin of the 
bid.” 
(Interview with Director) 
„negative information‟ 
„commercial information‟ 
„share price effect‟ 
 
The revelation of negative 
commercial information led to the 
share decline in share price. As 
quotation from bidder management 
suggests, this illustrated the weak 
position of equity bids such as this.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Information 
about Target  
„positive information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟, 
„financial‟, 
„management‟, 
„share price effect‟. 
NONE N/A 
Rival Bid „rival bid‟,  
„cash‟,  
„premium‟. 
 
Rival bid was a cash offer that was in fact at a discount to 
the initial bid. However, given the slide in bidder‟s share 
price, it was seen as competitive. RIVAL admitted that the 
bid was “opportunistic”, “taking advantage of the situation 
to acquire assets at a discount.” 
(RNS announcement, 26/2/2003) 
  
“It was no surprise that someone took advantage of the 
share price decline.” 
 
“RIVAL‟s bid existed. It was a cash bid, a competitive bid. 
Institutional investors are attracted to cash. They prefer 
cash to paper.” 
 
“There might have been comments from analysts that 
started about the time of RIVAL‟s bid, that putting in some 
cash would help, but in our view that would be self-
defeating.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
„cash ‟ 
No premium.  
„opportunistic‟  
Rival bidder seizing an opportunity 
when it arose. 
 
Offered cash which is attractive to 
institutional investors who prefer 
cash to paper.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
The target never recommended RIVAL‟s bid, seeking 
alternative options once it became clear that Bidder was 
not prepared to raise its price. None were forthcoming. 
Eventually the management recommended that 
shareholders should accept RIVAL‟s offer in the absence of 
others. 
(RNS Announcements) 
Competition 
Issues 
„competition 
problems‟, „referral to 
competition 
commission‟. 
NONE  
Nature of 
Abandonment 
„withdrawn‟, 
„lapse‟, 
„voluntary‟ 
involuntary‟. 
 
 
Bidder made a Rule 2.5 announcement, so posted 
documents. 
(RNS Announcement, 7/2/2003)  
 
30% acceptances received, but once share price started to 
decline, no further acceptances received.  
(RNS announcements) 
 
Once target switched recommendation, the bid was bound 
to lapse. 
(RNS announcement, 14/4/2003) 
 
„lapse‟ 
„involuntary‟ 
 
Insufficient acceptances. Unable to 
raise value of bid because of liquidity 
issues. Equity bid susceptible to 
share price declines.   
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Table c4: Post- Abandonment  
Area Codes Evidence Comments 
Strategic 
Changes 
„new direction‟, 
„reorientation‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
 
“Target was not the only strategy. It was one particular 
strategy. The failure of that bid enabled the company to adopt 
a different strategy. A strategy it was able to execute and 
execute successfully- a strategy to cement a very large alliance 
with a single party. Leverage value of platform by charging for 
access to someone with downstream expertise to pull products 
through.” 
 
“Well, if we‟d completed the merger, we‟d have been presented 
with this set of possibilities (hand movement to the left 
signalling one set of possibilities). The fact we didn‟t do the 
merger, meant we were presented with a different set of 
possibilities (hand movement to the right signalling another set 
of possibilities).” 
 
“Well, it did in the sense that it meant a change in strategy. 
The deal with GOS would have taken the company in a 
particular direction. The failed bid meant a new strategy. 
However, I wouldn‟t over-emphasise the impact of 
abandonment. Strategy meanders! An event happens and 
leads to a particular strategy. Something else happens and this 
takes the company off in another direction.”  
(Interview with Director) 
„new direction‟ 
This suggests that companies have a 
number of different possible 
strategies.  
 
They underplay the impact of 
abandonment in a negative sense.  
 
It just meant the company had to 
get on with an alternative strategy 
to generate shareholder value.  
 
Not tied to any particular strategy. 
Happy to adopt different strategies.   
Management 
Changes 
 
 
 
NONE 
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Area Codes Evidence Comments 
Asset 
Restructuring 
  
NONE 
 
 
Being Acquired „takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bids‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
The company entered into several alliances in the period after 
abandonment. One of these involved the selling of 19.3% stake 
to a downstream company. This eventually led to a takeover of 
the company by this company. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
On the subject of takeover talks, the director stated: “We 
talked to everyone. It was the nature of the industry to do 
deals with others. For instance, shortly after the abandoned 
bid, we did a deal with the market leader. The deal was a 
hugely important deal for us. It brought in £40mn. This was an 
example of strong links. The deal changed control aspects of 
the relationship between the two companies. It satisfied their 
(market leader‟s) needs. It was an opportunity, we were 
already partners, so there was a high degree of trust.” 
 
“We recognised it (the takeover) was a possibility. The 
partner… had access to our technology on a preferential basis. 
Their position within the strategic alliance with us was of great 
significance. We could only allow one company in such a 
position. There was no other partner.”  
 
“We recognised at the time that the possibility of being bought 
out at the right price was a satisfactory outcome for 
shareholders.” 
„takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bid‟ 
 
The director underplays the 
significance of takeover bids.  
 
Discussions with other companies 
happening all the time. Not a major 
issue. They made bids. They 
received bids. They were 
comfortable about that. There is no 
sense subsequent bids were 
disciplinary.   
 
Being acquired at the right price was 
part of maximising shareholder 
value. 
So was acquiring another company 
at the right price. 
 
Little support for Mitchell and Lehn 
(1990) 
  
286 
 
Area Codes Evidence Comments 
(Interview with Director) 
Financial 
Restructuring 
„Equity issues‟ 
„borrowing‟ 
„dividends‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
  
 
There were frequent references to financing issues in the 
company‟s accounts in the three years after the abandoned 
takeover, in the same way as before the abandoned bid.  
 
The director commented: 
“There was no immediate financial constraints. At the time of 
abandonment, the company was financial strong. Looking 
ahead, the company was down to three years cash, so the 
company was relatively comfortable. However, the joint 
venture and legal success (over the royalty dispute) alleviated 
the cash problems.” 
 
“… it was further recognised that the company stood up on its 
own terms. It was a success. It generated products. This would 
have been taken forward … within the parameters of the 
strategic alliance.” 
(Interview with Director) 
„liquidity‟ 
„equity issues‟ 
The company certainly had liquidity 
problems since they weren‟t 
generating sufficient revenues to 
fund projects going forward.  
 
In order to alleviate liquidity 
problems, the company had to sell 
tranches of shares to outside groups 
to bring in finance. 
  
The director admitted this by stating 
the joint venture and the resolution 
of the legal dispute helped with 
liquidity, but they would have been 
happy to remain independent had 
the opportunity to be acquired not 
arisen.  
  
  
287 
 
d) Case TRG 
 
Table d1: Bidder Characteristics 
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
52 years old. 
(FAME Database) 
„mature‟ 
Theory suggests that such a 
mature company can be 
susceptible to value-destroying 
bids. 
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Proportion of NEDs 
on board greater 
than 50% 
37.5% of boards are NEDs. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„weak‟ 
According to theory. Weak 
governance. 
Suggests poor monitoring by the 
board. 
 
Ownership 
Structure 
„concentrated‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
5 institutions held a total of 50% of share capital. 
No outside non-institutional shareholders. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„concentrated‟ 
„institutional‟ 
Consistent with governance codes. 
Replacement of managers two 
years previously suggests 
shareholder activism.  
Managerial 
Incentives 
„weak‟ 
„strong‟ 
Significant 
proportion of shares 
owned by managers 
Insignificant shareholdings by managers. 
0.02% of share capital. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
„weak‟ 
 
Illustrates weak incentives for 
managers 
  
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Little evidence of acquisitiveness in previous few 
years. Net acquisitions of less than 1% of total assets 
in three years prior to bid. 
However, there was a high level of investment 
spending equivalent to 33% of net assets.  
(Company Annual Report) 
 
No acquisitions. No evidence of 
growth strategy. Lots of 
restructuring signified by the high 
level of capital spending. 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Strategy  Two years previously, company had been considered 
a “basket case”. The management of the company 
was replaced. New team conducting restructuring and 
reorientation. 
Turned into a “half-decent company”.  
Market analysts considered company “stale”. 
The bid was their first major acquisition since new 
management came in.  
(Press report, 18/11/03) 
 
“The company had lost its way. It had dissipated its 
efforts in too many brands in this market…the popular 
catering market,” 
(Interview with Executive Chairman, Sunday 
Telegraph, 11/1/04) 
 
“The idea (of restructuring) was to bring focus.”    
(Interview with Executive Chairman, Sunday 
Telegraph, 11/1/04) 
 
Strategy had been to turn around 
the company. Comment that 
company was “stale” suggests a 
lack of opportunities for the 
company through internal growth, 
so external growth was the 
alternative option. 
 
Performance „profitable‟ 
„not profitable‟ 
„free cash‟ 
Average pre-bid performance was 6.7% 
Free cash of 3.4% of net assets. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„profitable‟ 
„free-cash‟ 
 
Table d2: Transaction Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
Bid Rationale 
  
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
It was proposed that the merger would create a company 
with a strong growth potential and a leading position in 
„synergy‟ 
„related‟ 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
„related‟  
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial 
inefficiency‟ 
 
the UK dining market. The market viewed that there was 
strong complementarities between the companies‟ 
portfolios – Bidder in out-of-town restaurants; Target in 
high-street chains. 
(Bid Document) 
 
Acquisition of Target was an opportunity to buy 
entrepreneurial flair. Target management viewed as 
bright entrepreneurs in the sector. 
 
“Inevitably, you look around at what else is happening. 
To us, the most admired competition on the high street 
was (the Target).” 
(Interview with Executive Chairman, Sunday Telegraph, 
11/1/04) 
 
Consistent with growth strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
„opportunism‟ 
„entrepreneurship‟ 
Consistent with the characteristics 
of the  bidder at the time of the 
bid.  
Means of 
Payment 
„cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
A part cash / share offer: 
40% cash; 60% equity. 
(Bid Documents) 
„cash‟ 
„equity‟ 
Give target shareholders some 
cash, but also a stake in the 
enlarged company. 
Merger or 
Acquisition 
„recommended‟ 
„unrecommended‟ 
 
Extremely friendly. The target management 
recommended the deal. “The founders are looking for an 
exit for their investment and have been selling shares in 
the company, holding 16% at the time of the bid. They 
would be joining the board of the enlarged group.” 
(Press report, 20/11/2003) 
„recommended‟ 
As substantial shareholders, 
Target managers looking to cash 
in gains from growth of company. 
Target directors to be joining the 
board. Have an incentive to 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
 
Indeed, Managing director of TRG left during the bid 
period. (RNS Announcement, 1/12/2003) 
encourage growth of the 
company. 
 
Conditions „Acceptances‟ 
Non-standard 
conditions‟ 
90% acceptances required 
(Bid Document) 
„Acceptances‟ 
Nothing unusual about such a 
high level of required 
acceptances. 
No other non-standard conditions. 
 
Table d3: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process  
Contingent Factor Codes Evidence Comments 
Valuation „fair value‟, 
„undervaluation‟, 
„opportunistic‟,  
„means of payment‟, 
„premium‟. 
 
Several weeks into the bid process, doubts 
were raised by market analysts about whether 
the merger would be completed. It forced the 
companies into issuing a statement that “…due 
diligence had been materially completed.” 
“Terms substantially agreed.” 
(RNS Statement, 11/12/2003) 
 
Investors Chronicle advised: “Target 
shareholders ought to hold out for a tasty slice 
of the action to reflect what they‟re bringing to 
the table.” 
Bidder should, “…sweeten offer by lifting cash 
element to 50% and providing a clearer 
rationale for synergies.”  
„undervaluation‟ 
Evidence suggests concerns among 
investors about the value of the bid. 
There was a view that the bidder needed 
the target more than the target needed 
the bidder and requires the bidder to 
increase the value of its bid.   
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Contingent Factor Codes Evidence Comments 
(Investor‟s Chronicle, 21/11/2003) 
Target 
Management 
Reaction 
„friendly‟,  
„hostile‟,  
„shareholder value‟, 
„management 
entrenchment‟. 
 
Initially friendly. The target management 
recommended the deal. They would be joining 
the board of the enlarged group.  
(RNS Statement, 10/1/2004) 
 
However, once potential rival bids emerged, 
the target commented that “any proposal 
would be judged on its merits.”  
(RNS Statement) 
 
When rival formal bid arises, Target directors 
switched recommendation to that  higher cash 
bid 
(RNS Announcement, 13/2/2004) 
„friendly‟ 
Initially friendly. Target management, as 
major shareholders viewed the 
acquisition as an opportunity for exit that 
would enable the managers to move 
onto another project. 
 
„shareholder value‟ 
Content to accept a higher offer if one 
emerges. Indeed, may have been 
attracted by possibility of a cash bid. 
Enable an unambiguous exit for the 
target managers.   
Information about 
Bidder 
„positive information‟, 
„negative information‟, 
„commercial‟ 
„financial‟, 
„management‟,  
„share price effect‟. 
 
Strong Christmas trading reported by Bidder.  
(Press Report, 10/1/2004) 
„positive information‟ 
„commercial‟ 
“Raises mood” for the bid. 
 
Information about 
Target  
„positive information‟, 
„negative information‟, 
„commercial‟, 
„financial‟, 
„management‟, 
„share price effect‟. 
Market comment highlights the skills and 
entrepreneurial flair of Target. 
Strong Christmas trading reported by Target.  
(Press Report, 10/1/2004) 
„positive information‟ 
Target viewed as an attractive 
proposition. Press comment and trading 
statements reiterates that point.  
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Contingent Factor Codes Evidence Comments 
 
Rival Bid „rival bid‟,  
„cash‟,  
„premium‟. 
„trade‟. 
„switched 
recommendation‟ 
 
Another rival bidder views the target‟s books. 
The target commented that “any proposal 
would be judged on its merits.”  
RNS Statement, 10/1/2004) 
 
A rival cash bid emerged from a private equity 
group at a substantial premium to TRG‟s bid. 
The rival bidder had previous acquisition 
experience in the sector.  
The target board commented that an offer is 
“extremely attractive” at that level. 
 
It took a few weeks for a formal bid to 
emerge. Eventually, the rival bidder was given 
a „Put-up or shut-up‟ deadline by the Takeover 
Panel.  
(RNS Announcement, 3/2/2004) 
 
On the deadline, a formal bid is announced. 
Target directors withdrew their support for 
TRG‟s bid and switched recommendation to 
higher rival bid.    
(RNS Announcement, 13/2/2004) 
„cash‟ 
„premium‟ 
„switched recommendation‟ 
 
Suggests that target managers prepared 
to accept the highest possible bid at an 
acceptable premium. Switch their 
recommendation to the higher bid.  
Interested in maximising the value to 
their shareholders through a cash exit. 
 
„opportunism‟ 
Bid by TRG signalled the availability of 
the Target and rival bidder saw an 
opportunity to acquire Target.  
Competition 
Issues 
„competition 
problems‟, „referral to 
competition 
commission‟. 
The merger “was given clearance by the Office 
of Fair Trading”. 
(RNS Announcement, 19/1/2004) 
No competition problems arising from 
the bid. 
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Contingent Factor Codes Evidence Comments 
 
Nature of 
Abandonment 
„withdrawn‟, 
„lapse‟, 
„voluntary‟ 
involuntary‟. 
 
Company made a 2.5 announcement, so 
documents were posted. 
47% acceptances received. Needed 90% 
acceptances. Quite substantial proportion 
collected up to the point where rival bid 
emerged and recommendation switched. After 
that, very few further acceptances.  
(RNS Statements between 26/1/2004 and 
3/2/2004) 
 
CCR allowed their bid to lapse stating that: 
“Overpaying would have jeopardised their 
position. Wanted the right deal at the right 
price.” 
(RNS Statement, 13/2/2003) 
 
„lapse‟ 
„involuntary‟ 
 
Insufficient acceptances. 
Wanted to pursue the bid, but was not 
prepared to pay too high a price. 
Wouldn‟t raise their bid price.  
 
 
 
Table d4: Post-Abandonment  
Dimension Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Strategic Changes „strategic review‟ 
„new direction‟, 
„reorientation‟ 
 
“Financing, part of which was to finance the 
abandoned takeover is viewed as a launch pad to 
developing…the Bidder.” 
(RNS Announcement, 13/2/2004) 
 
„launch pad‟ could be interpreted as a 
new start. 
Searching for alternative growth 
opportunities. 
 
No evidence of governance changes. 
Management „replacement‟ No replacement of CEO or other changes at board No discipline or shareholder activism. 
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Dimension Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Changes „discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
level. 
(Company Annual Report) 
Asset Restructuring „high disposals‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
 
„high acquisitions‟ 
„Growth‟ 
 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
Net Acquisitions equivalent to 53% of Net Assets 
acquired in the three years after abandonment.    
(Company Annual Report) 
„high acquisitions‟ 
„growth‟ 
 
Not consistent with discipline. 
Consistent with growth strategy 
revealed by abandoned bid and 
reiterated after abandonment. 
 
Being Acquired „takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bids‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
None 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
Restructuring 
„borrowing‟ 
„dividends‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
Gearing reduced by 55.5 percentage points 
compared to pre-bid period.  
 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
 
„low borrowing‟ 
 
No evidence of higher gearing to bond 
managers to shareholders interests. 
Used free cash to reduce debt burden.  
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e) Case MEL 
 
Table e1: Bidder Characteristics  
Characteristic 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
Incorporated in 2003. 1 year old at time of 
abandoned bid. 
(RNS) 
 
„young‟ 
 
 
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Proportion of NEDs 
on board greater 
than 50% 
Small board of four. Only one NED- a proportion 
of 25%.  
(Company Annual Report) 
„weak‟ 
 
Reflecting the age and size of the company 
as a cash shell. 
 
Ownership 
Structure 
„concentrated‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
Eight institutions held 63.3% of shares at the 
time of the abandoned bid.  
(Company Annual Report) 
„concentrated‟ 
„strong‟ 
 
Consistent with corporate governance 
codes. 
 
Managerial 
Incentives 
„strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Significant 
proportion of shares 
owned by managers 
Executive Directors held 7.4% of shares in the 
company. A significant block. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„strong‟ 
 
Strong incentives to pursue value-
enhancing acquisitions.  
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
A young company so no trail of evidence 
regarding acquisitions.  
(RNS) 
 
 
n/a 
Strategy  The stated strategy of the company was to: 
“acquire companies whose performance could 
Clear acquisition strategy to turnaround the 
performance of companies. Evidence of a 
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Characteristic 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
be improved by better management.” 
(Bid Document) 
 
governance role. 
Performance „profitable‟ 
„‟free cash‟ 
In short period of trading had made an 
operating loss of -1.04%.   
Performance of the management team at 
previous company (WAS), where they 
suggested that shareholders received a return of 
18% per annum over a 12 year period. 
(Bid Document) 
Not reflective of activity since the company 
was a cash shell. 
 
Performance of previous company suggests 
a focus on shareholders.  
 
Table e2: Transaction Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Bid Rationale 
  
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟  
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial 
inefficiency‟ 
 
In their bid document, MEL included a “damning 
indictment” of the performance of Novar‟s board 
in delivering shareholder value, particularly 
criticising the new CEO. 
 
“Your board has already destroyed a great deal 
of value simply through the poor running of the 
business.” 
(Bid Document) 
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial inefficiency‟ 
 
Consistent with strategy of turning around 
poorly performing companies.  
Means of Payment „cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
 
Part share / part cash offer. 1 MEL share and 
45p in cash, valuing Target at 140-150p per 
share.   
(Bid Document) 
 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
 
Consistent with the use of share power to 
acquire target. Target shareholders can 
enjoy any post-acquisition growth. 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Merger or 
Acquisition 
„recommended‟ 
„not recommended‟ 
 
Bid was a tender offer. There was no 
discussion. Target management were hostile. 
Highlighted that the management were 
committed to shareholder value They would 
consider offers for the company, but the value 
and structure of this offer “„undervalued 
(Target)”. 
(RNS Announcement, 4/11/2004) 
 
„not recommended‟ 
 
Hostility consistent with a „disciplinary‟ 
acquisition.  
Conditions „standard‟ 
„non-standard‟ 
Anticipated 90% acceptance condition 
(Bid Document) 
 
„standard‟ 
 
Table e3: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
Contingent Factor 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
Valuation „fair value‟, 
„undervaluation‟, 
„opportunistic‟,  
„means of payment‟, 
„premium‟. 
 
Part share / part cash offer. Valued Target at £1.40-
£1.50. 
A 17% premium on Target‟s share price.  
Target management resistance focused on the value of 
the bid and the terms of the deal, particularly the means 
of payment. 
(Bid Document) 
 
“Given the relative size of the companies, the upshot of 
a takeover would be to give Target‟s shareholders 
replacement shares in their own company.” 
Target management rejected bid, advising shareholders 
to take no action. 
“MEL‟s offer fails to reflect the true value of the 
„undervaluation‟ 
„means of payment‟ 
298 
 
Contingent Factor 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
company.” 
“MEL management would take a substantial chunk of 
the upside of any future value creation.” 
(RNS Statement, 29/11/2004) 
 
Target 
Management 
Reaction 
„friendly‟,  
„hostile‟,  
„shareholder value‟, 
„management 
entrenchment‟. 
 
Target management were hostile. 
Highlighted that the management as committed to 
shareholder value They would consider offers for the 
company, but the value and structure of this offer 
„undervalued (Target)‟. 
 
Target‟s continued defence focused on the terms of the 
deal, emphasising that it undervalued the company.  
 
(Various RNS Announcements between 4/11/2004 and 
13/12/2004) 
For example, they stated (the offer): 
“…deprived shareholders of a substantial element of the 
upside we are confident we can deliver.” 
(RNS statement, 29/11/04) 
 
 
„hostile‟ 
„shareholder value‟ 
 
Hostility focused on price and 
the means of payment.  
Information 
about Bidder 
„positive information‟, 
„negative information‟, 
„commercial‟ 
„financial‟, 
„management‟,  
„share price effect‟. 
 
Negative information reported by Target management 
about how MEL‟s management would benefit from future 
performance through the means of payment.  
(RNS Announcement, 10/11/2004) 
 
Other positive information emphasised. Strong 
performance of management team at previous company 
was highlighted- Growth of 18% p.a. over 12 years. 
(Bid Document)  
„negative information about 
management‟ 
 
„positive information about 
performance‟ 
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Contingent Factor 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
 
 
Information 
about Target  
 
„positive information‟, 
„negative information‟, 
„commercial‟, 
„financial‟, 
„management‟, 
„share price effect‟. 
 
 
Information revealed about the poor performance of the 
Target. A need for the Target to improve performance.  
(Bid Document) 
 
 
„negative information‟ 
„commercial‟ 
„management‟ 
Rival Bid „rival bid‟,  
„cash‟,  
„premium‟. 
 
Target‟s management would consider offers. Bid a 
“…catalyst for a number of other parties to express 
interest in the group‟s business.”   
„White knight‟ emerges. A recommended cash bid of 
£1.85. A substantial premium to MEL‟s offer.  
Rival‟s offer is considered more attractive. 
(RNS Announcement, 13/12/2004) 
 
„rival bid‟ 
„cash‟ 
„premium‟ 
 
Target management sought an 
alternative offer. More attractive 
than MEL‟s offer. Higher value 
and financed by cash. Attractive 
to shareholders.  
 
Competition 
Issues 
„competition 
problems‟, „referral to 
competition 
commission‟. 
No Competition Issues.  
Nature of 
Abandonment 
„withdrawn‟, 
„lapse‟, 
„voluntary‟ 
„involuntary‟. 
 
4.1% acceptances from Target shareholders. Very low. 
Allowed bid to lapse stating: 
their „…conditions had not been met and it would allow 
its offer to lapse.‟ 
(RNS Announcement, 20/12/2004) 
„lapse‟ 
„voluntary‟ 
 
Not prepared to raise bid and 
overpay. 
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Table e4: Post-Abandonment Changes 
Dimension Concept Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
Strategic Changes „strategic review‟ 
„new direction‟, 
„reorientation‟ 
 
None 
The directors tend to underplay the impact of the 
abandonment. 
The abandoned bid as one of many options and “…the 
failure of one such bid therefore had no impact on the 
company or lasting effects…”   
(Correspondence with Directors by author) 
 
 
 
Management 
Changes 
„replacement‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder activism‟ 
 
None 
 
 
Asset Restructuring „disposals‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
 
„acquisition‟ 
„Growth‟ 
„shareholder activism‟ 
Several large acquisitions were pursued in the months 
after abandonment. 
 
Restructuring conducted.  
(RNS Announcement, 21/4/2005)  
„acquisitions‟ 
 
In line with strategy of improving 
performance in Target companies. 
Purchased firms and restructured 
them to realise value.   
 
Subsequent 
Acquisition 
„takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bids‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder activism‟ 
 
None 
 
 
 
Financial 
Restructuring 
„borrowing‟ 
„dividends‟ 
„discipline‟ 
Large increase in gearing percentage immediately after 
abandoned bid to fund the large acquisitions.  
 
„borrowing‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
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Dimension Concept Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
„liquidity‟ 
„shareholder activism‟ 
 
 
 
Increased gearing of 112 percentage points.   
(Company Annual Report) 
 
No evidence the increase in 
gearing is a disciplinary response. 
Part of the financing associated 
with the acquisition strategy of 
the company.  
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f) Case REG 
 
Table f1: Bidder Characteristics  
Characteristics Codes Evidence Comments 
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
14 years old at time of bid.  
(FAME Database) 
„young‟ 
A young company in late night drinking sector. 
 
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Proportion of NEDs 
on board greater 
than 50% 
Only 33% of board are NEDs. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„weak‟ 
Weak monitoring.  
According to theory illustrates weak 
governance. Did not conform to the Combined 
Code. This suggests this could have been a 
contributory factor in poor performance before 
abandonment – the governance issues 
referred to by Director in interview. 
 
Ownership 
Structure 
„concentrated‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
No non-institutional blocks. 
Some institutional blocks held.  
Largest block is 9.9%. Then, one at 9.33%. 
2 @ 6% approximately. 
Others at 3% level. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„dispersed‟ 
„institutional‟ 
Despite this, some evidence of shareholder 
activism with replacement of managers in the 
year before abandoned bid.   
Managerial 
Incentives 
„strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Significant 
proportion of shares 
owned by managers 
About 1% of share capital held by managers. 
(Company Annual Report) 
Poor incentives.  
Theory suggests this could have been a 
contributory factor in the poor performance 
and governance issues referred to by Director 
in interview. 
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ Not acquisitive. Had net disposals in three „Not acquisitive‟  
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Characteristics Codes Evidence Comments 
„growth‟ years prior to bid of 14.9%. 
(Company Annual Report and author‟s 
calculations) 
 
 
„Low growth‟ 
 
Struggling. Net disposals show a need for 
consolidation. There was a lack of growth 
opportunities.  
Strategy  A Director commented: “The previous year, 
the bidder had got itself into a lot of trouble. 
Performance issues, issues of governance 
and that sort of stuff. The previous 
management team had been removed and 
myself and chairman came in, having just 
sold a business, to try and restore its 
fortunes…” 
(Interview with Director) 
  
“…obvious that Bidder and a number of other 
players in the sector were sub-scale. The 
overheads were too big for the type of 
business, not getting the benefits of 
purchasing power, not getting the benefits of 
marketing power.” 
 
“We were finding organic growth more and 
more difficult to get, therefore, consolidation 
became an obvious picture.” 
(Interview with Director) 
New managers brought in to turn things 
around. 
 
It was managers‟ view that problems for 
company (see acquisitiveness and 
performance) were derived from a lack of 
scale in the industry. Needs consolidation to 
achieve scale. 
Strategy in company was pursued to achieve 
that.  
Performance „profitable‟ 
„not profitable‟ 
Average ROCE in three years before 
abandoned bid was 0.456%. 
„not profitable‟ 
Company struggling with low profitability. 
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Characteristics Codes Evidence Comments 
„free cash‟ (FAME Database and author‟s calculations) 
 
There was a lack of organic growth  
 
Table f2: Bid Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
Bid Rationale 
  
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟  
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial 
inefficiency‟ 
 
“…it was always obvious that Bidder and a number of other 
players in the sector were sub-scale. The overheads were too 
big for the type of business, not getting the benefits of 
purchasing power, not getting the benefits of marketing power. 
And there was quite a number of small players around, not 
many of whom had been publicly quoted, target being one, 
there were others, and the bidder was predominantly late night 
drinking, and we had a good look at one or two of the other 
operators and came to the conclusion that…the target… had 
the best strategic fit with us.” 
 
“We did the same things. We bought the same things, so 
purchasing power; we could reduce the purchasing overhead.” 
 
“…a hell of an amount of research went into identifying that 
there were synergistic benefits to be had there. For both sets 
of shareholders, it was an obvious solution.” 
 
“ I don‟t recall exactly what the share prices were, but if you 
track (Target‟s) share price in early 2005, you‟ll see it had 
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
Consistent with Bidder‟s strategy. 
A need for consolidation in the 
industry. 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
come-off quite a lot. So there was an opportunity for us to 
offer a significant premium to their shareholders in order to 
make them happy.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
The Target‟s share price had fallen from 760p at the start of 
2005 to 573p by the beginning of May. A decrease of 23.3%. 
(Data from Perfect Analysis Database) 
 
 
„opportunism‟ 
Target is only the Plc available, so 
bidder sees an opportunity to 
acquire target. Share price had 
declined creating an opportunity 
to acquire company more 
cheaply. Combined with use of 
equity, use share power. 
Means of Payment „cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
 
Equity Bid 
Informal Offer 
820p per share 
Partial cash alternative – up to 30% of offer price. 
(RNS announcement, 8/6/2005) 
 
“Just to minimise the amount of cash going out of the 
business. But it wasn‟t necessarily all, it wasn‟t all shares. I 
can‟t remember the exact mix, but it was enough to be 
tempting for the targets‟ shareholders to get some cash out of 
it as well as get some growth in paper.” 
“It was a good enticement, but the percentage (of cash) was 
not too much.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
„cash‟ 
„share power‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
 
Suggests the use of share power 
in bidding, but also evidence of 
liquidity constraints.  
 
Merger or 
Acquisition 
„recommended‟ 
„unrecommended‟ 
 
Target rejected the bid publicly, stating that the bid 
undervalued their company, it was primarily share-based and 
lacked strategic fit. 
„unrecommended‟ 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
(RNS Statement, 8/6/2005) 
 
Bidder sought a recommendation, but it was not forthcoming. 
(RNS statement 8/6/2005) 
 
Conditions „standard 
conditions‟ 
„non-standard 
conditions‟ 
Bidder did not make a 2.5 announcement.  
Withdrew bid.  
“…regrets the decision by the (Target‟s) board not to cooperate 
with (REG‟s) proposal, which I believe would have increased 
value for both groups of shareholders. However, we are not 
prepared to overpay.” 
(Quote from Chief Executive in RNS statement, 18/7/05) 
 
The bidder director commented:  
“Lenders want to avoid hostility because it makes the bid more 
costly.” 
(Interview with Director) 
„standard‟ 
Bidder wanted to avoid hostility. 
Did not post documents and 
commit to the bidding process. 
 
Table f3: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process  
Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
Valuation „fair value‟, 
„undervaluation‟, 
„opportunistic‟,  
„means of 
Proposal was “…principally share based”. “…significantly 
undervalues Target.” 
(RNS statement, 8/6/05) 
 
„undervaluation‟ 
„means of payment‟ 
 
Terms of the bid and valuation, 
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
payment‟, 
„premium‟. 
 
Market sentiment agreed. To succeed, an offer would have to 
be at least 950p per share, or possibly above £10 per share. 
(Press report, 8/6/05) 
 
The revised offer of 975p per share with an enhanced share 
element was not considered high enough. It was rejected by 
the target management after consultation with key 
shareholders and advisors. 
(RNS statement, 13/7/05) 
 
“…it got to the point, well, we had raised our bid on three 
occasions and in the end we decided that this was getting too 
rich for us, we can‟t make this work and we were really 
surprised by the ultimate „take-out‟ price (£10.75).” 
“We couldn‟t make it work at that price. It wouldn‟t have been 
profitable at that price. As it turned out, this must be a matter 
of public record. (renamed Target) as it became, has gone 
through two restructurings because the level of debt was too 
high.” 
(Interview with Director) 
related to the means of payment 
were continually questioned 
throughout the bidding process. 
Target 
Management 
Reaction 
„friendly‟,  
„hostile‟,  
„shareholder 
value‟, 
„management 
entrenchment‟. 
 
Unsolicited bid. Target management did not recommend the 
bid. A clear rejection. The bid undervalued the company and 
was „share-based‟. „There was little strategic fit between the 
two very different businesses‟. 
(RNS Statement, 8/6/2005) 
 
Bidder sought a recommendation, but it was not forthcoming. 
„hostile‟ 
„shareholder value‟ 
 
Resistance was focused around 
maximising shareholder value. 
 
According to bidder managers, 
308 
 
Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
Even a revised offer of 975p per share was rejected. 
(RNS Statement, 12/7/2005) 
 
Bidder felt, “The resistance was partly emotional because that 
(take-private) is what they wanted to do, but it was also, it 
also ended up in a bidding process, which. Well, we went to see 
the top 5 or 6 shareholders and we presented our case to them 
and they seemed reasonably comfortable with it, but nobody 
was prepared to give us irrevocable undertakings, which is 
what you want to get. You wanted to get a certain percentage 
of irrevocables, but we couldn‟t get that. It became quite 
obvious that there was a bidding process going on. All the 
shareholders wanted was a maximum „cash-out‟, which is 
ultimately what they got.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
the Target‟s shareholders thought 
they could receive a higher cash 
bid.   
Information 
about Bidder 
„positive 
information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟ 
„financial‟, 
„management‟,  
„share price 
effect‟. 
Strong trading. Trading ahead of original expectations. Like-
for-like sales up 2%. In London up 6%. 
(RNS Announcement, 2/7/2005) 
„positive information‟ 
„commercial‟ 
 
Positive information, but it had 
little bearing on the bidding 
process. 
Information 
about Target  
„positive 
information‟, 
Bidder was given a “put-up or shut-up” deadline by Takeover 
panel. 
„management information‟ 
„negative information‟ 
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟, 
„financial‟, 
„management‟, 
„share price 
effect‟. 
 
(RNS Statement, 23/6/2005) 
 
Strong criticism of target management by Bidder. Inconsistent 
approach. Asking for such an ultimatum, while at the same 
time conducting a “public auction.” 
(RNS Statement, 13/7/2005) 
 
Rival Bid „rival bid‟,  
„cash‟,  
„premium‟. 
 
During the bidding process. Target revealed that it was in 
conversation with three other bidders. All revealed as private 
equity groups offering cash. 
Unsolicitied offer by bidder had “put the company in play.” 
(RNS Statement, 18/7/2005) 
 
One of the rival bids progresses to a formal offer, after REG 
withdrew its offer. This is an MBO financed by private equity. 
£10.70 per share. Cash offer 10% above Regent‟s offer. 
(RNS Statement, 8/9/2005) 
 
“…it became obvious that there was a rival bid and it was not a 
trade player. It was a „take-private‟ and that was quite 
obvious.”   
(Interview with Director) 
 
„rival bid‟ 
„cash‟ 
„premium‟ 
 
 
Competition 
Issues 
„competition 
problems‟, 
„referral to 
 
None  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
competition 
commission‟. 
Nature of 
Abandonment 
„withdrawn‟, 
„lapse‟, 
„voluntary‟ 
involuntary‟. 
 
Bidder withdrew its bid highlighting the lack of negotiation on 
the part of Target‟s management. It withdraws the bid on the 
understanding that if an offer arose, they would reserve the 
right to raise their offer.  
(RNS Statement, 18/7/05) 
 
“…regrets the decision by the (Target‟s) board not to 
cooperated with (REG‟s) proposal, which I believe would have 
increased value for both groups of shareholders. However, we 
are not prepared to overpay.” 
(Quote from Chief Executive in RNS statement, 18.7.05) 
 
“…it got to the point, well, we had raised our bid on three 
occasions and in the end we decided that this was getting too 
rich for us, we can‟t make this work and we were really 
surprised by the ultimate „take-out‟ price.” 
 
“It is a clear mathematical point where you clearly say where 
there is a point where you cannot make it work.” 
 
The successful price was £10.70.  
“We couldn‟t make it work at that price. It wouldn‟t have been 
profitable at that price.  
As it turned out, this must be a matter of public record. The 
target had gone through two restructurings because the level 
„withdrawn‟ 
„voluntary‟ 
 
Withdraws bid voluntarily. Does 
not allow itself to be drawn into a 
bidding war and paying too high a 
price.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The implication of this comment is 
that the bidder overpaid, suffering 
the winner‟s curse.  
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Contingent 
Factor 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and 
Comments 
of debt was too high.”  
 
“There are a number of things. Running a takeover is 
enormously time-consuming. There is real danger of taking 
your eye off the ball. The senior team, that‟s everything they 
do for several months and there is a danger that the business 
suffers as a result of that. So, running a takeover can have a 
big impact. From the point of view of abandonment, there can 
be positive impact. Okay, that didn‟t happen. Let‟s lick our 
wounds and get back to what we know best. So, I wouldn‟t 
necessarily see it as a bad thing actually. Of course, the one 
thing you can never, ever change is what you paid for it. You 
can do all sorts of other things, but you can‟t change what you 
paid for it.” 
     
“Lenders want to avoid hostility because it makes the bid more 
costly.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
 
 
Director reflects a positive impact 
of abandonment. Best to walk 
away. Don‟t get too caught up in 
a bid.  
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Table f4: Post- Abandonment Changes 
Dimension Concept Evidence Comments 
 
Strategic Changes 
 
„strategic review‟ 
„new direction‟, 
„reorientation‟ 
 
 
No evidence of a change in strategy. 
“From the point of view of abandonment, there can be 
positive impact. Okay, that didn‟t happen. Let‟s lick our 
wounds and get back to what we know best.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
 
No great strategic changes. Still 
wanted to achieve consolidation 
in the industry.  
 
Management 
Changes 
 
„replacement‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
 
CEO was replaced just under three years after the abandoned 
bid.  
 (Company Annual Report) 
 
 
„replacement‟ 
No evidence of discipline. 
 
 
Asset 
Restructuring 
 
„disposals‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
 
 
.„acquisition‟ 
„Growth‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
 
Restaurant chain acquired in year after abandoned bid. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
The bidder director stated that if the abandoned bid had 
succeeded, this acquisition wouldn‟t have happened. 
  
“There was a slightly different rationale for that bid …We had 
good cash coming off the operations … and limited 
opportunities to exploit. So the idea was to use the cash to 
buy the restaurant business and recycle that cash to grow the 
restaurant business- have a bigger restaurant bias.” 
 
 
„acquisitions‟ 
„growth‟ 
 
Evidence consistent with issues at 
the time of the abandoned bid. 
The structure of the industry 
meant limited opportunities to 
grow organically. Companies 
looking for acquisition 
opportunities.   
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Dimension Concept Evidence Comments 
Company entered administration just under three years after 
abandonment. Conducted asset and financial restructuring. 
(RNS announcement) 
 
“…the bidder went through a serious of restructuring last 
year.” 
 
“…given changes in the market, in 2006 with the smoking 
ban, the late night market was very hard hit.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
„administration‟ 
„disposals‟ 
 
Changes in the market occurred. 
Without the necessary 
consolidation, company was 
unable to continue trading in that 
way.  
 
Subsequent 
Acquisition 
„takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bids‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
Restaurant chain acquired in year after abandoned bid. 
 
In addition, bidder attracted takeover bids in the years after 
abandonment. These approaches acknowledged in news 
announcements and Company Reports.  
(RNS announcements, Company Annual Report) 
 
The director commented: 
“We had a subsequent bid in 2006 which we got pretty close 
to selling. The bid was allegedly at 1.23, which we would have 
been delighted with, but we couldn‟t persuade the 
shareholders. Shareholders believed that if there was a bid at 
1.23, they could get a little bit more.” 
 
In 2008, the company received another informal approach.  
The director commented: 
“…it was all set to go ahead in the middle of 2008 when their 
„takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bids‟ 
 
„consolidation‟ 
„shareholder value‟ 
 
Company prepared to acquire or 
be acquired in order to achieve 
the necessary consolidation in the 
industry. 
 
Difficult to force shareholders to 
accept bid. They want a little bit 
more. Supports the idea that 
bidders may overpay due to the 
demands of target shareholders.  
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Dimension Concept Evidence Comments 
banks pulled the plug on it. They were hit by the credit 
crunch.” 
 
When asked: „Do you think that selling the company to 
another bidder would have been seen as successful?, the 
director responded: 
 
“Yes, industry still needs consolidation. Insulate the industry 
from recession and regulatory changes. Better overheads and 
purchasing power … But, the issue with public companies is 
that, if the share price is that (a particular price), the 
shareholders always want a little bit more.” 
(Interview with Director) 
 
 
Financial 
Restructuring 
„borrowing‟ 
„dividends‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
 
 
Company entered administration just under three years after 
abandonment. Conducted asset and financial restructuring. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
“…the bidder went through a serious of restructuring last 
year.” 
 
“…given changes in the market, in 2006 with the smoking 
ban, the late night market was very hard hit.” 
(Interview with Director) 
„administration‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
 
Changes in the market occurred. 
Without the needed consolidation, 
company was unable to continue 
trading in that way.  
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g) Case MIC 
 
Table g1: Bidder Characteristics 
  
Characteristic 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
31 years old. 
(FAME Database) 
 
„mature‟ 
A mature company.  
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Proportion of NEDs 
on board greater 
than 50% 
4/7 board members were NEDs. Over 50% 
(Company Annual Report)  
„strong‟ 
No governance problems. 
Fulfils requirements of combined code at the 
time. 
Ownership 
Structure 
„concentrated‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
Four institutions with more than 5%. Two more 
with more than 3% of share capital. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„concentrated‟ 
A concentrated ownership structure, with 
institutional shareholders dominating outside 
shareholding. 
Managerial 
Incentives 
„weak‟ 
„strong‟ 
Significant 
proportion of 
shares owned by 
managers 
Directors hold approximately 10% of the share 
capital. 
(Company Annual Report) 
„strong‟ 
Significant holdings by a couple of directors. 
According to agency theory, this provides 
strong, appropriate incentives to act in 
shareholders‟ interests.  
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Company makes reference to an “acquisition 
strategy” in annual report.  
Acquired assets equivalent to 9.8% of Net Assets 
in three years prior to abandoned bid. 
„acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Evidence supports acquisitiveness on the part 
of the board. A desire to grow the company 
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Characteristic 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
over the medium term.  
Strategy  “…acquisition strategy”. 
No payment of dividends. Profits reinvested to 
finance acquisitions. 
Focus on medium term return for shareholders.  
Seeks to integrate companies – Annual reports 
make reference to “rapid acquisition integration 
model”, which enables Micro to integrate 
acquisitions quickly.  
Helps drive forward strategy. Looking for further 
acquisitions.  
The annual report refers to an intention to; 
“…explore potential further opportunities that 
may enhance shareholder value”. 
Acknowledges, “…there is no guarantee that 
suitable acquisitions will be identified or 
transactions completed”. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
The existence of a rapid acquisition integration 
model suggests the company believes that it 
was successful at integrating acquisitions and 
will look to secure suitable acquisitions in the 
future if the opportunity arises.  
The annual report refers to an intention to; 
“…explore potential further opportunities that 
may enhance shareholder value”. 
Performance „profitable‟ 
„not profitable‟ 
„free cash‟ 
Average ROCE in three years prior to bid was   -
2.19%. 
Average free cash equivalent to 4% of net 
assets. 
(FAME Database) 
 
„not profitable‟ 
 
Some free cash. Use to finance growth 
through acquisitions. 
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Table g2: Transaction Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Bid Rationale 
  
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟  
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial inefficiency‟ 
 
The transaction would, “provide …the bidder… 
with a significantly increased presence in the 
financial services sector.” “Provide an 
opportunity to market …bidder‟s… 
complementary software offerings to target‟s 
customer base.” 
 
“…enlarged group will benefit from having an 
increased presence and expanded client base, 
with a broader range of software and service 
offerings”. 
(Bid Document) 
 
Another bid for the target already existed.  
(Takeover Panel Disclosure Table, 5/4/2005) 
„synergy‟ 
„related‟ 
 
Bid fits in with growth strategy of 
bidder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„opportunism‟ 
Initial bid by rival attracted MIC to the 
target. Suggests that this alternative 
bid signalled the availability of the 
target‟s assets. Attracted MIC to the 
target.  
 
Means of Payment „cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
 
Cash/Share offer – 50p in cash and 0.3758 
MIC shares 
Implied value of bid is 81p per share. 
Mix and match option available. So target 
shareholders given the option to receive cash.  
Funded from existing cash reserves and 
„cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
Cash / equity mix. 
Similar to some other bids. Some cash 
offered to provide shareholders with 
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
committed bank facilities agreed for the 
transaction.   
(Bid Document) 
 
spend able income and some paper so 
they can share in any growth. 
  
Merger or 
Acquisition 
„recommended‟ 
„unrecommended‟ 
 
A recommended offer. Target board deem, 
“…the terms of the offer to be fair and 
reasonable” 
(RNS announcement, 28/4/2005) 
 
MIC‟s bid was at a 43.4% premium to the 
RIVAL bid. The target board immediately 
switched their recommendation to MIC‟s offer.  
(RNS announcement, 28/4/2005) 
 
Target prepared to pay MIC an inducement fee 
as well as pay RIVAL any inducement fees 
liable because of the switched 
recommendation.  
(RNS announcement, 28/4/2005) 
 
„recommended‟ 
MIC management wanted to avoid 
hostility. Sought and received a 
recommendation from target board. 
 
Target management were seeking the 
highest possible value for their 
shareholders. They were prepared to 
switch recommendation to which ever 
bid they felt was best for their 
shareholders.   
 
Conditions „standard‟ 
„non-standard‟ 
No non-standard conditions. 
 
Needs the approval of Bidder‟s shareholders.  
(Bid Document) 
 
„standard‟ conditions.  
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Table g3: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process 
Contingent Factor 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Valuation „fair value‟, 
„undervaluation‟, 
„opportunistic‟,  
„means of 
payment‟, 
„premium‟. 
 
Initial RIVAL bid of 71p in cash. 
This initial bid was at a premium of 25.7% and 
received immediate undertakings of 49.8%. 
 
MIC‟s bid was at a 43.4% premium to RIVAL. 
 
Target board believed, “…the terms of the offer to 
be fair and reasonable”. 
 
RIVAL raised its offer to 85.5p in cash. 
4p above implied value of MIC‟s cash/share offer.  
(RNS Statements between 28/4/2005 and 
5/5/2005) 
 
„undervaluation‟ 
„means of payment‟ 
 
MIC‟s bid was at a substantial 
premium to initial RIVAL bid.  
 
Value of bid was not considered a 
problem until RIVAL raising their bid. 
Only in the context of the higher 
revised offer was MIC‟s bid considered 
an undervaluation of the Target. 
 
Target 
Management 
Reaction 
„friendly‟,  
„hostile‟,  
„shareholder 
value‟, 
„management 
entrenchment‟. 
 
Target management had recommended a bid by 
RIVAL of 71p in cash. This initial bid was at a 
premium of 25.7% and received immediate 
undertakings of 49.8%. 
 
MIC‟s bid was at a 43.4% premium to RIVAL. The 
target board immediately switched their 
recommendation to MICRO‟s offer.  
(RNS Announcement, 28/4/2005) 
„friendly‟ 
„shareholder value‟ 
 
Target management were seeking the 
highest possible value for their 
shareholders. 
 
They were prepared to recommend 
which ever bid was best for 
shareholders. They switched their 
recommendation between offers twice 
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Contingent Factor 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
during the bidding process to do so.  
Information about 
Bidder 
„positive 
information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟ 
„financial‟, 
„management‟,  
„share price 
effect‟. 
 
No significant information emerges about the bidder 
independent of the bidding process. 
 
RIVAL highlighted concerns about nature of the bid; 
the ”significant paper element”, the “absence of a 
full cash alternative”. 
(RNS Statement, 28/4/2005) 
“negative information” 
 
 
 
„value of bid‟ 
„means of payment‟ 
 
Information about 
Target  
„positive 
information‟, 
„negative 
information‟, 
„commercial‟, 
„financial‟, 
„management‟, 
„share price 
effect‟. 
NONE   N/A 
Rival Bid „rival bid‟,  
„cash‟,  
„premium‟. 
 
MIC‟s bid was the second one on the table for 
target. MIC‟s bid was a share / cash offer. The 
RIVAL bid was a cash offer.  
 
MIC‟s initial bid was higher, and received 54.5% of 
acceptances from target‟s shareholders.  
 
„rival bid‟ 
„cash‟ 
„premium‟ 
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Contingent Factor 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
But, the RIVAL was able to come back with a higher 
cash price 7% higher. 
(RNS Statements between 28/4/2005 and 
5/5/2005) 
Competition 
Issues 
„competition 
problems‟, 
„referral to 
competition 
commission‟. 
 
NONE  
Nature of 
Abandonment 
„withdrawn‟, 
„lapse‟, 
„voluntary‟ 
involuntary‟. 
 
MIC admitted defeat, withdrawing its bid. Comment, 
“…it was not in shareholders‟ interests to raise its 
offer”. 
(RNS Statement, 5/5/2005) 
 
The rival bid succeeded.  
(RNS Statement, 13/5/2005) 
„lapse‟ 
„voluntary‟ 
 
Bidder had a price in mind and did not 
want to pay too much for the target -  
an opportunist bid. The conditions 
which gave rise to the opportunity no 
longer existed. So, it was prepared to 
walk away and look for other 
opportunities. 
 
Table g4: Post- Abandonment 
Dimension Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Strategic Changes „strategic review‟ 
„new direction‟, 
“Company reported strong earnings growth and 
significant investment in new products. The Group 
No strategic review. No change in 
strategy. 
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Dimension Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
„reorientation‟ 
 
has continued to evolve, with an increasing 
proportion of business derived from (MIC) software, 
particularly within the financial services sector.” 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
Management 
Changes 
„replacement‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
None 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
Asset Restructuring „disposals‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
 
„acquisition‟ 
„Growth‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
Substantial acquisitions in same year as abandoned 
bid equivalent to 10% of net assets.  
 
No acquisitions after that. Existing acquisitions 
integrated. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
„acquisitions‟ 
„growth‟ 
 
In line with growth strategy stated 
before the abandoned acquisition. 
 
 
Being Acquired „takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bids‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
None 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
Restructuring 
„borrowing‟ 
„borrowing‟ 
„dividends‟ 
„discipline‟ 
Company didn‟t pay a dividend before the 
abandoned bid. Continued policy of reinvestment of 
retaining earnings afterwards. 
(Company Annual Report) 
No significant change in debt. 
No dividends paid. 
 
Consistent with growth strategy. The 
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Dimension Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
„liquidity‟ 
„shareholder 
activism‟ 
 
 
firm reinvested earnings to finance 
future growth.  
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h) Case PTH 
 
Table h1: Bidder Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Age  „young‟ 
„mature‟ 
72 years old at time of bid. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
„mature‟ 
Property management company. 
Mature sector. 
Board Monitoring „strong‟ 
„weak‟ 
Proportion of NEDs 
on board greater 
than 50% 
Board size is 4. Proportion of NEDs on the board was 
50%. 
(Company Annual Report) 
 
„strong‟ 
Strong monitoring according to 
corporate governance theory.  
Ownership 
Structure 
„concentrated‟ 
„dispersed‟ 
„Non-institutional‟ 
„institutional‟ 
„blocks‟ 
 
No significant blocks of shares held by either by 
institutional and non-institutional shareholders. 
 
5% held by founding family member not on the board. 
 
(Company Annual Report) 
„dispersed‟ 
No outside blocks. Suggests weak 
monitoring. 
 
A non-institutional block related to 
the family of the chairman and chief 
executive.   
Managerial 
Incentives 
Significant 
proportion of 
shares owned by 
managers 
25% of share capital held by chairman / chief executive. 
 
Presentation and tone of company annual reports suggest 
ownership and control centred on chairman/chief 
executive. 
(Company Annual Report) 
High incentives for chairman. 
   
A strong-minded chairman, focused 
on profits, evidenced by statements 
in annual report.  
Acquisitiveness „acquisitiveness‟ 
„growth‟ 
Insignificant acquisitions equivalent to less than 1% of 
net assets. 
 
No codes revealed, consistent with 
disciplinary hypothesis. 
Low acquisitions in the pre-bid 
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High levels of capital and financial investment spending 
equivalent to 16.8% of net assets.  
(Company Annual Report) 
period. Low external growth. 
However, high organic investment. 
Strategy  Stated strategy from the annual accounts: 
“it is to make as much money (real profits) as possible, 
and grow the net assets of the Company with the capital 
we have available to us, always mindful of careful 
limitations on the risks involved.” 
(Company Annual Report) 
Some element of growth in the 
company‟s strategy, but a balance of 
risk and return.  
Performance  
„profitable‟ 
„not profitable‟ 
„free cash‟ 
Average ROCE in pre-bid period was 4%.  
Average free cash was -7% of net assets. 
(FAME Database, Company Annual Report) 
„profitable‟ 
 
Profitable with low free cash flow. 
Free cash flow committed to 
investment spending. 
 
Table h2: Transaction Characteristics  
Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Bid Rationale 
  
„synergy‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„related‟  
„unrelated‟ 
„managerial 
inefficiency‟ 
 
Made a bid for company in order to gain control of 
another Ltd company in which the target held a 29.34% 
stake. 
(Press Report, 24/11/2003) 
 
Part of a contest for corporate control. Bidder had 
brought forward a motion to dismiss the current directors 
of the Ltd company.  
(RNS Announcement, 24/10/2003) 
 
„synergy‟ 
„related‟ 
Company looking to gain control of 
assets. Tried a direct method 
through motion at AGM. Now, 
attempting an alternative route. 
 
 
„opportunism‟ 
An attempt to gain control of GROS.  
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Characteristic Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
The board had rebuffed the motive: 
“(The Bidder) is making an opportunistic attempt to 
secure control of the company without paying an 
appropriate premium.”    
(RNS Announcement, 24/10/2003) 
 
 
Means of Payment „cash‟ 
„debt‟ 
„equity‟ 
„share power‟ 
„uncertainty‟ 
 
A cash offer of 577p. 
(RNS Announcement, 24/10/2003)) 
„cash‟ 
„certainty‟ 
 
Cash bid is enticing for target 
shareholders because it provides 
certainty. 
 
Small bidder, with a concentrated 
ownership structure. Equity is not 
likely to be the currency used in 
such transactions - could lead to a 
dilution of existing shareholders‟ 
position in the firm. Hence, they 
would prefer to use cash instead.  
Merger or 
Acquisition 
„recommended‟ 
„unrecommended‟ 
 
Unsolicited bid. 
(RNS Statement, 20/10/2003) 
 
„unrecommended‟ 
 
Hostile bid. 
 
Conditions „standard‟ 
„non-standard‟ 
No documents posted  
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Table h3: Contingent Factors in the Bidding Process  
Contingent Factor 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Valuation „fair value‟, 
„undervaluation‟, 
„opportunistic‟,  
„means of payment‟, 
„premium‟. 
 
Initial bid was rejected. 
 
But, increased offer from 735p from 577p.  
Once this happened, bid was recommended by 
board of Target. 
(RNS Announcement, 19/11/2003) 
„undervaluation‟ 
„fair value‟ 
 
Initially, the Target stated that the bid 
undervalued the Target. The higher offer 
was recommended, so it was considered a 
fair value.  
Target 
Management 
Reaction 
„friendly‟,  
„hostile‟,  
„shareholder value‟, 
„management 
entrenchment‟. 
 
Initially hostile. However, once bid was raised, 
the target management recommended offer. 
(RNS Statements between 20/10/2003 and 
1/12/2003) 
„hostile‟ 
„shareholder value‟ 
 
The management‟s response to higher bid 
suggests they were interested in 
maximising shareholder value.   
Information 
about Bidder 
„positive information‟, 
„negative information‟, 
„commercial‟ 
„financial‟, 
„management‟,  
„share price effect‟. 
None  
Information 
about Target  
„positive information‟, 
„negative information‟, 
„commercial‟, 
„financial‟, 
„management‟, 
„share price effect‟. 
None N/A 
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Contingent Factor 
 
Codes Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Rival Bid „rival bid‟,  
„cash‟,  
„premium‟. 
 
A rival bid emerged. An MBO financed with 
private equity. The bid was at 760p per share. 
 
Given the target managers‟ substantial stake 
in company, the offer was immediately 
declared unconditional. 
(RNS Statement, 1/12/2003) 
„rival bid‟ 
 
Competitive Bid. Stimulated by PTH‟s bid 
to make bid themselves and keep control 
of the company.  
Competition 
Issues 
„competition 
problems‟, „referral to 
competition 
commission‟. 
 
No competition issues. N/A 
Nature of 
Abandonment 
„withdrawn‟, 
„lapse‟, 
„voluntary‟ 
„involuntary‟. 
 
Rival offer immediately declared unconditional. 
(RNS Statement, 1/12/2003) 
„withdrawn‟ 
 
PTH never made a rule 2.5 
announcement, so didn‟t post documents. 
Withdrew their bid one Rival emerged.  
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Table h4: Post- Abandonment 
Dimension Concept Evidence Revealed Codes and Comments 
Strategic Changes „strategic review‟ 
„new direction‟, „reorientation‟ 
 
No evidence of strategic change. 
 
 
 
Management 
Changes 
„replacement‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder activism‟ 
No management changes.  
 
Asset Restructuring „disposals‟ 
„consolidation‟ 
„acquisition‟ 
„Growth‟ 
„shareholder activism‟ 
Bids made. None successful.  
(Company Annual Reports and author‟s 
calculations) 
No substantial acquisitions or disposals. 
No evidence of governance. 
Being Acquired „takeover talks‟ 
„takeover bids‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„shareholder activism 
None  
 
 
 
 
Financial 
Restructuring 
„borrowing‟ 
„borrowing‟ 
„dividends‟ 
„discipline‟ 
„liquidity‟ 
„shareholder activism‟ 
 
Substantial decline in gearing. 
69.2 percentage point decline from 
pre-abandonment level.  
(Company Annual Reports and author‟s 
calculations) 
 
 
Low borrowing.  
 
Inconsistent with corporate governance 
literature. Not evidence of a governance 
process. 
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